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The present work is a study of the theory of inter-state re­
lations in Northern India from c. A.D. 800 to 1200.
Chapter X deals with the nature, scope, and source materials of 
the present enquiry and points out that the traditional theory of 
inter-state relations is interpreted and re-stated by our Sanskrit 
authorities•
In Chapter II we consider the concept of the state and maintain 
that a state comprising seven constituent, elements, indicating its 
sovereignty and power, is the subject of the theory of inter-state 
relations and that feudatories are ignored. It is also shorn that 
sovereignty is a relative concept in the inter-state sphere, and 
states are classified on the basis of power, independence, payment 
of tribute, and political allegiance.
Chapter III explains that the theory of inter-state relations 
is a corollary of the concept of the state, and it is based on the 
assumption of conflict of power and ambition for political supremacy 
among states. After a brief introduction to the development of the 
three concepts of inter-state relations, viz. man&ala (circle of 
states), gaflguflya (sixfold policy), and upayas (political expedients), 
we discuss the manual a system, which outlines a hypothetical pattern 
of inter-state relations based on the principles of geo-politics and 
power-politics. It provides a framework for the conduct of relations 
of a king desirous of conquest and supremacy over others.
Chapters I? to VII deal with the various aspects of the sixfold 
policy. We have attempted to define and analyse the policies of 
peace,war, inarching, staying quiet, dual policy and seeking shelter 
and have pointed out that each one of them is an instrument of the 
politico-military strategy for overcoming enemies during vicissitudes 
of power. It has been shown that all six policies are concerned with 
hostile relations and asana (staying quiet) is not 'neutrality1, as 
some modern; scholars contend.
Chapter VIII deals with the political expedients and analyses 
their contents. It shows that the means of diplomacy and war are 
comprehensive for attaining success in inter-state relations.
It is pointed out in conclusion that the dominant theme of the 
theory of inter-state relations as well as the dynastic history of 
our period is conflict of power and struggle for supremacy, which 
indicates the impact of political idea's on inter-dynastic relations.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The period with which the present study is concerned, that is 
from c. AoDo 800 to 1200, occupies a position of great importance in 
Indian history* It is of great political and cultural interest as it 
witnessed a great upsurge of dynasties whose records reveal a 
persistent struggle for power and significant developments in the 
fields of Sanskrit literature, historiography, architecture, 
iconography, and religion.. The comparatively rich source material 
for the history of this period shows the full development, the 
maturity, and the beginning of the decay of the institutions of 
Classical India.. The period also marks the end of Hindu sovereignty 
in Northern India and ushers in an era of Muslim rule*
This period has, however, only recently been a subject of 
historical research* Scholars, focussing their attention mainly on 
political history, have produced several monographs dealing with the 
history and culture of the various regional dynasties which ruled in 
North India* These monographs, learned as they are, do not enquire 
into the political thought and problems of inter-state relations nor 
do they give an integrated account of the history of this period* 
While presenting authentic accounts of inter-dynastic relations, they
do not reflect any knowledge of the principles and precepts of the inter­
state intercourse which influenced the thought and activity of kings 
in the conduct of their foreign relations, much less discuss them*
A recent work on the period, the fourth and fifth volumes of 
the History and Culture of the Indian People, prepared by eminent 
Indologists, though seeking to present the political history in a 
chronological order and dynastic sequence, fails to underline, or even 
to investigate, the ideological background to the inter-state 
relationships of the period generally summed up as rendemic warfare1*
Its two chapters on political theory and institutions, one in each of 
the fourth and fifth volumes, take some notice of the institution of 
kingship, especially the basis of political authority and the grounds 
of political obligation, but they hardly do justice to the bulk of 
material bearing on polity during this period* Even in these sections 
no cognizance has been taken of the theory and practice of inter-state 
relations despite the fact that most of the treatises on polity of 
this period deal with the subject* In fact, political thought and 
institutions of this period in general, and the theory and practice of 
inter-state relations in particular, have been neglected because scholars 
have been satisfied with the study of earlier authorities such as 
Kautilya and Manu and probably considered those who followed lacking 
in originality, hence of not much value* However, a general 
description of several aspects of the political thought of this period 
has been given by II. N. Ghoshal in his excellent work A History of 
Indian Political Ideas* Another recent study, Kingship in Northern
3
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India AaD® 600 - 1200 by R® Co P® Singh enquires into the various 
aspects of kingship but treats the theory of inter-state relations in 
a single chapter mainly based upon the Kamandakiya Nitisara®
Further, a few modern works devoted to the study of the theory 
of inter-state relations and diplomatic practices in ancient India on 
the basis of sources earlier than our period suffer from many drawbacks• 
The first monograph, Inter-state Relations in Ancient India pt„ I 
(Calcutta 1920) by Narendra Nath law deals with the concepts of 
mandala (Indian inter-state system) and of sadgunya (sixfold foreign 
policy) of which only one type of policy, viz,® sandhi (treaty or peace) 
is studied in some detail® It omits the concept of upayas altogether, 
which, it seems, was to be dealt with along with the remaining five 
forms of the sixfold policy in the second part of this book as planned 
by the author, which, however, never appeared-* This study mainly based 
on the Arthasastra is incomplete besides containing doubtful 
interpretations, which are noted in this thesis at the proper places®
The second monograph, Les theories diplomatiques de 1 ’Inde
'"■** —  * —  m i l^iiiifcni !■ i nii 1 1 i n Triii iw mu 1 nr inlnVT i r 'in  " "*' " ' — ~~ —*  ..." ' ..... .
2
ancienne et 1 1Arthasastra by Kalidas Nag, (Paris, 1923) gives an 
account of the traditional background of theories of diplomacy on the 
basis of Vedic literature, sutras, dharmasastras and the epics and
gives a general outline of Kautilyan diplomacy® Dr® Nag points to the
prakrtis (i®e® seven constituents) of the state as the basis of 
diplomacy; outlines the concept of mandala, which he calls ’sphere of
1® Thesis, University of London, 1957® (to be published by Motilal 
Banarasidass, Delhi)®
2® Trans® by V® R® R® Dikshitar, ’The Diplomatic Theories of Ancient
India and the Arthasastra1 in Journal of Indian History® Vols® V-VI, 
1926-27®
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action*; mentions upayas, and discusses sadgunya in some detail. He, 
however, merely reproduces the relevant sections of the Arthasastra, 
especially from its Books VI and VII. He does not make any critical 
study of the subject matter, much less does he illustrate various 
theories and principles by reference to historical events.
The third monograph, International Law, in Ancient India 
(Madras, 1925)* by Mr. S. V. Viswanath&is entirely new in its approach 
to the theory and practice of inter-state relations in Ancient India. 
Viswanathadealt with the usages and conventions which regulated 
intercourse among ancient Indian kings according to the familiar 
categories of modern international, law, viz., war, peace, neutrality, 
and diplomacy or diplomatic agents. He made an excellent job of the 
source material up to the fifth century A.D. in presenting the ideas 
and principles of inter-state relations, but in his desire to 
demonstrate the prevalence of some sort of international law in ancient 
India he concentrated on sadgunya (sixfold foreign policy), its various 
implications£01: international law in ancient times, and diplomatic 
agents instead of presenting a full and critical study of the concepts 
of mandala and ' upayas* His study, though very useful, does not, 
however, establish the complete theory of inter-state relations nor 
does it refer to historical events to illustrate its conclusions.
V. R. R. Dikshitar, also dealt with the theory of inter-state 
relations in two chapters of his book War in Ancient India (Madras, 
19^8). Like Law and Nag, he also did not utilize the source-material
of our period nor give the subject a thorough treatment. In his
5
conclusions he is greatly influenced by Law and Nag. However.,his 
discussion of the role of diplomatic agents is thorough, though 
mainly based on the Arthasastra. He often quotes from a late work 
Sivatatvaratnakara but if he^compared it with the Manasollasa he would 
have instantly realized that the former reproduces the latter on the 
topics of the subdivisions of sadgunya and upayas, which Dikshitar 
thinks are the evidence of the development of political ideas until 
quite late in Indian history.
In the last decade two more works have been published, viz.,
B. A. Saletorefs India*s Diplomatic Relations with the West (Bombay,
1958) and H. L. Ghatterjee’s International Law and Inter-state
<?
Relations in Ancient India (Cal. 195S). Saletore briefly describes 
the theory of inter-state relations and diplomacy in one chapter of 
his book, but he does not accomplish much by way of critical examination.
In fact; in the elucidation of the concept of mandala, he not only commits 
the blunder of assuming Kautilyafs version of the mandala dependent on 
Manu’s but also overlooks the fact that Kautilya himself gives two 
versions of mandala and does not favour the simpler one found in the 
Manusmrti0 but another* which he himself perfected and which he made the 
basis of the exposition of the sixfold polioy. Besides shortcomings 
like this, Saletore seldom utilizes sources of our period; for the 
discussion of the theory of inter-state relations. He^however, 
some useful observations on the diplomatic agents (duta) for which he 
has utilized later sources, especially the Kamandaklya Nxtisara and 
the Agni Purana.
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H. L. Chatterjee's work closely follows the pattern set by 
Viswanath like whom he applies the modern categories of international 
law to the study of ancient Indian thought and practices on different 
topics of inter-state intercourse. But like his predecessor,
Ghatter jee omits a full and critical study of the concepts of mandala
and upayas. His study is primarily based on the Ka&tilXya Arthasastra,
the Manusmrti, the Yajnavalkyasmrti, the Epics, and the Kamandakiya 
Nltisara with occasional references to a few other sources. In 
presenting fthe speculations of the ancient Hindus on War, Peace, 
Diplomacy and Neutrality*, he scarcely tries to illustrate the 
theoretical formulations from history/and when he does so^he relies 
on examples from the Epics and legends rather than historical instances.
In addition to these special studies, sections on the theory of 
inter-state relations are found in many books on ancient Indian polity. 
But these are far from thorough and critical studies because of the 
limitations of the works,, of which they form a part.
Thus, despite all that has so far been written on inter-state 
relations in ancient India, three prominent shortcomings are evident, 
firstly, the investigations have been largely confined to the sources 
before A.D. 800; secondly, the three concepts of inter-state relations 
have not been thoroughly and critically treated as a whole to bring 
out their full significance; and thirdly, the theoretical formulations 
have hardly ever been illustrated by well attested historical 
instances. In addition to these there are many lopsided interpretations
7
and unfounded conclusions. We have made an attempt to fulfil the 
first want, to accomplish the second, and to remove the last defect 
in the present study. We have also avoided the temptation of 
applying modern categories of international law to the ancient 
Indian principles of inter-state relations, but rather have followed 
our ancient authorities according to their own categories. Heading 
the present into the past is unhistorical and only creates confusion 
and misconception.
The importance of the subject for this period can hardly be 
over emphasized, as it stands out as a well-marked epoch in which the 
struggle for empire in Northern India continued unabated. This struggle 
for hegemony became fierce towards the closing decades of the 8th 
century A.D. At this time there were two claimants for the over lordship 
of the North, the Palas of Bengal and the Pratiharas of Avanti. The 
latter fought their way to Kanauj where they succeeded in establishing 
their seat of power in about 815 A.D. The Pratihara kings had not 
only to confront the Palas of Bengal but also the Hastrakutas of the 
Deccan who had been their inveterate enemies since their rise to 
political prominence in the middle of 8th century. It seems that 
the Pratiharas had aimed at becoming a North Indian power and wanted,
like Harsavardhana,to set up a unified TJttarapatha in response to 
the challenge of the EastrakujtaSj who had assumed the mantle of the 
CarJukyas, the lords of Daksinapatha. The conflict for supremacy 
assumed a tripartite character from the closing decades of the 
8th century. But one strikingly prominent feature in inter-state
politics is the bi-partit© character of wars, for it has not been 
conclusively established that the Pratiharas ever fought against a 
combined force of the Palas and the Rastrakutas, although there exists 
a strong possibility that the Palas derived comfort at the periodic 
shake-up of the Pratihara power by the Hastrakutas and improved 
their status in inter-state relations thereby. As their records 
reveal, the Pratiharas, the P&las, and the Hastrakutas fought 
intermittently until their strength gave out towards the middle of 
the tenth century A.D. Despite their chequered ascendancy, the 
Pratiharas succeeded in establishing their hegemony over major parts 
of Northern India and their empire under Bhoja and Mahendrapala 
embraced territories as widely apart as RajpUtana, eastern Punjab, 
Gorakhpur region, North Bengal, Bundelkhand, Ujjain, and Saurastra.
The decline of the Pratiharas began in about the middle of the 10th 
century A.D. The fissip&rous tendencies ready to operate in such 
circumstances worked rapidly until the division of the Kanauj empire 
into several inde/pendent powers was accomplished.
The second sub-period (A.D. 1000-1200) is marked by the
emergence of erstwhile feudatories and small powers, owing nominal 
allegiance to imperial houses>into independent states. Among these
the Candellas of Jejakabhukti, the Cedis of Bahala, the Paramras 
of Malwa, the Caulukyas of Anhilavada, the Cahamanas of Sakambharl 
were most noteworthy. In addition, dynasties like the Gahadavalas 
of Varanasi and Kanauj and the Senas of Bengal came into prominence 
some time later. The Sahis of Kabul and later of Udbhandapur
became conspicuous in the arena of North Indiaupolitics owing to 
their defensive^ but all the more heroic warfare; with the Muslims of 
the north-west* To these Hindu kingdoms may be added the Muslim 
principalities particularly of Ghazni and Ghor. Unmindful of the 
rising Muslim power in the north-west the Hindu ruling dynasties 
incessantly fought among themselves for supremacy and empire. The 
struggle became serious on the entry of the Sultans of Ghazni and 
Ghor into North Indian inter-state rivalry. Owing to the number of 
ambitious kings, who sought wealth and expansion of their power by 
encroaching upon others, the problem of the defence of a kingdom 
against its aggressors became acute. Political isolation as a 
measure of defence was neither possible nor was it traditional as far 
as the kingdoms within the geo-political bounds of the Indian sub­
continent were concerned. This is not to say that all kingdoms were 
involved in conflict with every other, but that each major one was 
engaged with a few others in political relationship evident from 
historical sources. The conflict for power was naturally made more 
intense by the Ghaznavid and Ghor id incursions during our period.
Theoretically the importance of inter-state relations is set
in clear terms by our authorities. The Nitisastra (science of
politics) is divided into two aspects as it concerns the activities
of a king relating to the protection of his own kingdom and those
1
to the acquisition of the territory belonging to others.
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Somadeva, appropriating Kautilya, postulates that the well-being of a 
state depends on the wise application of the sixfold foreign policy 
(sadgunya), for, what results from it is the advancement, stability 
■:qjp“ decline of a state, which is measured in terms of the threefold 
power (of intelligence or statesmanship, of might, and of energy) and
'I
the threefold success (siddhi) in these spheres. Medhatithi also 
expresses the importance of the subject by exemplifying the visible
2acts 'of the king*, virtually constituting Bajadharma, by sadgunya.
He further comments that the 'highest success1 (siddhis/ca parama) 
that a king may attain to, means 'success in the form of undisputed 
sovereignty (ekadhipatya) which accrues to a vijiglsu*. Thus he sets 
out the goal of the king, which is the attainment of paramountcy and 
explains the importance of foreign policy, which has to be decided 
and applied after special deliberation. Further, the subjects of 
mandala (Inter-state system), sadgunya (sixfold policy) and upayas 
( mean© of policy) are introduced in the smrtis and pur anas
as important . concerns in the daily routine of the king, which 
implies that foreign relations were important. It will be
evident in the following pages that the theoretical disquisitions on 
inter-state relations emphasize the conflict of power and struggle for
supremacy in the inter-state sphere. The ' objectives of
foreign policy are security, prosperity, and political hegemony which 
can be realized by the promotion of one's own economic and military
1. Ibid., XXIX.t36ff; cf. KA, VI. 2.
2. On Manu, VII. 1.
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resources and by the acquisition of pothers7 wealth. The principal 
means to realize the ambition of conquest and hegemony are 
conciliation, gifts, concession or bribery, sowing dissension among 
enemies, and force. The success of a king in foreign affairs is said 
to depend on his knowledge of the science of politics in general and 
the wise application of sadgunya and the intelligent employment of 
upayas in particular^ as by good policy (naya) he can not only foil 
the attempts of his enemies to harm him and maintain a favourable 
balance of power among kings,, but also realize his ambition of 
paramountcy. It may be pointed out that the theoretical importance 
of foreign affairs is in accordance with the historical experience 
of our period characterized by the inter-dynastic struggle for 
hegemony. It will be our purpose to study the theory of inter-state 
relations in the context of history in order to show the ideas and 
principles which influenced the struggle for hegemony, and enquire 
into the correspondence between theory and practice.
The period between c. A.D. 800 and 1200 is generally regarded 
as an era of great commentaries and digests in the history of ancient 
Indian political ideas and jurisprudence. Since among the extant 
published smrti commentaries., which incorporate sections on polity 
especially dealing with the theory of inter-state relations9are 
datable about or after . A.D. 800 we have considered it a 
convenient date for the delimitation of the field of the present
1. See below p.
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enquiry which extends up to A.D. 1200 when the Hindu sovereignty in 
Northern India had come to an end.
* * + *
The source material is somewhat complex in nature. There are 
commentaries on the Manusrarti and the Tajnavalkyasmrti, and the 
Puranas which have sections on Ranadharma, a term which covers ’law, 
governmental policy, statecraft and politics under the somewhat 
misleading expression ’duties of the King'; smyti digests, 
especially the Krtyakalpataru which has a separate section on 
Ranadharma: and several independent treatises on polity (ftrfei) like
the Nitivakyamrta and the Laghvarhanniti. In addition to such
primary sources, there is a hulk of literary and epigraphic source 
material which in some way or other throws light on the prevalence and 
popularity of the principles of inter-state relations and precepts on 
statecraft. Incidental information may also he gathered from the 
Muslim accounts which mention Indian usages and observances 
concerning war, destruction, booty, settlement of conquered kingdoms, 
and the practice of sending envoys and messengers to the opponent for 
demanding submission before taking recourse to battle as well as the 
trust that Hindu kings reposed in promise, truce or agreement. As it 
will cover much space even to mention briefly the variety of literary 
and epigraphic sources utilized in this study, only some of the 
important ones, especially the texts bearing directly on our subject
13
can be discussed*
Before we commence our discussion of the primary source 
material, it may be observed that it consists of two classes of 
literature on polity, viz* (a) dharma^astra and (b) nitisara or 
arthasastra* Without undertaking an exhaustive discussion of their 
relative authority, it may be concluded with Prof* K. V* Rangaswami 
Aiyangar that by and large the rules of the farmer were mandatory
'I
and those of the latter commendatory. However, it will be evident 
from the following pages that with slight differences both the 
dharmsastra and nitisara approach to the problems of inter-state 
relations and their precepts on inter-state politics tend to concur 
rather than to conflict with each other* This is due mostly to the 
fact that the celebrated smrtis of Manu and Yajnavalkya used 
arthasastra material and a dotted- its technique at least in the 
exposition of the theory of inter-state relations* Their dependence 
021 arthasastra works is evident from the actual use of terms as 
mandala, sadgunya and upaya, parsnigraha, and akranda which cannot be 
properly understood without a reference^ such works* The brevity of 
Manu and Yajnavalkya demanded some kind of commentary from the very 
beginning, especially in the sections on Ra.jadharma in general and
the passages concerning inter-state relations in particular. Their 
commentators would therefore be justified in turning to arthasastra 
and nitisara authorities for the elucidation and supplementation 
(wherever necessary) of their texts. But, as Prof* J. D. M. Derrett 
rightly observes, ’In view of the dichotomy of the sastras a certain
1* RDK, Preface, p. vi.
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1self-consciousness would be expected1, which accounts for the rare
reference to arthasastra itself. However, these commentators have
extensively drawn upon the arthasastra and the nitisara works to
which they are closer on issues of inter-state relations than the
smrtis. The Pur anas also assimilated the ideas on inter-state
relations found in the technical works on polity and the Agni Pur ana,
as we will see below, even appropriated the relevant verses from the
Kamandaklya Nitisara on all the three concepts of inter-state
2relations, viz. the mandala, s&dgunya, and upaya $, Thus, the 
dharmasastra and the arthasastra or nitisara approach to the foreign 
affairs of a state is^by and large,similar and the dependence of the 
former on the latter is accentuated by the borrowings of the 
commentators and later Puranas.
Another point to be made at the outset concerns certain texts 
utilised in this thesis which were written much earlier than our 
period. The first category includes the smrtis particularly those 
of Manu and Tajnavalkya, which were extensively commented upon during 
our period. Although we have primarily concentrated on their 
commentaries, nevertheless^we have had to appropriate more often than 
not the texts themselvesfbecause sometimes the comments are sparing 
when verses are self-explanatory or inexplicable without a reference 
to the text itself. Furthermore, the Manusmrti and the Yajnavalkyasmrti
enjoyed great popularity in northern India as authoritative treatises
1 • See below p. I*7 « 1 .
2. See below, pp. 30-31,
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laying down the principles of government and politics and were as 
valid in our period as when they were written. This is borne out 
by all the verses concerning the theory of inter-state relations being 
reproduced in the Hajadharraakahda, a work of our period, and by their 
being paraphrased or plagiarized by others such as Hemacandra.
Other smptis appearing in the body of this thesis as also the 
dharmasutras and the Epics are used where these are cited by the 
smrti commentators and the digest compilers. The second category 
includes the Kamandaklya Nitisara and the Kautiliya Arthasastra, which 
are constantly consulted for making comparisons or checking the 
deviations in later works. These are referred to the foot­
notes unless reproduced partly or wholly in the works of our period.
The references to the Kamandaklya in the body of the thesis are 
rather frequent as it is profusely appropriated by the Agni Pur ana 
and quoted occasionally by the Yuktikalpataru without acknowledgement.
Commentaries on the Manusmrti
Manubhasya of MedheT tithi
Among the extant published commentaries on Manu, the
1 _
Manubhasya of Medhatithi occupies the foremost place. Medhatithi,
a great scholar of dharmasastra as well as arthasastra literature, is
° *  2 assigned to the period between^ A.D. v 825 and 900. He was a northerner
1. J. D. M. Derrett announces the preparation of the edition and
translation of Bharucin*s 1 Manusas tra-Vivarana», an early 
commentary on Manu, to be published by the Centre du sud-est 
asiatique, University of Brussels. Z.D.M.G. Pt X. P* 137f£*
2. HDS,2p. 273*
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and probably a Kashmiri.
The commentary on the Ra.jadharma section of the smrti which 
includes the theory of inter-state relations is scholarly, exhaustive, 
and illuminating. In order to give correct interpretations and 
cogent elucidations Medhatithi not only cites numerous smrti writers 
like Gautama, A'pastamba, Yajnavalkya, Vfenu, Vyasa, Narada,
Katyayana and others, but also several arthasastra authorities such
✓ 2 as Brhaspati and Usanas, and he^mentions Canakya. There is, however,
a controversy among modern scholars on the exact source or sources
of arthasastra material in the Manubhasya^especially in Book VII.
On the grounds that Medhatithi knew about a samanatantra (an
obtrusively anonymous source) and quotes the Adhyaksapracara, a
section of the present Kautillya Arthasastra, it has been suggested
that Medhatithi drew upon the Kautillya.^ Recently Frof . J. D. M.
Derrett has shown that the arthasastra material of the Manubhasya
is derived from Bharuci’s Vivarana, an early commentary on Manu, which
draws upon the Kaj&tiliya Arthasastra without acknowledgement; a
copy of an anonymous work, which was essentially an excerpt from the
1. Ibid., I. pp* 269ff; Btihler, Laws of Manu, Intr. p. cxxiii.
2. HDS, I. p. 270.
3. Jolly*s ed. Kautillya, Intr. p. 11. Jolly found that Medh.
used Kautilya at vii. 61 and 81 where Adhyaksapracara
(KA Bk. II) is referred and also at VII. 35* 5k*, 10k without 
acknowledgement. Kane, (HDS, I. p. 270) found that Medh. 
used Kautilya at VII, 5k, lk8, 15k. See also VII. 160; of.
KA, VII. *1. 20; Further Medh, on Manu, VII. 191 quotes a 
verse as from *samantantroktam1 which is the same as KA,
X. 5. 50.
Arthasastra, and the Adhyaksapracara section of the Arthasastra
_ ■     ^
probably passing under an independent title, besides the iirorks of 
Brhaspati and Usanas, Medhatithi*s failure to name the Kautiliya 
Arthasastra is due to the fact that neither Bharuci, whom 
Medhatithi closely follows, named his Arthasastra source, nor did
Medhatithi possess a complete copy of the Arthasastra under the name
2 3of Kautilya, But another recent writer, Dieter Schlingloff,
contends that both Medhatithi and Kautilya drew upon an early common
Arthasastra treatise and that the former did not draw upon the
Arthasastra as we now have it* But, Medhatithi mentions Canakya
as an authority on the science of politics (dandaniti), which
may indicate his inclination to utilise this famous work
rather than an earlier arthasastra treatise, Schlingloff*s
view cannot, therefore, be upheld until the discovery of such a
hypothetical common source of both Medhatithi and Kautilya, It
may be further pointed out that this conclusion is drawn upon a
comparison of parallel passages in the two works which are close in
phraseology but rarely identical. The assumption of Schlingloff is,
of course, that Medhatithi would have quoted Kautilya verbatim, if
1, I, Do Mo Derrett, fA newly discovered contact between
Arthasastra and Dharmasastras the Role of Bharucin’in Z0DoM*G« 
Band 113 - Heft 1, 1963* pp. 137 ff.
2o Ibid,
3* Von Dieter Schlingloff% *Arthasastra-Studien* in Wiener
Zeitschrift fttr die Ktmcte Sud-und Ostasiens, Band IX, 19 (>5j 
Po Iff,
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indeed it was this work he was drawing upon. But this assumption is 
unwarranted; while a passage from sruti or smrti is generally quoted 
verbatim, the tendency is to paraphrase, rather than, to quote, works 
outside these categories, often without ascription®
Medhatithifs comments on Manufs verses dealing with the 
concepts of inter-state relations are most valuable.* He does not 
merely e:xp>lain the verses, of which he sometimes gives different 
readings and variant interpretations, but also elucidates and 
supplements them with rich arthasastra material so that the terse 
smrti contents become comprehensible both in their meaning and 
implication® He also brings political principles up to date by 
introducing in his comments certain prevailing ideas and practices, 
as for instance, the terms of agreement between the conqueror and a 
newly installed tributary king in an occupied kingdom, \tfhich outline 
the nature of relationship between overffLord and vassal®
Manutika of Govindaraja (c» 1030-1080).
The next commentary on Manu is the Manutika of Govindaraja®
Its author claims to have received the eastras of Manu in an unbroken
2
tradition of pupil' and teacher . Prom his statement that the
1 „ On Manu, vii. 202.
2. Manutika, Verse i.
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ffleccha countries like Andhra and such others were unfit for performing
1sacrifices, it is plausible to infer that he was a northerner.
Both Jolly and Biihler assigned Govindaraja to the 12th and 13th
2century, but P. V. Kane convincingly shows that •... the period of 
Govindaraja is between 1030 /to 1100 or 11^0 A.D. * He further says, 
•Govindaraja will have to be pushed back between 1050 „— ; 1080 if
Jimutavahana flourished between 1090 t© 1140 A.D. as is held by
33many.
The Manutika is a very concise and complete paraphrase of 
Manu*s text. In the opinion of Biihler it is an abstract of Medhatithi*s 
commentary 1 from which Govindaraja appropriated whatever seemed to 
him most valuable.* Govindaraja has not only discarded many of 
Medhatithi*s alternative explanations and controversial disquisitions 
but also added interpretations to those words of Manu left without 
comment by his predecessors. In these he sometimes expresses 
original opinions, although these made him an object of ridicule for
his successor Kulluka. Notwithstanding his indebtedness to early
the.
commentators on Manu and^numerous smrti writers he quotes,
Govindaraja is clear and refreshing in his interpretations and 
elucidations of Manu*s verses bearing on inter-state relations. We 
may mention in particular his explanation of Manu, VII. 136
1. On Manu, II. 23*
2. EDS, I. pp. 313-313.
3. Ibid., I. p. 315.
8 ifh le .r j o f i . c t t . , In tro , p* Q ix v ii i
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describing the eight constituents of mandala besides the vijigisu,
ari, madhyama and udasina, where,unlike Medhatithi,he follows the
— 1 nitisara version of the composition of the mandala. Further he
appropriates Kamandaka in verse 167 to explain that dvaidhibhava also
means duplicity. His knowledge of the nitisara works is further shown
by his clear comments on verse 206 stating that if the enemy is
willing to make an alliance, to pay tribute, and to cede some
territory, the vijiglsu may also make peace with him without actually
fighting and may return home. The later commentators Narayana and
Kulluka accepted Govindaraja's explanations. Thus Govindaraja is
not without scholarship as alleged by Kulluka. His is the best and
most complete explanation of Manu's text which helps the student to
understand the text and also to find his way through the tangled
mesh of the Manubhasya.
The ManTviarthavivrti of Sarvajna Narayana
The Manfvarthavivrti was written by Sarvajna Narayana with the
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  ^
avowed intention of superseding the works of his predecessors.
1. All the commentators except Medh. used the Kamandakiya 
Nitisara or some prose work of the same school to elucidate 
Manu, VII. 135-36 and other verses. See
Biihler, op. cit., fn. to verse. 156; J* Jolly,
Arthasastra und Dharmasastra, Z.D.M.G., L xvii. (1913* PP* 9-96.) P«96.
2. On Manu, I. 119*
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Narayana was, as ha himself tells us, well-versed not only in the 
sacred laws hut also in various other sastras.^ His other works on 
dharma, the Kamadhenudipaka and the Suddhidlpaka are also known. ^
His place of origin is unknown hut from the slender evidence of his 
examples of rivers and mountains for which he mentions the Ganges 
and the Himalayas it is inferred that he was a northerner*
Biihler concludes that ,..* Narayana cannot have written later than in 
the last half of the fourteenth century. Possibly he may be somewhat
. Ij,
•. omer.1 But P. V. Kane rightly thinks that Narayana flourished
between A.D. 1100-1300 as kulltSka (who is certainly later,composed 
his work about A.D. 1250 and flourished before A*D. 1300.^
The Man^varthavivrti is not a running commentary but confines 
itself to the elucidation of difficult passages.of the Manusmrti. In 
his anxiety to offer explanations different from Medhatithi and 
Govindaraja, Narayana sometimes accepts the views rejected by 
Medhatithi; but more often than not his explanations are his own or 
taken from earlier commentaries not accessible to us. As far as the 
verses relating to the theory of inter-state relations are concerned 
Narayana does not generally differ from Medhatithi and Govindaraja 
and in several cases where he doeSjas for instance in Book VII, verse 167,
1. Ibid., I. 1 anekasakhasmrtiparadarsl.
2. Ibid., V. 56, 80, 10^, XI. 72.
3. Ibid., III. 9-
if. Biihler, op* cit., p. cxxix.
5. Ibid.
6. HDS, I. pp. 157, 362-3.
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his explanations seem rather out of context and meaningless*
The Man^varthamuktavalx of Kullukabhatta
The Man^^thamuktavalx is the last among the commentaries on 
Manui which, although somewhat later than our period, has been 
utilized by us. Its author Kulluka came of a Varendra Brahmanam
p
family of Ganda (Bengal) and was the son of Bhatta Divakara.
Kulluka composed it in Kashi in the company of pandits there.^
ji,
Biihler held that he probably lived in the fifteenth century. But
Kane convincingly argues that Kulluka flourished before A.D. 1300
•5and wrote his work about A.D. 1250.
The Maii^vai:thamuktavali is concise, lucid, and to the point.
Il£
Kulluka made extensive use of Medhatithi, whom he abridged., and^  also
plagiarized Govindaraja. Despite the claims of Kulluka himself that
he has elucidated the text in a manner not done before and adduced
6explanations not found elsewhere, and the high praise given to his
splendid achievements by Sir William Jones, Jolly and Biihler are
right in criticizing him for offering an improved version of Manutika
—
and copying its portions verbatim. Kane also thinks that Kulluka
1. See also On Manu VII. 15^* Narayanaf s explanation of pancavarga.
2. Kulldka on Manu, I. 1.
3* Ibid.
if. Op cit*, p. cxxxi.
3. EDS, I. 363.
6. Kull,«. on Manu, p. 265, XII. 126*
7. Jolly, J. Tagore Law Lectures, p. 10. BUhler, op. cit., Intr. 
p. cxxxi.
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1
is not quite original* However, Kalluka is not without interest as 
his interpretations are narked by clarity, boldness and independence, 
if not originality.
Commentaries on the Yajhavalkyasmrti.
She principal commentaries on the Ya jnavalkyasmrti belonging to 
our period are three: the Balakrlda of Visvarupa, who flourished
about A.D. 800-825; the Hju Mitaksara (generally referred as the 
Mitaksara) composed by Vijhanesvara, between A.D. * , 1070 and 1100; 
and the Apararka-Ya.inavalkya-dharmasas tra~ nibandha written by 
Apararka or Aparadityadeva, a Silahara prince of Konkana (A.D. 1115-30) 
probably after 1126 A.D. Of these three commentaries9especially on 
the Ra.jadharma section of the smrti, it can be said that the first 
one is concise and illuminating, although not complete; the second is 
thorough, exhaustive, and voluminous, and at the same time most 
learned; and the*,third like the second, is really in the nature of a 
digest and far more voluminous than it, but not so original or 
influential. It can further be pointed out that the commentators 
were well read in the dharmasastras and were also aware of the 
arthausastra literature. The latter influenced their explanation^f 
the text pertaining to the principles of inter-state relations. While
1. HDS, Lp,353,
2* HPQ« I. p. £6^.
3. Ibid., p. 290; The Struggle for Empire, p. 333 - refers to
Rangaswami Aiyangar1 s view that the Mitaksara was composed 
between A.D. 1118 and 1127, possibly in 1126.
k .  Ibid., pp. 328, 332-333; : G- Yazdani (ed.) The Early History,
of the Deccan, (Oxford, i960), vol. I. p. ^52.
5* ^Struggle for Empire, p. 333*
Visvarupa quotes Brhaspati at Ya.jh. I. 30? and 313, and cites 
Visalaksa at ibid, 328, Vijnanesvara simply states that the details 
of the different term© for the kings of the mandala are explained
i.arnm-MU
in other works, evidently a reference to the arthasastra or 
nitisara works, hence they have been omitted by the Lord of Yogis
(i.e. Yajhavalkya)• However, the influence of the arthasastra or' 1 1   .
nitisara versions of the theory of the inter-state relations are 
obvious in Vijnanesvara's comments, although it is difficult to 
determine whether this is derived from other early smrti commentaries 
or from technical treatises on polity.
All these commentators were southerners, but their works have 
been utilised because the Yajnavalkyasmrti was by no means less 
authoritative in the North than in the South, and their elucidations 
of the verses on inter-state relations do not show any local trait.
On the contrary, they corroborate the view that the general principles 
of inter-state relations were the same all over India. These 
commentaries help us to understand the text, which also had its 
relevant verses quoted by Laksmldhara.
Digests on polity
Alongside the commentaries, some of which were themselves in 
the nature of digests, grew up the digest literature in which the 
dharnta was stated through the sources themselves. The compilers 
offered only the minimum of comments to the more difficult of the
25
passages cited in order to make their view© clear* Their main 
contribution lay in their judicious citations and interpretation of 
the selected source material by skilful juxtaposition. A few of 
these digest compilers are known to have included a separate section 
on the Rajadharma or Kajaniti (science of royal polity), which also 
includes the theory of inter-state relations. W© are only concerned 
with such digests and not those which have hardly anything to do with 
politics or confine themselves to law and religion.
The Rajadharmakanda of the Krtyakalpataru
The foremost among the extant digests is the Krtyakalpataru, 
an encyclopaedic work divided into twelve kandas (sections) of which
the eleventh and the twelth are assigned to the exposition of the
t
Rajadharma and Vyavahara. In this^.. evv£ Lor Ihe first-ft/we come across 
that scheme of mechanical repetition of strings of the ancient
'I
texts, which is the surest index of the hidebound scholasticism.1 
Its author, laksmidhara, was the Minister for fka&i and W a ni
(sandhivigrahika)of the Gahadavala king Govindacandra (c. 11^ -6-1155) * 
The Rajadharmakanda, the smallest of the Krtyakalpataru fs 
divisions, is of great interest to us. Its content© fall into three 
distinct divisions: the first consist© of eleven chapter© devoted 
to the discussion of the seven elements of the state (saptahga) and 
the security princes; the second, comprises three
1. U. K. Ghoshal, A thfrkory c f- Pdf\&d lAno^s , p . -
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chapters dealing with the state-covuasel (mantra), ways and means of 
policy (upayas), concept of mandala (inter-state system) and %ad7gunya 
(sixfold foreign policy), yatra (expedition), diplomacy, war, 
military code, booty, settlement of the conquered territory, and 
also the duties of a consecrated king with regard to internal 
affairs; and the third consists of the last seven chapters, which 
describe the ritual performances that promote the well-being of the 
state. The discussion of the concepts of inter-state relations 
as of other topics constitutes the reproduction of the smigti 
passages and citations from other dharmasastra works. There are 
some useful short explanations of difficult citations. However, 
despite the fact that Laksmidhara was not only a very great scholar 
but also an active statesman who conducted the foreign affairs of 
one of the most powerful kings of northern India of his times, 
his work has no claim to originality. Nevertheless it is valuable 
as it attests to the fact that ancient ideas on polity in general 
and inter-state relations in particular were cherished by kings and 
statesman of our period. It also shows that there was a good deal 
of flexibility as regards the concept of mandala, which is borne out 
by two versions of its composition in the Rajadharmak .anda. The
concepts of sadgunya and upaya are given adequate but only theoretical
attention. K. V. Rangaswami sees not unreasonably the influence of
.contemporary.unsettled political conditions and the danger of
Muslim invasions in Laksmidhara1s emphasis on the duty of fighting
1
and rewards of heaven in the event of death on the battle-field.
1.RDK., Intr. p. 75*
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The krtyakalpataru exercised great influence on posterity and 
curiously enough was considered by later authors such as Candesvara 
as a work on niti.
The Kamadhenu of GopaXa was another smrti digest which had a
on
separate section^ polity called the Ra janitikamadhenu; Gopala 
was probably a contemporary of Laksmidhara, hut little is known 
about him. His work is also lost. It is now known from a few
quotations in a late work, the Ra.janrfciratriakara of Candesvara, which
- 1 quotes both the Ba.janit ikamadhenu and its author GopaM - We have
utilized these references especially in regard to the types of
rulers.
The Puranas
The Puranas, which as a class of literature existed from 
ancient times, are a mine of information on various subjects such as 
religion, philosophy, mythology, history, geography, law>politics, 
astrology, astronomy, iconography, art and architecture etc. Some of 
them, especially the Matsya, the Visnudharmottara, and the Agni Puranas, 
deal with the science of politics and statecraft under separate 
sections entitled Bajadharma. While it seems certain that some of
the eighteen Mahapuranas and eighteen Upapuranas belong to our 
period, the chronology of the Puranas is still unsettled and we have 
to be extremely cautious in utilizing this valuable source.
1. Raj. R., pp. 2, 72, 75; see also its Intr. by K. P. Ja^ aswal,
p. 23«
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We have, however, used the Matsya, the Visnudharmottara, 
and especially the Agni Puranas for our subject. The first two 
puranas are generally dated earlier than our period, although U. N. 
Ghoshal utilizes their evidence for the exposition of the political
ideas of the period, A.D. 800-1200. As regards the Matsya Pur ana
2  ' ' "
P.V. Kane says that it cannot be later than the sixth century, but
Hans Losch prefers the later sixth to seventh century as the period of
3 kits composition. R. C. Hazra convincingly shows that the Matsya
was first compiled about the last quarter of the third or the first
quarter of the fourth century A.D. But he also concludes that the
Rajadharma section cannot possibly be dated earlier than A.D. 600 or
rather 650 and not later than A.D. 1000, although alterations,
additions, and even interpolations continued to be made in certain
5other chapters as late as A.D. 1100. It is further pointed out that 
the Matsya has borrowed from the Visnudharmottara in its Rajadharma
section, which is apparent from the comparison of its chapters
6
215-227 with the latterfs section II, chs. 2^-28 and 65-72. In view 
of the conflicting opinions on the date of the Matsya Purana and its
1. A HisW/of Indian Political Ideas, pp. ^37ff*
2. Cited by V. S. Agrawal: Matsya Purana - A Btudy, Preface, 
pp. iii-iv.
3. Hans Losch, Rajadharma (Bonn, 1959) p* 10.
*1*. R. C. Hazra, Studies in the Puranic Records on Hindu-Rites and
Cufcoms, (Dacca, 19**o), p. 32. * — —
5* Hazra, R.C., Op* cit., pp. 50-5j*
6. See also Hans Losch, op. cit., pp. 262-267 for concordance of
verses and also his footnotes to the Wifi.text.
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different chapters, we have been extremely careful in utilising its 
material on the theory of inter-state relations and only such verses 
of the Matsya which have been quoted in the Hajadharmakanda, occur
0 c
in the body of this thesis. It may, however, be pointed out that
nothing valuable on our subject in this Purana has been left out as
Laksmidhara cites it rather profusely because it contains
predominantly dharmasastra material.
The Visnudharmottara Purana, an encyclopaedic work^excluded from
the list of the traditional Mahapuranas, is often quoted by Al —
-1Biru^ti as an authoritative treatise in the elarenth century A.D.
Dr. Hazra concludes after an extensive investigation that *the
Visnudharmottara cannot be dated earlier than *K)0 A.D. and not later 
2than 500 A.D. * However, Hans Losch prefers to assign its composition 
to the end of the seventh century. Its section of the Rajadharma 
which figures mainly in the second part is important as it deals with 
the concepts of mandala! sadgunya and upayas and also marching 
against an enemy, battle and other related issues. It is rightly 
maintained that the Agni P. has extensively borrowed from it in tw 
Hajadharma section, which makes it necessary for us to refer to 
this primary source as the former was composed during our period.
1. Hazra,R.C., Studies in the Upapuranas, Vol. I, p. 208 fn. 239 - 
for a list of citations.
2. Ibid., p. 212.
3. Op. cit., p. 13*
if. Ibid., pp. 22if-2?3 for a list of concordance between the
verses of VHL-and Agni; see also Hazra, op. cit., p. 209*
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The Agni Purana is the most important for our purpose as it
gives a fairly full treatment to the theory of inter-state relations.
P. V. Kane cogently argues that the extant Agni Purana, which quotes
Dandin and Bhamaha and knew the theory of dhvani^was composed about 
1A.D. 900. Dr. Hazra also holds that ’the present Agni Purana was
— — *
compiled sometime during the ’ninth century* ’... most probably
3
in West Bengal. ’ Thus the Agni Purana belongs to our period and we 
have extensively used this text.
The Agni Purana is essentially a Saivute work. It has an 
encyclopaedic character as it deals with subjects like religion, 
astronomy, astrology, geography, politics and law, metrics and 
grammar, marriage and death, costumes etc. etc. Its section on the 
Hajadharma has, however, hardly any claim to originality; nevertheless 
it is interesting and valuable because it not only faithfully 
reproduces the puranic traditions on polity manifest In its 
incorporation of numerous verses of the Visnudharmottara Purana ^  
but also in its appropriation of the Kamanda&kxya Nitisara almost 
verbatim especially in its chapters 239-2*12, which describe the 
duties of the king and concepts of mandala, sadgunya, upayas and war. 
The Agni Purana repeats the discussion of the theory of inter-state 
relations and several chapters overlap. As for example, it discusses 
upayas in chs. 226, 23*1* and 2*fj which clearly show that in chs. 226 and
1. HDS, I. p. 1?2; also Kane, HisWyof Sanskrit Poetics, pp. III-V.
2. Hazra.R.G., op. cit., p. 138; see also its footnotes no. 13W 136.
3. Hazra,B.C., Studies in the Upapuranas, p. 209-
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23*1- it is recording the puranic tradition by drawing upon the 
Visnudharmottara £*. II. chs. 67, 70, 147-149 and the MatsyaP • 
chs. 222-223, while in ch. 241 it. is quoting from the Kamandaklya 
Nitisara, canto X V IV , Similarly the repetitious discussions of the 
concepts of mandala in chs. 233 and 240 and of sadgunya in chs. 234 
and 240 are also due to the differences in sources.^ This admixture of 
the sources, however, does not represent any new attempt to synthesize 
the dharmasastra and the nitisara ideas on inter-state relations 
because we have already seen that the smrtis themselves and their 
commentators had done so in their own way, Nevertheless the Agni 
Purana attests to the fact that the Nitisara treatises had come close 
to the dharma^astra and that the Kamandaklya Nitisara had become 
quite popular in Northern India.
Furthermore, a Jain purana called the Adipurana of Jinasena 
written in the ninth century A.D. has some material on polity. It refers 
briefly to the principles of inter-state relations in the account 
of the patriarch Rsabhadeva's instructions to the assemblage of kings 
in Ksatriya behaviour. The speaker characteristically puts forward 
a plea for a pacifist approach to war as he recommends paying
tribute to a powerful invader instead of fighting because of the 
risks and losses of war. However, this pacifism in inter-state 
relations is limited to the situations of battle; it does not
1. cf. V3.fr, II. chs. 145, & 150; KN, VIII. 16-19, & IX. 1, 2-4,
21, 25-28; X. 1-3, 16, 17, 19-23, 25-27; XI. 2, 12, 23, 24, 25.
See also Hans Losch, op.cit., pp. 224-274 - for studious 
compilation of concordance among the verses of the V&ti, Matsya, 
and Agni, and also a list of verses reproduced by tBgTjgna
purana from the Kamandaklya; HDS, I. pp 170ff -Kane shows that the 
Agni jpUrapa reproduces the vyayahara section of the Va jnavalkyasmrt i •
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emphasize inter-state co-operation and amity as an alternative to 
political domination and rivalry.
Works on polity 
(1) NITIVMYAWPA
The Nitivakyamrta is the work of the Jain monk Somadeva Suri, 
who wrote it after A.D. 9591 which is the date of the completion^his 
Ya^astjlaka Campu, a religious romance, according to its colophon.
Somadeva was a great scholar poet ^ dispxttant and logician. He
enjoyed the favour of the Calukya kings of Vemulavada (now in Karimanagar
District of Hyderabad) , who were feudatories of the Rastrakutas.
However, he does not seem to have been connected with the Rastrakuta
emperor ICrsna III, whose conquests of the south in A.D. 959 he 
mentions in the colophon of the Yasastilaka. Notwithstanding his 
religious professions, Somadeva was keenly interested in the social 
and political life of his age. His Yasastilaka Campu is justly 
described as a socio-political study of the age and a learned 
compendium of philosophy, theology, and religion. In its third 
section, Somadeva displays a wide knowledge of political ideas and 
appreciable understanding of the problems ^ statecraft. He dwells 
upon such topics of polity as the obligations and duties of the king,
1. NY, p. k06* the colophon.
2. cf. Yazdani G. (Ed) The Early History of Deccan, (Oxford, 1960),
II. pp. 511-12. Somadeva is the donee in the Prabhani plates 
of Arikesar! Ill dated in A.D. 966.
3. K. K. Handiqui, Yasastilaka and Indian Culture (Sholapur, 19^9)1
pref. p. V.
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qualifications and duties of ministers, risks of the corrupt officials 
and the need of the spies to inform the king about the maladminis- 
tration of his kingdom, the problems of foreign relations, the 
selection of the appropriate policy against foreign kings in the light 
of the traditional inter-state system, questions of war and peace.
But these found a separate, complete, and erudite treatment in his 
independent work on polity, the Nitivakyamrta, which appears to be 
the product of his mature age* What urged Somadeva to write the 
Nitivakyamrta we do not know for certain, although its anonymous 
commentator alleges that he was asked by Mahendradeva, the king of 
Kanauj, to compose a simple treatise on politics as the king was 
distressed at the difficult and abstruse text of the Arthasastra of cl
"I
a former savant (acarya) , probably a reference to the Kautilxya
Arthasastra* Although Somadeva extensively draws upon the Arthasastra,
it cannot be substantiated that he wrote the Nitivakyamrta at the
— — —  1 1    ■*
behest of king Mahendradeva of Kanauj^ beeause the only contemporary
_ . . 2  
king of that name could have been the Pratihara ruler Mahendrapala II
whose P«;v„tabgarh inscription is dated in A.D* , but who must
have been dead even before the completion of the Yasastilaka in 959
A.D.^which preceded the Nitivakyamrta as is clear from the colophon to
the latter.
1. NV, p.2.
2. Ibid., Intr. pp. 21-22. Nathuram Premi is wrong in identifying
Mahendradeva of the commentator with the Pratihara king
Mahendrapala I who lived before Somadeva*s time. (A.D. 885-910)•
3. E.I., XIV. pp. 176-188.
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There is a dispute among modern scholars as to the immediate
source of inspiration of the NitivakyamrtaD Shamashastry in his
introduction to the Arthasastra says that it is evident from the
phrases and style that the Nitivakyamrta, like the Kamandakiya Nitisara,
is an abridged version of the Kautiliya Arthasastra* But U. N.
Ghoshal observes that *the immediate source of Somadeva*s inspiration
has probably to be found in the large number of metrical works dealing
with topics on politics which are quoted by the anonymous commentary 
- - 1on the Nitivakyamrta** It seems, however, from internal evxdence 
that Somadeva may have been inspired by the metrical smrtis if the 
commentary is taken as a guide but, in fact, he had as the model for 
his work the Arthasastra, which he follows closely in his treatment 
of the old problem of the values of the four traditional sciences 
(vidyas) in the context of a prince*s educational curriculum, the 
theory of inter-state relations, and the problems of war and peace*
The Nitivakyamrta is divided into thirty-two sections dealing 
with the three ends of life? dharma, artha, and kama, which the 
state helps to promote; the four traditional sciences philosophy 
(anviksiki), three Vedas (trayi), economics (vartta), and
— " it i i l i u m  g L .
science of politics (dandaniti), appointment and qualifications of 
ministers, the royal chaplain, commander of the army, envoys, spies, 
the seven constituents of the state, law, disputes, sixfold policy,
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war, etc. It also manages occasional digressions on such topics 
as the daily duties of the householder, moral conduct, marriage etc. 
because Somadeva held niti in its wider concept of appropriate 
policy and general morals. Its two sections (XXIX 8c XXX) entitled 
3a<^upyasamuddesya and Yuddhasamuddesya are exclusively devoted 
to the foreign relations of a king. In both these sections Somadeva
s'
extensively draws upon the Arthasastra^which he more often than not 
merely abridges or paraphrases. He is, however, very clear and 
straightforward in his treatment of the concept of the mandala, 
sadgunya and upayas in which he also displays the qualities of an
•a
independent approach to the traditional principles. Despite the 
fact that his ideas on politics are often suffused with moral maxims, 
the dominant theme of his statements on inter-state relations is 
power and success. He regards every king as a potential vi.jigigu
o
and instructs him to so arrange his internal affairs and external 
relations as to be able to achieve over lordship. While he pleads 
for inter-state amity and advises a weak king to retain the goodwill 
of his powerful neighbour by paying him tribute under some pretext ^  
he observes that the basis of a durable treaty is solemn 
affirmation (satya) and trust ;be extols the virtues of union and
wm m tim aesm m m z*
alliance aid recommends diplomatic struggle rather than fighting,and 
permits the use of force only in the last resort and primarily in the 
defence of the kingdoms yet, he is no pacifist in his approach to 
war. He has advocated such restraints on war which arise out of 
the consideration of sound policy and power rather than religious
36
morality or non-violent tenets of his own faith. Whether he in fact 
advocates pacifism or aggression in foreign relations cannot be stated 
categorically. But it is evident that in his approach to inter­
state relations Somadeva prefers stability to adventure, consolidation
avuct
to expansion^ conciliation to confrontation* --- :— — --- ^
  ---^ jj@ no  ^averse to the exercise of power in a wider
political sphere if it promotes the well-being of the state.
The Nitivakyamrta is quite original in its independent 
§
affirmation of old ideas and their modification either through
greater emphasis or prudent omission of details. It is characterized
by an objective approach to politics and freedom from any kind of
sectarian bias. The impact of contemporary political life is
perhaps to be seen in Somadeva*s emphasis on the consolidation of
political power in the kingdom and appreciation of inter-state
1
politics dominated by factors of interests, power, and cause.
However, like other political thinkers he does not draw upon historical 
events to illustrate principles and policies and lacks political 
imagination to realize the need for innovations in the old concepts 
in order to foster inter-state understanding and cooperation.
The Yuktikalpataru is a compendium on polity and many other 
subjects of secular interest such as the construction of buildings, 
weapons, draught animals, vehicles, boats and ships, and shipbuilding
1. That Somadeva knew about the political events of his age may 
be seen from the colophon of the Yasastilaka Campu in which 
the historical events of the years of its completion are 
mentioned; the conquest of C61a and pandya kingdoms by the 
Mstrakuta king Krsna III.
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intended for the education of a prince. Its authorship is ascribed 
to the Paramara polyhistor king Bhoja of Dhara (A.D. 1000-1055)* The 
first eighteen chapters of the printed edition of the Yuktikalpataru 
deal with topics relating to polity such as the significance of 
dandanlti, importance of nlti for the king, appointment of ministers, 
officials, envoys and spies etc., their qualifications and functions, 
the sixfold foreign policy (sadgunya), the expedients (upayas), lai* 
and punishment, fortifications etc. The author himself says that 
he has compiled it from the nibandhas of ancient sagas • He really 
cites or plagiarizes the metrical smrtis especially Manu and
• V  2 ” _  2
Yajnavalkya and reproduces verses from the Kamandaklya Nitisara 
without acknowledgement. The ideas of Bhoja on issues of inter-state 
relations have hardly any claim to originality. The significant 
point about the book is it draws equally upon the dharmasastra and the
yl — .............. iinr-M-wmrrniB ■■■■■mi . .
nitisara sources ,without any difference or deference.
The Mahasollasa or Abhilasitarthacintamani is an encyclopaedic
_ / 
work, which is attributed to the Western Galukya king Somesvara III
(A.D. 1126-1138) of Kalyanl. It deals with^ive sections (called
vimsati)of twenty chapters each with a hundred different topics
connected with the royal household and royal court and other
/
necessities. Its second vimsati is devoted to polity. Its first
1. Hit., km p. 1.
2. Concordance between Ykt., v.v. 72-7^, 112b, 113a, 118, and Manu 
vii. 63-6 ,^ 66, 1479 7 k , Ykt •, v. 109 and Yajil, I. j k k *
3* Compare verses relating to sandhi, vigraha, asana, dvaidhibhava o^vuL 
samsraya.
seven chapters deal with the seven constituents of state; chapters 
eight to ten describe the threefold power (sakti) ; chapters eleven 
to sixteen discuss the sixfold foreign policy (sadgunya, one chapter 
is devoted each to sandhi, vigraha and the others), and chapters 
seventeen to twenty elucidate the four expedients (upayas). The last 
chapter, which is devoted to danda, also includes some aspects of 
private law and punishment evidently as an adjunct. Thus, the whole 
vimsati is really a treatise on polity.
The value of the work as regards different aspects of polity 
and especia3-ly the theory of inter-state relations is noteworthy. Its 
treatment of the seven constituents, though conventional in nature, 
is nevertheless not devoid of original featiires like the government 
by ministers in which the king is relegated to the background. The 
work displays a marked quality in its elucidations of the two major 
concepts of the theory of inter-state relations, namely, the 
sadgunya and the upayas. The various sub-classifies!ion of each
* i p V  «T-r*S ■ M lflfl umgiipw
of the six gunas (forms of policy), viz., sandhi, vigraha etc., and 
each of the four upayas, viz., sama, dana, bheda and danda . 
as found in the Manasollasa are unique, if not entirely original.
The Manasollasa may be regarded as the last composition on 
polity which synthesizes the traditional material and carried forward 
the development of political ideas at least in respect of the sixfold 
policy and the expedients. With all its merits, the work, however, 
by and large follows a conventional pattern. Whatever knowledge
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of the practice of inter-state politics is implicit in the many 
explanations, the treatment of the subject matter is theoretical, 
and is not historical.
The Arhannitl or Laghvarhanniti written by the Jain monk
Hemacandra (A.D. 1088-1172) styled 'the Omniscient one of the Kali
age' (Kalikalasar vajna) is a concise work on polity written at the
request of Kumarapala (A.D. 11^3-1172), the Caulukya king of Gujarat.
Written in metrical form the Laghvarhanniti begins its treatment of
the science of politics (hiti) by describing the qualities of the
king and his officers especially the ministers, the commander
(senapati), envoy (duta) - their training and functions; then it
divides niti into three topics; war (ijuddha-niti), punishment
(d.anda-niti), and law and procedure (vyavahara) - Strangely enough a
fourth topic, penance (praya^citta), is also dealt with at the end.
Besides its opening verses which mention the constituents of state,
its section on the yiuddhaniti is of use to us as it is devoted to
the discussion of the sixfold foreign policy, expedients, war, rules
of fighting and the settlement of the conquered kingdom and other
related issues of inter-state relations. Notwithstanding the claim
of Hemacandra that the science of politics originated with the Jain
S£|
mythical royal patriarch R^ahadeva , there is nothing different or 
original as regards the political ideas on inter-state relations 
that either comes from his Jain heritage or from his own vast 
learning and close relationship with the two most powerful kings,
HA, I. 8ff
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Jayasimha Siddharaja and Kumarapala, of Gujarat. He draws
extensively upon the Manusmrti and sometimes on the Yajnavalkyasmrti.
“5 *”
He plagiarises Manu on the topics of Sadgunya, Upayas , and war with
occasional borrowing from Yajnavlkya. Qeariy/Hews urn influence of
some nitisara work, whether Kamandaklya or Bhoja*s Yuktikalpataru or
even Somadeva*s Nitivakyamrta. He follows the smrti - nitisara
tradition and his approach to war is characterised by the clear
statement that it is a matter of power and that force is the last
means to overcome the enemy when all other politic means of diplomacy
have failed. He lays great emphasis on the role of diplomacy
(nLti-marga and nlti-yuddha) and the mission of envoys before the war«
His statements are marked by clarity, brevity, and a thorough
knowledge of the principles of politics as found in early works.
Hemacandra is, however, the only author who takes note of the
Muslim kings and prescribes that the commander should be acquainted
with the language of the Mlecchas and should employ the expedients 
3against them.
In addition to the Arhanniti, Hemacandra1s TrisastTI^salaka- 
purusacarita (Lives of the sixty-three famous men) and 
Abhidhanacintaniani, a lexicon, are of some use for our purpose. The 
latter is particularly helpful in determining the meaning and 
interpretation of certain political terms as understood in our period.
1. Compare HA, II. 8ff with Manu, vii. 161 ff; HA, II. 9ff with 
Manu, vii. 169-17^.5 HA, II. 19-20 with Manu, vii 196-199.
2. HA, II. 21 d l Yajn,, I. 3^6.
3. Ibid., I. ?8.
according to F# W. Thomas, is a work of 12th century# It has some 
interesting information on certain aspects of polity such as the 
importance of dandaniti in the traditional list of sciences
ir t>
(vidya), kingship, and theories of government* Its discussion of
the concept of upayas is of special interest to us#
/ —
Next comes the Sukranitisara, which until recently was assigned 
to the early mediaeval period, most probably 11th and 12th century#
But Dr* Gopal has now convincingly shown that the present text was 
composed in about c. 1850 A#D# by some man who had an intimate 
knowledge of the East India Company’s regulations of the first 
quarter of the 19th century and was also familiar with Maratha history
“I
and institutions • We have therefore excluded the text from the
body of this thesis, although it is sometimes referred to the foot-
a .
notes for elucidating a point, making ^comparison or pointing to
the continuity of the traditional political ideas#
The Ka.janitiratnakara is yet another work on polity, composed 
in the fourteenth century by Candesvara of Mithila (Bihar). It is a 
small work based on the quotations from dharmasastra and nit isara 
authorities# Candesvara has, however, added his comments to his 
citations# Although outside our period, we have occasionally used 
its evidence especially when it comes from the authorities belonging 
to our period.
1# Lallanji Gopal, ’The Date of Sukraniti1
tk&Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,
XXV# pt. 3, 1962.
Last but not least,we have occasionally used the Lekhapaddhati,
a
which is collection of documents intended to provide specimens of 
different types of letters, official and private, charters etc., 
that were in use in mediaeval times. It is difficult to determine 
the date of its compilation but a recent writer 1ms shown that ’a 
large number of documents In the Lekhapaddati are authentic ones 
belonging to the early years of the thirteenth century1, although it
'I
was compiled in the fifteenth century • We have often referred to 
it for its text of a treaty purported to have been concluded between 
the Canlukya minister Lavanaprasada and the Yadava king Simhana in 
V.S. 1288.
1. Mrs. K. K. Gopal, Feudalism in Northern India, c. 700-1200 A.D. 
(unpublished thesis of London University, 19625", p. 373•
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Chapter XI 
RAJYA (THE STATE JMB ITS CONSTITUENTS)
An enquiry into inter-state relations presupposes a concept of the 
state, which forms its basis. The composition and characterof1 the 
state has a direct bearing on inter-state intercourse, because other 
states of like form and character would]respond and react in similar 
ways. The constituents of the state denote the elements of power 
and point to the impact of power in the inter-state sphere, A know­
ledge of the composition of the state and the elements of dbs power 
is therefore necessary for a full understanding of its external acti­
vities.
Much has been written on the subject of whether or not ancient 
Indian political theorists developed any concept of the state, which, 
some would assert, is a relatively modern political idea. While it 
is true that a concept of the state, like the modern western one, is 
unknown in the early Indian sources, it can be suggested that notions 
about the state as a political entity are traceable in a vague form 
in the literature on Indian polity. The state is, however, approached 
largely as a practical concern rather than a political concept. It 
is the physical character of the state and its political organisation 
which engage the attention of our authorities, who show a remarkably 
clear understanding as to what constitutes the state and what are 
its constituent and ministrant functions.
Notwithstanding the controversy among modern scholars about the
4 4
precise Sanskrit term for the state our authorities use the term
rajya for it and proceed to lay down its seven constituents, which,
while falling short of connoting ideas behind the modern concept
of state, substantially express ibs form and character. Etymologically
rajya means the karma or bhava (activity?- or state; of a king being
1
derived from the root raj ~ with the affix ya. There are not many 
authorities who even care to define rajya and it is interpreted nn a 
variety of ways in our sources. However, Somadeva, who is an original 
thinker of our period, says; 1Rajya means the activity of the ruler 
that would be appropriate to protecting the earth (ppthvi)',^ which 
is further defined as ’possessed of the people belonging to the four 
classes and the four stages of life and bestowing cereals, gold, cattle, 
and forest products etc.’ The anonymous commentator on the Hitivakyampta 
draws a clear distinction between rajya as the activity of a king and 
rajya as the territorial state; 1 Rajya is not only defined as the 
protection by the ruler of his subjects'; means the earth'
endowed with the aforementioned qualities.^- In fact, rajya may mean
5 6 7kingship, government, kingdom, a prosperous people, etc. depending
H.D.S., III.p.19.
2m, i *** ***** **
1JS* Y• 4 • RajnafoPr.tlwlpa^
Ibid. j, 5. V a r n a s r am ava t i dhanyahirafflyapas^tckupyavpg^ipradanaphala ca
pythvi.Delhi ed. reads much better;*Visigfra-phala-da for — vggfri- 
p rad anap hala.
ibid., 7. 5^  Na kevalam bhupatefr prajapalanam rajyani ucyate. Cakaradnrar- 
pasramavati hiragyapasulrupya-vpg^ipradanaphala ca pythvi raj yam ucyat e.
^Hanas., ll.viii.688 ff.
Medh. on Maxm. VII.Ill; On Ya.j.H. g 5 55; cf. HI, XIV.81-82.
7Meah. on Manu, VIII. 1. Pra.iaisvaryap M
45
upnn the context :in which it is used. However, when rendered as
government ’it includes only the king and his ministers and conveys,
even in modern times, the agency or machinery through which the will
1of the state is formulated, realized or carried out', In popular 
parlance and also in works on polity rajya. is, however, generally, 
used in the sense of a kingdom, that is, a distinct territory in­
habited by &- socially organized people mider a ruler. According 
to our texts the rajya is said to comprise the seven elements which 
determine its physical form as well as its nature. Thus ,the term rajya 
when understood both in the sense of the government and governed 
may be rendered as the state.
The seven constituents of the state (Saptanga rajya)
Our authorities declare that the rajya consists of seven elements. 
They ares- -the lord or sovereign (svamin), the minister (amatya), 
the territory and its people (janapada or ragfcra), the fort or 
fortified city (durga or pura), the treasury (kosa), the army (bala), 
and the ally (mitra or suhpt). The epigraphic records, as for example,
III.p. 19.
% >  VI.1.1; Svamyamatyajanapadadnr gakosad.apda-mitrapi prakptay;afr. 
Yajfi., 1,353: Svamyamatyajanodurgagi koso dapj.as tathaiva cat Mitranyrp d sp
etafr prakptayo rfjyam saptahgam ucyate tl Manu, IX. 294: Svamy amatyau
icosa aapqo sunyt tamafSapta pralcrtayo hy etah saptaftga# 
rate*. ucyateU Agni, 225*11: Svamy amatyo janapada durgo dapdas tathalva
cafKoso mi tram ca dharmajha saptangagi rajyata ucyate tl Ibid.. , 253.12:
Svamy amatyas tatha durgah koga dandas tathalya cajftjitram jamapadas 
caiva rajyaiii saptangam ucyatejf Ibid., 235*12: Svamy ^amatyas ca 
(cont.)
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the Man stone inscription, also mention *ahganl sapta1, ' that is,
the seven limbs of the state. These seven constituents are called
prakrtis or angas. The term prakyti (element or constituent) in
this context means the operating cause (karapa) so as to make these
elements the components of the state in the same manner as potsherds
ar^components of a jar, or it refers to their nature (svabhava) so
2
as to make the state partake of their characteristics, or ’root
cause’ of the state, or better still,that whereby a product is made,
fixed and brought into shape as ■ gold is the prakpti of an ear- 
4
ring. Thus,the prakptis are both the material as well as the ab­
stract causes of the state and their characteristics determine the 
composition, character and the nature of the ancient Indian state.
It will be apparent from the quotations already cited from different 
authorities that the order of precedence as well as the nomenclature of 
the seven constituents of the state varyfWhile the lists of the Hanusmpti,
/ S M d  y  A|]i ti*
(cont. ) ragjbram ca durgah koso balaiji suhrtl Parasparopakaridaxji saptahgaip. 
rajyagi ucyate|| Agni_, 259.1a is the same as KIT, f. 18a and 225.11 as 
Vdh.^  II.65•18. HA, 1.56; Svanyairiatyasidiptkosar ag jradurgabalani ca j 
ffaptanga njforajasya prakptis cag^ama kvacitlf RDIC, X.p.91 quotes both 
Manu and Yajhavalkya but follows Manu’s order of the enumeration of 
the prakptis in the division of its chapters concerning the elements
of the state. 1W, chs. 17-13 follows Kaujilyan order of preference and 
lianas., II. chs, 8 ff also has the same.
h . I . , vol. I, v.8. p. 198.
2
Medn. on Harm, IX.294.
'’Mit ■ on Yajfi,, 1.353.v •- -Ml
4
Apararka on Ibid.
the A^niJPura^a and other'texts are different, those of Kaufilya,
Yajnava3.kya, Kamandaka, Somadeva etc.show a marked similarity. K. T.
1Rangaswami Aiyangar tends to assign the latter order, viz., the 
lord, or the king, ministers, territory and its people, fort, treasury, 
army and ally, to the Gupta period and attributes changes from Manuf o 
list as for instance precedence of ragfrra over the pura (fortified
capital) or the substitution of the pura by the dujrga, (f oz’t) to
India's experience of war extending over a period from itie advent 
of the Sakas to the Hun a. inroads. He thus tries to exhibit the em­
pirical knowledge of defence needs contained in this Apparently 
2
crude list'.
It is true that the compositioncf the seven-limbed state reflects 
the defence mechanism and political realism which cannot be divorced 
from historical experience, but Rangaswami Aiyangar*s theory Is in­
consistent. For Kaujxtlya had already enumerated the prakptis In a
standard order of precedence and nomenclature according to their im­
portance and role in the whole body-politic and, there is 110 apparent 
reason why later authors reverted to him in preference to Manu or 
rearranged, the latter's list in view of any potential or proven 
military value of these prakrtis realized afterwards. The commentators 
on Manu do not adjust the list accordingly, nor do all the post- 
Guptan authors conform to Kautilya, as Is illustrated by the Agni
18
Ihirana, Laksnidliara and others. Moreover, Manu himself is aware
of the Kaujilyan order in his enumeration, in a different context
(discussion of the circle of states), of at least five
viz., the minister, the territory and its people, the fortified
1city,the treasury, and the ally. This fully hears out his awareness
of their relative military importance, if any, in a calculated order,
in the struggle for power among states. It appears that while making
a general statement Manu gave a correspondingly higher importance to
the fortified capital (pura) over the territory and its people
(rajpjnpa) because it suited his theory of royal autocracy as the
protection of the person of the king is of vital importance to the
2existence of the state. But he could not overlook their relative 
significance when especially viewed in the context of inter-state 
relations. Other authorities,who, like ICaufilya, ' Manu,1 and
Kamandaka, do not expressly state that when calamities occur In each 
of these seven constituents those o^each earlier one are more serious 
to the state than those of each later one, arrange them in an order 
which suits their metrical needs, although they are consistent as 
regards the precedence of the king and thejministers over the rest.
10n Manu. VII.157.
2Ibid., IS.295.
■3KA, VIII. 1.5.
4Manu, VTi.295. See Medh. comments, which adjudge the precedence on 
the basis of defence-potential * of each and- greater role In maintaining 
internal solidarity and external security.
5IQT, XIV.93.
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All our sources give a pre-eminent place to the svamln (lord) 
among the seven constituents. Kaujilya puts the matter emphatically,
1
fthe king and the kingdom; this is the sum total of the constituents1.
Somadeva recounts the same idea when he says, ’the lorcljis the root of
all the prakptis; they accomplish their object but not those without 
2the lord'. The wording of the Kaufilyan summing up is sometimes
taken to imply the recognition of only one prakrti, that is, the king
is the state, although not in the same sense as expressed by Louis XIV1s
3words ’I’etat c’est moi1. However, it seems correct to recognise 
in this passage two prakptis, vkz. raja and r_aPjya_, the latter signi­
fying the kingdom comprising the remaining six prakptis from the
minister to the ally, as two commentators on the Arthasastra and
-  4.
Kamandaka state. The distinction between the king and his five prakptis,
~4cA , VIII. 2.1. Raja raj yam iti prakrti samkgepafc •
M l >  XVII.4; also Agii, 225.12; of. Matsya. 222.20-21.
3H .I).5 , , 111.p . 18; D .R . Bhandarkar, Some aspects of ^ ancient Hindrgpolity, 
p.' 1277      ".~
4KA,(tr.) VIII.2.1. p.451, fn.l; KN, XV.1. S. P. Kangle asserts that t U  
'jrajya refers to rulership or rule and does not mean'■kingdom? The 
idea here is that the kirg and his rule constitute the sum-total of 
prakpti s . H e  rejects the view of the commentaries, Hayacandrika 
and T. Ganapati Sastri’s modern Srimula, that there are twcjelements, 
the king and the kingdom, the latter comprising the remaining; prakptis 
frcmi the amatya to mitra. But Kamandaka (XV.ls Afma/byadyafc. prakptayo mit- 
ranta rajyam ucyate) gives sufficient basis for this distinction. Other 
scholars have also found king and kingdom distinct in Kaujilya’a state­
ment . See U .N . Ghoshal, op^jcit *, p • 119; Shamasastry, Arth. (tr.), p . 352.
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• - (raj aprakpt l a n d  dr avy ap r aky tl) is also dr ami 
in the formulation of the circle of state-constituents (prakpti- 
map.dala.). ^ Further^ a fourteenth century author Candesvara also dis­
tinguishes these two prakytls, viz-, the king and kingdom, in his 
description of the coronation rituals of the successor of an abdicating 
ruler. Near the end of the ceremony came the rite of making over the 
six-limbed kingdom (saflanga-rajya) to the new king by the abdicating
ruler, who is also required to proclaim the end of his rule and the
2inauguration of the new ruler.
Neither the sovereign nor the other six constituents are treated 
in abstraction. They are quite real. The relative precedence is adjudged 
in view of the location of the sovereignty or coercive authority, the 
power and function of the different organs of the state. In deter­
mining the precedence or presenting the state as a composite entity 
the need of law and order within the kingdom and its defence from 
foreign invasions are uppermost. In advising the king to abandon the 
six prakptis, if they cannot be saved and to protect himself at all 
costs-j some authorities clearly imply that the sovereign symbolizes the 
state, the distinct mark of which is Independence in the comity of 
states. It is this idea which runs through the pronouncements that 
each preceding constituent is superior to the following one. The king 
is the sovereign and he represents the unifying force among the con­
stituents of the state. The Indian theory . pi a ces h i jn  . between ■ . •
^Kulluka on Manu, ¥11.157; KN, ¥111.25 and comms., ef. also KA,
¥1.2,28.
2 - .
Raj, R., p.74; of. Matsya, 220.21 which enjoins upon^tbe king the 
protection of the six limbs of the state (ga&anga rakga).
51
1civil order and anarchy, Thus^while svamin is justly placed at the
head and is aptly regarded as of primary importance, he does not, by
himself, sum up the state, nor is he the state, hut the king and the
kingdom constitute in brief all the prakytis.
The state is conceived as an integration of the seven constituents,
which form an harmonious whole. Each of these seven are regarded as
2
complementary, mutually dependent and helpful. This is expressed 
by Manu and his commentators' statement that 'no one of them is 
superior', which, as Medhatithi points out, means that 'due care should 
be taken in the guarding of the "ally" and other limbs also* in want 
of which the rajya would become exposed to the peril of destruction.
The cohesive character and mutually dependent characteristics of the 
seven constituents impart to the state a sort of organic unity, which 
is implied by calling them atiga, organs or limbs^or prakptl, material 
cause or element. Manu expresses the distinctiveness of each of the 
seven elements, as well as the essential unity in their integration.^ 
by comparing the seven-limbed state with the three staves of a sanyasin's 
(ascetic’s) staff, which are tied together (by strands of cow's hair) so 
as to form a single staff.^ Medhatithi comments: 'in as much as they 
/the seven constituents/ are helpful to one another, there can be no 
distinction among them, just as there is none among the soil, seed and
1RDK, l.p.2; on Manu, VII.3.
\ $ n ± 9 239.1; on Manu, IX. 296; cf. KM, IV.1-2, .
5 On Manu, IX.296.
^Hanu, IX.29 6.
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1
water in the process of cultivation1. Some authorities liken 
the state to a tree with the sixfold policy (sa^gupya) as its 
projecting branches, with conciliation etc. (i.e. up ay as, me an s) 
as its four beautiful flowers and the tjfivarga (virtue, wealth
\ 2 yand desire; as its three fruits." The hukranltisara compares the
3
seven limbs of the state to the different 'parts of the body.
It may be mentioned that in several works the ministers are de­
scribed as the eyes and hands of the king or state5 but these vague 
expressions do not suggest any organic structure of the state. However 
inadequate and vague these analogies between the constituents of 
the state and the human body or tree etc. may be, they indicate an 
appreciation of the mutual dependence of the elements of the state 
and a need for harmony in their functioning, while at the same time 
they concede a distinctive place to each in the body politic. The 
objective put forth for each of the seven constituents is a dynamic 
increase in the power of the whole through mutual cooperation. The 
progress and the prosperity of the state are measured by the sum 
total of the excellences of all the seven constituents in themselves 
and in comparison with other states. It is sufficiently evident that
*Sledh. on Manu, IX. 2 9 6 ,
^Commentary on W ,  p.7. quotes gukra.
fulcra. (tr.), 1.122-124* Of these seven constituent elements of the 
state the king is the head., the minister is the eye, the ally is the 
ear, the treasury is the mouth, the army is the mind, the fort is the 
arm and the territory and]its people are the legs.
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the state as a political institution could he thought of neither 
as an ill-assorted assemblage of discordant factors, nor as being 
in complete isolation from other states. The interdependence of the 
constituent elements of the state is constantly emphasised some 
times through organic analogies; aid the interdependence of states 
is recognised by including the ally among the seven constituents of the 
state.
As the political status and role of a state would correspond 
largely to the relatively superior, equal or inferior excellences 
(.3-Hlih or samp at) of these seven constituent^ it would be worth while
to describe them briefly at the outset.
Svamin (the lord or sovereign)
The word svamin (owner) means 'lord’ or 'sovereign*, and denotes 
the king in this context. The Indian political genius found Its 
fulfilment largely in a monarchical rather than a republican state. 
Monarchy was the normal form of government during our period. The 
general trend of political thought was towards benevolent autocracy 
which became more pronounced during our period. The divinity of the 
king was an accepted doctrine* which is even emphasized by^Jairx author. 
...US Somadeva ,who regards the king as the visible representation of
the Hindu trinity - Brahma, Vigpu, and £iva? Our authors state that
1
0n Manu, VII*3-8; IX.303-311* RDK, I.pp. 2 ff. quotes Manu,
Mirada; MV, XXIX.16-19* Agnl, 226.19-20, cf. Mateya, 226.2-12.
2HV, XXIX.16-19.
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the king endowed with immense power appears in different forms^ •
Agni, Indra, Soma, Tama and Kuteera and several other lesser gods
by performing t h e . i t }  functions. The divinity
of the king gave a basis to his authority which could not ordinarily
be assailed. He was the wielder of the rod of chastisement (dapda)
or in other words he exercised the coercive authority. As the king
is called the destroyer of enemies, protector of the people and
dispensator of equitable justice,'*' h e m s  possessed of political,
economic and judicial powers. The legislative prerogatives were
vested in him and as an upholder of the varpasramadharma he even
enjoyed substantial social and religious powers. Ilis authority was
2
absolute and his order an impassable wall to all. He who is slrghted 
by the king, writes Somadeva, is slighted by all, and he who is 
honoured by the king is honoured by the people. Almost paraphrasing 
Manu. Somadeva writes, ’Even a king in pictures should not be despised, 
for the Kgatriya’s strength resides in it as in a deity in a mighty 
human form1
His basic function was the protection of the subjects, but the 
sources also emphasize the ministrant functions of promoting the 
all-round welfare of his state, although their discharge was often 
offset by frequent warfare which put greater stress on defence from
3. ft** "K ft:*: IT\»r
Agni ? 218*2-7 Ra j a Ijhavedcliatruhaiita pr aj apal a^ i sudafiglavan^ 
m i . 25-28; RDIC, I.p.2 ff. quotes Manu and Narada.
XTCI.34-35.
hfbid., XXII.6 6 ; Manu, VII.8 ; RISC, I.pp. 4-5. quotes Harada.
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external dangers. However, our authorities tend to scribe full
responsibility for the good and ill that befalls the state to the
king, who is said to be !the maker of his age, raising or lowering
its tone by his action (raja kalasya karanam). His greatest
obligation was to please his subjects by identifying their pleasures
2
and miseries with his own.
The exercise of vast powers and the discharge of heavy responsi­
bilities put a premium upon the high qualities of both head and heart 
of the ruler. Our sources naturally have a disquisitinn on the ex­
cellences of an ideal king. As a typical example, Somadeva says, ’one 
who is virtuous, ofjnoble lineage, endowed with majesty or sovereignty 
(pratapavan), intent on following good policy, independent in showing 
his anger and favour, possessed of increasing personal excellences
•a* ^
and wealth is a svamin1. The qualities of an ideal king comprise
the excellences of easy approachability (abhigamika^up.a), noble lineage,
intelligence and spirit, not breaking one’s promise etc., the possession
4
of weak neighbouring princes (sakyasamanta), qualities of intellect 
(prajhagupa) such as desire to learn, thorough understanding, retention 
etc.; qualities of energy and exertion (utsahagu&a) such as bravery, 
resentment, quickness, dexterity; and finally, numerous personal 
excellences (atma-sampat) such as eloquence, boldness, memory, self-
hnr, XVII.50; cf. £ukra, 1.1.43-44; EM, I.p.4ff; also III, pp. 20-21;
Agni, 218.2 ff.
2
■KDK., II.pp. 20-21. quotes Vispu. 3*38; Agni, 220.24.
'Z
NV, ATX 1 .1  -2 . Dharmikafr kulacarabhi j anavisuddhah p.r a t ap avan nayanugat a v.p ia 
ca svami. Kopaprasadayoh svatantrah atmatisayaip. dhanaiy va yasyasti sa 
svami.
hgni, 239.4; cf. KA, VI.1.3.
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control, freedom from vice, proficiency in undertaking* works at the 
proper time and place, knowledge of statecraft, discrimination between 
agreement or peace and hostility or war, capability to guard secrets
1
of his own policy, and to pierce into the enemy’s weak points etc.; etc.
MoSt of these qualities are repeated by our sources in their descriptions
of an ideal king, and they also often recur in tie inscriptions of our
period. Somesvara, however, sums up M s  catalogue of ’the king’s
forty-four qualities by prescribing the five most essential on ess
truthfulness, valour, for0bearance, liberality and capacity to appre-
2ciate others’ merits.
It may be remarked that offsetting the acceptance and advocacy of 
royal autocracy by Manu, Narada quoted by Lakgmiidhara, Somadeva, Somes- j
vara and others, there is emphasis on-the qualities of the king designed :
to encourage the ruler to be self-disciplined, proficient, just and {
benevolent. In the absence of constitutional safeguards against royal 
tyranny,^ the king has to be repeatedly reminded to be personally 
virtuous, to identify his interests with those of his subjects, to
*^0n Manu ^ *52-44; On Yajfi. , 1 .309-311 - draws a distinction between
the inward or the most essential (antaranga ) and. the outward 
(bahiranga) qualities of the king. NV, XVTI.l.ff; HA J.24-30 enumerates 
36 qualities? RDK, 111.^18 ff. quotes the ahkhalikhita, which substantially; 
agrees with Kautilya (VI.1.3-6) in enumerating royal qualities, Gautama 
(11.1-6), Yajfi., Manu, hatyu^/una (Kane. 1-3 & 8~10), Vi gjju (Jolly,” 3.SSJ, 
Agni, 239.2-5, cf. fiy, 1 .21-22,’~IV. 15-19, 24. M a n a s ~  II.1.2-7. -
Slaiias., II. 1.8.
3
HZ? XVII.44. It is said that there is no remedy against the injustice of 
the king and it should be considered as the result of the ’kali Age’
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consult his minister and listen to elders, and above all, strictly
to adhere to the principles of dharma. The king is, however, also
warned that his injustice and oppression of the subjects would ruin
him and his tyrannical acts would cause his destruction at the hands
1
of his i'*elatives, enemies or even daring men.
Perhaps the most striking point made by our authors, in this
case Somadeva and Somesvara, is that the sovereign (svamin) must
be his own master. Somadeva in the list of attributes mentioned
2
above, calls him ’independent in showing anger and favour’. His
commentator explains that the sovereign is an independent king who,
by his own decision, inflicts punishments upon the wicked when angry,
3
and who grants favours to the virtuous when pleased.' Somadeva 
describes ’sovereignty (aisvarya) as consisting in the carrying 
out of commands (a j h a p h a l a ) and states that ’the king’s command
g
is an impassable barrier, which cannot be overstepped by any^body'. 
The king does not brook disobedience even from his own son.^
Somesvara defines ’a sovereign /prabhu^ as a king who is 
himself competent to show favour and disfavour, to give gifts and to 
withhold them, to undertake acts and to undo them, to imprison and
V ,  XVTII.20; Medh. on Manu, VII.111.
2 m ,  xvix.2 .
3Ibid.
'^Ibid., 21 
3Ibid., 22.
^Ibid., 2 3 .
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to release, whose commands are not obstructed, and who is thus possessed
X *of his own powers’. ’Sovereignty (orabln-sakti)’, he says, ’is that
power which prevails over all in the form of command, which is endowed
2
with splendour, and which rises out of might.' It appears that 
Somesvara Is here describing the svamin who Is the same as prabhu.
Somesvara also describes the problem of the exercise of sovereign 
power, which forms the basis for distinguishing three grades of kings 
as well as three types of government. 1 The lowest type of the govern­
ment is that in which the minister boasts that the government and the 
king are under his control and that nobody can question whatever Is 
done by him. This is called a government dependent upon the minister 
(sacivayatta rajya)„ The middle type of government Is that ’in which 
the minister, by attributing equality to both /I.e. himself and the 
king/ eays that whatever plan of action is communicated by him, the 
king considers as necessary to be done'.^ The verse also seems to 
imply that whatever acts the minister has performed will meet with 
the royal assent. ’Is the success derjends on both, there prevail 
happiness and unhappiness; this is called a government which depends 
on both, i.e. the minister and the king (ubhayayatta rajya).’  ^ 'The
^Manas., II.viii.6 94-6 9 5.
2Xblci., 6 9 6.
5Xbid., 688-89.
4 lbid., 6 9 0.
5lbid., 6 9 1.
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best type of government is that in which the king who3.1 y depends
upon himself (atraayatta rajya), and in which the minister realises
that he is incapable of accomplishing his acts without the sovereign’s
command, and, thus fearing the king, remains loyal. Under such a
government there is no insecurity; it is said to give happiness and
1
success of all kinds and it is the most stable form of government. 1 
Thus* in the lowest type of government the minister usurps the sovereign 
power and relegates the king into the background; in the second type, 
the minister and the king are mutually dependent for the exercise 
of sovereign power; and in the third type, the king is his own master 
and has his minister under control. It seems that Somesvara's state­
ments are based on the historical facts about the working of 
government. However, the best ruler is one who is an autocrat and 
even in these types of government, there is no indication of any con­
stitutional limitations of the ruler’s exercise of sovereign power.
They only indicate practical handicaps occasioned by the inability of 
the ruler to exercise his power, owing to M s  weakness or absorption 
In amusements, on the one hand, and the tendency of the minister to 
usurp the royal authority, on the other.
Thus the svamin is conceived as a sovereign and the state as 
independent. The corollary of this is that the feudatories and their 
domains do not come under the rubric of rajya (state) and are, therefore, 
excluded from the theory of inter-state relations. This, in a period of
^Manas., Il.viii. 6 9 1 - 6 9 3 *
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increasing importance of feudatories, is the chief weakness of political 
theory.
imatya (minis ter)
The second constituent element of the state iscalled amatya (minister
or counsellor) which term denotes assistants to the ruler. Mantrin and
( \ *** counsellor; are mostly used as synonyms for amatya. Somadeva
says that ’the counsellors (mantrlns) are those who commence under­
takings not begun before, accomplish those already commenced, and in-
1crease the excellences of those already completed’.* He further writes
that ’the ministers (amatyas) are those whose prosperity and adversity
are determined by gifts and honour /granted or withheld/ with regard
2to their zeal or negligence in the performance of their duties’.
He, however, tends to differentiate between mantrin and amatya by
emphasizing the advisory function of the former and the executive
3function of the latter.
Our authorities emphasise the indispensability of the ministers
to'the ruler. Somadeva says, ’a single man does not attain success;
4one wheel alone does not turn.’ 'The work of the king,’ according to 
Medhatithi, ’is an important undertaking and leads to important results;
X * * * * * * * *
NY, X.24; .Akptarambham arabdhasyapy anug&hanam anugfhita visesaaa 
vinlyoga sa^padar# ca ye kuryas te mantrin ah.
2 *»
Ibid., XVTII. 5^ S vak armotkargapakargayor danamanabhyagi sahotpattivipatti
te ’mat —
^Xbld, i chs. X & XVIII; cf. Amarkosa, II.S.4- H.D.S., ITI.p.105 
HtJV, m i l . 2-3; cf. K A 9 1.7.9.
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its proper accompli slim ent "bears important fruits and important
results accrue to the man who fulfils it. But a single man cannot
he expected to know all the sixfold policy (sadguxiya ') . Hence it
is necessary for the king to appoint to the several departments
of state trusted assistants, who are possessed of qualifications
3
similar to those of the king himself1." It is thus emphasised 
that the sovereign needs advisors and officials^who/ together with 
him fadminis t er the state.
As the many-sided activities of the state demand persons of 
diverse abilities^there is great stress on the qualifications 
of the ministerscmd officials. Moreover, since counsellors and 
officials owe their position to the king and are to be responsible 
to him,their success in administration and influence inthe state 
depend largely upon their ability, integrity and loyalty, which 
enhance the sovereign's trust in them and win public cooperation 
and support. Among the numerous qualifications prescribed by our 
sources as conditions for tie appointment of a minister, it is stressed 
that besides qualities of intelligence,honesty, purity, devotion, 
endurance, statesmanship, experience in administration, influence, 
farsightedness, etc., one must belong to one of the three classes 
of Brahmapa^ Ksatriya and Vaisya, must be born of high family, be a 
native of the country, a hereditary subject of the kingdom (maula) 
and so have a stake in the country and remain there to experience
'Siedh. on Manu, VII • 5 5.
the iesuits of one's advice and action, be possessed of the knowledge
of all sastras, laws and customs, proficient in the art of government,
skilled in the application of the sixfold policy,adept in military
affairs, be of pure conduct and free from all kinds of vice, be
capable of grave consideration of the pros and cons of an issue and
of exclusive devotion to the ways and means, be firmly devoted to
the king, acceptable to the subjects or approved by the people
(,jananai^ sammata; and, above all, be capable of keeping the secrets
1
of policies which have been deliberated. The recruitment to high
offices finally involves severe tests called upadhas, those of piety
*** 2 (dharma), material gain (art ha) , lust (kama) and fear (bhay a) .
The ministers (mantrins) are to be appointed when they have the nec­
essary qualifications and successfully cleared of all tests. But 
those failing in a few are to be given responsibilities in those 
spheres in which they have proved their fitness. The qualifications 
specified are designed to ensure both efficiency and loyalty. Thus,* 
the king should appoint seven or eightyor three, five or seven highly 
qualified ministers to counsel him in all matters of state and many
10n Manu, VII.54; on Yajfi., 1.312. BV, X.5; see also XVIII, 13 ff. 
for disqualifications of the amatya. HA, 1.61-66; RDK, IV.pp. 22 ff, 
XII. pp. 104 ff; Agni, 239.11-15; cf. ktt, IV.18.24-30; Manas, II. 
52-59 ff; E.I., I.w.30-31, 36, 40-41, pp.201-2, 205-6.
2 *  -
HV? X. 1 ■4 • Dharmarthakamabhayegu vyajena parac111aparlkgapam upadha%
On Yajfi., 1.312; EPIC, IV. p.22, 24; , XIX.p. 153 \ 0atur upadha
suddhasya); Medh. on Manu, VII.54.
3-I0L* X.71; see also on Manu, VII.54 prescribes seven or eight ministers 
which Is regarded by Meffiatithi as a restrictive rule. Manas., II.ii, 
57 - seven or eight ministers.
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high, officials to pnf, the state policy into action, and thereby
1
complete the organisation of the government,,
Hvery undertaking of the state is to be preceded by due de­
liberation. Medhatithi says that with his counsellors and finance 
ministers the king should deliberate upon questions of war and peace 
in general (specific details being discussed in connection with 
the sixfold policy); discuss the’state? (sthana), which is fourfold, 
consisting of army, treasury, capital city and kingdom, that is, 
their administration, protection and welfare; ’sources of revenue*
(samudaya) ’such as agriculture, pastures, barriers, trade, fines 
and so forth’; ’means of protection’ (gupti) of the king’s own 
kingdom and ’consolidation of what has been acquired’ (1abdha pr as amana), 
which involves ’the honouring of learned and pious men andjfche con­
tinuance of bounties to them, granting of fresh bounties, and the 
removal of all restraints; merciful treatment of the poor and the 
diseased, the instituting of fresh public sports and rejoicings 
and the continuance of those already in vogue. He shalijjput a stop 
to all abuses regarding the treasury (kosa) and judicial procedure 
and introduce sounder methods of work. If any improper act is perpetrated
by others he shall stop it; but he shall not interfere with any
2
righteous act that may be done by others.’ Our other authorities 
also include all kinds of state business under the deliberative sphere
for list of ministers and high officials vide H.B.S., 111. pp. 112 ff.
2Hedh. on Manu, VII.56; R33K, XII.p.106,108. See also Medh.onManu,
VII. 151-154* three alternative explanations of the eightfold" business 
of the state, especially the ‘‘eightfold business of ■ ' deliberation
comprising 3.) undertaking^what has not been done, 2) the doing of what
(cont.)
of the ministers but Somadeva pointedly remarks that the main functions
of the amatyas concern the revenue, the expenditure, the protection
Us
of the king ( i . e h i s  dharma, . . wife and children;, and
1the maintenance of the army. It is, hcmever, evident from all our
sources that the business of deliberation is divided between external
and. internal affairs. The concentration on issues of protection and 
2
defence, the sixfold policy, finance and army implies that matters 
affecting the independence and status of a state among other states 
are given greater importance during our period, tfe may strengthen this 
suggestion by a reference to the inscriptions and literary works in 
which ministers take special pride in recording that their counsel 
and diplomacy (mantra) made many kings tributaries to their masters. J
It is expressly laid down that the state depends upon mantra 
(counsel or policy arrived at after due deliberation with the counsellor 
This points to the vital place of ministers and officials in the exist- 
ence and prosperity of the state. It is greatly emphasize djthat the 
mantra should be kept strictly secret until the appearance?of the
\ "flk(cont.) has not been done, 3)^refining of what has beenjdone, 4) the
acquiring of the fruits of the act, 5) conciliating, 6) alienating,
giving and 8) employing force*EDK, XII.pp. 107-109- See also
Manas., II.ix.706-721. *
HV, XVIII. 6, 7-12.
Medh. and others on Manu, VII.56; RDK, XII.p.12; also Manas., II.ix, 
706-7, 709, 712.    "
3,
E.I-? pp. 195-207. Mau stone Ins. refers to a family of ministers who 
served the Candella kings. Some of these ministers ascribe the success 
their^masters to their own policy, cf. also Ibid., I, pp. 208 ff - 
BatesJvara Ins.; RDIC, p.l. Laksmldhara claims that his mantra (counsel 
and diplomacy; enabled hismaster to establish supremacy over other king
40n Taj8., 1.344; on Manu, VII.148; EDK, XII.pp. 101 ff.
1the fruits of the undertaking. Somadeva, neproducing Kaufilya,
states that mantra accomplishes the following; 'coming to know
what is not known, definite strengthening of what has become known,
removal of doubt in case of two possible alternatives in a matter,
2
finding out the rest in a matter that is partly known'. Further, 
mantra is said to be fivefold: ’the means of starting undertakings,
Z
pvh »r.§ tufjs m**
to be supplied/ /suitable/
apportionment of time and place, provision against failure, and the
■3
accomplishment of the work1, which would promote the prosperity of
the state. Thus, it is comprehensive and covers all aspects of
•the functions of the state.
According to our texts, the role and place of amatyas is second 
only to the sovereign. They affect the nature of government by 
counselling the king and executing the policies finally approved 
by him. Mutual trust, cooperation, dependence and regard between 
the sovereign and his advisers are essential for the smooth running
of the government and progress and prosperity of the state. The
ministers have to check any rash and impulsive move of the sovereign, 
whose duty it is to treat them as parents and preceptor,^ thereby
1..
On Yajfi., 1,344; HV, A, 28. A karyasiddhe ralcgl tavyo ni ant rah,
tob  X.23; cf. EA, 1.15.20; Agni. 241,3-4; cf. KB, ;ai.30, slso
Jayamahgala comm .
HV, X.25; cf. KA? i. (5.42; Medh. on Manu, VII.146; Manas, II.i: 
697-98. "
implying a willingness to submit to wholesome ministerial restraints.
It is the duty of the ministers to speak the right thing in an amiable 
manner without regard for the king's displeasure* For, if the 
ministers and the officials indulge in pleasing the king by giving
him such advice as is palatable to him, instead of speaking the right
- - 1 
thing, says ICatyayana, the kingdom would be speedily ruined. Though
the king enjoys the finality of decision and is not bound by his
2ministers' advice, he is normally strongly advised not to overrule 
it, for Somadeva says, 'he is no king who acts in disregard of his
'S
ministers', and the king who makes himself . self-sufficient^destroys 
4everything. He further warns that the most serious of all dis- 
affections is that of the leading ministers and officials. X^ractical
wisdom consists in acting according to the counsel of the chaplain,
6 *ministers, and the commander-in-chief, However, according to Som.es-
vara, the best government is that in which the ministers are under
complete control of thoovereign, and that in which they exercise
royal powers and relegate the sovereign into the background is the lowest.
,lvp. 24 quotes ICatyayana (Kane 11-15)*
l^iedh. on Hanu, VII 56; Manas., II.is,716.
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Me have some historical instances of kings flouting their
**» A M
ministers’ solemn advice, as for instance Vakpatiraja II Mufija of 
Malhwa who invaded the kingdom of the Qalukyaj • of Kalyapi against
the wishes of M s  chief minister Rudraditya and crossed the river
■*-» 1 Godavari against his specific instructions never to do so; or
VigraharsQa IV who brushed aside his chief minister who did not
2
want him to incur the displeasure of the Muslims. But we also 
have instances of ministers’ plotting against their masters and 
succeeding in reversing the policy, as for example the action of 
Ajayadeva, the chief minister of the Candella king Paramardideva, 
who has been charged by the Muslim authors with having been against 
his master’s submitting to the invader ICutub-ud-din and finally 
holding out against the Muslims for some time either by assassinating 
Paramardideva or reversing the latter*s decision on his sudden death.^ 
It may be added that sometimes a minister or ministers maintained 
the state during the incapacity of the king or in situations contingent 
upon the extinction of the dynasty caused by the removal of the 
sovereign by death or otherwise.
D. 0. Ganguly, History of tie Paramara Dynasty, p. 59.
2
D. Sharma, Marly Chauhan Dynasties., p. 61.
S^. K. Mitra, The Marly Rulers of Khaiuraho_, pp. 126-127. 
H. S. Bose, History of thqpandellas, pp. 98-99,
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Ra-^ Jra, or Janapada (Territory and its people)
By ras1;ra or janapada is meant the territory and its people, which.
according to the Agnl Purapa, is the most important constituent element
of the state. ' As a typical example, Somadeva says, *ARkhtfA is so
called because it shines with the abundance of its cattle, crops,
2gold and riches’. He further defines ;]anapada as that which is the 
residence of the people char ac ter iiTed by the classes and the stages 
of life (TOr^asrama) and is the source of the production of various 
articles.^ Cur sources provide a catalogue of the excellences of the 
territory and its inhabitants for an ideal state . They bring out 
clearly^qualities of a ragtra such as its physical features, terri­
torial suitability for economic development and defence, possession 
of vast arable land, natural resources and mineral deposits, production 
of manufactured goods and varied rich substances, flourishing trade 
and industry etc. A territory so richly endowed should be inhabited 
by a socially organised population consisting mainly of the productive 
castes^obedient and loyal to the sovereign and antagonistic to the enemy, 
and finally^there should prevail a wise government and efficient adnin- 
stration.^ These characteristics are still prised by a modern state
^Agni, 239.25 Rajyanyaaam varaiy ragfcram. •, ;cf,Ykt., 39.p. 6.
JH* ■iaE¥1 p
HV, XL X.l. Pasudhanyahir apyas amp ad a raj ate jsobh ate JL ti ra § fram.
Ibid. , XIX* 5* Janasya varpLasramalak^a&asya dravyotpatter va padagi 
sthanam iti janapadaR, cf. also ICA, XIII*4.3.
4'0n Yajh., 1*321; On Mam, VII* 69, VIII. 22. Agni, 239.24-27; 
sane as KIT, IV, 49-54; HV, XIX*8, see also 9-10 for the demerits of 
rag fra; Manas «« I I . 151-54. Cf. also SDK, V.pp. 39-40. quotes Tajil 
Manu and^ Katsya, 217.2-3, cf. KA, VI. 1.8.
A
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in its territory and citizens. However, it is true that the idea 
of nationalism as such could not be fostered even during our period, 
although the preceding qualities of an ideal ragfcra betray an 
implied knowledge of its basic requirements and seek to inculcate 
them in the population.
The topics of town and rural administration, development of 
land, construction of irrigation works, and. protective works such 
as fortifications, care of rivers, trees and cattle 3 \ the pro­
tection of property-} • the preservation of territorial integrity
■ ^he encroachments by others and enemies1 invasions are dis-
1cussed under this constituent. It is expressly stated that the
qualities of land increase,, the excelJencey of the countr^nd those
2, enhance the prosperity of the king. It clearly em­
phasizes the inter-dependence of the king and his government and
the rastra. Somadeva alscjstates that both the ,janapada and the king
5are each other1s protectors*
It may be interesting to know that Somadeva considered the dis­
tinguishing mark of a desa (country) to consist in its contribution 
to the king’s treasury and army, and that of a vigaya (region or 
district) in its provision of elephants and horses for the ruler.^
The loyalty of a village is indicated by .'its contribution to the aug- 
mentation of the royal army in all its four arms. It is evident
10n Menu, YII. lip ff; also Medh. on Maim, VII. 56; HBIC, VII. pp. 79 ff 
M&naav, II.bl.154 ffr. J k t ., 59.p.6;
o
Manas., IT J iu  151; ^  cf. KIT, IV. 48. 
-Vl, MIX.8,
'hrbid., XIX. 2-5 *
5]TV9 XIX. 22.
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that Somadeva’s definitions tend to assess the value of the state
territory fromihe standpoint of its military and economic advantages
to the ruler and indicate that the possession of a strong army was not
only requisite for the king^but * also the hallmark of the power
and prosperity of a stable state. It is not unlikely that in this:
and. many other respectsjSomadeva shows the impact of the contemporary
politics which echoed with the clash of swords^putting a premium
upon the treasury and array- The Agni Purapa regards the possession
1of the weak neighbouring princes as a quality of the king‘s but ICauJilya
2has included it among those of the j^ anapacla as well, which
implies that the ideal of conquest • Se t our authorities before 
every energetic Hindu ruler needed ^fdv'fis^ a sound treasury, . a well 
equipped army, as well as feeble opponents, Since not every ragjgra 
can be expected to possess all the advantages of an ideal territory 
its ruler has to do his best with all such qualities as his kingdom has
The king, however, could and did increase the qualities of his state
territory by developing its latent potentialities as well as by 
adding ne*Jfcerritory through occupation and annexation.
burg a or Pura (port or fortified city)
Somadeva says,, ’ durga ^fort or stronghold^ is that by the use of
1
Agni, 239*4.
2
KA, VI.1.8.
^Cf. Hatsya, 217.1-5*
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which the enemies come to harm or which removes calamities of onefs
1 nown side caused by the efforts of evil persons1. the king is 
asked to build fortresses and establish his capital there. Byhaspati 
quoted by Lak§smidhara states that the king should construct a fort 
with ramparts and gates for the protection of himself, his wives,
p
the people and the accumulated wealth. Our authorities concur
that the purpose of the forts is to provide a well protected residence
for the king and the high officials of the state, to safeguard one*s
people, treasure and person, to enable the ruler to withstand sudden
threats to his rule from internal insurrections and external aggressions,
3
and to wage a defensive war and obtain refuge in times of catastrophe, 
h Ais essential to the waging of mantrayuddha (war of wits; and 
tusniip-yuddha (secret warfare). Secured within the ramparts, a 
king could effect a change in his politico-military strategy by talcing 
recourse to the dual policy (dvaidhibhava)^ and also to instigate the
«51k'
non™committed kings of the udasjna and madhyama types against his 
assailant. In ordinary times a king could employ expedients against 
his enemy with impunity and protect his subjects from th^Latter’s 
blandishments and machinations, as a fort enables the king to distinguish 
between friends and foes, for the entry into^fort is to be regulated
3
by a permit system. The defensive merits of tie fort, from a purely
jL j t .as
hV9 -XX. 1. Yasyabhiyogat pare dukha^ i gaochanti va
syasyapado gamayat^jLti durgam.
2RDK, 7.p.4:0.
XX.Iff; On Yajn., 1.321; Medh. on Hanu, VII.73; Agni, 241.19-21;
cf. KITP XIV.28-29- also oomms; lianas., II.xv.950.
^Medh. on Hanu, VII,167; K&, II•1 3. explanations of dvaidhibhaya.
51TV, XX. 6-7.
Military point of1 view, are admirably summed up by Hanu,(of ten 
quoted by our sources)) thus: ’A single bowman, standing on a rampart, 
can fight against a hundred, and a hundred can fight against ten
1thousand; it is for this reason that fortification,, ha's, been enjoined.1
2Ports were of two types; natural and artificial, but the
kinds of forts mentioned in our sources vary from four to nine. Most
of our authors, following Manu, enumerate six kinds of forts: desert
fort, land fort, water fort, forest fort, one fortified by arned
forces (nrdurga), and mountain fort, To these Somesvara adds three
A
more: those built with stones, baked bricks and mud.' These forts
had to have sufficient room inside? somewere veritable cities withI*-i
all the necessaries of princely accommodation. Our sources pre­
scribe that forts, especially those that are capitals, should possess 
plenty of food, fodder, and. fuel, drugs and other requisites, g;old 
and silver, horses, elephants, and draught animals, armouries, and. 
stock-piles of weapons; further, artisans, physicians, and also 
Brabuiapas to perform benedictory rites or to ward off evils, and a 
strong garrison in order to meet any assault and withstand a long
1 pJ7.
Hanu, VII.74, also comms; Hanu is quoted in Ykt, y.118; RDK,
V . p. 41 *
z z . 2 ; Ykt., 119.p. .17.
-On Mam;., 711.70; On Ya.jS.. 1.321; Agn j., 222.4-5; of. Vdh. ,1126.6-7;
Hatsya, 217.6-7; Rl)k, V. p. 40; Manas., II.y. 541-42.
4 «*kanas., ll.y.542.
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siege, if necessary.^ Detailed instruJctionsjfor the construction
2of forts of various types are found in many sources* Somadeva
in particular emphasises that a fort must have a secret. exit,
3otherwise it will he a prison. I-Ie further prescribes that nobody
should be allowed, to enter or leave the fort without a pass or
4without being searched.
It is evident from our sources that forts were an integral part 
of political life. Cur authors talk about them in terras of ‘their
5use. Some even give directions as to the capture of enemy forts.
As to their importance, Bhoja observes that the ordinary military
strength of a king is no strength; his real strength lies in forts#
because a king even with a meagre force becomes powerful o e  account
6of their invincibility. Somadeva also states that anybody could
7conquer a country without a fort. A king, he says further, has 
no refuge without a fort, like a bird let loose from a ship inihe 
midst of an ocean.® In fact,the role of forts in the defence of 
the kingdoms during our period is immense and siege warfare occupies 
an important place in the history. Their importance can hardly 
be exaggerated for an age when the impregnable ramparts could hold
Cn Eanu, VII.75-76; BDII, V.pp. 39 ff; Katsja, 217.2 ff; Vdh.. 11.26. 
20 ff; BV, XX.3; Hanas., II.5. 549-55; 'Ami. 239.29.
hj)IC, V.p.42 ff; Kedh. On Hanu, VII.70.
ym ,  XI.3; Manas.. II.v.550.
'Ibid. , XI.7.
Ibid., XX.6; Nanas., II.xx.1061 ff.
6
Jilt0? 117, 141 ff. pp. 17, 21. Cf. Sargngadharapaddhati, Ho. 1363 - 
It states that tie purpose of a fort cannot be had even from a thousand
(cont.)
74
out against a vastly superior army and a powerful king was obliged 
to retreat because his fortifications were inadequate to meet the enemy,
Eosa (Treasury)
The kosa (treasury) is essential to the state. Somadeva says
that the kosa is that which'increases or strengthens the army of a
1 ***king in prosperity and adversity. The Agni Rirapu considers it
as the main'"stay of the state and the means to the external consummation
of the Trivarga (i;e. three ends of human endeavours vis., dharma,
\ 2artha, aid kama). According to our sources an excellent treasury is
one which is lawfully acquired by one's ancestor or oneself, contains
various kinds of big jewels and large cash, and which car|withstand a
great calamity even of a long duration involving heavy expenditure
and little collection.^ Its proceeds should be vast and disbursement
limited, like the water pot of an ascetic which has a wide mouth for
4filling but a narrow hole for discharge. The accumulation of funds
(cont.) elephants end a lakh.of horse*
EX. 4.
^Ibid.,
M.f X2CC.1.
:ni, 241-22; cf. IOI, JtflV. 32-33, Manas., II.iv.539.
1 
2.,
^HV, XXI.2; Ibid., 239.30; SDK, VIII.p.94; cf. KIT, .IV. 61-62; 
KA, VI. 1.10.“
4Ibld,, XVIII.7; cf. OT, IV.60,
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was required for the purpose , of launching state undertakings,
increasing wealth, promoting happiness through its enjoyment,
maintaining dependents, state officials, servants, army, etc., and
1above all, for advancing in dharma.* It was thus not only a source
of human satisfaction, but also a means of achieving the ends of 
the state. A king with a depleted treasury oppresses the subjects 
(paurajjanapada), ^ who7in consequence*desert the kingdom. The king 
is also forsaken by his attendants, .and supporters, for none serves 
without subsistence and thus, causing disaffection among the 
prakptls, he ruins himself through tyrannical rule and expos-es 
the state to the attack of the enemy. It was laid down by our 
thinkers that such a state deserves to be subjugated by another 
powerful ruler. In view of these perils, the king was told that
the’kosa^not his breath,is the life of the king; It is that by trialch
%
he exists, and not by his’
Even today a sound economy is the first requisite of a stable 
and just government; it helps to determine the position of one state 
with regard to others. Indian political thinkers rightly regarded
it as ’power1 and It is rightly stated that the foundations of rulership 
are in the treasury. Such statements clearly emphasise that the state,
Ykt., 31.  p. 5; cf. IQI, I?, 62; KDK, ¥111. p. 87; Hanas. 31.IV. 55 9;
Agni_, 241.22.
2BV, XXI.6.
Ibid., XXI.10. 
Ibid., XXI.5, 7; Ykt., 30-31.p.4-5.
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no less than the Individual, requires rich sustenance for its 
upkeep and the fulfilment of its ends. This emphasis, however, 
does not indicate either that the state is an economic institution 
or that it is determined by economic factors,"but merely shows one
importsjit
of its aspects». _ . Somadeva is right when
1he declares that ’one who has money in hand conquers*, for 
the kosa increases the army and enhances power.
Bala or Dapgn (Army or armed forces)
The sixth constituent element of the state is called bala or 
da.p.r],a which in this context means army or armed forces, komadeva
says, * bala (army) is that which, for the sake of gifts of wealth
and endearing remarks ,( p r iy a- bha s an a) strengthens and shields 
the king’s welfare in all conditions, by warding off the enemy,’ *'
The author of the Agni Bura&a writes that’ force (.dn'Q.Jn) tends to 
create friends and foes alike, and enables a king to acquire wealth*.. 
to conquer his adversaries /and/ to accomplish with despatch, a 
work requiring time for its completion... \  In fact, a strong army 
is indispensable to the state, and our authorities, by calling it 
dagj.a, which primarily denotes the coercive power of the state to 
inflict punishment on the wrong-door, Imply that a state is ultimately 
maintained by the army.
In, xa.a.
2 mi, x x i m
3jBgni, 2-4D* 23 ; tf* K N , X(V, .
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The Agni^  Parana further describes the excellences of a good
army. It says, 1 an army comprising hereditary troops (maula),
thoroughly obedient and disc iplined, firmly united, well paid, well-
known for bravery and manliness, skilful in handling all kinds of
weapons, commanded by experts in the art of war, trained in various
modes of warfare, crowned with legions of warriors, swarming with
elephants and horses, purified by the nira;fana ceremony, accustomed
to staying abroad and to trouble and distress, indefatigable in
fight, having its ranks filled with never vacillating kgatriyas,
1is excellent.*' These merits of the army are repeated in other 
sources.
Traditionally, 'he army consists of four parts, viz., elephants,
2
cavalry, chariots and infantry. But Lakgsmldhara, quoting Bhima, 
in the Hahabhar at a, describes the eightfold army, which distinguishes 
four more constituents: compulsory labour (vigti), navy, intelligence
corps or spies (carah) and guides (daisikah or natives of the invaded 
country)^ In other works, the army Is said to be sixfold and the 
fifth and sixth constituents are named as treasury and mechanics^' 
or mantra(counsel and diplomacy) and kosa (treasury)."1 The texts
^Agni, 239.31-33, same as IgJ, IV.65-6£T; cf. KA, VI. 1.11; HV, XXII. 13.
2Medh. on Hanu, VII.56? Ykt, 43.p*6; 1TV, XXII. 2 ff.
JRD1C, IX.p.93; also ibid., Intro., p.65. Lakjynidhara interprets vigjfi 
as ’ compulsorily recruited labour corps (balalg karepa akpstalg 
karmakarah )’ but Hangaswami Interprets it as ’conscripts’. However, 
his Interpretation of daisikah as 'natives of the invaded country re­
cruited as guides’, seems correct.
"h-ledh. on Hanu, VII. 189.
5A£ni, 242.2; cf. El, XK. 24.
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emphasize an elaborate organization of armed forces and the pro­
motion of all-round strength of the state in which they also
realised the importance of the power of counsel and diplomacy and 
treasury. further, they dilate upon the relative effectiveness 
of each of the traditional four army divisions and describe their 
equipment as well as the country and seasons best suited for their 
operation.
The army comprises six classes of troops? mania (hereditary
troops), bhytya (hired troops), sxeig.1 (soldiers belonging to guilds 
%tdA/iks~ &t at&vl bale- (jVnasfc -troops); 
or corporations), mitra (troops of allies) and amitra (troops that
once belonged to enemies). ‘ Several authorities hold that each
preceding class of troops is superior to the succeeding one in
2view of their loyalty, efficiency, and overall effectiveness.
Detailed descriptions of these different classes of troops, tieir 
recruitment, training, discipline, pay and rewards, are found in our 
texts. There is, however, great emphasis on the training of elephants 
and horses and the unity and cohesion among the soldiers, their fit­
ness and loyalty. Somadeva says that a small but good and well-knit
army is better than a vast herd of men. for disorganized and weal-:
— —  —  —
Medh. on I-Ianu, Til .185; Agnzi, 242.1 - the printed text has Phut a and 
sropi in place of bhrtya and srepi which have been translated by 
I-h II. Dutt . as 1the front or vanguard and the rear’; cf. KN, XIX.3; 
lianas, II.v1.556 ff; Ykt, 44 P*7; HV, XXII. 12 - Somadeva omits amitra- 
bala but makes uj) the six by differentiating between bhrtaiia (retainers) 
and bhrtya (hired troops); see also Udepur prasasti of‘kings of Malwa, 
SLIn Tl-Pp. 233-36, v.19.
Agni, 242.2; cf. El, W . 3 ;  M ,  XXII. 12 5 cf. KA, IX.2.15 ff. :Ect.,
44.p.7.
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1 ttroops cause the destruction of his hest division, Lak^mrdhara
also observes that a king may conquer a territory, even with a
2
small army which is loyal, well-fed and in good spirits#
Thus, the army was indispensable and by including it among 
the constituents of the state, our authors showed their practical 
approach to the problems of government and particularly of defence.
MITRA or SUHRT (Ally or Friend)
The seventh constituent element of the state is mitra or suhrt 
which denotes an ally or a friendly state. Medhatithi says, 1 an 
ally is one having the same end in view; as it h as been said:
"nex t to him comes an ally (mitram tasmad anantaram)M*•  ^ This 
latter reference alludes to the definition of mitra in the context
mm
of the maadala (circle of states). Vi j ftaae s var a, Kulluka and others 
clearly bear out this cross-classification;? According to the prin­
ciple of the ma&dala, a king or state beyond the state called enemy 
(ari). who is immediately next to the king himself^ is the ally (mitra) ♦ 
Such an ally is called pr alert a (natural) merely on the basis of the 
geo-political position of the state itself. The common purpose of
1m. xxx. 16-17.
2RDK. IX.p.95.
'’On Mam, IX. 294;
4Ibid.. 711.158; also Agni. 235.21.
5Ibid.. IX.294; VII.158; On Ya.1H.. 1.353, 345.
Ibid.. VII.158; Ibid.. 1.345. Agni. 233.14-15; NV, XXIX.20;
RDIC, XII. 107,110.
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these two states arises from the presumption of the enmity of the
intervening state to both of them, and hence the common need of
protection against it, Thus, notwithstanding the different kinds of
allies, the one who is conceived of as the prakyti of the state is
the prakyta-mitra (natural ally), via,, the king or state beyond
one's neighbouring state*
This interpretation, however, presupposes the existence of a
neighbouring king or state who is termed prakytari (natural enemy)
1by Vijhanesvara and who is treated by Kaujiilya as if he were an
2 -eighth element of the state. But prakrtari is never recognised
as a constituent element o f the state as such since this would
undermine the cohesiveness and concordance and militate against
the promotioncf the welfare of the state. Further, the inclusion
of the enemy is against the conception of sovereignty, for
other prakytis '...when they operate become subordinate to the ex-
3
cellences of the king*. However, the inclusion of an ally as a con­
stituent element of the state and cognizance of the enemy state 
demonstrate the appreciationof the external aspects of sovereignty 
and of the fact that a state cannot be conceived in isolation from 
others. It is forthwith recognized that external allies are essential
XOa Ya.iH.. 1.345.
2cf. KA, VI.1.13-15.
\ k .  VI. 1.15.
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1
for the defence and progress of the state and that inter-state 
relationships are basic to the idea of the state in a wider geo­
political sphere*
Somadeva briefly states that *one who supports /lit* **t6
-r 2Jy in adversity as in prosperity is an ally*. This
definition together with Medhatithi* s interpretation of an ally 
being *one who has the same end in view* provides a fairly sound 
basis for an alliance and the condition of its continuity* Ordin­
arily two classes of allies, natural (saha,ja) and acquired (kytrima) 
are distinguished, but some authorities have a threefold classi- 
fication: torn (sahaja), such as 'a sister's son, a father's sister's
son and the like1; natural (prakrta)* 1 the ruler of the state next
beyond the adjoining state*; and acquired (krtrima), one *who has
4done a good turn or towards whom some good has been done** Soma­
deva classifies allies as a constant ally (nitya mitra), one who 
is protected or one who protects without a motive; a born (sahaja) 
ally, one who is related by ancestry; and an acquired (krtrima) ally, 
one whose livelihood and protection depend on the friendly relation­
ship*^ Lakgmidhara, quoting the Matsya Purana* classifies allies as
1Medh. on Manu. ' .4^.296.
2 -
MY, XXIII. 1: Yah sampadiva vipady api medyati tan mitram*
3Medh. on Manu. VII.158.
Mit. on Ya.jn., 1.345, 353; Kulluka on Manu, IX.294; RDK, X.p.96.
5NV, XXIII.2-4.
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those who are allies for generations, enemies of the neighbouring 
enemy (samantas ca tatha ripoh). and acquired allies. fhese classi­
fications of the ally show various grounds of alliance such as common 
purpose, mutual defence, ancestral bonds, heredity, relationship 
andself-interest,and include a wide range of persons who are treated 
as allies.
It may be suggested that the classifications of allies were so
** 2comprehensive that they could even include the samantas (feudatories),
whose relations with their overlord often partook of the nature of
allies. The epigraphic and literary evidence shows that the role of
leading samantas. some of whom were relatives, in the internal affairs
3of their overlord, such as rebellion, and in the latter*s external 
undertakings, particularly campaigns of conquest, was similar to that
RDKt X.p.96; cf. RHP,_p.277, which says that the Vig&udharmottara Purapa 
reads 1 ami tram on tatha ripob* for the Matsya passage samantas oa tatha 
ripoh. X .V .Rangaswami Aiyangar, EPIC (intr. p.6l) translates the latter 
as 1 discontented feudatories or the enemies of the enemy*. In this con­
text, however, * discontented feudatories* is a wrong rendering, M.N.Dutt 
(Agni, (tr.) II, p.835) is also mistaken in translating samanta as 
*the feudatory or the dependent estates of an empire* in a context where 
it clearly means the neighbouring king, who, according to the mapdala 
theory, is a natural enemy. On this question see Lallanji G-opal,
* Samanta - Its varying significance in ancient India* in J.E.A.S.,
1963, p. 21 ff.
2 «.
» PP* 43 includes even friendly ministers under the category
of ally.
^Medh. on Manu, IX.294; of. Agni, (tr.), II, p.865. Butt is mistaken 
in his translation of the Agni, 240.20-22. Ihe verses are reproduced 
from the Kamandakiya Hitisara (XIV* 28-29), which describe the uses of 
the fort, and not the duties of feudatories as wrongly stated by Butt,
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of the allies, Somesvara describe^ . different grades of samantas and 
entrust^ feudal relations to the qrare of the Minister for Peace and
• M  1
War (sandhivigrahika) , This indicates the importance and the 
nature of political r elations between the samantas and their overlord. 
Even petty feudatories, who depended on the king for their sustenance 
and protection, can be classified as acquired allies in view of Soma- 
deva*s definition, While these possibilities exist, the determination 
of the status of the various grades of samantas (feudatories, vassals 
or tributaries) from the standpoint of the seventh constituent of the 
state is uncertain, because our authorities do not discuss it. In 
fact,ihe traditional theory of state has no place for the feudatory 
or tributary relations. Our authorities retain it as a relic of 
the past, and while they try to re-interpret it, theyihil to include 
many facts of contemporary political organization, particularly the 
samanta system, although samantas as such are sometimes mentioned.
Our authorities prescribe many qualities of the ideal ally, the 
prominent ones of which are: allied from the days of the father
and grandfather, constant, truthful, grateful, loyal, righteous, 
nobly born, of pure conduct, well-versed in the science of polity, 
having many partisans and contented prakytis (i.e. other constituents 
of state as officials and subjects), persevering in action, not having 
a separate interest, free from vices especially those concerning women
^Manas., II .127-28.
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and wealth, ready to attend in calamity without being asked, not 
becoming jealous of the friend when the latter is pleased or angry, 
not being selfish at his friend*s cost nor intriguing to appropriate 
his wealth by deceit, vigilant in carrying out his friend1s ob­
jectives, faithful in prospei’ity and adversity and capable of sacri-
1
ficing wealth and life for his friend* The principal characteristic
of an ally is the identity of his and his friend’s interests and it
is frankly admitted that the real basis of alliance or friendship is 
2self-interest.
The higher purpose of making allies is to secure virtue (dharma) , 
wealth (artha) and fulfilment of desires (kama) or happiness (sukha) ; J 
in other words the ends of the ruler asjwell as of the state. Accord­
ing to the Agni Pur ana, an ally promotes his friend* s welfare by per­
forming many duties, such as restraining other allies from throwing
off allegiance, destroying his friend’s enemies and helping him with
4men and money in calamities. Owing to these important services a 
king is advised to preserve zealously his allies by truth and con- 
sistency as regards the promises made. The Agni Purana, repeating
Kamandaka, states that alliances are made and strengthened by a
visit even from a distant country, coming out to a ccord a hearty
Kulluka on Manu. VII.209; SDK, X.p.96-97; FT, XXIII.5; Agni. 239. 
34-37; cf. HI, IV.66-73. ~lanas.. II. vii.685-86. Of. KA,VI.1.12.
SDK, X.p.97 quotes Mbh.; Medh. on Manu, VII. 177., cf. HI, IV.73.
Agni. 239.36; cf. KM, IV.70; Manas.. II.vii.686.
4rbid, 241.24; cf. IBid. XIVT..38.
50n Ya.iH.. 1.352; SDK. X.p.96.
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welcome even from a distance, cordial and unambiguous conference, and
1
fulfilment of promises.
Perhaps owing to the varied services of allies several authorities 
like Manu, Yajfiavalkya and their commentators regarded the gain of an 
ally even superior to that of money or of land, in a king’s inter- 
state enterprise. In fact,the chief value of an ally lay in his being 
an element of a king’s power as he could be invoked to promote self- 
aggrandizement in prosperity and to safeguard the state in adversity.
In conditdois of no inter-state laws alliances helped to maintain and 
promote the status and power of a king in inter-state relations,
Thus, a state comprising these seven constituent elements,in­
dicating its sovereignty and poweryis the subject of the theory of 
inter-state relations.
Classifications of states and the scone 
of inter-state relations 
States were distinguished in inter-state relatinns on the basis 
of power rather than any principle of international law. Independent 
states were graded as superior, equal or inferior in accordance with
3
the condition of tkeir power in relation to others. The concept of 
power was threefold; power of counsel or statesmanship (mantrasakti);
1Agni, 239.35; of. K|, IT.69.
Slanu. VII.208; Ya.1g.. 1.352.
5NT, XXIX.41; cf. KA, VI.2.35; IX.1.2ff.
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of might (prabhu-sakti)» which consisted in the power of the treasury 
and army; and of energy ($ytsaha-sakti) which indicated a ruler’s 
valour and resolution to play an active role in the internal as well 
as external affairs.1 The conditionjo f the threefold power indicated 
whether a state was advancing, stable, or declining. This influenced 
the status of its ruler in inter-state relations. In fact, the 
selection and pursuit of the different measures of the sixfold foreign 
policy, as well as the appropriate useo f the political expedients, 
were conditioned by one’s power in relation to others. Kings of 
superior, equal or inferior grades merited different kiiids of treatment 
in situations of peace and war. The degree of one’s power in relation 
to others could even compromise an independent course of action in 
external relations and could reduce a king to a semi-independent 
status. However, the power principle only classified the states 
and graded the rulers; the title of the state as such depended on 
the traditional definition of ra.iya.
While most authorities describe grades of kings on the b asis 
of power, Narada and Gopala quoted by CapgjLesvara, a fourteenth 
centurywriter on polity, distinguish three types of kings in inter­
state relations on thebasis of the payment of tribute, the exercise 
of sovereignty (consisting in the independence to award punishment), 
and the nature of political allegiance. According to Narada, the 
three types of king are; the emperor (samrat or cakravartin), one
H.V.. XXIX.36-40; cf. KA., VI.2.33; Agni. 241.1; ttaaas.. XX. chs. 
8-10. See below, pp. f8o if.
who levies tribute from all kings; the tributary king (sakara- 
adhisvara ), one who pays tribute monthly to the emperor, and the 
non-tributary or semi-independent king (akara- adhi svara), one who 
sends tribute to the emperor at his will (svecchaya) pretending an 
order to pay or under the pretext of sending messages (sandesa 
vya.i ena)
A further twofold classification of the semi-independent (akara) 
and tributary rulers is found in Goplla's tojmifpi ICmadhenui 'There
are two kinds of adhlsvaras (kings): There is akara (lit. non-
tributary^ by reason of the emperor's favour. The first gives dan&a
etc. (punishment1) at his will and pleasure /i.e. h® ^as absolute
jurisdiction in the exercise of coercive authority/; the second as
a favour /of the emperoi/.I£or a smrti says, "But 0 Destroyer of
enemies, the akara does everything himself, provided he enjoys the
favour of the emperor; for then he acts simply in accordance with
justice /lawT/l1 This may be taken with a second meaning; the first
gives some tribute for the sake of peace (samartha) pretending an order 
* *•* 2to pay (sandesa vyajena).1 It is evident from this remarkable
passage that the criterion for the distinction between two types 
of semi-independent kings is the exercise of sovereignty in internal 
affairs. If this is done by virtue of one's own power it indicates 
complete independence and absolute jurisdiction. If, however, the
i - .
IiUt! • &. t P • 3 *
2Ibid., p.4*
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power of penal justice is exercised under political f avour or by 
grace of another superior authority, it implies dependence even 
in the internal affairs* Gopala clearly says that the first type 
of semi-independent king gives tribute for the sake of peace, which 
indicates that he is independent even in those spheres of his 
external a ctivities which do not come into conflict with the emperor*
In fact, both these types of non-tributary rulers have semi­
independent status. 'The first type may be a weak neighbour, anxious 
to maintain peace with the emperor in the interest of his independence 
and the second may be a ruler, who has submitted to the emperor for 
the sake of retaining a semi-independent status and thereby escaping 
being redueed to a dependent status. This distinction between the 
emperor and semi-independent rulers points to the fact that sovereignty 
is a|r elative concept in inter-state relations, because, although the 
first type of semi-independent ruler enjoys absolute jurisdiction 
within his kingdom, and pays tribute to the emperor at his will in 
the form of presents under some pretext, his status in the inter­
state sphere is compromised owing to the p resence of another more 
powerful ruler,‘fewhom he owes some sort of political allegiance.
Somadeva also implies a similar knowledge of political relationships 
when he advises a we ale king to appease his powerful neighbour by giving 
him occasional gifts in order to avoid the possibility of being 
forced to pay tribute on stipulated basis which would compromise 
his independence.^
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The two sub-classes of the tributary kings (sakara) ares
fOne who has been invested with danda etc* /"i.e. criminal juris­
diction and so on or power to award punishment/ and one who has not 
been invested with daa&a etc* From the judgement of the first there 
is an appeal /Eo the empero3$ by which the punishment, when carried 
out (?), is not annulled; but the authority in the judgement of 
the other is not an authority that extends to punishment, but there 
is an appeal from the decision (nyaya). If by mere force he enter­
tains litigants /against his authority, i.e. transgresses his juris­
diction and arbitrarily awards punishment/ thep., in the case of a crime 
with sahasa /violence/, the punishment consists in fining him /by 
the emperoa^ according to the sahasa /damage ?/, in cases other 
than violence, if he /i.e. the tributary/ approaches him, /i.e. 
the emperor/, the emperor should not accept a fee for his grace 
/prasadakara, i.e. tribute brought by the tributary king to obtain 
the emperor*s pardon/, but, by not allowing him audience for two or 
three days put him off /so as to humiliate him ?/. /However/ his 
act is not to be annulled amongst his subjects by the emperor. For 
the Naradlya Smrti says, "all subjects are dependent, only the lord 
of earth is independent". The verse applies only to this class of
ruler /s akara/ here, for it would be impossible in the case of the
1emperor and the rest; and the tradition is to the same effect.1
1 -Raj. R., p.4.
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The above passage makes it quite clear that the sakara rulers
are feudatories and are under the control of the emperor, although
one type has greater autonomy andjpower to award punishment etc.,
the other has only administrative authority. The distinction, however, 
points only to the statusjof tributary kings within the empire; it
does not give them any status in inter-state relations. It may be 
added that there were different grades of feudatories in the empires 
of our period whose powers seem to have varied. The second type of 
sakara may refer to a class of hereditary administrative officers 
with the rank of a feudatory or petty chief within the empire* The 
full-fledged tributary or feudatory appears to have enjoyed greater 
autonomy in the exercise of the coercive authority within hisjuris- 
diction. Thus from the description of the sakara kings, it is evident 
that he is a dependent king, who,therefore, has no status in the 
inter-state sphere. In fact, in the strict terms of the mandala system, 
the feudatories primarily presented problems of what we may call inter­
state adjustments rather thonjinter-state relations* Thus ,there are 
three grades of sovereign kings or statess superior, equal and inferior 
and three types of rulerw: emperor, semi-independent and dependent.
Our sources, however, mention yet another type of king, who can 
be called a protected king and his kingdom a protectorate. The pro­
tectorates are said to come into existence as a result of the policy 
of seeking shelter (samsraya) adopted by weak kings to avert destruction 
in the event of an external aggression or to deter the enemies from 
future harassment of their kingdom. . The status of a protectorate is
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obtained by submitting eitherjto another powerful ruler or/the aggressor 
himself. The obligations of a protected king towards his protector 
are sosweeping in political terms that he becomes virtually a feudatory;’*' 
but his powers seem to have been determine^by the circumstances in which 
the shelter has been sought, as well as whether the protector is the 
invader or some other powerful king. His status, however, seems to be 
that of a dependent king, somewhere between the aforementioned semi­
independent and tributouy kings.
All these types of kings or states existed in the inter-state sphere, 
but they were not entitled to the same status in inter-state relations.
The feudatories or tributaries and protectorates were inferior inter­
state entities because of their being dependent states. Any significant 
political dealings with them implicated their overlord, who would inter­
vene in suci^affairs which affected his supremacy. Injthe history of our 
period we find that although many feudatory kings received recognition 
from their overlord in different ways, they had a second-rate status in 
the inter-state sphere. When, however,feudatories became so powerful 
as to defy their overlord, they could and did improve their status by 
alliance and war with other kings,as for example did the Candellas of 
Jejakabhukti from]bhe time of their king Harsadeva onwards. Although 
the changes in thejpolitical status of kings owing to the vicissitudes 
of power were considered in the context of conquest,the traditional 
theory o^inter-state relations nevertheless dealt with the independent 
states,
XMedh. on Mann. VII.175; cl. KA, VII.15.21 ff
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Chapter III 
MAUD ALA (CIRCLE OF STATES)
The theory of inter-state relations in Ancient India is de­
veloped as a corollary of the concept of the state (rajya). The 
seven constituents of the state include an ally who is a friendly 
king of another state situated immediately beyond the neighbour 
e&lled 'enemy1 (amitra). Thus^inter-state relations are regarded 
as inevitable 011 the basis of the mere existence of the state and 
foreign states are initially distinguished as hostile and friendly.
The inclusion of an ally as an integral constituent of the state 
and the recognition of the enemy as a related political entity 
further reflect upon the concept of sovereignty in its external 
aspect. Its obvious implication is that a state, in order to 
exercise its sovereignty 'unobstructed by and independent of other 
states, has to recognize the limits of its power internally and the 
restraints imposed by its existing among other states externally.
A state has to foster understanding with those with which some basis 
for common interest exists and to deal with those which are inimical 
in order to protect itself and promote its power and prosperity.
Thus the need for recognizing allies and confronting enemies leads 
to the consideration of other existing states.
The purpose of the state is to promote the well-being of its 
subjects, which consists in acquisition (yoga) and security (kgema).
Nv I.p.7. Dharmarthakama-phalaya ca rajyaya namah; cf. RDK, I.Jl 1. i^ infimnw ■™iiinn jw» *wnmiinmi.i.iiii ■i.h'i .m^in r w *u>whm—  iim m dwWuJ * w.hi.th#*
pp. 2-8, III. pp. 20-21; KJJ, IV.7*f; On Manu, VII.151.
These spring from peace (sama) and activity (vyayama), which
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depend on the sixfold policy (gaflguaya), a formula of foreign
policy to deal with enemies. The framework in which the sixfold 
policy operates is the cix’cle of states (mandala),^ which stands 
for the geo-political sphere of action of an ambitious king 
comprising several states arranged in a hypothetical pattern of 
inter-relationships. The objectives of the sixfold policy are to 
ensure the accomplishment of one's own economic and defence under­
takings and to acquire wealth and territory belonging to one's 
enemies. The consequences of tie application of the sixfold 
policy reflect whether a state is advancing, . stable or declining,^" 
which is measured in terms of the threefold power, viz. power of 
counsel or statesmanship (mantrasakti), power of majesty and might 
(prabhusakti) and power of energy (utsahasakti) ? It is thus evident 
that the accomplishment of one's own undertakings and the security 
of their enjoyment,much more than the aggrandizement of one's own 
interests at the expense of enemies, depend on the success of one's 
policy towards others. The assumptions underlying this line of thought 
are, however, fear and need of defence rather than trust and co­
1HY> XXIX.l ff; cf. KA, VI.2.1 ff; Media, on Manu, VII.160; of. Mbh.. 
XII.^4-68; XV.11.5-6.
2
1TV. XXIX.20 ff; cf. KA, VII. 1 J.; Media, on Manu. VII.154-16D & ff 
Agni, 253.13 ff, 234.16 ff, 240.1 ff.
See below, p. ’
XXIX.40;
r- ( f) C X K  t i  r  -
Ibid., XXIX.36-42; cf. Ibid, VI.2.30 ff; see below, pp.Jal-ft.
4HV,  cf. KA, VI.2.35; RDK, XIX.p.154
operation. It also points to the twofold aspect of the problem 
of protection; internal and external, and emphasizes their inter­
dependence, Further, it assumes the conflict of interests among 
states as normal, which is highlighted by our authorities when 
they evaluate the stains of a state in terms of power. Thus,we 
discern a conflict of interests which ultimately turns into a con­
flict of power among states.
Cur authors do not hold a static ideal of stability and order 
for the state? on the contrary, it is dynamic in terms of power 
and prosperity which are again regarded as comparative achievements 
with far-reaching consequences in the struggle for supremacy among 
states. Recognising the natural urge for domination, Somadeva states 
that the nitisastra consists of tantra and avapag the former con­
cerned with the protection of one’s own territory and the latter
1
deals with the acquisition of territory belonging to others.
It is evident that internal administration and foreign affairs are
equally important. The political objective of state activity is
to enhance its power, which, in turn, implies and promotes prosperity,
Thus?the state policy naturally addresses itself to maintaining
and increasing power, and finally, to demonstrating power
2
in internal as well as foreign affairs. The application of 
the sixfold policy has always to be with due regard to one’s
hV, XXX. 45-47 o Tantravapau nitisastram. svamap.da.1 apalanabhiyogas 
tan tram. paramandalavaptyabhiyoga^^vapah;" ~ Abhidhlinacintaman.i, 
III. 379. Cf. On Manu, VII.99 ff; KA, 1.4.3.
^Iledh. on Manu, VII. 103•
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power. The ideals of imperial sway connected with the sarvabhauma 
or cakravartin, samraj; (the lord of the whole world or emperor), 
which were advocated for every king, further accentuate the conflict 
for power and tie struggle for supremacy which follows from the 
nature of the state and its policy.
Thus the inter-, dependence of one state with another for pro­
tection, promotion of prosperity and political ambition, the in­
evitability of competition for material possessions, and the conflict 
of interests defined as power prompted the ancient Indian thinkers 
to study the behaviour of a group of states situated at varying 
distances apart from a state intending conquest and striving for 
hegemony over them. They devised a hypothetical structure of the 
inter-state system and contemplated its governing principles of 
inter-relationship, the underlying motives andthe interplay of 
recognisable and recondite forces, which helped them to evolve a 
general pattern in the light of political happenings. Although 
inter-state relations should touch upon many different aspects 
of a state, our authors concentrated on the political and military 
problems and dealt with economic, religious and cultural issues 
only by implication.
The ancient Indian theory of inter-state relations comprised 
three concepts;
Vll.3*l; see below,}>p. l $ o  ffit
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1) ‘^ e nia^dala (the circle of states or the geo-political inter­
state sphere),
2) the gadgupya (the sixfold policy or sixftistruments or measures
of foreign policy), and
3) the upayas (the means or political expedients).
These three concepts were formulated at an early stage of Indian 
history as they are found fully developed in the Arthasastra and the 
Manu-smrti. However, the antiquity of the theory of mapdala cannot
be ascertained^although its formulation is attributed to some of the
a. ^  ^ 2.
earliest authorities on polity like Usnas, Visalakga, Manavas etc.
£
V.R.R.Dikshitar alleges that Usinas took his idea of the circle of
kings from the Yedic ritual of the twelve-day rite performed by
Brahma in order to acquire power, prosperity, and glory which is
* 2described in the Aitareya Brahmapa. It is, however, impossible
a.
to substantiate Dikshitar's contention as the age of Usnas and other 
authorities cannot be determined. The theory of the ma&dala is 
clearly based on an elaborated concept of the state. What is evident 
from the extant sources is a three-staged development of the theory 
flia&dala by the time it had appeared in the Arthasastra. Simi-
i%l /
larly,the concept of the gadgupya (the sixfold foreign policy,
KN, VIII.20-28.
2WAI, p.311.
See below, pp. I0& f f ,
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namely, sandhi (compact or peace), vigraha (hostility or war), 
yana (marching), asana (staying quiet, pause or waiting), 
dvaidhibhava (dual policy), and sagLsraya (seeking shelter)),3* is
associated with, but does not necessarily presuppose the theory
2map, dal a1. It also shows signs of development from two types 
of policy, peace and war, by the time it had appeared in the 
Arthasastra.^ Finally, the earliest of the three concepts seems 
to be that of upayas (political or diplomatic expedients). Its 
antiquity is indicated by the expedients being the means and 
methods to deal with the everyday affairs ofigie people as also the 
internal problems of a state besides those of foreign affairs^
The upayas originally are four in number: sama (conciliation),
dana (gifts or bribery), bheda (sowing dissension), and danda (force),
a n  \ cs$
to which are later added three mores maya (illusion;, upeksa
(indifference), and indra.jala (incantation or magic). There is some 
overlapping between the sixfold policy and four or seven expedients, 
as for example, sama and sandhi, dagt&a and vigraha combined with yana,<^d 
upekga and asana defined as indifference, but by and large the sixfold
^See below,fp. f f  ■
R.P.Kangle, The Kautiliya Arthasastra: A Study, vol. III. p.248.
^  * .... . I—  ■   TV ii|i,irmWin»Mui»w.ui»>.MMnin  i nm u  i,ip*. HhHp. w K .ti.i, 7 **- *
3KA, VII.1.3-4; ffi, XI. 35-40; see also below, p./77 .
Mit. on Ya.ifi.. 1.346; Medh. on Manu. VII.214-15; a ,  1,13.15 ff;
see below, pp • 3&8 f f ,
Cf, also Vadiraja*s commentary on Mbh., XV.12.1 - Samakaranam dravyadanam 
sambandhakaranam ceti sandhea^qpayatrayam. Yanarqasanam astrasastradida&gU-- 
danam Q®ti vigrahasyopaya trayam. Medh. on Manu, VII.167 calls 
dvaidhibhava an upaya.
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policy is addressed to the inter-state conflict, while the
political expedients are applicable to situations between states
as between men. Further, upayas constitute means to implement the
foreign policy, although these measures are often called policy
(niti) or policies.
It seems that these three concepts, viz. mandala, ga&gupya,
and upayas, appeared more or less independently, but they were
developed and. integrated at a certain stage of the development
of political ideas to form the body of principles governing the
inter-state relations. The mandala concept outlined a hypothetical
inter-state structure related to an ambitious state with a view
to providing the basic knowledge of the potential political attitudes
towards its policy of conquest; ^a&gunya was concerned with the
suitable measures laying out the politico-military strategy of
inter-state conflicts in view of the relative factors of power,
* »
place and time; and upayas embodied means and methods appropriate 
to achieving the objectives of foreign policy.
After this introduction to the development of the theory of 
inter-state relations in general, we shall now proceed to discuss 
each of its three concepts.
^Cf. KH, VIII.42 and its comms. which liken the inter-state system to 
a tree that has four trunks (lit. roots) i.e. the conqueror, enemy, 
middle and neutral kings, eight branches, i.e. subsidiary kings of 
the circle of twelve, states, sixty leaves i.e. five material con­
stituents each of twelve states (see below, pp. f - z o ^ 22 ), two props 
i.e. Destiny and human endeavour, six flowers i.e. sixfold policy, and 
three fruits i.e. advancement, stability, and decline - the three 
conditions of the state. Cf. also Dasakumaracaritqi,viii tr. by Kale,
p.150.
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THE THEORY OF MAffgALA (CIRCLE Off STATES OR ICINGS, OR
INTER-STATE SYSTEM)
The term mafft&ala, which ordinarily means circle, orb, territory, 
administrative division of a kingdom or province, etc. has, however, 
a specific connotation in the context of inter-state relations. It 
indicates a circle or, more precisely, the geo-political sphere of 
an ambitious state1s near and distant neighbours with whom it should 
maintain political and diplomatic relations. The mas, dal a theory, in 
other words, seeks to outline a hypothetical inter-state structure 
primarily based on the principles of geopolitics and power’politics. 
While its fundamental premise is a state or king desirous of con­
quest (vi,j igisu) in order eventually to establish its hegemony over 
its geopolitic sphere, nevertheless each state has to recognise this 
potential patterncf the mandala relationship and conduct its foreign 
affairs accordingly.*1'
The theory of mandala is clearly based on the concept of state. 
Since svami (the lord, sovereign or king) is defined as an inde­
pendent ruler, the mandala deals only with sovereign states and ig­
nores feudatories. The constituent states of the mandala may be of 
any size since size is not a consideration in the definition of the 
state. Initially it distinguishes foreign, states as hostile and
On Manu, VII.154; <3a Ya,m, 1.345; Agni, 233.13 ff; 240.1 ff.
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friendly because the neighbour is described as the enemy and the
king beyond him as an ally according to the concept of the state.
It assumes the conflict of power between states as natural and con™
centrates on the political urge of a powerful king to establish
his hegemony over others. In fact, the masidala theory envisages a
pattern of political relations in a given geo-political sphere from
the point of view of an ambitious and powerful ruler in order to
enable him not only to promote his economic and defence undertakings'
calculated to enhance his power and to ensure greater security, but
also to guide him in. acquiring the wealth and territory belonging
to his enemies, and thus extend his sway through a policy of aggrandize'
ment. Its subject is not only the king, but the whole state. This
is shoxcn by the twofold aspects of the ma&dala structure; the circle
of kings (rajamandala) is distinguished from the corresponding circle
of their material constituents (dravyaprakptis) comprising the
ministers, country and its people, stronghold or fortifications,
1treasury and army. The purpose of this distinction and its import­
ance for the foreign policy consist in enabling the king to reckon 
the total power and potential of his state in relation to. others 
in the inter-state sphere.
As already oemarked, it seems that the theory of ma&d&la- underwent 
development an. three stages. However, it should be emphasized that
On Manu. 7X1.157; HDIC, XII.pp. 107,109; of. KA, VI.2.24-28; KH, 
VIII.24 ff.
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these three stages represent a logical sequence based on an analysis 
of the principal versions of ma^ala, and not necessarily a chrono­
logical one, The basic versions of mandala which suggest these 
three stages of development may be broadly classified as a) the three­
fold mandala, b) the fourfold mandala, and c) the standard mandala
U W W » f L l l»l» H W W  ’ ' WI»I ' KWW*
of twelve kings or states. ¥e shall now discuss each one of them 
separately,
I The threefold ma&dala
The nucleus of the theory of mandala (circle of states) was 
a group of three states related to a fourth one which is fundamental 
to it. The king of the primary state is designated as the vl;]igigu 
(one desiring victory, or would be conqueror, henceforth referred 
to simply as conqueror). ~Yajnavalkya states; 'An enemy (hri), an 
ally (mitra), a neutral (udasina); that is an adjoining one, the 
one next to him, and the one beyond himj who constitute the mandala 
of the conqueror tacitly assumed in the verse, 'should be thought 
of in due order by means such as the conciliation and others (i.e.
A M
upayas)'. Manu, while advocating the fourfold mandala, displays 
the knowledge of this basic mandala when he writes, 'He /the conqueror/ 
shall regardjas his enemy0 his immediate neighbour^ as also those who 
help his enemy; the immediate neighbour of his enemy he shall regard
1 -
Yajh., 1,345; see also comms. esp. Hit.
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as ally; and as neutral the king who is beyond these two*1
Thusfthis basic mandnla approach differentiates three kinds of
rulers besides the conqueror and places them in successive gee-
political contiguity from the vi.jigigu. Both vV&jnavalkya and Manu
are in agreement as regards the pattern of the composition of
ma&dala as well as its political nature. Kaujilya also agrees
with the above geo-political relationship but only as regards
2the conqueror, the enemy# and ally; he does not accept the 
position of the neutral as described in the threefold mandala 
because he postulates a different as well as a larger ma&dala.
Wfl
ICamandaka concludes that a mandala virtually consists of enemies, 
allies and neutrals, but he also disagrees with the above- 
mentioned geo-political place of the neutral. Somadeva sub­
stantially accepts the formulation of the threefold mandala as 
far as the kings in front of the vi,jigigu are concerned, but he
introduces a new constituent called antardhi (buffer king) between
4the conqueror and his enemy. Hem&candra reproduces the definitions 
of the enemy, ally, and the neutral according to the threefold
Hlanu, VII.158; cf. ibid., VII. 177# 180; see also comms. esp. ICull- 
RDg, XII.p.107 quotes Manu.
2KA, VI.2.14-15.
3KH, VIII.89.
%V, XXIX.20-21.
103
.a, but lie does not obviously describe the threefold 
because lutdefines parsnigraha (the enemy in the rear of the con-
f T H wmiM i n m fr  t l r r j i n i f T n i i K MM i i i ' fn u rT  '
1queror) as well. It is thus evident that all authorities accept 
the basic premise of the threefold mandala as regards the inter­
relationship among the conquerorf enemy, and ally, but many of them 
differ 011 the place of the neutral. The threefold mandala may be 
illustrated with a diagram:
Di&^ fwv A/b. 1 A .
difuJtiny, 4 C o n y u W * .
c
£
A
N -  hf€xxbral
1 * W
Abhi dhan a c i n tarn an i, III.596.
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These authorities show that in the formulationjof the basic 
circle of states only three states in addition to the conqueror 
are involved. The nature of their respective relationships is 
determined by the geopolitical factor and the imperial ambition, 
power and policy of the vi;jigigu» This mandala approach to the 
inter-relation of a group of states fairly demonstrates enmity, 
friendship and neutrality as the fundamental political attitudes 
which prevail in the inter-state sphere from the point of view 
of the conqueror’s designs. The relative geo-political nearness 
or remoteness determines the extent of the conflict of interests, 
which, reinforced by the problems of marching agross an inter­
vening kingdom, dictates the corresponding potential political 
attitudes towards one’s near and distant neighbours. It is also 
assumed that common enmity is likely to unite neighbours on opposite 
sides of a state.
Circle of likings or states; An extension o f the threefold mandala 
Yijhanesvara and Apararka commenting on Yajhavalkya and 
ICulluka commenting on Manu, however, elaborated this circle of 
states by stating that the vijigigu is surrounded on each of his 
four sides by a similar set of three kings, viz. the enemy, ally
10n Tajfi., 1.345.
20n Manu. 711.158.
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and neutral in territorial succession. VijKanesvara called it a 
circle of thirteen kings in the shape of a lotus, while Apararka 
and others wrongly described it as a circle of twelve kings. We 
may draw a diagram to illustrate this circle of thirteen kings.
Dia^ rsu-rv Afo* IB *
A
C
E
A
N
ConcjxteTOT* 
N e x itral
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It is evident that thesis smyti commentators while describing 
a concentric band of states around the vitj igigu* s state^which 
is its axis, postulate a naive inter-state structure. The states 
seem to be arranged as contents in cosmology. There is no dismission 
of the relative power of the states involved in the mandala system 
nor is there any attempt made to describe the complexities of 
the aggressive policy of the vitjigigu to establish his hegemony 
over the mandala. It may, however, be mentioned that these parti-
mi m 1 mlt. v w *
fkJZ-
culars are not found in^  smrti texts, although the commentators on 
Manu describe them by borrowing the ideas from the arthasastra or
*03 f
ijfianesvara,
nevertheless distinguish three kinds of enemies, allies and neutrals
Xas natural (prakrta), acquired (krtrima) and hereditary (sahaja), 
thereby emphasizing that the geo-political factor is not the only 
criterion for determining the potential political relations among 
states. The addition of the factors of heredity and cause is quite 
significant as it makes the mandala system flexible.
II The fourfold mandala
A second stage in the development cf the mandala concept seems 
to have been the fourfc04^mandala with its extension into the mandala 
of twelve kings and their sixty material constituents of state. It
1 ** /' **
Mit. on Yajfi., 1.345; also Yisvarupa on ibid.
nitisara works. The commentators on Yajhavalkya, notablw
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is attributed to the ManavajjL (the followers of Manu) ' and discussed
2
in the Manusmyti and its commentaries, although it is also described
.rmrr 'S ATVS ™V /I KM R
in tie Arthasastra, the Kamaadakiya Nitisara, the Rajadharmaka&da 
and other works on polity as another version of the ma&dala.
Commenting on Manu, Medhatithi says, 'Of the said circle of 
kings the following are the principal elements: the king bent upon
conquest (vijigigu), the enemy (ari),the middle king (madhyama) 
and the neutral king (udasina)... ! 'These four lave been described 
as the "root*1 or basic components of the circle; and there are "eight
others11 also - i.e. each ofrhese four have two belonging to each
7
in the shape of the "ally" and the "enemy"... '. Altogether they
8constitute the circle of twelve kings. Lakgmidhara also agrees 
with Medhatithi on the pattern of the composition, namely, that each 
of the four principal kings has an ally and an enemy making a total
icu, VIII.24.
aim, 711.155-57; also comrns.; cf. Mbh., XV.11.1.
3KA, VI.2.24-28. 
ior, VIII.24.
5EDK. XII.pp. 107, quotes Manu, VII.155-57, p.109.
On Manu. VII.155.
7On Manu, VII. 156. Kulluka and other commentators confuse the 
arrangement of twelve kings by describing it exactly on the pattern 
of the standard mandala of Iiautilya, which is, however, different
«« ■■ i— ETnfcW*.! i ■ j1» n i III W V  f * *
from the fourfold mag dala.
8Ibid.
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1of twelve kings in the mandala. In this formulation the exist­
ence of the vijiglgu is explicit, while that of the ally is assumed; 
an entirely new political entity, the middle king, is admitted to 
the mandala. On an analysis the following formation is suggested: 
Group I - Conqueror - his enemy - his ally
" XI - Enemy - his enemy - his ally
u III - Middle king- his enemy - his ally
" IY - Neutral
king - his enemy - his ally
II'A* Circle of separate groups-
This elaboratinn of the fourfold mandala may be called the 
circle of separate groups; for, if the conqueror's enemy of group 
I were the enemy of group II, and similarly the conqueror's ally were 
the enemy's enemy, as would be tie case if the states of the first two 
circles were thought of as lying in the front of the conqueror, 
there would be a total of ten kings and not twelve. Thus, in this 
formulation of the mandala, the geographical relatinn between the 
four principal groups is left unspecified. This may be illustrated 
by a diagram:
1KDK. XXX.p.109.
DldflTS2n A/b* 2/3.
c
M
C - CjSncpxtror 
E *»
M  = MlAaU
/V » N/e-ufcrtaJl
A  s ^ 1U/
E o l c I v  i a s  ' h i s  r v e s p e c t i v - e  e n e m y  £ £ )  o _ n < L  ( / f )  -
II-B- Circle of interlocking groups
It is interesting to find a different version of the con­
stituents of each of the principal groups in the elaboration of 
the fourfold mandala into a circle of twelve states in the Raja- 
nitiprakasa. It quotes from a different text of the ICy tyakalpataru 
Lakgmidhara’s comments on the aforementioned verse of Manu, which
makes the group of each of the principal states comprise the leader,
1his ally and his ally's ally. This formulation of each bloc,
mss
MP, p.323. Yijigigumitram vijigigumitr amitram, arlmitram,
Iftoup X
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incidentally,. is virtually the same as described by ICau£ilya in
1his description of the fourfo 1 d mandala,, which, however, is only one
of the two types of the ma^ala foimd in the Arthasastra, This
may be illustrated by another diagram: 
bhdLgjTZlhX' A/b *. %  6 e
Group J Conqueror** Csil- his allyCs/fs/^  his ally’s ally*-
” II ~£ = Enemy, B. ~ his ally Esj&A*. his ally’s ally*
« III -M»Middle king/isJ-= his ally Mfs/)s/3.c his ally’s ally,
t X V ™(Va-Keutral king^ Afida-his ally his ally's ally.
Cs A  i  £ ’s j\ J CsAsAj^s^sA
KA, VII.2.24-27.
2
B. A. Saletore, India’s Diplomatic Relations with the West, jjp 
fails to notice the two types of the magL&ala in the Arthasastra, 
and wrongly regards Kaujilya’s version of the mapdala, which we 
term as the standard mapdala, as^reproduction of Manu's version0
Ill
Because in this scheme the enemy of group II comes between the 
conqueror and his ally of group I and similarly the enemy's 
ally of group II intervenes between the conqueror's ally and his ally's 
ally of group I, this formulation can be called the circle of inter­
locking groups. Moreover the diagram above will show that the 
middle and neutral kings are discrete as they are said never to be 
contiguous to each other, although we have presumed that their 
groups interlock.
Of these two different versions of the constituents of each 
of the four groups of the fourfold mandala in its elaboration into 
a raapdala of twelve states, we may observe that the circle of the 
interlocking groups is adequate to e:xplain political facts and is 
more convincing than the circle of the separate groups because it 
emphasises the allied nature of the constituents, while the Is/bter 
merely outlines an equal divisinn of the inter-state sphere into 
four separate groups each consisting of the leader, his enemy, and 
his ally| In comparison, however, the circle of interlocking groups 
in its elaborated shape tends to make each of the four groups some 
sort of an entente or alliance in as much as its leader and two 
allied members are presumably drawn together by the geo-political 
factor and considerations of common interests and fears. It shows 
that at least the circles of the conqueror and the enemy are inter­
locked, which implies the political nature of the fourfold maplnfa 
as characterised by potential alliances and counter-alliances. There 
is, however, no cleax* evidence as to the nature of the relationship
of the middle and neutral kings nor to their relation with the 
conqueror and the enemy in the Manusmrfi, although these are 
described by the commentators, who borrow them jfrom-fdae Arthasastra 
or nitisara versioncf a different type of manual a. Medhatithi 
only describes the geo-political relation of the middle king,whose 
territory is said to be co-terminous with the conqueror and his 
enemy and ignores the place of the neutral king in the map£ala. 
Kulluka also does the same and so also Lakgnddhara. But all comment­
ators and Lakpiidhara describe the power of the middle king in 
relation to the conqueror and his enemy, although Medhatithi*s 
comments according to the printed edition of G. Jha are confused. 
He is said to be capable of showing favour to the conqueror and his 
enemy when they are united and chastising them when they are dis­
united. The neutral king is said to be capable of defeating the 
conqueror, his enemy and the middle king singly, but not con­
jointly. The implications of the relative factor of power of each 
principal constituent will be discussed later.
Ill The standard mapdala
The third stage in the development of the map&ala concept seem 
to have been the formulation of the standard mapdala of twelve state 
or kings, which carries over the nucleus of the threefold map^ala, 
that is, only the geo-political alignment of the vljiglgu, his 
enemy and his ally, and the system of the interlocking groups of 
the fourfold mapflala as well as its feature of the four principal 
constituents. These are synthesized on a rational pattern by making
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innovations in the schematic arrangement of states, by interpreting
the geo-political relationship, and by introducing power political
considerations* This is accomplished for the first time in the 
1Arthasastra;. among the extant sources with the deliberate design 
of demonstrating the feasibility of the eventual domination of the 
mapdala by the vi.jigigu, who is central to the inter-state system*
The standard ma&dala owes its advocacy to ICaujiilya, although its
ect n»j
origin is ascribed to Usnas. It is also described in the Kamandakiya
_ 2 3
Nitisara, the Agni 'Pura&a and some of its salient features are
introduced, in the commentaries on the Manu-smyti^ in order to explain 
the 1 verses on the ma&flala. It is, found in a considerably circum­
scribed form in the N11ivalQyamrtand several features of it, such 
as the terms denoting kings or states, are mentiifed in almost every 
kind of writing on polity*
The formulation of the standard map.dala of twelve kings begins 
by positing ho* 1* the conqueror (vi.jigigu) as the central king or 
state, his distinguishing marks being the ambition and potential 
power to eventually establish./ his hegemony over the geo-political
1KA, VI. 2.13 ff.
VIII.22-23, 41.
3Agni, 233.14-20, 2H0.1-5.
Manu, VII*155-58 - Kulluka arranges the twelve kings :in the same 
order as according to Kaujflya and designations of the component 
kings are also identical*
5NT, XXIX.20 ff.
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sphere consisting of eleven other kings or states each of whom 
has a distinct designation in accordance with his relative terri­
torial contiguity, potential political attitude, and the relative 
degree of power primarily from the point of view of the conqueror.
These are mainly arranged in the front indicating the direction of
1the conqueror’s aggrandisement, in the rear and on his side, usually
in succession. Those in the front of the conqueror are: No. 2. 
enemy (ari), whose territory is adjacent to that of the conqueror;
No. 3- ally (mitra) -with territory immediately beyond that of the 
enemy; No. 4. enemy’s ally (arimitra) with territory beyond that 
of the ally; No. 5- ally’s ally (mitramitra) with territory 
beyond enemy’s ally; No. 6. enemy's ally’s ally (arimltramitra) with 
territory beyond the ally’s ally; and those in the rear of the 
conqueror are: No. 7. the enemy immediately behind the conqueror
(pargnlgraha) who is potentially in league with the enemyin the 
front; No. 8, the ally in the rear (akranda) with territory behind
that of the enemy in the rear; No. 9. the ally of the enemy in the
/ ft** fttei *
rear {pargnigrahasara) behind that of the ally in the rear; and
No. 10. the ally’s ally in the rear (akrandasara) further behind the
2enemy’s ally in the rear. The remaining two constituents are:
No. 11, the middle king or state (madhyama), whose territory is 
conterminous with that of the conqueror and the enemy, and who is
*2j
stronger than either of the latter; and Ho. 12. the neutral king or
On Manu, VII.155; HV, XXIX.22; Agni, 
of .“S T  VI. 2.21; fflf, VIII.18.
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state (udasina) ’lying outside1 is more powerful than the conqueror,
1the enemy, and the middle king individually." This ma&flala of twelve
states may he illustrated with a diagram.
DiagrdJTL bfo. 3 .
d b b j e c t i o n ,  t i e r ' s  ^ X £ f ) r e - s s t t r w
iiE Rearward- Enemij 
il,A ^ dt'cLTWd^Tcl a l l y
R, 5 Is A * Rearvard 
R A'i f t a R.^a.rwa.a Ally's j91lw
Fenr- oth-ex- ahlbvev'ifvbionff y-ee altov-e- p* -
There is some confusion among modern scholars about the place 
of the neutral king (udasina) in the standard mapdala of twelve 
states, stemming from the lack of precise information in the Sanskrit 
textso h„ N. Law places the neutral king on the conqueror's flank
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1opposite the middle king/ But such a position is impossible in
view of whatever information our authorities afford about the
neutral’s place and also because it sandwiches the conqueror between
two kings, each stronger than himself,when he is expected to become
the overlord of the mandala. B. V# Kane places the neutral at the
side of the conqueror’s ally, enemy’s ally, and conqueror’s ally's
2ally on the opposite side of the middle king,“ khich is untenable 
because not only the place of the neutral king does not support the 
geo-political implications of his position which makes him friendly 
to the vijigigu and his all*/ and ally's ally in the front and un~ 
unfriendly to the enemy and his allies, but also the neutral is not
'Op. cit., p.12. Law’s diagram;
?
H . D . S ., III.p•222• Kane’s diagram;
r -. ^
n
Ms AREt A RA RE C A EsAAs A
——— 
L's&A
NeutraL
c m .  VII.18.1-2, 26.
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ascribed such a vast territory in any text. As a rectification
of P, V, Kane's scheme of twelve kings, Prof. ¥. Ruben suggests
that the neutral one should be placed at the side of the vi.jigigu,
]the middle one and the enemy, " which is again implausible because 
the neutral king is never said to be contiguous to the middle king.
As, however, in the standard mandala the neutral king is said to 
be 'Ivina' outside the mandala' (i.e. of the vijigigu’s mandala of“  ' W i.»n — IT—r»*m i w wwulw .irm*
ten kings); as a commentator on the Kamandakiya says that the
2neutral is near the enemy's ally's ally, and as the neutral's only
possible place in the fourfold map.fl.ala under its interlocking groups
is near the enemy's ally's ally, it can be inferred that the neutral's
position is as depicted in our diagram. The neutral king should be
placed near the enemy's ally's ally on the same side as the middle
king in the standard mandala.
On analysis it is realised that the threefold and fourfold
mapflalas are so skilfully adjusted and synthesised in the standard
map, flat a of twelve that a new finished structure of inter-state system
comes into existence. It is stated that in respect of the middle
king, and by implication, of the neutral king, the conqueror, his
ally and ally's ally are friendly elements, the enemy, his ally and
3his ally's ally are unfriendly elements. This statement not only 
explains their relationship to the map.dal a but also sums up with
1
V. Rtlben, 'Inter-state ReMions in Ancient India and Kaujalya's 
Arthasastra', in 1TBIA, vol. IV (l955)? p.139? fn. 8.
9rp  ^  ^  ^ ^
"Upadhyayanirpekganusaimi commentary (Bibliotheca Jndica) on KN, VI!1.45 
See also M. II, Butt's tr. I<H, VIII.45? 48.
\ l i ,  VII. 13.1-2, 26.
four kings what was described according to the fourfold mapflala 
with eight subsidiary kings, for, the relations of the middle and 
jieutral kings to the kings or states in the rear of the conqueror 
are not touched at all. It is thus evident that fie separate groups 
of the middle and. neutral, kings are merged with the states in front 
of the conqueror. The logical implications of this are that the con­
queror's hegemony over the inapflala is shorn to be eventually feasible; 
for, he can outweigh his enemy through a prudent foreign policy and 
skilful diplomacy. On the whole this schematic grouping of states 
is so geometrically perfect that the balance of the partisans, 
and also the balance of power, tips in favour of the conqueror.
The principle of balance of power unfolds itself In the description 
of the power of the middle king in relation to the conqueror and his 
enemy^and of the neutral king in relation to the conqueror, his enemy, 
and the middle king. The middle king is indeed designed to hold the 
balance of power between the belligerents and the neutral king hetiv^ en 
all the three. However, the conqueror has also to balance the power 
between his interlocking blocs as it would influence the conduct of 
the middle and neutral kings, who normally remain disinterested in 
the struggle between the conqueror and his enemy Until one of them 
requests either shelter or protective alliance in a catastrophe.
Thus^the originality of the standard mapflala consists in the 
addition of four states or kings in the rear of the conquerorjarranged 
as the enemy and the ally In the lear and their respective allies 
further behind, in the definitional the geo-political relationship of
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the middle and neutral kings to the mafl&ala and the elimination of 
their separate groups, and the introduction of the principle of 
relative power in the mafl&ala system. The standard mapdala makes 
a great advance on previous formulations. The subsequent versions
(fee, turf
of the map dal a as described in the ICamand&kiya hltlsara aid other 
works do not make any really original contributions in principle 
or in the pattern of inter-state relations. The smaller and bigger 
versions of mapdala as described by Kamandaka mark an exercise in 
subtraction and multiplication of the constituents of the standard 
map.dal a .
IV The vijigigu's mapdala of ten kings
The mapdala formed on the pattern of the s tandard mapdala5but 
without the middle (madhyama) and neutral kings (udasrna) is 
separately called the vi.jigigTiiis (conqueror's) mapdala of ten kings
« *  JZW « ,  X
or states by Kamandaka, the author of the Agnl Purapa and Lakgmldhara. 
Lakgmldhara describes it by quoting verses from the Mahabharata, and 
he evidently differentiates it from the fourfold mapdalajwhich he re­
produces from Manu. This version implies that the concept of map&ala 
is essentially a doctrine of the equilibration of power; the balance 
of power, if any, arises from the confrontation of the potential 
belligerents and the artful management of one's own allies against
~4th, VIII.3 5 1 Agni, 240.3; HbK, XII.p.110 quotes Mbh. cf.^ Sarasvatlvilasa, 
pp. 37-41, which attributes the formulation of the vijigxgu's mapdala 
to TJs?ias; see alsoJKA, XIII.4.56. IC. alsoimagines a mapd&la without 
the madhyama and ud'asina.
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one’s enemy’s allies both in front and in rear. The distinct mention 
of the vi.jigigu’s mapdala in the Rajadharmakapda may suggest that 
the position and political attitudes of the states of middle and 
neutral character were regarded uncertain In the inter-state relations, 
an inference strengthened by Somadeva’s views about them. The vi.jigigu’ s 
ma&flala of ten kings is, however, limited in its approach to inter­
state relations, which are confined to enmity and alliance without 
any cognizance of neutrality ciS a political attitude in the context 
of the struggle for supremacy. It may be added in passing that these 
four different formulations of the ma&dala system are inter-related 
and an appreciation of any one of them in isolation is difficult „
V The prakpti-maadala (circle of state-constituents)
The advocates of the fourfold magical a and the standard of twelve 
states distinguish between the kings and their material constituents 
of state or resource elements in the formulation of the manf.ala„ They 
state that there are in the entire mangala a total of twelve con­
stituents who are Icings (rajaprakptis) and sixty material con­
stituents (dr a vy ap r aiq; 11 s), vis. the ministers, the country and its 
people, the fort or stronghold, the treasury, and the army, five for 
each king, which together makes an aggregate of seventy-two constituents 
In all/ This is called the circle of state-constituents (prakyti-
h n  Maau. VII.157; RDK, XII.pp. 107, 109; KA, VI.2 .25-29; EH, VIII.24-25-
According to M.N.Dutt 's translation of M ,  7111.27, 29, 32, 36 the 
praJkrtimandala consists of the six constituents of state, viz. the 
ministers, the country and its people, the stronghold, the treasury, 
the army and the ally, which is confusing because the ally is already a 
royal constituent of the mapdala reckoned in the respective preceding 
verses and this Interpretation excludes the king. The translator has
(cont.)
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nmriclala) . The cohesion in this apparent conglomeration of the 
constituents of states in the inter-state system is sometimes sug­
gested on the analogy of a tree implying the idea of inter-dependence 
]among states. ‘ It is, however, striking to note that as in the con­
cept of state, so in the concept of the circle of state-constituents,
the material constituents usually figure as a unit, the minister
2
being their leader.
The purpose of delineating the prakptimandala is not only to 
demonstrate that the state as such entered into the inter-state 
sphere, hut also to provide the basis for an accurate assessment of 
the condition of these resource elements individually and collectively, 
as it was essential for estimating the total power of each state in 
relation to the other and its impact on the inter-state sy&tem. Indeed, 
no proper evaluation of the power of a state would be possible unless 
one judged each element of one's otto, power in correlation with all 
those states of friendly, hostile, and neutral character with whom 
one has to deal both in peace and war. As the selection of the 
suitable measures of foreign policy and the corresponding employment 
of political expedients were conditioned by the relative excellences 
of the constituents of one's otto state with others, it was essential 
that these should be weighed in the mapjala. The role of these
(cont.) obviously misunderstood the meaning, which, however, is 
explicit in the Jayamangala commentary.
^On Mann, VII0156-57, esp. Kulluka; M ,  VIII. 42, also Jay amangal a 
commentary.
2Cf. Mbh., XV.11.4.
constituents in strengthening the prospective alliances, appre­
hending the potential enmities, and ensuring likely neutrality 
was considered important. The disposition and the condition of 
the constituents of state largely influenced the course of war
and the nature of fighting, as also the pacification of a conquered
1territory and its annexation. Even in normal times they were 
under constant strain of the political expedients employed by the 
allies and the enemies alike in the intrigues of inter-state politics.
Osv
However, the Agni Purana and the Hitivakyampta omit from 
their discussion the corresponding circle of state-constituents.
This omission seems to have been deliberate and points to the over­
riding importance of the king in inter-state relations in our period. 
Perhaps a conglomeration of the constituents of states came to be 
regarded as irrelevant in a political life of which the main feature 
was the existence of numerous feudatories, although they are not 
mentioned as substitutes for the constituents of state in the ma.pdala 
system by our authorities. The omission, however, seems to have 
been a retrograde step, at least theoretically, because it undermines 
the significance of the other constituents of the state in the theory 
of inter-state relations, and strikes at the basis of a fair estimate 
of one’s total power in relation to others.
While these aforementioned types of map, dal a were mainly dis­
cussed in the texts of our period, which strikingly ignore many
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other mapdalas of varying sizes ranging from the lowest number o£ on« or two
k i n g s  tb tl-* l a r g e s t  n u m b e r  ^  ^
Aof 54 kings and 324 constituents of states as found in tlie Kamandakiya 
1
Nitisara,' Somadeva. postulated a different type of mapflala which is 
quite interesting and which by its implications could point to some 
important consequences in inter-state relations. His views deserve 
separate treatment because of their clarity and originality.
V I  Somadeva’s mapflala of ten kings
The circle of states as described by Somadeva consists of only 
ten kings, nine of whom are traditional, namely, the conqueror, 
the enemy, and the ally in front; the conqueror’s enemy in the rear, 
the ally in the rear, and their respective allies further behind; and 
the middle and neutral kings; but the tenth, a buffer king or state
called antardhi (lit. from antar-dha ’to place between’) as an in-
2tegral constituent of the mapdala system is novel, Somadeva says,
’an antardhi £a buffer king)/is one/ whose place of livelihood is 
between the realms of the conqueror gvlj iglsu) and the enemy ( & t±), 
who is in the pay of both, and who takes refuge in mountains or forests.’ 
This raajgclala may be illustrated with a diagram;
ha;, vixi. 20 ff.
P  « W  fcftfir EHv A w
NV* 20a Udasina-madhyaina-yijigigu-aiflitra-mitra-parg^igraha-
krandasarantardhayo yathasanibhavagunagana^vibhavantaratajiiyan»IV H  ■ if tit ...... .«■ 11.  i     Vrf ■ . ■&, . W -  ■ -*■  - Tt— —r-fr-fT - ■■r[T»-.i-T T-IVHII Jl rilifc ml r 11 H ~ n n n J j  n-|;T_i^ ._
mahdalanam adhigthatarah *>
Ibid. ,__29«^ Ari*-vi.iigigor map&alantar vihitavpttlr ubhayavetan ah 
parvatafavikrtasrayas ca antardhljn
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D idgr&An A/bv4^ .
i-Ule
(lup&cd'ioT^ o f \  Ccrw^uBW r ^  agyreS&(on
fc r r  CLbbrvTriations Se-^ ahcrve. p p . Ifo  &hcL U S
The recognition of the buffer king as a constituent of the 
mapd&I& system shows that the kings situated especially in or near 
the forest and mountainous areas between the rivals played a significant 
role in inter-state relations. Kaufilya mentions a buffer king, who, 
although weak:, is nevertheless a hindrance to the strong, if in 
possession of a fort or forest as a place of retreat, and says that 
he entertains feelings of dependence towards his iiowerful neighbour/ 
He^howeverjdoes not concede him a distinct place in fee mapjala.
Somadeva, on the contrary, regards a buffer king as a regular con­
stituent of the mahdala, although he agrees with Kau^ilya about the 
character and conduct of the buffer king.
■1*
nco'nsfl&'tw't
The inclusion of a buffer king as a regular^is also significant 
owing to the possible implications that territorial boundaries were 
vague, and more often than not the bordering areas between two 
kingdoms^especially when these were forest and mountains,were ruled 
by local kings, who depended for their well-being on both of the 
rivals. The commentator on the NitivaKyampta states that a buffer 
king was present between every two kingdoms and dubs him as wagtail 
(carata) owing to his inconstant political loyalties. The character 
of a buffer king remains dubious owing to his being in the pay of 
both neighbours on his opposite sides. His policy towards them is 
marked by duplicity and conducted on the basis of expediency. However^ 
the rivals exploit the buffer king in their political intrigues as 
well as during military campaigns in order to afflict each other.
Envoys and spies are asked to win over the buffer king and to use 
him for inciting trouble in the enemy kingdom and to harass an invader. 
In passing, it may be noted that the admission of a buffer king in 
the ma:pdala suggests that the political boundaries and. not so much 
the territorial ones were important in inter-state politics.
Historical illustrations of the position and role of the kings 
of the antardhi1s character may be inferred from the shifting 
allegiancescr^s^ch dynasties, like the Kalacus&is of Tripuri, the 
Parainar&s of Malwa, and even the Candellas of Jejakabhukti during 
the period of irrtense struggle for hegemony among the Pratiharas,
 ^ *U< *30
the Ragfrakutas and the Palas before the middle of the tenth century. 
Further examples may be found in the checkered history of the Lata
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principality and its role in the conflict for power among the
Caulukyas of Gujarat, the Paramaras of Mai wa, Oalukyas of Kalyapi
and later the Yadavas of Devagiri, as it shifted its allegiance
to each one of them at its convenience, The position of the Cahamana
kingdom of Naddula and several political changes in its history at
least during the wars between the Caulukya king Kumarapala and the
Cahamana king Arporaja and &lso their successors can be properly
th-e
understood if we recognise that Nagplula kingdom tended towards the
position of the antardhi and consequently the attitudes of the rivals
towards it, as also its own towards them, could, be moulded according
to the situations in inter-state politics, Furthermore^the buffer
states largely owed their status and security to their geo-political
position and rivalry between powerful neighbours on their opposite
sides owing to which their political allegiance fluctuated.. This may
be the reason for conflicting claims of success against them put
forward by rivals, as in the case of La£a, by all of its neighbours
during the reign of their more energetic kings such as Vakpatiraja XX
a nd
Muhja, Sindhuraja, Bhoja and later Subhat avarwaan^ Devapala of the
tCtft, Kltr
Paramara dynasty of Malwa on the one hand, the Caulukya Mularaja I, 
Bhima 1, Bhima II and others on the other, Tailappa II, Vikramaditya VI
A
of the Calukya dynasty of Kalyapi and SinThapa and other Yadava kings
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1
of Devagiri notwithstanding.
Another contribution of Somadeva to the conce£>t of , maprlala 
consists in his explanation about the geo-political position of 
the udasina (neutral king or state). He says; 'One situated in 
the front, in the rear, at an angle,near or in the circle / o f  
the vi.jigigu.7 is the udasina, who5although capable of suppressing 
the middle king etc. when disunited and helping them when united, 
remains indifferent for some reason or other to the endeavours of 
the vi.jigigUo * It is evident that M s  statement makes the position 
of the neutral king extremely uncertain; his circle is said to be 
irregular; and what is, therefore, important is his attitude of
1
See for details the standard works on the dynastic history;
1. H.C.Ray, Dynastic History of Northern India, vols. I & II.
2. R.S.Tripathi, History of Kanauj.
** Mi I ....      
3. A.S.Altekar, Ragfrrakutas and their times.
4. B. IT. Puri, The History of the Crur.jara Pratiharas.
5. K.C.Majumdar and. A. D .Pusalkar (ed.)" i) The Age of Imperial ICanauj s 
ii) The Struggle for Empire.
6. D.C.Ganguly, History of the Paramara dymsty (of Malwa).
7. A . H .Maj umdar, Cliautufc^ as of Gujarat.
8. D. Sharma, Early Ghauh'an dynasties.
9. G. Yazdani (ed.), The Early History of the Deccan, vols. I & II.
10 o 8 .IC.Mitra, The Earl:/ Rulers of ICha juralio.
2 - 
HY, XXIX. 21. Agra tap pygtatah kone va sannikpgtaifl va map del e sthito
madhyamadinam vigrahitaham nigrahe, samba tan am anugrahe samartho*pii  ............. i - ■ .r.. i  ^r-_   i —~" ■ n**i jxT«n-roiHTV*Tir* "Mi ' i ■ mr ■ »■ m .. m.H .iji.. - - r mu.........  m n.imiii ~i *ft,.!(,■ iiT*Mf-»rrm —■ i. ■ i----------nn- "i^  » rhw —it
kenaclt karanenanyasmin bhupatau. vij igi.giimape ya udaste sa udasinafr. 
P.V.K an (H . D . S,, III, p. 2 20 ) rein ark s ab ou t t h e un ce r t ain p o s i t i on 
of the udasina, which, he ascribes to ICulluka on Menu (VII.158) are 
confusing since ICulluka confines himself to the discussion of the 
udasina as according to the threefold basic mapd.ala elaborated into 
a in an clod-a of 13 or 12 kings.
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indifference to the conqueror, which again is due to some cause 
(karana) and M s  capability to chastise any of the leading kings 
of the ma&flala. It iSj however, not unlikely that the changing 
political status of several kingdoms in the contemporary politics 
and their uncertain attitude towards the kings of far and near underlie 
the observation of Somadeva,
As to the factors determining the relative position and re­
lationship of the constituent kings or states of the ma&dala, Somadeva 
recognises three, namely, excellences of the king and the other con­
stituents of his kingdom, might and territorial contiguity*^ The 
potential political attitudes of enmity, friendship, and. neutrality 
of the kings of the circle towards the conqueror are not determined 
by the geo-political principle alone, but by motives of interest 
and specific causes (kara&a) and the power topLay the corresponding
role in the inter-state sphere or, in other words, by power politics
2
and not so much by .. geo-politics, Somadeva is the only author
who explicitly and rightly says that the middle king,for some reason
or other adopts,an attitude of mediation towards the conqueror in
3
conflict with his enemy* It is thus evident that he regards the inter­
state structure as flexible andnot geo-politically rigid, the
1m, xxix. 20.
2rbid., XXIX.21-35.
Ibid., XXIX. 22.
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characterisation of the kings dependent on the excellences and 
might, and the political attitudes contingent uponthe conflict of 
interests defined as power and specific causes (kara,pa) „
In conclusion^ we may remark that old ideas on the theory of 
mandala prevailed during our period. Only Somadeva showed some new 
thinking. His views on the place and role of the udasina (neutral 
king) in the mandala pointed to certain important consequences In 
inter-state relations approached on the traditional pattern because they
«i6
showed the possibility of the udasina becoming a contender for 
political supremacy in the vljiglgu* s ma&dala ^ if the factors of 
power politics changed,, To illustrate this, we may refer to a crude 
illustration of the alignment of kingdoms in Northern India by the 
beginning of the eleventh century. At this time the Candellas of 
Jejakabhukti had come to occupy the status of the vij lgd.su. Their 
enemies were the Pratiharas of Kanauj, and the Candella king 
V'idyadhara had friendly relations with the ,^ ahi kings of Punjab; his 
predecessor Dhahga had helped them against their enemy, the Muslim 
Sultan of Ghazni. According to Somadeva*s version of the mandala the 
Sultans of Ghazni would be the idaslna..who remained indifferent to 
the rivalry between the Candellas and the Pratiharas until Sultan 
Mahmud had succeeded in overrunning the £ahis. It is true that 
Candellas, along with others, probably joined the S'ahis as confederates 
to fight Sultan Mahmud in A.D.1008 but they later failed to take any 
initiative in the direction of a concerted action when Mahmud Invaded 
other parts of Northern India. On the contrary, the Candella king..
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Vidyaclhara exploited the discomfiture of the Pratihara king' Raj yap al a at 
the hands of Mahmud in order to exterminate him. He, however, 
showed a certain amount of appreciation of the geo-political changes 
when after installing Trilocanapala on Rajyapala*s throne under his 
aegis, he tried to assist the fallen Sfahi king Trilocanapala in re-
•MtbltiOT&innMnl • ***
covering his kingdom from MaJjmud. This move of the Candella king 
provoked another invasion of Malmrud of Ghazni in A.D.1019 and subse­
quently in A.D.1021-22. The result was that, although the Candella 
kingdom did, not suffer much in either property or political power, 
yet the Sahi prince and. perhaps also the Pratihara king Trilocanapala 
were eliminated, in the course of the struggle. That was suggested by 
these happenings was that the vi jigigu and. the udasina could also 
become rivals fox' political supremacy as was indicated by Somadeva* s 
concept of ma^ala. It, however, puts a premium upon the vigilance 
and statesmanship of the vljigisu, who should organize a, confederacy 
to oppose an invader of the erstwhile udasina character. It was in 
this respect that the Hindu kings failed, owing to lack of political 
foresight and many other factors. Somadeva*s contributions in this 
respect passed unnoticed as Is clear from the great popularity of 
Smytis and the composition of the; l£rtyakalpataru, although Lakgmidhara 
Indicates that the majgt&ala without the middle and the neutral could 
be thought of, which probably influenced the statesmen more during 
our period.
It will have been apparent that notwithstanding the concentric 
band of states situated around the vijigigu, according to the threefold
^ie formulations of the fourfold map.dal a, the standard 
man dal a of twelve, the vl;] igigu * s man dal a of ten, and Somadeva1 s mandala 
are linear rather than circular in structure. It may be mentioned in 
passing that our authors do not indicate the size of states forming 
the mandala nor do they admit the vassals to the inter-state system.
The constituent states may be small or large as the area of the 
universal emperor (cakravartin or sarvabhauma) Is said to be the entire 
Indian subcontinent from the Himalayas to the seas. It is, however, 
more correct to say that states forming the subject matter of the 
mandala. were of small size, although the ma^dals- itself was expandable 
to the whole country depending on'ihe size and power of the conqueror* s 
state.
Constituents of the mandala
We have already mentioned various designations of the constituents 
‘kk® fli&&dala system and noted some of their characteristics. These 
terms, viz. ari, mitra, pargpigraha, akranda, madhyama, udasina, etc. 
define, however, the position of individual rulers or states in re- 
lation to the a dynamic inter-state relation. All are
subject to political changes owing to the vicissitudes of power. The 
prominent constituents of the ma^ala, however, need more detailed 
discussion as there exists controversy among modern scholars about 
their character and political conduct.
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(would-be conqueror or a king intending conquest)
Our authorities state that a king endowed with personal ex­
cellences, fortune, and excellent material constituents, who is the 
seat of good policy and valour, and who has made up his mind to eon™ 
quer the earth (i.e. Indian sub-continent) is the vijigigu by reason 
of his being endowed with courage and s t r e n g t h T h e  vtjigigu is 
thus distinguished not only by his power and ambition hat also by
his endeavours to carry out his designs of subduing the world. He is
2called a righteous conqueror by the Agni Parana. bomadeva stresses 
that the vijlgigu and other kings are the lords of the magdala as far
15
as^compatible with their excellences, might and majesty, and contiguity. 
It is, therefore, not the geo-politically central position or imaginative 
central placing in the mapplalpi, but, in fact, the ambition for conquest
bu
backed power and exertion to materialize it that entitles a king or 
state to the rank of the vijjggryu, his neighbours and others are then 
named according to their geo-political and power political position 
relative to him. Thus,the is the fundamental power political
entity of the mafoflala system distinguished by his policy of conquest 
seeking to establish his sole sovereignty or supremacy (ekadhipatya)' 
over the mandala.
1 Cq
NV, XXIX. 23; Raja tm a dai vadravy apr akr t i s amp arm cla ay av ikr amy o r adhisihanam 
vijigiguk; of. KA, VI.2.15; A^r^3l24-26;^MedhTon"teu~VII.155r" 
Tatra cajo raja prakrtisampamijhanjevamvidbam prthvrm vijesye^bhSthitah 
sa vijlgiguh utsahasalcbiyogat; also other comms.; RDK» XII.£.109; 
Tatraigam eva r a j ap r akp 11 s amp anno jetum abhyu dy a t ah sa vljlglsul'i.
2
Agni, 231»26; Jigigu dharmavijayl tatha lokam vasam nayet.
M^edli. on Manu, VII. 1.
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In view of the evidence we disagree with R.R.Law who proposed 
to render vijigigu by a colourless word such as 'central state' 
because he wrongly argued, that the aspiration for conquest was 
not the particular characteristic of the vijigigu alone in a
cluster of kings nor was the mandala meant for use only in times
1 ** of war. In his zeal to reduce the concept of the vijigigu to
a generality, Law missed its real spirit. We also feel that the
remark of Winternitz that the vijigigu must 'always be a model of
virtue, possessed of the best prakytis and the embodiment of states- 
2manship' is misleading as it tends to regard such a king a historical 
impossibility. In fact, these excellences of the vi jiglgu are 
to be judged in comparison with other kings. Even theoretically 
the vljigigu is considered to be inferior to two other constituents 
of the mandala, the middle and neutral kings.
¥. RUben writes that 'one should avoid to translate the term 
/vi jigigu7 as "desiring conquest" because that would imply from 
the very beginning that the vijigisgu wants to conquer an empire,
Z bmi* yean £l:/ Ji.e. the Arthasastra/ he does not.''
Later on he states that the vijigigu does not conquer the countries 
of his enemies.^" It is evident that Rtfben's objection is based on
Op.cit., p.3; Studies in Indian history and culture, pp. 197-193*
2Cited in N.R.Law, Studies in Indian History and Culture, p. 2173 
, M .Winternitz, Some Problems of Indian Literature, p.97*
W^. Ruben, 'Inter-State Relations In Ancient India and Kaujalya's 
Arthasastra', in IYBIA, vol. IV, pp. 138 ff.
^Ibld. o pp. 14-C-141*
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the interpretation of the terms ’conquest' and ’conquering an
empire’, the latter implying taking possession of a country by
force, thereby involving territorial annexations. It seems,
however, that Rtfben tends to be pedantic, for conquest also means
’action of overcoming, gaining of victory, etc.’ which justifies
the translation of the vijigigu as ’ d&siriny conquest’ . Moreover,
as we will see in the following pages, the vijigigu also conquers 
1his enemies and annexes their territories. Among fie three types 
of victors, righteous, greedy, and demoniacal, the last two seek 
to acquire the territory, and the demoniacal is said to be satisfied
with the seizure of land, goods, sons, wives, and the life of the
2 *adversary. According to Yijhanesvara the objective of an expedition
3is to annex the enemy’s territory. Among the three gains of marching, 
Kaufilya and Somadeva prefer territory to money and money to ally.^ 
YajPLavalkya and his commentators describe the duties of the conqueror 
towards the conquered kingdom; they do not mention the reinstate­
ment of either the defeated king or a scion of his family, if he had 
f? *•*died in battle. Medhatithi shows that the victor in the battle leads 
to the subjugation of the conquered kingdom, and he countenances
the installation of a, scion of the fallen king as a vassal only, when
/ t i c
the occupied kingdom cannot be annexed owing to the loyalty of^subjects
Agnl, 233 • 24: £>atrum jigigur ucchindyat svayam saknoti chedyadi.
2w, XXX.71-72; KA, XIX. 1.10-16.
^Mit»^  on 1.348; see also Ibid., 1.324.
4W »  XXIX.78; KA, VII.9.1 ff.
5 *,
Yajh^I.342-343? also comms.
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1 *? to their former master* It is thus evident that the vijigigu
is not forbidden from annexing the enemy’s territories, although
in many sources including the Arthasastra the conqueror Is ideally
asked to subdue the enemy and reduce him or his scion to tributary
or feudatory status* In fact^the Indian empires were built both
by annexing the enemyls territories and by reducing the adversaries
to tributary status.
Thus,the vijigigu Is one particular king who Is assigned a
central position in the inter-state system at a particular time
and place by virtue of his imperial ambition and power* The relative
position and characterisation of other kings or states of the mandala
are subject to change as their power and success (salcti and siddhi)
wax or wane* Indeed^the map^ala concept revolves round the vijigigu,
w kb ■ is not a static phenomenon but a changing political
entity* Geographical adjacency was the physical factor behind the
structure of the map&ala, but devoid of power no king or state could
be assumed to be the centre of political gravity.
AR1 (Enemy)
The king of the state contiguous to that of the vijigigu in 
front? that is^the direction <s£ the latter’s aggrandizement, is 
called the ari or enemy in the formulation of the map^ala9" although
^On Manu, VII *201-2.
2rbid., VII. 155-158; On Yi.IB., 1.345; Agnl, 233.14 ff; 240.1 ff.;
OT, XXIX.20; SDK. XII. pp. 107-109.
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all kings on the circumference of the vijigigu* s territory are
]
characterized as potential enemies, ‘ The vijigigu himself is advised 
against "creating them as serious contenders at a particular moment.
The mast&ala concept concentrates on only one king in the front (ari) 
of the vijigigu and another in his rear called parg&lgraha (lit,
heel-catcher); others are described as friendly and dependent
2 m
neighbours. Somadeva says, fone who doeskarm to his /vi,jigigu1 s/
painty and persists in opposing M m  is an ariT, J The factors really 
determining the enemy character are distinct rivalry expressed through 
pursuing the same object, power and policy to oppose, motives cf 
interest (svartha), cause (karapa) and force of circumstance.^
These together outweigh the considerations of geo-politics, which, 
however, are retained owing to their physical relevance in the con­
text of power politics.
According to our authorities an ari is said to be of three kinds; 
born (sahaja or kulya) , acquired (kptrima), and mtural (bhumyanantara 
or prakrta, i.e. from being the prakrti of the mandala of the viiiglsu) 
Vijfianesvara, who also extends this threefold classification to the 
ally (mitra) and the neutral (udasina),^ elucidates these categories
3 **** **
'Hit, on Yajn., 1.345; Kulluka on Manu, VXI.158; cf. KA, VI.2.14,
2cf. ICA, VII. 18.29 *
MV, MIX. 24 - Ya ey a svasyahitanugj:hanena|pratikulyan: Vya,xti sa evarih
4,
Medh, on Manu, VII.17?5 Agni, 233*20; HV, XXIX.35; also 33-34; RDM, 
X.p.96-1quotes Mbh. and Vyasa; cf. KIT, VIII.14, 52 ff; Ifrh.f * ^ 11,138, 
133; CnJajM, 1.345. " ^
5L , «»
"Kit, on Yacjh0.T1.345; Agni, 233.21; RI)K, MI.p. 109; Kulluka on Manu, VII 
155* ~ ~
6
Hit. on Yajfi^  1.345.
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by stating that among these ’born enemies’ are relations such as half-
brothers, uncles and their sons; an acquired enemy is one to whom
some wrong has been done or by whom some wrong has been done; while
a ’natural’ (prakpta) is the ruler of an adjoining country. The
Agni Purana adds that each preceding type is more serious than the 
2following one. But many authorities admit of only a twofold dis­
tinction of enemies: ’born’, i.e. of the same family (saha.ja), and 
’acquired’ (kptrlma), one who apposes, on account of harm previously
txw
done to him by the vijigigu , incites antagonists, or himself pre~
3
cipitates conflict. The Agni Purana, following the Yigaudharmo11ara, 
states that in its opinion the ’natural’ is virtually the acquired’,^  
which fact further bears out that the territorial contiT.guity is 
not sufficient ground for enmity.
- Enemy states (ari or satru) further divided into four 
categories in view of the condition oftt&% resources, power, and 
political status. They a are: yatavya, fit to be attacked, <■& the ruler
of an adjoining state possessed of qualities of an ideal enemy, namely 
greed, cruelty, ignoble birth, idleness, injustice, one having mean
k i t . on Ya.iH.. I, 345.
2i\gni, 233.21.
kedh. on Manu. VII.155; HV, XXIX, 33-34; cf. KM, VIII. 58 & ff.
Agni, 233.22; of. Vdh., 11.145.15-16.
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councillors, and disaffected prakptis, particularly one forsaken
by his allies, ministers, feudatories, army commander, and afflicted
with calamities; ucchedaniya, !fit to be extirpated*, one who is
without a fort, an ally or a place to seek shelter, and is weak;
pr&aniya, ’fit to be harassed’, is one who is wanting in good counsel
(mantra) and forces; and, karganiya, ’to be weakened1, one who has
1powerful allies and strong forces„ This differentiation enables 
^ ie vljIglsu or any other king to adopt suitable measures to deal 
effectively with his enemies in order to achieve his political ob­
jectives,, However, it is also pointed out by several authors, that 
an art who is intelligent, of noble race, brave, clever, charitable, 
grateful and firm, thus endowed with personal qualities like the 
vi jiglgu himself, is most troublesome.
It is evident from the three or two kinds of enemies and their 
fourfold division according to the condition of thefe power and status 
that hostile attitudes are to be assessed in view of the con­
flict of interests defined as power. It is implied that a weak 
neighbour is more likely to become a prey to a strong vijigigu, while a 
powerful neighbouring prince not only maintains his own security, 
but also proves troublesome in the struggle for empire. What our 
authorities primarily mean is not a political condition but an 
attitude of hostility which is subject to modification under the
M ,  XXIX.30-32; Hit, on Ya.iH.. 1.345; cf. KA, VI. 1.13, 2.16-17;
KN, VIII.58-63.
On Manu, VII.210; SDK, XlI.p.lo7.
compulsion of circumstances, By emphasizing the acquired hostility 
(kptrima) our authorities suggest that it is possible to ally 
with a neighbouring king out of common fear and interests, and to 
dissuade him from open hostility by the use of diplomatic expedients. 
In fact, the actual rivalry and alliance are seen to be contingent 
upon causes, capacity and situations .rather than a priori con-”
“  * ”  ~ ir i u mu r i i il i ■ ■ i n i 11 i t
siderations. Even in respect of the 'born enemy* (sahaja) these 
considerations are equally strong as may be noted in the relations
■hiu m mm mtji,
between the Gahamanas of Sakambhari and the Cahamanas of Na££ula, 
although the latter*s political allegiance to the Caulukyas of 
Gujarat was a significant factor.
The ari has two allies in the front of the vijigigu, who are 
called arimitra (the enemy’s ally) and arimltramitra (the enemy’s 
ally’s ally). Besides the ari, another enemy king in the rear of 
the vijigigu is called pargaigraha ; (1 the heel catcher’), who 
invades the rear after the vijigigu has undertaken an expedition 
in front. The parg&igraha*s ally is called pars&igrahasara, who 
moves forward to help him from behind the vijigigu*s ally in the 
rear (akranda).
EXTRA (ally)
'Che ml tra (ally), as a component of the mandala, is the king 
or state situated beyond the ari in front of the vijigigu. The
criteria of geo-politics and power-polltics are applied to determine 
the basis and character of an alliance as in the case of enmity.
It is insisted that 'no king becomes a friend or foe without
sufficient cause or without due regard for ills own interests, only
1 cfor the sake of amity or discord/ and .ifriends osvidJtmmmare to be 
CL& 'facc/L 2regarded^only in accordance with the power^they possess'. Like 
the ari, the mltra is also of three or two kinds but the differ­
entiation ox the ally in view of the condition of power and the 
corresponding policy on the part of the vijigigu is only twofoldi 
Vijfianesvara says, 'One who is to be strengthened (b^h^iya) 
and the other who is to be weakened /'karsapiya) , One weak in money
and forces (kogabala) is to be strengthened, and one strong In
3finance and forces is to be weakened.’ It is evident that the 
vijigigu should maintain a sort of balance of power among his 
allies In order to maintain his superiority over them, to retain Hieir 
reasonable dependence upon him, and to sustain their power in com­
parison with his enemy’s allies,^ Kamandalca has described double 
dealings of the vijigigu even against some of his own allies, especially 
unsteady and distant ones, and has even recommended the extii’pation 
of an ally who has become hopelessly corrupt and a liability in the
Agni. 233.20; W ,  XIX.35; cf. K|, Till.52. 
medli. on Manu. Til.177; see above, p./jA fn. ^  . 
Mit. on Ya.jn,, 1.345.
4Cf. KN, Till.81).
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struggle for power." The real test of an alliance is the service 
other kings render to their leader. In fact, the principles behind 
alliances, like enmity, are those of power politics and political 
expediency.
Beside mitra, an ally in the rear of the vi,j igigu situated behind
the enemy in the rear is important. He is called akranda, one for
whose helpcry may be raised by the vijigigu. lie las an ally or
helpmate (asaraj, who is situated behind the ally of the vijigigu*s
2enemy in the rear. The role of these allies is quite significant 
in the event of an attack in the rear of the vijigisu's kingdom, 
while he is away on expedition in front.
However, the idea of a potential alliance is fundamental to the 
working of the mapclala system. The vifjigigu and also the arl have 
their potential allies both in the front and thews-ar in their re­
spective zones, Since enmity is the basis of inter-state politics, 
alliances are essential to confront enemies in the struggle for 
power. Thus,the alliances and counter alliances among members 
of alternative states help the aggrandizement of a powerful party 
but may also contribute to the maintenance of the status quo and 
thereby safeguard the existence of weaker states. According to the 
texts the pattern of alliance of the mapdala type .^ims at isolating 
external interference in the event of war between the vi,jigigu and the
Kg, VIII. 74-76.
NY, XXIX.27-28 (Delhi ed.); Aani. 233.16-17.
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1
ari, nevertheless the former is said to have better advantages as
he can manoeuvre to crush the latter between his weight and that 
of his ally. The purpose of cherishing allies is to enable the 
vijigisu to realise his ambition of overlordship over the circle 
of kings? to maintain a favourable balance of power among hostile and 
friendly states and to find support and shelter at the time of the 
worst calamities. However, the interests and causes which are 
the basis of an alliance should be properly appreciated and contin­
uously appraised.
(middle king or state)
Kadhyama (the middle king) is one of the four principal con­
stituents of the circle of twelve kings. Our authorities define 
his geographical situation as co-terminous with that . of the vi;jigigu
and ari; his power is said to be greater than that of the vijigign
o
and the ari separately but less than their conjoint strength*" and 
also inferior to another constituent of the mandala called the
*xa *♦* ^
udasjna. His attitude towards either the vtjigigu or the ari remains 
uncertain unless crystallised by word or deed. However ICau£ilya 
and Medhatithi consider', the madhyama normally to be friendly to 
^ le vijigigu and Ids allies in the front." Somadeva says that the
1Agni, 235.23; cf. KH, VIII.44-50; BDK, XII.p.110.
iffll, 233.18, 240.3-4; NV, XXIX.20, 22; ICulluka on Manu, VII. 155; 
RDK, XII.p. 109; of. KK, VIII. 18; EA, VI.2.21. ' ~
K^A, VII.18.1; Medh. on Manu, VII.177.
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madhyama adopts an attitude of mediation towards the activities
1of the vl.jlgigu for some reason or other. Our sources make
the madhyama1s favour or disfavour dependent on the unity or
disunity between the conqueror and the enemy. It appears reasonable
to assume that the madhyama1s conduct was regulated by realistic
politics and the calculation of advantages. Normally the madhyama
remains aloof from the mutual rivalry between the conqueror and
the enemy because his interests are being served thereby, and he
does not run the risk of enlarging the area of the conflict nor
of exposing the mapdala t0 the intervention of the udasina by
his open partisanship. The madhyama, however, may grant protection
(sameraya) to either the vijigigu or the ari when threatened with 
2annihilation. This is required in the interest of the balance of 
power. The madhyama when invading the ma&flala first starts warfare 
in the region «af the allies of the vi.jigjgu and the ari in the front 
and does not invade them directly to cause their combination against 
himself, J Our authorities prescribe several measures to the vi.jigigu 
in order to forestall the designs of an aggressive madhyama and
1
NT, XXIX.22; TTdasinavad aniyatamandalo ?narabhupaoeksava samadhikabale?Di 
kutascit karanad anyasmin nrpatau vi.jiglgumane yo madhyasthabhavam 
aval am bate aa madhyastbah°
Agni, 234.20; of. Jdh, IX.150-3-5; KA, VII.2.21.
Cf. KB, VIII. 55, see also comms.; KA, VII.18.5 ff.
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introduce in this context the principle of the balance of power 6^
emphasising the need of a concerted move by the conqueror and
his enemy to suppress the destroyer of the political equilibrium 
1in the circle.
H.N.law interprets the term madhyama as the 'medium power' and
says that It is so called from its strength being intermediate
between those of the central state /i.e. the vijigisu/ on the
one hand and the udasina on the other, the last being the strongest
2power in the first zone/ He rejects Shamasastry*s rendering of
themadhyama as 'mediatory' and argues that 'Mediation need not
3be the special work of a particular neighbour'. Dikshitar first
rendered madhyama as the 'neutral king' but later accepted Law's
interpretation.^ Mangle translates the word literally as 'the
middle king' which may appropriately connote the meaning of the 
5
madhyama.
In order to form a correct idea of the status of the madhyama 
in the map dala we have to keep in view the factors of geo-political 
contiguity, power, the material excellences and the operative 
causes. Law's approach, based on the principle of power, is inadequate
T1H , VIJI.55, see also comms; KA, VII. 18. 5 ff; also see below pp.o’/< fff
O
.M . Law, krler~$i&{? Qei&fi&ns: &\ fl'ng-estf in d A ^  / p  g
' , p ® 13.
^WAJ, p. 311; Hjndu Administrative Inst I‘but inns, p. 271.
5KA, VII. 2.Zl ,
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to account for the madhyama* a attitude towards the vl.jigigu and 
his ari , particularly in view of Kaulf lya's statement that with 
respect to the middle king the vijiglsu and his allies in the 
front are normally friendly constituents" and the enemy and 
his allies are unfriendly elements. If the attitude of the 
madhyama were to alternate between hostility and friendship on 
the condition of the unity and disunity between the conqueror 
and the enemy we should, expect an attitude of opportune inter­
vention or veiled hostility as the chances of their alliance are 
slender by the nature of the mapdala. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that the superiority of the power of the madhyama is 
for the purpose of the defence of his own territory against the 
impetuosity of either the vljlgigu or the ari. His friendship 
towards the vijiglgu is negative in nature. It is further derived 
from the calculations of the vijlgigu being the potential overlord 
of the map, dal a of ten kings and inferior in power to the madhyama 
only in degree, and that too not unreasonably due to the potential 
confrontation of his enemy. Th&, absence of hostility between 
the madhyama and the vijigigu is further assumed by the probability 
of the intervention of the udaslna, who may injure all the three 
combatants, the middle king, the conqueror and the enemy, more or 
less equally. The vijigigu , on the other hand. Is advised first to
subdue the circle of ten kings and then to conquer the madhyama»^
_  _  . _  _  "  -  “
KA, VII,18.1, see also Kangle's critical note 5 Medh. on Manu? V n . 177.
2Cf. KA, VII. 18. 5 ff; XIII.. 4.54-61.
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which means that he will not offend the madhyama until he has 
gained power superior to him* Eoreover the interests of the 
madhyama are not in peril on account of the vljlgigu* s activity*
It is, therefore, likely that the vijigigu can count upon the 
non-interference of the madhyama in his feuds with others* However, 
sometimes the madhyama is called a common ally which demands cl 
further intensive diplomatic activity to keep up the normal feelings 
of friendliness of the madhyama towards the vijigigu to ensure 
that he refrains from taking part in the vijigigu*s war with the 
enemy*
The sense of mediation, if any, attached to the term madhyama 
springs neither from his special suitability to mediate between 
the conqueror and the enemy nor from his attitude or policy towards 
them, but from his position to grant shelter or protection (saipsraya) 
to the vijiglgu if his enemies overpower him, or to restore him 
to his kingdom in the event of the collapse of his authority. This 
may, however, be the outcome less of friendship than of the calcu­
lations of power politics* The madhyama enjoys a middle position 
in respect of his geographical situation that does not imply a direct 
po bential confrontation with either the vijiglgu or the ar:' ; h: s 
power i s medium in relation to the combined strength of tin- conqueror 
aid the oneigj ; his- interests in the first zone of natural enmity arc
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alTrayr. middling as compared to those of the conqueror and tl,o
enemy, and he folious a middle courto of conduct Lokards then
oven "i'oo ho decides to aggrandise bins elf at the expense of
the circlu of the vij Igigu, for, the outbreak of hustil.it h.r i.i
such an event generally taken place in the din bant zone of natural
friends] ip of both the conqueror and the enemy. Tlio madhyama,
like the udasina, has a.n irregular circle of friends and fees
an/1 bic attitude towardn them remains mostly ‘inexplicable since
]
it depends on poorer, .material objects and operative causes, Thus^
the marthyama’ s attitude towards the vij iglgu i n  conflict with
the aim is characterised by negative friendship, opportune host?11 by
and for the most part cautious neutrality. The neutrality in his
case is the result of the fear of enraging either the v? ji^isu
or the ari or unwillingness to take sides.
Viswanatfois suggestion that ’the term madhyama ... referred
p
to a king whose state was neutralized permanently or temporarily’~ 
seems to be plausible because the madhyama is expected to show
equal favour to both the vij igigu and his enemy and their re- 
sjjective allies, thereby displaying his impartiality and causing 
no offence to the vij igigu. When he takes sides with one he becomes 
the enemy of the other and when he Invades the vijigigu’s allies
try, rax. 22.
n
_S- V- y Ifljtrne^-heyseJ l~Cwv> a/~ lhAsifi f p. W f  .
\ k ,  VII. 18.3.
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he is likely to provoke the mapdala lead by the vijigigu against him
1and cause a confederacy of kings to defeat him. So his bounds
are fixed by his own geo-political position, power, interests,
and policy. It is, however, not possible to agree with Vis-
wanathavthat the madhyama1 s policy is characterised by as ana
(staying quiet) because our texts do not say so nor does asana
2
mean a policy of neutrality.
UDASIHA (Neutral or indifferent king or state)
Modern scholars differ as to the correct interpretation of 
the term udasina. Shamasastry rendered it as 1 neutral1 V.H.R.
Dikshitar first translated it as 'negligible'^ but later agreed 
with N.F.Law, who interpreted it as 'super power1 as its strength
5is considered the greatest among the constituents of the manuala.
Sometimes the word is also rendered as 'indifferent' and it is
6taken to denote 'an attitude of passive indifference'. There
are others who hold that 'the term refers to a king situated in
a particular position in the circle of states; it does not refer
7to a neutral king'. It is apparent that three different approaches
1KA, VII.18.5.ff.
^See below, p. ^ 7, 3^-G f f ,
-z
VI. 2.pp. 290-291; Viswanatl%p. 33.
^Hjndu A6m. Institutions, p.271? WAI, pp. 311-12.
5Op.cit., pp. 10-11, 13; Studies in Indian History & Culture, pp. 200-210
6
Viswanathty op.cit., p.189.
7 H .L .0 h a - t te r je e ,  In kw A h e J  U w  a W  twW -'Skk 'w. / .
underlie these interpretations. On the basis of the literal meaning 
of the word udasina, i.e. ‘one who sits apart*, ‘neutral* or 
‘indifferent’, the term suggests such an attitude towards the 
vijigigu at war with his enemy. As to his geo-political situation 
he is generally assumed to be distant from the vijigigu, while 
his relative power among the Icings of the map, dal a is superior.
It is, therefore, necessary to examine these three aspects to 
obtain a correct idea of the udasina* s status and his attitude
in the circle of kings before we accept or reject any of the
interpretations mentioned above.
We have already discussed the geo-political position of the 
udasina in the ma&dala, and noted that it varies under different 
formulations? Nevertheless^the udasina is never said to be adjacent 
to the vijigigu, and his placing next to the vijigigu*s ally, although
in any direction, is the nearest in the ma^flala formulation. This
distance, however, has some bearing on the character of the udasina. 
in normal times, as it indicates no direct conflict of interest 
with the vij igigu nor hostility to the latter1s ari on mere geo­
political grounds.
Notwithstanding the varying geo-political positions, our 
authorities uniformly maintain that the udasina is superior in 
power to the vijigigu, ari, and madhyama separately, but inferior 
to their combined strength. He thus holds the balance of power
10n Manu, VI1.15«j SDK, XII.p.109j Agni, 233.19, 240-4; Of. HI,
VIII. 19; NV> XXIX. 21; cf. KA, VI
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over all three, particularly during war, because it is laid down
that the udasina is capable of helping the vi.j igi$ut ari and
madhyama when they are united, and of suppressing them when they 
1
are disunited. It follows that the superiority of his power is 
primarily for defensive purposes and serves as a deterrent to the 
impetuosity of the vijigisu. N.N.Law and others are therefore 
right in designating the udasina as the 1 super power1, but this is 
not the only aspect of his significance in the mandala, as Law 
wrongly contends,J because alongside his power, lis attitude of 
neutrality is equally important. Law further remarks that on
account of his power the udasina could meet 1 the emergencies of
4
reference* without explaining this term. These emergencies, 
however, relate to either the vijigisu or the ari taking shelter
1 5with him in theevent of military defeat.
There is, however, some confusion among modern scholars about 
the position and policy of the udasina owing to the lack of any ex­
planation of his possession of superior power. We do not know 
whether it results from the larger extent of his realm or greater
10n Harm, VII.155; KDK. XII.p.109? Agni. 233.19, 240.4; cf. KN, 
VIII.19. NV_, XXIX . 2 1 .  Cf. KA, VI.2.22.
2
'Op,cit., pp, 9-13•
4 b i d .. p.13.
4bid.
5Agni, 234.20, cf. Vdh., II.1503-5; Cf. KA, VII.2.21.
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excellences of the constituents of his state. As to the excellences
of the udasina himself^Hanu and his commentators mention nobility,
1
knowledge of men, bravery, compassion and constant liberality;
but these in no way excel those of the vi^igigUjhence they cannot
account for his superiority. The mar^ala pattern of relationships,
as well as the manner in which his power is described, suggest that
the secrets of the udasina* s superior power, as also largely that
of the madhyama, are his flexible attitude towards other constituents
of the vijigigu1s mapdala, his impartiality, and his ability to
form alliances for stregnthening his side, when in conflict with
the yi.jigigu, the ari, or even the madhyama. We may refer to the
Arthasastra in which the vi.jigigu is described as helping the udasina
2
at war with the madhyama under certain conditions. Somadeva probably 
had this aspect of the udasina in mind when he attributed to him 
an irregular circle of friends and enemies (aniyata-mandala).
It may be added that the partisan character of the kings of the 
vijigigu1s ma&dala enhances the manoeuvrability of the udasina, who 
thus has all the politico-military advantages to swell his power 
in order to frustrate any aggression against himself.
According to our sources the udasina1s normal political
10n Manu, VII.211.
A a , VII.18.24-25.
3EfV, XXIX. 21- 2 2
attitude towards the vijigigu In conflict with his enemy is
1characterised by neutrality or indifference. Further, from 
the manner of the description of his superior power it appears 
that the udasina*s favour, expressed through financial and 
military assistance to the vijigigu, and by implication to the 
ari and even the madhyama, and disfavour, indicated by the de­
claration of vigraha against them, alternate as they are united 
o:& divided, suggesting thereby the impact of the political de- 
velopments. In fact, the neutrality of the udasina is not a 
political conditirm but an attitude. It is initially deduced 
from his geo-political position in the magdala, which shows 
primari' ly that the udasina lacks direct political stakes in 
the sone of vijigigu*s natural enmity and has no vital interests 
involved that affect his power and status. Further, he is handi­
capped as regards military Intervention in the conflict between 
the vijigigu and his £ri on account of the interposing territory 
of at least the natural ally of the vijigigu. In comparison to 
the madhyama, the udasina is thus further removed from the geo­
political consequences of the struggle for supremacy between belli­
gerents, so he can afford to observe neutrality or indifference.
To these geo-political considerations are added the over­
riding calculations of the power politics which really determine
IV, XXIX.21.
See abovej. p., ISO, fn.1.
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and crystallise neutrality in a given political situation. Soma-
deva expressly states that the udasina remains neutral to the
— 1vijigigu owing to certain causes. It implies that the neutrality
is made possible through political reciprocity; it is not a one­
sided affair. The vijigigu has to take precautions through policy 
and political expedients and so manage his inter-state relations 
that the neutral disposition cf the uclas'ina does not alter adversely 
owing to apprehensions on his account. The neutrality of the 
udasina is further facilitated by the man&ala considerations, 
which, according to K!au£ilya, make the udasina normally friendly 
to the vij igigu (a political leverage which the latter may exploit), 
butAshould not take for granted, because the friendly trait of the 
udasina is rather negative in bearing as far as the yijy:gi£u' s 
ambition is concerned. This is evident from the fact that the 
udasina is a non-aligned power even in the standard manuala. He 
is definiteS-Iy said to possess an irregular circle of friends and 
foes. It is also implied that the udasina like the madhyama may 
persecute the vijigigu* s ally, although, onthe other hand, the 
vijigigu may also exploit him to restrain his ari* s ally in time of 
war. ^  Moreover^ the udasina can grant shelter to the vij igigu and 
the ari alike when approached in a catastrophe. It is thus indi­
cated that despite the neutral dispositioncf the udasina his policy
1HY, XXIX.21.
2KH’. TEII.45, esp. TrpadJayayaalrpekgaCnusariQl commy. (Bibliotb.eca Indlca).
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of neutrality or attitude of non-intervention is quite flexible.
In its adjustment to the situations it may vary from qualified 
support to open enmity by granting shelter to either of the con- 
testants. The vijigigu has to be ever vigilant of the udasina 
because his neutrality is, by and large, a matter of politico- 
military strategy and subject to modification in view of inter­
state vicissitudes.
Notwithstanding the freaks of his political behaviour the 
neutrality of the udasina is further ensured by the balance of 
power in the map dala arising out of the two confronting power blocs 
of the vijigisu and his ari. It is laid down that if the udasina 
were to invade the mag$ala owing to his excessive power the vij igigu 
should join together with other kings according to the rule of 
union (sangha-dharma) in order to frustrate the powerful invader 
from the outside. Its obvious implication is that the udasina1s
•fit*
policy of aggrandizement against the vijigigu1s ma&dala is doomed 
to failure if the vij igigu has the foresight, .and shows proper 
realization of the threat to the balance of power. In the absence 
of concerted action against the aggressive udasina not only would 
he upset the existing distribution of power inclined in favour of 
the v^igigu but also the independence of many states would be 
compromised, and the map, dal a itself might disintegrate. This precept
See Medh. on Manu, VII.184, 197.
TOST, VIII.56.
155
while fully appreciating the gravity of the situation and pre­
scribing remedial measures also points to the restraints on the 
udasina1s political designs, thereby showing the profitability 
and the feasibility of the policy of ■ neutrality, which adequately 
safeguards and promotes the udasina1s interests withou^nuch 
exertion.
Furthermore^the vijigigu is not advised aggrandizement against
the udasina until he has subdued his enemies in the mapdala to-
1gether with the madhyama. In none of the ma&flala formulations is 
it indicated that the imperial drives of the vij igigu and the
Mr?
udasina clash with each other until at least the former has been 
able to overwhelm his natural enemy and to accommodate his natural 
ally in the altered geo-political set-up. Thus,the vij igigu eschews 
provocative actions against the udasina, likely to induce him to 
renounce his neutrality and cultivate partisanship with the 
vi.l igigu1s enemy. On his own prt the udasina is powerful enough 
to protect his kingdom against the military adventurism of the
Of
.713 igigu of for that matter^ any other king of the map, dal a.
It is evident that neutrality is not an attribute of a weak 
state nor is a neLitral position assigned to a king who cannot 
effectively defend himself. The superior power which protects his 
neutrality is, however, not dependent on the ctejw of conflict between
1Cf. KA, XXII.4.54-61.
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2>e J '
rivals; on the contrary, it is supposed to inhere1 in Abates or 
kings of the madhyama and the udasina designations. It may be 
reasonable to remark that this concept of neutrality, which is 
implied in the theory of the mapdala, partakes of the nature of 
armed neutrality. The neutral position cf the udasina is not normally 
sought to be - compromised in the interest of belligerency;
nor is it implied that it is by any means a stage In the rivalry 
Itself. When, however, the udasina Is spoken of In general terms 
the emphasis is on his superior power and potential attitude of 
neutrality, which are related to the bi-partite struggle for 
supremacy rather than to the geo-political arrangements of states.
Thus devoid of the geo-political factor, the position and the 
policy of the udasina would be compromised if these were not determined 
by the consideration of power politics. It is realised that the 
neutral position and neutrality of the madhyama and the udasina 
would end if they were to be faced with a direct stand against 
the vij igigu or ari. In fact, the only conceivable situation 
in which neutrality' could function is in holding the balance of 
power between rivals. The presence of belligerency or rival power 
blocs is thus the essential pre-requisite of n e u t r a l w h i c h ,  
however, is the cardinal feature of the theory of manual a .
The udasina like the madhyama Is a relative and dynamic 
character in the map, dal a. His attitude of neutrality or policy of 
non-iAhvention in the conflict between the vij igigu and his ari 
is finally determined in view of power, interest and operative
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causes, which imply that neutrality could also he a strategy and 
an expedient in certain circumstances* It is tempting to
visualise the influence of this aspect of neutrality as an ex­
pedient on the concept of asana (staying quiet, pause or watchful 
waiting) defined as upeksana (indifference) especially whenjthe 
latter can he linked with the political expedient of upeksa (in­
difference) in its application. But asana and neutrality 
(nirapeksatii or udasinata) are different political concepts.
The requisites of neutrality as a political attitude deducible 
from the udasina are uncommitted position in relation to the vijigisu 
and ari, superior power to project one’s own kingdom against the military 
adventurism of the vijigisu, lack of the vital interests in the conflict, 
and usually a certain distance from the vijigisu. On the contrary, asana 
is an instrument of the sixfold foreign policy which is applicable 
to the state of belligerency, nay> it characterises a particular 
phase in the rivalry between the vijigisu and his enemy or for that 
matter betweenjany two hostile parties. Asana means withholding 
action and neutrality means non-intervention. The indifference 
implied by asana is directed against the warfare and not against the 
enemy himself or the ambitious king’s expedition which character- 
ises the policy of the udasina towards the vijigisu in^normal course 
of warfare. Moreover, the impact of the policy of asanaQ& the 
balance of power in the mandala isjnot significant as it involves 
only a temporary cessation of hostilities, while that of the 
udasina*s neutrality is important because it contributes to the 
preservation of the balance of power. The neutrality of the
udasina or the mediatory propensities of the madhyama thus have 
no connexion with the policy of 1 asana either in our texts or
in the inter-state system to which they apply. Hence many scholars
1 k 2 3 4
such as Viswanath^ Diksitar, Krishna Kao, Ohatterjee and others
are wrong in explaining the conduct of the udasina in terms of
asana. The concept of neutrality which they arbitrarily developed
from the forced conjunction of the character of the udasina and the
madhyama with that of the asana is misleading.
It may he added that their misconception cf the neutrality has
led Yiswanathciand Chatterjee to erroneously remark that it was
possible for one who was not sufficiently powerful,as compared to
any one of the belligerent nations^to assume the neutral attitude.^
We must, however, remember that both the madhyama and the uiasina are
individually superior to the vijigigu and his ari separately and
their main characteristic is 'abstinence from hostility'. What is,
•65*
therefore, true for asana, a measure of policy which is adox>ted in 
a state of weakness, indecision or oscillation due to the external 
forces, and consequent upon some understanding with the opposite 
party or parties does not hold good in case of the udasina or the 
madhyama , whose neutrality is both a condition as well as a policy 
towards the belligerents. Further Ohatterjee, in his illustration of
^Op.cit., pp. 190, 192-94.
2m i. 321-322.
3Krishna Kao, Studies in Kautilya, p.160.
4.
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the neutrality in the mandala, has , misunderstood the meaning
of several terms. Not only is he unable to appreciate whatever 
implications the geo-political factor has as regards neutrality D 
but . argues that the natural ally of the vij igigu remains
neutral until other considerations urge him to take the side of
- 1 the vij igigu at war with his enemy* "While it is true that friends
and foes alikeifetermined their policies in view of the realities 
of the situation - the chances of the success and failures, ad­
vantages and disadvantages in the end, military involvement etc. - 
there is treatise on ancient Indian polity which
concede?neutrality to a natural ally as suggested 
by Ohatterjee. Further^his remark contravenes his own approval 
of the definition of neutrality as fthe continuation of a previously 
existing condition', because, according to the ma&dala formulation ^  
the division of the kings into partisan character is the normal 
condition of the inter-state sphere. In fact^the neutrality or 
intermediary position were hard to find in the mandala except in
case.of the udasina or the madhyama because of the prevailing selfish- 
2ness.
In the end,we may remark that both the madhyama and the udasina 
were characteristic elements of the inter-state system as they ex­
plain the presence of the neutral states with policies of non-
10p.cit., p.136.il ■ II <*■■■<■- ■ m ■ ■ f Jm
Cf. KC[, VIII, 73;
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intervention in the conflict between belligerents. This non-
partisanship is essentially a self-imposed political status which
is related only to the belligerents and not to other states for, os
we have already seen, the madhyama and the udasina both have their
allies and enemies in their own geo-political sphere. The nature
of neutrality is however not static, passive or negative in
relation to the struggle for power between two parties, but it is
dynamic, cautious and vigilant and is conditioned by the area of
conflict whether it affects it vitally or not. As already noted5
neutrality will become meaningless if the madhyama or the udasina were
to face the vijigigu or the ari directly or decide to invade the
mandala by themselves. Neutrality or non-partisanship thus depends
on many political factors? it is not an absolute condition., but
a relative political character of state in inter-state relations.
It is therefore wrong to maintain that there is 'no evidence of
1non-alignment in either the ma&dala doctrine' or in Indian tradition.
T’urther, the political propensities of the madhyama and the 
udasina indicate that they could also play the role of a third 
party in a dispute between the vij igigu and the ari. It has been 
been noted that madhyama is more prone to mediate in the conflict 
between the belligerents, obviously for the purpose of bringing 
an end to it, and the udasina is also ready to grant shelter to 
either of the hard-pressed contenders. It follows from this that
1
Indian traditions and Rule of Laxf among nations, Report of All India
Seminar (Delhi, I960), p.19.
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they may act as a third party. It is, however, doubtful, if any 
one of them could be effective unless threatening to ally with 
the aggrieved in order to coerce the uncompromising party. This 
third-party intervention could only be fruitful if one of the neutrals 
initiated it and the other remained unconcerned. In such cases the 
action cf the madhyama would create fewer problems than that of the 
udasina. Butjthe third-party role has less scope because of the 
implied rivalry between the madhyama and the u dasina as 'indieatecL in the
fKtt
Arthasastra. It must be pointed out that in an Inter-state dispute 
negotiations were generally conducted mutually and what could not 
be agreed between the rivals themselves had little chance of settle­
ment even on the intervention of the third party. Moreover^the 
madhyama and the idasTna may intervene on the side of one party against 
another. It is not an Independent course of action undertaken in 
the Interest of inter-state peace. However, the historical instances 
of the third-party intervention in the interest of the balance of 
power are found but not of the third-party judjnent In a feud between 
kings.
Principles and precepts of the theory of :
The theory of the ma&dala, as mil be evident from the pre­
ceding discussion, is based on the two fundamental principles of 
geo-politics and power politics, the former providing the physical 
framework of the inter-state system and the latter outlining the 
pattern of inter-relationship of states and laying down its rules
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on the basis of political realism. In fact, it is the latter 
that explains the former in order to rationalise the conflict of 
interest defined as power, particularly in relation to an ambitious 
state which pursues a policy of imperialism and of prestige seeking 
to change the existing distribution of power and thus threatening the 
inter-state status quo emerging from the formulation of the circle 
of states. Once it is understood that any political struggle is 
for interest and power, the geo-political principles help to devise 
a hypothetical scheme of inter-state arrangement. This is high­
lighted when an energetic king, endowed with statesmanship and 
might, tries to anticipate the political attitudes of a set of 
states situated at varying distances from himself, to lay down the 
broad outlines of his foreign policy which aims at the gradual sub­
jugation of his enemies. This being thejw&al nature of the mapdala , 
geo-politics has its relevance in the context of f *; power-politics 
because the sovereigns of the mandala acquire their respective
IW1.1 fcffnm+i ■ M i* II m “**
positions . compatible with their excellences, power- and majesty,, 
and lastly^ geo-political relationship; mere territorial contiguity 
or remoteness creates neither enmity nor amity nor even neutrality, (f* 
these are due to the motives of interests and the operative cause 
(karana)^ . While radically modifying the principle of geo-politics, 
the principle of power politics does not negate it, but only obviates
NV, XXIX. 20-22, 35; Agni, 233*20; Medh. on Hanu. VII, £77; 
RJDK, X.p. 96,o $']t
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its rigidity. Together they thus explain why the belligerents 
are usually contiguous. The operation of these principles may be 
seen in the events of a set of contiguous kingdoms. The history 
of the Paramaras of Iialwa and the Oaulukyas of Gujarat or the 
Cahamanas of Sakambhari and the GahagLavalas of Kanauj demonstrates 
that while territorial contiguity tended to make them potential 
belligerents? the real conflicts took place only when one of them had 
an „ energetic and powerful ruler. Potential enmity doe^iot mean 
confrontation unless one t£ the neighbours embarked upon a policy 
of conquest; and in this case also the aspirant had not to treat 
all his neighbours as active opponents; but only one of them lying 
in the direction of his imperialistic drive and another in his rearj> 
who might be in league with the enemy in front. It is therefore 
apparent that the principles of geo-politics and power politics 
are complementary and not contradictory. Howeverythe greater em­
phasis is on the principle of ' ■ power -politics rather than geo­
politics. The inter-state structure founded on these principles is 
really flexible* Inter-state politics Is thus explained as a 
matter of continuous concern and contingent adjustments according 
to political expediency, rather than a stereotyped arrangement of 
states.
Thus^ these two fundamental principles define tie relationship 
between the conqueror and his neighbours as one^hostility. They 
are^Purther developed to define his relationship with the ally, 
middle and neutral kings. Firstly, the belligerents are usually
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adjacent, as the geo-political contiguity may create conflict 
of interests. It is natural to expect an immediate neighbour to 
defy any attempt at domination by another neighbour because it 
involves deeper issues of political independence and a compromise 
of the material interests. Secondly, in the case of the conqueror 
and his ally the principle involved is that common enmity tends to 
unite the neighbours on opposite sides of a state, as for example 
the alliance between the Kalacuri king Lak§mlkar$a of Iripuri and 
the Caulukya king Bhima I of Gujarat against the Paramara king
i
Bhoja of Malwa, Hext^with regard to the middle king, the prin­
ciple involved is that a state with territory co-terminous with 
those of the belligerents and stronger than each of them holds 
the balance of power between them and occupies a middle position 
in relation to them. It tends, however, to income neutral towards 
the conqueror in conflict with his enemy, because its Interests 
are served by their mutual weakening and Its own inability to ag­
grandize itself against the belligerents, owing to the fear of 
causing their confederation against itself. As an example, we 
may refer to the incidental attitude and policy of the Calukya king
y fife
Somesvara I of Kalyapi towards the invasions by ICalacuri and the 
Calukya troops against Bhoja. ^ aramara some time about A.D. 105b. 
Finally, with regard to the neutral, the principle is that a king 
outside the circle of the conqueror, his enemy, and the middle king }
1C.I.I., IV.pp. xciv-v.
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with, power to chastise any one cf them individually^ holds the 
balance of power over them and adopts an attitude of indifference 
towards the conqueror because the struggle for power at a considerable 
distance does not call for partisanship, since it does not threaten 
his interests. Moreover, intervention against the conqueror is fraught 
with the danger that he might suspend hostilities with his enemy and 
form a confederacy to defeat and suppress the intruder from outside.
It may also be added that the political altitudes towards a 
conqueror, though formed in view of the principles of geo-politics 
and power politics, are finally crystallised by some definite cause 
at a particular moment in history. Herein lies the importance of 
diplomacy, on which the success orjhilure of the foreign policy 
depends.
The theory of the ma&dala also implies several precepts of 
political expediency and military strategy, such as, it is impolitic
S o j v ' i ' O
and dangerous to antagonise all neighbours atihe^time and to march 
against an enemy without safeguarding the rear where one's hostile 
neighbour generally awaits an opportunity to exploit such a situation. 
It is further suggested that alliances other than natural ones are 
difficult to conclude andare not endiiring. It is again not possible 
to form an alliance, whether for an immediate purpose or a long term 
objective without some basis of common interests or fears.
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The purpose and the signifficance of the Theory of Ha^alaj its 
historlca3. relevance.
The central concept of the theory of ma&jLala is a state whose 
king is called the vijigigu or would-be conqueror. Its main purpose, 
therefore, seems to be to promote expansion, in general, by out- 
lining the political complexities of an aggressive venture and 
suggesting the kind of Interstate strategy which would eventually 
bring success. As the advocates of the ma&dala concept fully appreciate 
the fact that the conquest depends nn the skilful political and dip­
lomatic strategy as well as on power, they adequately emphasise that 
the Inter-state system is characterised by alliances formed to push 
forward the plans of conquest, as also counter alliances created in 
response to them, in order to maintain the existing distribution 
of power In a given ^ o-political sphere. The struggle for power 
thus represents a conflict between tie policy of imperialism and 
the policy of maintaining the status quo. ThusDthe ma&dala has for 
the conqueror a twofold purposes namely, to promote his aggrandise­
ment against his enemies in prosperity, and to defend his interests 
In vicissitudes by maintaining the balance of power; and, for the 
victims of the policy of imperialism its purpose is defensive, and 
In extreme distress the ma&&ala is a means of survival.
The whole idea of the ma^§al_a begins with the recognition of 
an equilibrium of power among a group of interlocking independent 
states. This equilibrium of power arises on account of the potential 
confrontation between two power blocs and operates on the principle
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of balancing enemies against allies and is transformed into the
it i.
balance of power on^admissionof the two states of neutral disposition, 
who in the last analysi^f the maa.da.la system, contribute to the 
preservation ofthe balance of power. It is, however, remarkable 
that neither of the neutral states can, by itself, upset this 
balance of power without an alliance with one of the principal rivals 
which, however, is again not foreseen until one of the belligerents 
fears his total annihilation and seeks shelter with anyone of them.'
Despite this precarious balance of power the ambitious king 
is sho>m to be capable of establishing his supremacy over the whole 
man&ala through political or diplomatic expedients, aggression, 
and finally a policy of prestige. However, in view of the balance 
of power, while the conqueror is urged to put the knowledge of the 
interstate system to his politicaladvantage and crush his enemies, 
one by one, by cutting them off from their allies through the in­
strumentality of his own allies and isolating them fromthe neutrals
i
by enlisting their friendship through diplomacy, thereby preventing 
any outside help or intervention in favour of his enemies, neverthe­
less fhe is strongly advised to act with moderation in the hour of 
victory. The restraints of the manuala system are contained in the 
warnings against the annexation of the conquered kingdom by uprooting 
the :&llen dynasty or forcing a vanquished king to desperate re­
sistance or seeking shelter with the middle or neutral kings. The
i
'KDK, XII.p. 110; Agni, 233.23-24-; Of. ffl, V I I I .4-6 ff.
conqueror is also advised against persecuting a submissive king
and coveting his property; because such a course of action is not
ojsc? ■»
only morally unjust^but*politically disastrous, as it is likely to
1provoke the whole man&ala to rise and destroy him. In fact.the 
dictates of the moral conscience are sought to be harmonised with 
political realism. In this respect the theory of mandala is in 
accord with the ideal of universal conqueror and the conquest of the 
four quarters of the earth. It also seems to correspond with the 
'Ksatriva ethic*', of war in respect to Its discouragement of annexations 
and the treatment of the conquered kingdom. It is likely that the 
theory of mandala was developed as a geo-political counterpart to 
the ideal of the universal emperor (sarvabhauma or cakravafftin) In 
order to approximate it through a policy of gradual aggrandisement.
This restraining influence of the map.dala incidentally defines 
the limits of the foreign policy, and reflects upon he character of 
empires built against the background of thema&&ala theory. It 
indicates that the conqueror should generally aim at overlordship 
and to accommodate the vanquished states under his imperial sway.
We know that most empires in early mediaeval India represented a con­
glomeration of vassals or tributaries and semi-independent units, 
which lacked cohesion. In fact, empires came Into existence 
through a delicate balance between the aspirations of imperial unity 
actuated by the Ideals of sarvabhauma or cakravartin, on the one hand,
and the forces promoting independent existence or regional and 
dynastic separatism, on the other. The Indian empire was thus a 
compromise between these tendencies forced by the superior power 
of an ambitious ruler. The ma&dala theory seems to have favoured 
this precarious balance by discouraging territorial annexations and 
by allowing the defeated states to retain the elements of their 
power, which led to the disintegration of empires when imperial 
superiority declined. Thus the ma&dala concept may also contribute 
to an understanding; of the persistent tendency in Indian history 
of political disintegration and regionalism.
The theory of mapdala acknowledges the existence of several 
independent states and demonstrates that the inter-state system 
operates on the principle of checks and balances. By not conceding 
an independent role to the vassals or tributary kings in the inter­
state system, it indicates that their importance lay within a parti­
cular sovereign state or empire. However, the vassals and chieftains 
could be exploited as instruments of intrigue in inter-state 
politics. During our period, i.e. c. A.D.800-1200, we notice that 
many feudatories wielded great influence with their overlords and 
played a significant part in interstate relations, although this 
did not entitle them to recognition as sovereign kings, nevertheless^, 
one of the most striking shortcomings of the map&ala theory is the 
absence of any clear reference to the samanta system and its role 
In interstate relations.
It is generally thought that the whole theory of magical a was an
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intellectual exercise in political geometry without much relevance 
to events in Indian history. The manuala concept, it is true, is 
primarily and finally a theory; and the political condition in India 
at no time in her history fully conformed to the hypothetical structure 
outlined by it. However, it cannot he said that it has no historical 
relevance because some crude historical illustrations, at least during 
the history of early mediaeval India, can be suggested. It is, 
moreover, possible to illustrate the principles Linderlying the 
concept of map, dal a from the early mediaeval Indian history already 
suggested. However, it seems to us, that the theory of map, dal a 
provided an excellent working hypothesis, which, wher^iddressed to 
a particular ambitious king, could explain the possible political 
complications of interstate situations, and thus become the basis 
for deliberation on the sixfold foreign policy and the employment 
of political expedients or diplomacy. Historical illustrations of 
the application of the sixfold policy can also be pointed out and 
the employment of the political or diplomatic expedients through 
royal edicts, envoys and spies ascertained from the chronicles and 
literary works written during our period. Hven in those works
^ (X-va:L
written by kings such as the Yuktikalpataru  ^the Manasollasa, while 
they do not describe the theory of map dala as such, they nevertheless 
mention several of its salient features in their discussion of 
foreign policy and diplomacy. Thusfthe influence of the theory of 
mapidala can be deduced from the events of early mediaeval Indian 
history, although its geo-political structure cannot be illustrated
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in its entirety.
The significance of the theory of ma^dala, in itself, lies in 
the fact that it outlines and interprets an intestate system, which 
gives to the foreign policy of a state a sense of direction, by 
pointing to the limits of its objective^ as well as the course of 
action conducive to the accomplishment of those aims. It also in™ 
dicates the task of diplomacy and determines its sphere ofaction.
!Furthermit defines the interstate conflict in terms of power.,- which, 
however, is really material interest. Oniihe whole, the theory appears 
to be striking in its approach to the Interstate system, which is 
political and materialistic rather than religious and philosophical.
The Importance of the theory may be judged from the continuous 
M
interest in it, as^ evident from the writings on Indian policy from 
the earliest time to the 12th century A.D. The various works written 
over a long period are not merely repetitive, but their authors show 
some originality as regards the formulations of manuala, which may 
have been due to the influence of contemporary history no less than 
their proclivity for scholastic discussion. Since the objective of 
the mapdala theory is not to describe the historical kingdoms and 
their inter-relations but to lay down general rules of guidance 
and disclose the potential pattern of interstate system, its illustra­
tion Is greatly handicapped. It Is conspicuous, for the same 
reason, by its omission of the impact of the foreign invaders except 
that which can be inferred from the attitude and conduct of the 
udasjna. These limitations, however, do not mean that the theory has
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no influence on historical events. In the rajadharma section of 
the smrtis and puranas it is urged that the king should deliberate 
on f or eigi^4f fairs in the context of the mag, dal a. system, and we do not 
feel that the education of a king as well as the precepts of .state- 
craft had no influence on his activities. The map4ala system is 
intended to be relevant to the situations created by the policy of 
conquest of the vijigigu aiming at the supremacy over kings of his geo­
political sphere, and it seems thq|t its deliberative value could not 
be ignored, which explains its popularity in ancient India.
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Chapter XV 
SADGUCTYA (SIXFOLD POLICY)
Having demonstrated that conflict for power among a group 
of states is natural^ on the presumption of the political relations 
based on the mandala system, our authorities discuss the vital 
subject of inter-state policy, primarily,with a view to offeri^ 
guidance to the vi jigjgu on how to attain success in the struggle 
for supremacy. This constitutes the subject matter of the concept
S^dgunya which outlines policies to deal with enemies in inter- 
-to
state relations and^meet situations consequent upon the vicissitudes 
of power.
The term sadgunya means that which is composed of six gunas
i 1 1*  I iJ>LWKffcBi»<lipPll.*» iiM ^  issf #. tma.W*» mi mwmm
or policies which are; sandhi (compact or treaty, i.e. policy of 
peace), vigraha (hostility or war), yana (marching on an expedition), 
asana (pause or staying quiet or a policy of waiting), dvaidhibhava 
(dual policy or duplicity), and samsraya (seeking shelter or protective 
alliance)^ The king is asked to deliberate carefully and calmly 
upon these six policies with his ministers in the context of the 
inter-state system and to have recourse to the appropriate one in
*S[V, XXIX. 42- ~ Sandhivigrahayanasanasamsrayacdvaidhibhavafsadgunyam.
Agni, 234*17 - Sandhis ca. vigrahas caiva yanam as an am eva ca,
j |  ^ •'--------- 1 r ~ fiT --r-« |^ |-»i iii»i niipi.iMMii iTMii-ii-miiinrnrj y iin i-J r .-.n iinT i i^ mp n     , i i i i^ li h i im ,. win  .....
Dvaidhibhavak samsrayascaivstgag.guo.Yah parikirtitab. of. Ydh., IX. 150 
3 ff; also Agni. 240.5 ff; On Manu, VII.160-61; On Yarifi.. X.547: HA, 
II.6-14. RDK. XIII.pp. Ill ff; Manas.. II. chs. 11-16, also 17 verses 
970-71. cf. Ktr, IX-XI; KA, VII.1.1 f t .
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view of the factors of power, place, time and the 
1his allies ' .  by means of which, he feels, he would be 
enabled to erect fortifications, capture elephants, dig mines, 
carry on trade, cut down forests, raise embankments round fields 
in tracts not irrigated by rain, and to win the wealth of enemies 
[ i  ‘ , parasya/1 Other authorities succinctly state that the 
objectives of the application of the sa&gunya are to promote
3one!s own advancement and bring about the decline of enemies.
That gadgu&ya is applicable to foreign affairs is evident,not
only from the discussion of it on the basis of maa&ala.but also
from the statements of Hedhatithi that ffrom among the sixfold
policy the king should resort to one or the other, according to
his capacity for the conquest of ma&dala* S o m e s v a r a  III also
says that these six policies are to be applied against the enemy
bloc (satrumandala).^
The composite term ga&guaya thus stands for the foreign policy 
6
of state. Each guna (policy or proper course of action) is
Mit. on Xa.iK.. 1.347, on Manu. VII.56; Medh. on Kami, VII, 154, 160-5.
Tledh. on Manu. VII.160; cf. KA, VII.1.20.
Kull. on Manu. VII.160; Agni. 234, 21 ff.
4Medh. on Manu. VII.176.
M^anas. 11.17.970-71.
6
There is no^term for foreign policy as such, although Somadeva uses
the term avapa as opposed to tantra and says that tie former constitutes
activities of a king pertaining to the acquisition of enemy1s territory. 
(WV, XXX.47; see also above, p.£)^» )
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however not only a form, a type, an attribute, or an aspect of 
the foreign policy,but also constitutes its instrument or measure.
It is evident that gadgunyu is primarily addressed to the enemies 
and thus seeks to deal with the conflict for power. Its objectives 
are to augment the economic and defence potentials of the king and 
to win the wealth of enemies by a policy of self-aggrandizement.
A glance at gadgu&ya is sufficient to indicate our authorities1
comprehensive approach to the problems of inter-state conflict and
their imagination to devise policies to cope with politico-military
complications in the struggle for supremacy. It may give another
instance of their delight in pedantic thoroughness, which, however,
is not without significance, ga&gunya obviously distinguishes six
facets of inter-state relations by taking into account the possible
1vicissitudes of power, caused by bad policy and chance. It seems 
that these types of policy could not have been laid down without 
a reference to real inter-state conditions. For, it cannot be 
denied that there are intermediary conditions between peace and 
war and policies to deal with them must accordingly differ. Further, 
it is evident that these six policies are arranged alternatives
such as peace and war, marching and pause, dual policy and 
seeking shelter, which clearly imply an adjustment of policy to 
politico-military situations and an appreciation of the aggressive
^See below, pp. ifrO ff ,
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and. defensive measures to promote and safeguard vital interests on 
the basis of expediency. In some circumstances* however, the six 
policies together would represent different stages and aspects of 
relations between two rival states. As, for instance, sandhi re­
presents a stage when the rivals can resolve their differences and 
enter into a compact to desist from active hostility or to co­
operate with each other in the sphere of common interest. If 
sandhi is . not possible on mutually agreeable terms, the
alternative is a state of war (vigraha). Its initial stages are 
marked by hostilities and diplomatic contest which, however, come 
to a head with the sending of envoys by the aggressive party with 
an ultimatum of peace on its own terms or war* On the failure 
of the diplomatic mission, yana is the next stage; then comes 
the stage of pause (asana) in active hostility, which may be resorted 
to before, during, and after the actual invasion or battle. The 
fifth stage is that of dvaidhibhava which may a . b e  adopted by 
the aggressor according to the situations resulting from warfare; 
and finally,, comes the stage of samsraya to cope with the threat of 
annihilation. Even the aggressor may be caught in such a situation 
when his army has been massacred in the battle. It is thus evident 
that the ga&gusiya provides instruments of politico-military strategy
ifti uilfllWTwin. liWih I.m «** J. v
of the different stages and situations in the conflict to suit the 
demands; and tactics of the struggle for power. It is, however, striking 
that the concept of ga&gunya suffers from serious limitations because 
of being confined to hostile relations only.
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Several authorities hold that basic and best among the six
policies are those of peace (sandhi) and war (vigraha). It is
pointed out that in as much as dual policy (dvaidhibhava) and
seeking shelter (samsraya) are prompted by a desire for peace
(sandhi) and involve an agreement, they are included under sandhi,
and marching on expedition (yana) and pause (asana) are the aspects 
2
°£ vigraha. But others,following Kaufilya,argue that all the 
six policies are distinct because of the difference in the situations 
(avasthabhedat) they express and seek to ameliorate.''5 While it is 
true that these six policies,as well as the conditions,are different, 
nevertheless, a close examination of these will show that,,strictly 
speaking^ peace is only one of the six categories, the others beiru^
differs t r
^aspects of war,!. We shall see in the
following pages that in certain circumstances dvaidhibhava is resorted
Agni, 234.16; KU, XI.35-37; KA., VII, 1.3 quotes Vatavyadhi, who 
taught a twofold foreign policy comprising only sandhi and vigraha 
but Kaujilya refutes his view and states the sixfold policy.
^Cf. KN, XI.35-37; Byhaspati IIbid., 38"39jrecognised a
threefold foreign policy comprising only sandhi, vigraha and samsraya. 
Kamandaka finally says (40 ) that logically there is only one policy 
(guna)f viz. vigraha; sandhi and others proceed from it.
'z for
KA, VII. 1.5; XI.40. Except^the Agni P. our sources do not take 
cognizance of these opinions but only state that the policy is sixfold.
kA.L.Basham, The Wonder^ that was India, p. 125.
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to in order to prosecute war on another front and a recourse
'k° samsraya prolongs rather than terminates hostilities. This
analysis strengthens our earlier conclusion that the sa&gu&ya
as a concept outlines instruments of the politico-military strategy
of inter-state conditions for the self-aggrandizement of a state
in prosperity and protection from enemies in adversity.
Some modern scholars argue that the principal types of policies
are three: vigraha (war), sandhi (peace) and asana (neutrality(sic.))
which correspond roughly to the types of rulers in the mapdala and
1reflect the divisions of international relations. . Viswanatto*.
Jtaw 1^_1
Likshitar, and Chatterjee assign the policy of asana to t^he 
madhyama and udasina‘1 and the former implies that the vljigisu 
will pursue the policy of war and the ari that of peace. Yiswanatha. 
further regards the remaining three policies, viz. sagisraya, yanat 
and dvaidhibhava as minor ones and explains the dual policy as
*5
applied by an 'imperial state' towards its refractory vassals.
But he has evidently missed the full import of gadgunya which seems 
obviously addressed in its entirety to the vijigigu for successfully
1
S.V.Viswanath^- op.cit., pp. 54-55. Y.R.K.Dikshitar, Mauryan Polity,p.179. 
, This is, however, different from Byhaspati's view of the threefold 
policy (see above p.ll^, fn,!!. )
2frp.cit., pp. 191 ff; WAX. 321-22, op.pit.
3
S.V.Viswanath^, op.cit.. p.55.
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dealing with situations complicated by his foreign enterprise.
Although, as we will note below, the six policies have a general
applicability, nevertheless^there is no evidence whichjdistinguishes
sadgunya into major and minor divisions in the preceding manner,
nor one that ties them up with the three categoric s of the kings
—  ]
in the mandala. On the contrary, a text, Cak^usiyam, states that
these six policies constitute measures to deal with[the enemy,
ally, middle and neutral kings.
The disquisition of sadgunya is, however, meant not only
for the vijigisu, but also foi^other rulers, because guidance
is needed fozjall those to be affected by his activities as much as
for him. Moreover, any and every king should consider himself as
vijigisu, as the characterizations of rulers of the mandala are all
relative. Further, as already remarked, sa^lgupya consists of precepts
of inter-state relations which embody alternative courses of action, as
for instance, when)the vijigxgu is told when ancl whom to attack in prosperity,
as well as how and wliehto pause in his offensive and defend himself 
in distress or weakness. It is implied that the aggrieved ruler will
pursue an alternative policy suited for the protection against invasion.
Further, these six policies also admit of combinations, as each
one is an instrument of success and the inter-state conditions
^Sutraf 54, p.20
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may call forth the application of several such instruments owing
to the multiplicity of parties involved in inter-state relations*
A thorough knowledge, proper appreciation, and wise application
after due deliberation of ga&gu&ya is fundamental to the vital
interests of state. Somadeva,reproducing Kau^ilya,observes, 'Peace
(sama) and activity (vyayama) constitute the source of acquisition
and security (yogakgema), Activity is that which brings about
the accomplishment of works undertaken. Peace is that which brings
1about security of enjoyment of the fruits of works.1 And Kaujilya 
states, 'The source of peace and activity is the sixfold policy. 
Decline., stability and advancement are the consequences of that 
3  O l l c y ? . '2 It is thus evident that the well-being of the state, 
and not only its inter-state status, depends on the application 
of .gjflgugya.
Since the advancement, stability, or declinein the condition 
of a state is measured, in terms of power (sakti) and success (siddhi) 
attained by it, the concept of ga&gunya seems to have been de­
veloped in view of the vicissitudes of power. In fact;the criteria 
for the distinction of these six policies are different inter­
state conditions created by the conflict for power and a king is 
to employ the sixfold policy with due regard to his power and the
W, XXIX. 1-2; KA, VI. 2.1-3.
nA, VI.2.4-5. These lines are omitted in the NV.
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principle of expediency. As we shall later discuss in relation 
to the application of each policy, it would be evident that the 
general rule is that when one is weaker than the enemy, he should 
pursue the policy of sandhi, if stronger than him, then vigraha; 
if both equal in power, as ana is the policy to be preferred; if 
excessively powerful, yana should be undertaken; if with the help 
from one the fight against another enemy can be carried on with
success, than dvaidhibhava is the right policy; and when one
* 1is very weak, the policy of samsraya is to be resorted to. It
is, therefore, necessary to have some idea of the concept of power 
m  order to appreciate the concept of sadgunya.
Concept of Power (sakti)
Somadeva and Somesvara III have prefaced their expositions
gaflgunya with an elucidationlof the concept of power, * Power 
*** 2
is /possession ofJ  strength,1 says Itau^ilya, and our authorities 
following him hold that it is threefold; power of counsel or in­
telligence (mantrasakti or buddhisakti), power of might or majesty 
(prabhu sakti), and power of energy (utsahasakti). ^ The strength 
of knowledge (i.e. of statecraft and diplomacy) is the power of 
counel or intelligence; the strength of treasury and army is the 
power of might; and the sti'ength of valour is the power of energy.^
fV, XXIX. 5£> ff; On Manu. VII.169-174. RDK, XIII.pp.112-13; HA» II.9-14. 
^KA, VI.2.31 Balam saktib.
^NV, XXIX.36-40; Yasastilalca. III.p.386; Agni. 241.1; Manas., II.clis.8-10.
MV, XXIX.36-40; Jganabalam mantrasaktib. KosadaaAabalam nrabhusalctib. 
Vikramo balam cotaahasaktib. (Delhi ed.'V: cf.'lA. VI.2.53~
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Kaujilya/Whom Somadeva reproduces as regards the threefold power,
has also described the threefold success (siddhi) attained by
1each of these three powers respectively. Like ICauJilya and
Kamandaka, both Somadeva and the Agni Purana declare the power
2 «■of counsel or intelligence to be the most superior. Mantrasakti
the
really consists in the knowledge of statecraft,^ framing of wise 
foreign policy,^decision on the suitable measures of policy con­
ducive to the accomplishment of objectives and the employment of
upayas (expedients) in order to subdue the enemy with little or no
3loss to oneself, and protection of one's own kingdom. In fact, 
as already seen, the state depends on mantra and Somadeva holds that 
the state is preserved by the good policy (naya) and valour (vikrama).^  
In fact,the two principal concerns of mantra (counsel or state 
policy) as regards the foreign affairs are decisions on the appli­
cation of sadgunya and the employment of upayas ( means
or expedients), which together bring about success in external
undertakings. The effectiveness of mantrasakti is expressed by the
5
analogy of a hare killing a lion through intelligence. It is said 
1KA., VI.2.34.
~HV, XXIX.36; XXX.4-8; Agni. 241.1, cf. KN, XII.7.
KA, IX.1.2 ff.
3 -Manas, 11.9*697-721. Deliberation on the whole range of state policy, 
internal end external, and ways and means to accomplish the objectives 
come under the scope of Mantrasakti; Visvarupa on Yajft., 1.344; 
Yasastilalca, III. pp. 375-94*
4rrv, xxx.3.
Ibid., XXIX.37.
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^ t) leZ'-e 'iS
to be an unfailing weapon against the emamy and^a type of fighting 
termed ~ mantrayuddha or buddhiyuddha (diplomatic warfare)miiwi ■ him ir * in iTm nil* i imfwim n ■■■■wm hi*wiwm m  mwr m nwmir—
between rivals,enmeshing even the non-committed kings like the
« ■  JNiF 2
madhyama and the udasina. It is not unreasonable to find some
ministers claiming that their mantra enabled their masters to subdue
—
their enemies, make other kings their tributaries and win glory, 
since they advised them on the application of sadgunya.
It is evident that our authorities have a wholesome concept 
of power, which is not the same as force, although the army is an 
important constituent of power.
It is the conditioncf the threefold power which really deter- 
mines the status of a state in inter-state relations. Repeating 
XCauJilya,Somadeva says, ’thriving with these three powers, a king 
becomes superior, reduced in these inferior, and with equal powers 
equal*.^ So the decline, stability and the advancement of a kingdom 
are judged by the extent of its possession of the threefold power, 
which, as already pointed out, result from the application of 
ga&gunya. As these powers are mutable, so should the instruments 
of inter-state policy -vary according to the actual circumstances.
1m, xxx. 8.
Ibid., XXX.4 ff; of. KA, XII.1.17; XII.2.1 ff.
KDK, _p.l; E.I., I.pp. 195-207 - Mau stone ins; pp. 207 ff. -
Bajiesvara Ins. for^andella minister's claims; E.I., II.pp. 161 ff. - 
Badala pillar ins. contains eulogy of five generations of hereditary 
Bala ministers.whose policy, it ds claimed, was responsible for the 
success of their masters.
4MV. XXIX.41; KA, VI.2.35.
In addition to power, other factors determining the selection
1
from and the application of $a&gunya are place, time, and allies,
which clearly indicate that it is primarily a matter of political
and military expediency rather than religious morality. It is
striking that the influence of the alliances on tie pursuit of
the foreign policy is recognised.
Despite the fact that our sources emphasise these factors,
they invariably insert a discussion on the relative role of human
endeavour (pauruga or manuga) and Destiny (daiva) in the success
2of all undertakings of the king. It is acknowledged that both the 
human and providential factors govern the world. The human acts 
are characterised as good policy or bad policy (nayanaya) and 
that of Destiny as fortune and misfortune. It is, however, em­
phasised that the king should concentrate on the human endeavours 
which can be thought of, and propitiate or disregard the providential 
elements that are incalculable. Despite the fact that good or bad 
policy is said to account primarily for the success in internal 
as well as the external undertakings of the king, the role of the 
Destiny or providential factors or chance elements is not altogether 
discounted. In several sources the prevailing importance of daiva 
is rather over-exaggerated and the Tisnudharmottara Pura&a even
Hit. on Yajg.. 1.347; On Manu. VII.56; Medh. on Manu. VII.: 160-61.
2 —
On Manu. VII.205. ; On Ya.jg., 349-51; EDK, XIV, pp. 139-141;
Agni, 226.1-5; MV, XXIX.a ft ; also Yaaastilaka. Act. III.
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elevated it to the status of a fourth power, ‘ which should be 
taken into account by the king in the determination of his policy.
Thus,the application of the sixfold policy is also affected by 
this factor and Medhatithi accounts for the sudden weakness in 
finances and forces of a king by the elements of chance as well^which 
compel him to adopt the policy of asana.2 This belief also accounts
for
for the elaborate rituals that preceded a campaign, and^the attention
that kings paid to omens, portents, and astrology. The chance
elements did play an important role in the affairs of the state ,
as also in the life of the individual,and sometimes even changed
the course of events. Eor instance, we may refer to the sudden snow
and hail storm which caused panic among the troops of the fSahi king
Jayapala fighting with the Muslim ruler Subuktagin in 986, and
changed a possible victory into an abject defeat, because Hindu
3hordes considered this incident as an act of adverse Destiny. It 
seems that the incident even-idemoralisddothe king to the extent 
that he never regained his confidence against the Muslims. Indeed, 
the advice is against too much reliance on Destiny,
but it seems to have impressed the king and ministers alike so 
much so that some of the kings lost heart in the secular activities 
and confidence In their endeavour to ameliorate adverse conditions.
We can hear the wail of such resigned spirits in the futility of 
life even in the inscriptions. It seems that the application of
XVdh.. IX.71.11.
On Manu. VII.166.
3A.B.Pandey, Early Mediaeval India, pp. 64**
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the sixfold policy as well as the employment of the expedients 
(upayas) was influenced by the belief in the working of daiva.
However, the objectives of foreign policy were to bring about 
an all-round increase in the economic and military power of the 
kingdom and to contrive the decline in the power of the enemy.
It is interesting to note that although ga&gunya3like the concept 
upayas,has the ultimate aim of enabling the king to realize 
trivarga (dharma, artha, and lcama), nevertheless pits immediate 
objectives are materialistic rather than religious. The cost of 
the pursuit is reckoned by the profit or loss in men, money and 
material and political influence in the inter-state system. Its 
success is measured in terms of the advancement of power and pros­
perity, rather than spiritual or even religious merit. The selection 
from and application of ga&gunya are based on power and political 
expediency rather than rules of religious ethics.
A. SMDHI (Treaty, Compact or Peace: Policy of peace)
Meaning of Sandhi
Reproducing Kaufilya, Somadeva states, 1 Entering into a treaty 
1 « *
is sandhi'. Vijhanesvara l and Hemacandra define it as 'making
As will emerge in these pages, sandhi (lit. 'conjunction*) is best 
translated 'treaty* or 'compact* as it is never considered an end 
in itselfpbut as a means of terminating hostilities, securing one's 
rear or gaining an ally for the purpose of warfare. We sometimes 
retain the translation 'peace', however, to preserve the symmetry 
with 'war' (vigraha, lit. 'rupture').
~4?V, XXIX.43 - Panabrandhah sandhifc; KA, VII.1.6; Agni, 234.18 -
smrtah sandhih*>• QTkt., 79c.p.11 - Panavaddho bhavet sandhiK 
syyaifl mnas tarn acaret.
187
an adjustment or a settlement1 ,**" which, according to our authorities,
involves conditions or terms stipulating friendly relations,
financial and military obligations, and promises for mutual help
and cooperation or even such agreement as 'we should not do any
2 ***harm to each other'. 'Medhatithi and other commentators on Manu 
imply that sandhi means coming to terms with the rival even at the 
cost of slight harm or loss in money (to oneself) for the cessation 
of hostilities.' It may be pointed out at the outset that sandhi 
is primarily addressed to the conflict or war between rivals, of
whom the aggressor has a threefold objective of acquiring an ally,
4money, and territory, which means that any agreement between the 
antagonists would contain terms relating to one or all of these 
three objects. The preceding definitions make It evident that sandhi 
means a treaty or compact containing terms or conditions which seek
to adjust issues of conflict in order to avoid war and establish
5peace between rivals. In itself,sandhi is both a policy and an 
instrument of policy „ a method of the settlement of dis­
putes. However, as an aspect of foreign policy, it expresses a
1 M r  «
Hit. on Yajfi., 1.347 - Sandhir vyyasthakaranam; HA, II.6. - 
Sandhir vyavastha.
On Manu, VII.163,2Q2,206; Hit, on Yajn., 1.352. See also below pp. 109, 
kinds of sandhi. RHP,R524*
^On Manu, YII.169. cf. i^ukra, IY. 7.466-67 defines sandhi as that by 
which a powerful enemy. becomes friendly.
40ov. and Kull. on Manu. VII.206; RDK, XIV.p.142, also Ya.ig., 1.352.
viJi^ Medh. on Manu. VII.202,212.
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desire and the decision of a king to try amicably to compose his 
differences with the adversary befo're resorting to war or to terminate 
war by mutual agreement on political status and. material interests. 
Sandhi demands compromise and concessions in treasury, troops, 
territory, and even political status. It is characterised by mutual 
appreciation of politico-military situation and each other1s diffi­
culties. Even the treaty which a victor concluded with the defeated 
king or a scion of the slain king,whom he has installed on the 
throne of the occupied kingdom/has in view his own difficulties 
to annex the country to his own territory; as well as a regard for
the defiant spirit of the vanquished people who refuse to acquiesce 
1
in his rule.
In another context, however, sandhi provides for an alliance 
between two rulers for some political or material end. Medhatithi
says, 1Presents of gold and other things to secure the good-will
(JK0jv\C£. 2
of both parties constitutes{sandhjy • Other commentators on
Manu also state that sandhi is entering into a treaty for mutual
benefit such as fwe shall help each other with elephants, horses,
3chariots, money,1 and so forth. It seems that sandhi in this con- 
text is connected with another policy of gadgu&ya, viz., yana 
(marching against an enemy), and its terms bind the contracting
As*
parties to mutual cooperation in war. This is borne out by Medhatithi^
1 rqecMx, c m  v v u , CL o t
^On Manu, YII.160 - Tatra hiranyadidanobhayanugraharthah sandhib* 
3Kull. ibid., of. RHP, p.324.
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comments on the following verse. He observes, ’Having entered
into alliance (sandhi) with one party, the king shall declare war
1upon another even under false pretences’ * Here it seems that the
king has concluded a treaty with another enemy^possibly in his rear
or on the _periphery of his kingdom,in order to undertake an
allied expedition against his adversary. This meaning and purpose
sandhi is in full accord with the text and commentaries which
2further distinguish two kinds of sandhi •
Hature of sandhi
notwithstanding the objectives, whether self-preservation by 
bringing about a cessation in hostilities through political and 
financial concessions to the aggressor^ or self-aggrandizement Ty 
means of an alliance with one enemy for a successful attack upon 
another, or by compelling the opponent to yield to the proposal of 
a treaty demanding submission and concession in treasury, troops 
or territory, sandhi is by nature an agreement for mutual benefit, 
which arrests further deterioration in relations between contracting 
parties by establishing peace between them. It may be added that 
even sandhi for an alliance with another enemy for cooperation in 
war cannot be concluded without the abjuration of mutual hostilities,
10n Manu. VII.161.
2I M A .. VII.163; of. KA, VII.6.2.ff; see below, p . W -
howsoever temporarily. It is evident that agreement and peace 
constitute essentials of sandhi. Thus,the policy of sandhi seeks 
a settlement of the conflict by agreement on terms, which bring 
about peace and hold out a promise of good-will and mutual co­
operation. Sandhi,therefore,is a means to an end. However, strictly 
speaking;sandhi is not peace,but an instrument of peaceful re­
lations and mutual cooperation between rivals as well as between 
friends. In the case of the latter it may mean a means to con­
solidate .existing friendship,or;it may embody;,mutual agreement 
on terms and conditions for a common undertaking.
It is striking that.unlike Kaujilya .who distinguishes between
1
treaties with or without stipulations, our authorities only re­
cognize sandhi with stipulations, probably because the elucidation 
of a treaty without stipulations in the Arthasastra itself con­
stitutes a trick of confidence and a means to dupe an enemy suffer-
2
ing from vices until one is able to strike at him. The stipulations
rz
of a treaty are in respect of object, place, and time, which are 
clearly shown by Medhatithi’s explanation of two kinds of sandhi 
and also by the provisions of the treaty concluded between a victor 
and his protege on the throne of a conquered kingdom. Further,
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the stipulations of the draft-treaty,purported to have been con­
cluded between Lava$aprasada, the minister of the Caulukya king 
Bhima II and the Yadava king Simha$.a, relate to mutual non-aggression, 
defensive alliance against a powerful invader attacking either of 
them, an undertaking to refuse asylum to any rebellious prince or
noble who has fled from either country, and to restore»to each
1
other,all valuables removed by the refugees*
That sandhis were often with stipulations may also be in-
th-e
ferred from a few historical instances,such as one entered intoA
by the Caulukya king Bhima I and the ICalacuri king Lakgmikar^a
- 2for the simultaneous invasion of Malwa, . or th^ one concluded by
Jagaddeva Pratihara, the chief minister of Bhima II of Gujarat
with Pythvlraja III of ^akambhari providing for peace* It seems
that Jagaddeva,in pursuance of the stipulations of the peace-
treaty (sandhi), threatened his subordinate dan&anayaka Abhayadeva
of Asvala with dire punishmentywhen the latter desired permission
to rob rich travellers from the Cahamana kingdom,as this act would
the
have contravened the provisions ofAtreaty relating to the abstinence 
from mutual hostilities. Thus, sandhis concluded during our period 
seem to have been generally with stipulations. It is, however, 
also emphasized in our texts that the king concluding sandhi must
1
Lekhanaddhatif p.52.
2A.K.Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 53™54. C.I.I., IV. Pt. I.pp.
3
Ibid., p. 141; I). Sharma, op.cit. , p. 77.
ensure that theie would be no violation of the terms and conditions
1of the treaty by the opponent.
Factors and circumstances connected with sandhi
A recourse to the policy of sandhi to meet the situations
arising in the inter-state conflict for power is primarily dictated
by tie weakness and inconvenience of a king with regard to the factors
of power, place, time, and friendly alliances relative to his opponent
and the prospect of certain loss in men and material in the event 
2
of war. Our authorities recommend a stronger king, one equal 
in power, and especially a weaker king to adopt the policy of sandhi 
against an invader;when afflicted with calamities, when seeing cer­
tain mutual destruction in battle but expecting future superiority 
in power, and when lacking means to protect himself and his kingdom.
It is argued that like ice-cold water entering into a sore, even a
weaker aggressor causes pain to a stronger king suffering from 
3calamities. Should, however, such an aggressor refuse the offer 
of treaty, the king is advised to strike him down when the opponent 
is confident of victory. The advisability of sandhi with an equal 
is argued from the standpoint of the uncertainties of victory in 
war, while loss and evencteath in it is certain. It is against 
sound policy to wage uncertain war. The futility of&fight between
193
equals is illustrated by the simile of the clash between two 
unbaked jars, which is destructive to both. Medhatithi and other 
commentators on Manu, however, ascribe the decision to conclude sandhi 
with the enemy equal in power to the aggrieved king’s expectation 
of victory over the opponent in future, when he hopes to have en­
hanced his power by impairing his opponent's strength through creating
dissension among his ministers and subjects or by contracting
2powerful alliances. Should, however, the equal king refuse to 
ma^e sandhi on agreeable terms, the king should cause him harm to 
the same extent, and even more than that which he has sustained, 'for, 
iron does not join unless heated*. Through the employment of force 
and other expedients (upayas) an equal king should be forced to 
conclude sandhi.
Sandhi is the best policy for a weak king, who, according'to 
Somesvara III and others, cannot overcome the aggressor by force 
owing to such factors as place, time, etc., or when the enemy is 
overwhelmingly strong , or when he is unable to hit back at his
powerful assailant; in fact,when he has no effective means to protect
the 4
his interests in face of an invasion. He should offer to the assail-
ant an alliance, treasury, territory, or its produce,to conclude a
hfV, XXX. 60; of. KN, IX.61; KA, VII.3.4.
20n Manu. VII. 169.'
%V. XXX.57-58, of. XJI, IX.77-78; EA, VII.3.7.9; XII.1.20$.
^Manas.. IX.11.72/S~27; se^e also above, p.i^u.fn.i«
194
sandhi. If the invader is not willing to accept sandhi on the 
offered terms, the king should perform several military and 
diplomatic feats and even threaten him with fight to the finish.
On the other handy a powerful invader is counselled not to outrage 
a desperate and submissive ruler by further persecution, but to 
conclude peace by treaty; for in the alternative, he will resort 
to a desperate battle which may imperil the invader, because
2
heroism born of grief and resentment makes one fight bravely*
*like a forest fire1, and 1... even Indra^dare1 not stand before
/Such? men...* Such a desperate king also becomes the object
of the favour of the man&ala and is likely to be helped by neutral
kings. Thus,the pursuance of the policy of sandhi is also facilitated
by these politic considerations.
Besides the advisability of the policy of sandhi to meet an
invasion, it is recommended in all circumstances of general decline
in power. Bhoja prescribes it to all those kings who are distressed
by an adverse fate (daiva)» whose kingdoms are threatened, and who
4have many enemies. Since sandhi provides for the cessation of 
hostilities between antagonists, it not only preserves the king in 
adverse circumstances, but also enables him to recoup his powers;
1 509^
I ,  XXIX.6H-6€f also/31-33; Manas., 11.11.728 ff; Agrxi, 240.6 ff. 
2Ibid.. XXX.63-64; of. Kfl., VII.3.10-11.
5Medh. on Manu. VII.200.
4Xkt., 83.p.12.
for the period of this absence of hostilities in foreign relations 
is to be utilized to promote one*s interests by all available means.
However, a policy of sandhi is also conducive to promoting 
self-aggrandizement when an ambitious king wants to subjugate an 
adversary who is equal in power. In order to increase his strength, 
he is advised to contract alliances with his less hostile enemies 
and undertake an expedition. Even a vijigisu, xdio does not need. 
any alliance with his enemies to commence a war, combines the 
policy of vigraha and yana with that of sandhi. This finds
expression before, during, and after the war with the adversary.
The pursuit of the policy of sandhi in such circumstances is not, 
however, dictated by unfavourable factors of power, place, and 
time, but is prompted by a desire to avoid war and minimize losses 
in men and material, if the objectives of hostility can be secured 
by agreement. After victory in the battlefield,the policy of 
sandhi is aimed at the pacification of the conquered kingdom and 
the conclusion of a treaty with the newly installed or reinstated 
king embodying the political, financial, and military settlement, 
which would be the basis of mutual reflations in future.
Thus,the factors determining the adoption of the policy of 
sandhi may vary from weakness in power to superior strength, and 
its circumstances,from self-preservation to self-aggrandizement 
through aggression. The advice of our authorities in general is 
in favour of a policy of sandhi, whether for averting an encounter 
and ending war or increasing strength to make war. The motive behind
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an
sandhi is to promote one's interests whether by acquiring^ally,
money, or territory, or by arresting further deterioration through
concessions to the adversary.
Some striking features of inter-state relations are suggested
by the preceding discussion. It is evident that while recommending
a policy of sandhi to deal with an invader, our authorities do
1not advocate the instant submission of the aggrieved king. In
generalyit is advisable to perform diplomatic and military manoeuvres
to inflict losses upon the enemy in order to secure favourable terms
of sandhi. Somadeva cryptically states that 'it is neither for**-
bearance nor indifference but the display of spirit /heroism/ which
2makes for sandhi'. It therefore follows that force is a prelude 
to peace, although its employment is in pursuance of the policy of 
sandhi. It may be remarked that resistance^even from the officials 
and subjects of an already vanquished kingdom^obliges a conqueror 
to install on the vanquished throne a scion of the fallen king 
and contract a treaty with him. Relentless opposition on the part 
of the loser may explain the matrimonial alliances offered by the 
victorias for instance,the Caulukya king Jayasiijha Siddharaja's 
offer of his daughter in marriage to his defeated adversary the 
C ah am an a king Aryioraja. This was often the only way of overcoming 
his hostility and initiating a phase of peaceful relations promising
~hfkt., 82.p.l2.Agni, 240.6. cf. KN, IX.1.
2W ,  XXX. 59.
cooperation in future.
As regards the advice of concluding sandhi with an aggressor, 
the historical events of our period point to contrary facts. The 
rivals seldom come to terms without war, howsoever indecisive.
Those equal in power often prefer war to peace (sandhi) involving 
the loss of face. A weak assailant is beaten back even at a con­
siderable loss. Even a stronger aggressor is often fought reck­
lessly to the complete disregard of the material consequences.
In fact, politic guidance is generally dashed against dynastic 
pride and political rivalry,with the result that peace treaties 
between antagonists proceed frommr, rather than forestall it.
Parties with whom treaties should not be concluded
Following Kamandaka, the author of the Agni Purana observes 
that a king should never enter into a treaty with a child, an old 
man, an invalid, a man deserted by his friends and relations, a 
coward or a terrified person, a greedy or a covetous person, nor 
with persons who have renounced all worldly concerns or are ex­
cessively fond of earthly possessions. Similarly, a king should 
never enter iito an alliance with a king who devises many schemes 
at a time and does everything in a half-hearted way; or with those 
who speak ill of gods and Brahma^as; nor with a king whose terri­
tory has badly suffered from visitations of Maturefsuch as famine 
etc; jhor one] with an army discontented and mutinous; nor with 
a king whose dominion, long rent asunder with civil dissensions,
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has regained its peaoe after a long time; nor with kings who ars. 
void of all sense of religion or truth1. Like Kamandaka,he decries 
a compact with these twenty-one persons, who should always be 
attacked.^ Bhoja has also advised against sandhi with those who 
have bad policies or divided counsel, those who are excessively en­
grossed in truth and religion (i.e. to the extent of being unworldly), 
and especially those who have previously been in distress or calamity 
For, &n\/one concluding a treaty with them is likely to lose even his 
life.^
A glance at the condition of the above parties gives an idea 
of our authors1 motives for these prohibitions. In fact,the apparent 
grounds are weaknesses in the threefold power and want of its con­
summation, unstable kingdom and disloyal subjects ;and lack of dis­
crimination . ■ as regards reliance on human exertion and
Fate, religiousness and self-reliance in the king himself, and above 
all,vulnerability of such kings and the prospects of gaining easy 
victory over them. The considerations against making treaties 
with such rulers are, therefore, politic par excellence. A sharp 
contrast is evinced in the Kamandakl.ya (not reproduced in our author­
ities) which advocates alliance even with an Anarya (non-Aryan), if
hgni, 240.10-14; cf. KN, IX.24-28.
*Tkt.. 85.p.12.
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he is strong, along with six other kinds of rulers % a kih^-true
to his promise, an Arya (a nohle king), a virtuous prince, one
having many friends, a very powerful sovereign, and one who has
1
come off victorious in many wars.
Kinds of sandhi
Medhatithi and other commentators on Manu describe sandhi in
2
two contexts, one in which it terminates war with the aggressor
3and the other in which it provides for an alliance in an expedition.
The latter is divided into two kinds1 that in which the act of
marching is undertaken in common with the ally, who was an enemy 
before sandhi, and that in which it is separate.^ Medhatithi 
further elucidates that in the first case the agreement entered 
into is in the following form: ’Let us march toward the goal con­
jointly, having equal shares in it, and X shall not be passed over 
by you; whatever we gain shall belong to both of us’; and in the
second: ’You march one way, I go the other’, ’where the action is
5not joint*. Further, the commentators on Manu also mention a treaty
embodying the settlement of a conquered kingdom. The subject of
defensive alliance (satpsraya) is, however, discussed separately in
1B8r. IX.43 ff.
On Manu. VII.169; RDK. XIII.p.112.
Ibid.. VII.163; Ibid.. XIII.p.111.
Ibid.
5 *
Ibid., see also below, pp.Z ° i 3 , - sandhayayana.
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our sources as it involves a different kind of policy.
Alliances between kings for cooperation in war against a 
common enemy are known,as for example between the ICalacuri king 
Lak^mikar^ia and the Caulukya king Bhima I for simultaneous attack 
on Malwa. Merutixpga alleges that ICar^a had promised half of the 
kingdom of Malwa to Bhima, but after victory, he violated the
« »  Ctr
previous agreement and annexed the whole of Malwa. This enraged
Bhima who invaded the Cedi country; but Karp.a made peace with
him by presenting him horses, elephants and the golden man&apika
1of Bhoja which he had carried away. This instance shows that 
alliances with stipulations were contracted. We may as well refer 
to an alliance between the Yadava king Sighana, the Lafra chieftain 
Sa^igrama Si^ iha, and the Paramara king Devapala for a joint attack 
on Gujarat, although it is not possible to ascertain the stipulations. 
An alliance between the Paramara king Bhoja and the Kalacuri king 
Gang'eyadeva was also concluded for a joint attack against the 
Calukyas of Kalyani. ^
Following Kamandaka the author of the Agni Furana divides 
treaties into sixteen classes; kapala (potsherd treaty), upahara 
(treaty through gifts), santana (by offering a princess in marriage),
^PC, pp.74-75"; C. I.I., vol. IV.pp. XO-iy-xcv.
2
ST.1.1., vol. IV, pp. lxxxix~xfc.
saregata (treaty based on friendship), upanyasa (treaty settling 
all outstanding controversies), pratikara (treaty for mutual benefit), 
samyoga (treaty for accomplishing an act of common intex^est), 
purugantara (treaty providing for transfer of best troops to the 
conqueror), adr$£anara (or puruga) (treaty with persons unseen), 
atmatQisao lk/cfk Hwv\5e(i' p f t y  [. on^ omc£tuie<L
b y  k X t v i S e W ~  w i t U  h i s  ~h> t/i-e '•gh^h'vLj ) ^  upagraha
(treaty for the preservation of oneself by surrendering everything), 
parikraya (treaty with the surrender of a part or whole of the 
treasury), skandhopaneya (a treaty with fsupport*, when the indemnity 
is to be delivered in instalments), adigfa (directed treaty, through 
the cession of apart of territory), the ucchinna (1 exterminated 
treaty1, concluded through the surrender of one's best lands 
ifN, ix.is7 or surrender of lands from which all riches have been 
removed with the exception of the base /ICA, VII.5*337) and the 
paribhugana or paridugana (treaty involving complete surrender ofrmiiwi i ■nu»*iil.n.««iiM—iw M iiW w iimilg » ' m iim im , iw nn  muBTip n iplf ^unw » v  L“ -f
the produce of the lands)."1'
Further repeating Kamandaka, the Agni Purana recognises only
*** nnwmTi.mwwii ■■■ mm—  ^ *
four kinds of principal treatj£sor compacts (sandhi) s parasparo pci^ Ara y
Agni. 240.7-8. KN, LX.2-20. Also vide KA, VII. 3.-23 ff. On a
comparison with Kaujilya* s list of peace-treaties it will be seen 
that only with slight differences in meaning (in a few cases') and 
with the exception of the avakraya (hire treaty) these sixteen 
kinds of treaties not only include all varieties of the hina-sandhi 
but also treaties resulting from reciprocal goodwill and political 
necessity.
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(pratikara), maitra (sarigata), sambandha (santana), and upahara.
/
Somesvara also subscribes to this view, and enumerates four similar
2
classifications, It appears that in our period the prevailing forms 
of treaties were summed up under these four categories.
1. Parasparopakara (pratikara) sandhi (treaty through mutual benefit)
Kamandaka defines this as fI did him good, he will also do same
to me, or I shall do him good, he will also do the same to me, when
treaty is ooncluded under such considerations, this is called pratikara 
3 ✓
sandhi.’ Somesvara also calls it parasparopakarasandhi. that is an
4
agreement to help each other. It appears that in pursuance of this 
kind of agreement on a personal level betweenjibhe Paramara king Jayasimha 
and the Later Calukya king Vikramaditya (later Vileramaditya VI of Kalyani), 
the former sided with the latter in his feuds with his elder brother 
Somesvara II (e. A.D,1068-1126), which, however, proved disastrous for 
the Paramaras. This kind of sandhi seems to be fairly comprehensive 
in scope and may include compacts for various purposes, even offensive 
and defensive alliance.
1Agni, 240.9? KN, IX#21, see Jayamangala comm.
2Manas.■ 11.11.728.
^KN, IX.11.7.
Sianas., II.11.731*
D.C.Ganguly, op.cit#, pp. 127-28.
2. Maitra or sangata sandhi (treaty through friendship)
Kamandaka says, fThat sandhi is named safogata which is founded
on friendship between two good men. This lcind of sandhi last a as long
as part|^]to it live; the parties identify their acts and resources;
it is not broken by any cause whatsoever)either in prosperity or
adversity. This kind of sandhi is excellent, like gold among other
metals. People versed in treaty-making also call this sandhi,
1 , aho
kahcana or golden.* Somesvara£designates it as maitra, the
treaty which is concluded through mutual friendship based on the
2
goodness and virtues of both parties along with their relations.
It implies a friendly alliance between virtuous parties for mutual 
cooperation and help, as well as for the settlement of conflict between 
them.
3. Sambandha sandhi (treaty through marriage)
According to Somesvara this treaty is concluded by a king giving 
his daughter in marriage to another king for some reason. This is 
really matrimonial alliance, which was concluded by kings having 
different motives such as the termination of a war.
4. Upahara sandhi (treaty through gifts)
Sandhi which is concluded through offer of presents or con-
*** A
cessions of various sorts as tokens of friendship is called upahara.
J* in. qlun«
1KM, IX.7-9.
Sianas., 11.11.729.
X b i d .. 730; cf. KM. IX. 6. calls it santana sandhi.
'^Cf. IOT, IX.6. see also comms.
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According to Somesvara9a treaty which is concluded by giving
•* 1
elephants, horses, jewels, gold and land is called upahara sandhi,
Xt may be remarked that all kinds of peace treaties (hina-sandhi)
concluded with troops surrendered, with treasury submitted, and
as 0
with land or its produce ceded^ described in the Arthasastra„are
included under the heading of upahara/ Somadeva also recommends
the conclusion of a peace treaty when necessary> by giving any one
of these objects* However, where the cession of land is involved,
he favours the giving of the produce of land to land itself; for
land once ceded is difficult to recover and ceding it strikes
4
at the root of a king and his dynasty. As an instance of simple 
upahara sandhi we may mention the Cahamana king Somesvara1 s sending
of a silver or golden pavillion to the CaJ-ukya king Ajayapala after
5 *his defeat at the hands of the latter. Probably Somesvara was
forced to pay some tribute to Ajayapala as a mark of submission.
The treaty between the Gandella king Yidyadhara and Sultan Mahmud 
in 1022 may be treated as another example of upahara sandhi.
1Manas.. II.XI.732.
2 feft, Vih I*3- fJ'
3 NV.>X'VX,
4MV, XXIX. 65-66. (X>eflU.eA.)
5
A.K.Majumdar, op.cit., p.127; D. Sharma, op.cit. * p.70.
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These four principal classes of sandhi cover a wide range of 
political agreements and point to main grounds and objects of 
their conclusion. They include not only treaties concluded between 
belligerents in order to terminate warfbut also those contracted 
for strengthening one*s power and status in relation to one's enemies,, 
as well as friendly alliances for promoting one's interests in inter-
m *► ’ / A>state relations. The pratikara and sangata (or parasparopakara and 
maitra) sandhis seem to be more in the nature of alliance3,rather 
than of treaties to establish peaceful relations after war. The 
saajibandha (or santana) sandhi, which figures as^sub si diary arrangement
to the treaties with troops surrendered (dandopanata) and with treasury
/ 0 \ /”“ 1
submitted (kosopanata) in the Arthasastra, became an independent
category by itself long before our period. It is, however, not 
unlikely that the matrimonial alliance continued as a part, indeed 
a significant one, of conditions of peace treaties. The matri­
monial alliances seem to have been regarded as an honourable means 
of bringing about cessation of hostilities during our period, when 
pride and chivalry overrode material calculations. We have several 
historical examples of matrimonial alliancesysuch as the marriages
of the Oahamana king Argioraja's daughter with the victorious Caulukya
« *** _  2  , __»IV Ifjfa- Ms* **n / \
king ICumarapala, or the Pala kang Hamapala1 s niece Kumaradevi (?) with
ffd D m  ^
the victorious GahajLavala crown prince Govind ^ acandra, of the
1KA, VII.3.26.
2 *» * r '
Dvyasraya Q  kavya, XIX.21-4; D. Sharma, op.cit., p.54; A.K.Majumdar, 
op.cit., p.105.
^Roma Niyogi, History of the Gahadavala dynasty, p.65; E.I., IX.pp. 519 ff.
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daughter of Jayantasigiha (a usurper king of Gujarat), Vijayasri
1with the victorious Paramara king Arjunavarman} which were concluded
by the defeated kings to bring about an end to war and establish
peaceful relations. But several other examples suggest that
matrimonial alliances served various other purposes as well. For
»
instance, the marriage of ICaftcanJLdevi, the daughter of the victorious
■w* **&
Gaulukya king Jayasirpha Siddharaj a with the vanquished Oaham^ana 
king Ar$oraja,aimed not only at ending war and placating the
0 ah am an a pride; but also secuiing Ar^oraj&'s cooperation in Jayasii^ha's
mta cpj 2
conquest of Malwa. This matrimonial alliance achieved its immediate 
as well as distant objective,,because it is known that ArgLoraja
wt m  ABC* y
actively assisted Jayasi$ha Siddharaja to subjugate Malwa. Sometimes
political marriages between rivals served as an instrument of security
and defence against another enemy and also provided an honourable
means to the defeated to accept vassalage. The Tomara king succeeded
in retaining his existence probably through the marriage of Desladevi
(a Tomara princess) with Vigraharaja XV, the Cahamana king, who con™
4quered the Tomara kingdom. The matrimonial alliances sometimes also
1
B.C.Ganguly, op.cit., p.2C0£6. ; A.IC.Majumdar, op.cit., p.148.
Kirtikaumudi, 11.27-d'f; Ppthvirajavinaya, VI.34. D. Sharma, op.cit., 
p.47; A.IC.Majumdar, op.cit., p.71.
3
A.IC.Majumdar, op. cit., p.71.
^D.Sharma, op.cit., pp. 61 ff: see also Lalitavigraraja-nataka,
* i mm ***■■■.....  iwn **» * nri"i ••iv • c r I ........... ■tw t—■ ahiwh-ii.tit.bV— -------*——i — n~ — r -
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saved the independence of weaker neighbours. As for instance, the
Kalacuri kings owed their independent status during the palmy days
of the Ragjrakuja imperialism to their friendly relations withthe 
relations
latter,in which.the marriages of the Kalacuri princesses to the
1
Ragsjrakuja kings and princes played a significant part. In fact, 
matrimonial alliance was the recognized means to terminate hostilities, 
to ensure peace and good neighbourly relations, to augment one’s power 
and prestige and to strengthen one’s forces of aggression as well 
as the resources of defence. However, the effectiveness of matrimonial 
alliances to terminate hostilities and establish lasting peace between
rivals or to guarantee inviolability of terms of treaty may be doubted,
for these, as we will see later, largely depended on power and poli­
tical expediency.
3?our activities connected with sandhi
■i t—  -..- .....  - —  - -n i ■■!■■■ ■■---------r-i— irn— — ------  - - ---- - -------- Jtmn— i *
There are four kinds of activities connected with sandhi;
\ \1; . making of a treaty and settlement of its terms, 2 ) maintenance
of a treaty made, 3) spoiling or violating
2the terms of a treaty, and 4) repair or restoration of what is broken.
We shall now discuss sandhi in these aspects.
1. Treaty-mailing
The powef of treaty-making during our period was exei*cised by
O.I.I., IV. p.lxxii,
2cf. KA., VII.6.16.
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the king himself. Although inter-state affairs were put under the 
charge of the Minister for Peace and War (Sandhivigrahika), the 
king was personally responsible for initiating negotiations and 
concluding sandhi. As an example, we may refer to the Caulukya
Gas y \
king Mularaja 1 (c, A.3).941-997; who made a, personal approach
men,
to the Cahamana invader Yigraharaja II in the latter’s camp for 
a peace-treaty. Medhatithi,discussing the application of sama t 
implies that the rival kings should sit together and converse with
2
each other etc.^  obviously to negotiate a settlement of the conflict.
However, sometimes the power of treaty-making was delegated 
by the king to his representatives such as envoys (duta) and other 
high ranking ministers. Medhatithi^ commenting on Manu’s statement 
that 1...upon^ambassa&or depend peace and its opposite’(dute sandhi- 
viparyayau) observes that ’peace (sandhi) is obtained by the use 
of agreeable words and showing off what is done by his /envoy’sj 
master; the opposite of this leads to war; both of these thus
A
are dependent upon the envoy.* The envoy is further said to bring 
about the alliance of kings and also to disunite those who are already
P.C.faj.23-24; b * Sharma, op.cit., p.30; A.IC.Majumdar, op.cit., p. 28.
2 . Manu, VII.198;aJgo comms ,
5Ibid., 65; RDK. IV.p.35 quotes ibid.
L.L —  wsfi
On Manuv, YII.65; see also Kulluka.
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1aJJied, Our texts distinguish three classes of
envoys: a) nig|££tha (envoy plenipotentiary; lit. to whom the
matter has been entrusted (with full powers of negotiation),
bj^mrtartha (an envoy with limited mission), and c) sasanahara
(bearer of a message or messenger-envoy), Among these the 
§ —
nisp^artha is entrusted with full discretion as to what is to 
be said appropriate to time and place in order to accomplish his 
mission.' Whatever he has settled or done concerning peace and 
war (sandhivigrahau) becomes valib. ■ and binding on his 
king. The nigmartha is said to be an envoy, like K^s^a of the
«* 6 
PagL^ Lavas,who has full powers to conclude a treaty or declare war.
•S
It may be added,that the nis^tartha was normally an envoy minister
plenipotentiary because a duta is designated as mantrin equal in 
- 7
rank to Senapatl and it seems that ministers were commissioned to
perform the function of envoy especially when a treaty was to be
'8 5negotiated. ' It seems certain that the envoys,,at least of nis&tartha
class, possessed delegated power to negotiate and conclude a treaty.
As an instance of ministers concluding a treaty, we may refer to 
Lavagiaprasada, the minister of the Caulukya king Bhima II (c. A.D.
XOn Manu. VII.66; RPK. IV.p.33.
2R.P. ICangle, (tr.) KA, 1.16.2, see also fn;) A.S.Altekar, Stafe and 
Government in Ancient Indjgur,/ p.222.
Agni, 241.8, same as KH, XIII.3; fV, XIII.3; of. KA, 1.16.2-4. Mii. on 
Yajh, 1.328 names the second as sandistartha; Ykt., 74-76.p.11.
en , 1 .328.
5h v , x i i i.4.
6 Ibid.. /oont.
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1178-1242) who is said to have concluded a treaty with the Yadava 
king Si$ha£La, which, curiously enough, does not even mention the 
name of Bhima. Another instance is that of Jagaddeva Pratihara, 
the chief minister of Bhima /who claims to have concluded a peace
na t£1f ^
treaty with the Cahamana king P^thviraja.
However, it seems that when exercising the power of treaty- 
making the kings often utilized the agency of envoys to carry on 
the negotiations. Treaties concluded through envoys and repre­
sentatives seem to have been subsequently ratified by the king 
himself. In this connection it may be remarked that He L. Chatterjee 
reads too much into the Arthasastra, when he states that the ratifi- 
cation was done ’ ... by the rulers concerned by means of a sasana 
or royal writ, for, Kaufilya says that matters relating to peace 
and mr depend upon writs.1 In fact, ICauJilya seems to be concerned 
with the drafting of edicts and the proficiency of scribes in this 
regards as a careless composition may affect the issues of peace 
and war. Somadeva, who substantially reproduces lCau£ilya, substitutes 
leklia (document) for s as ana (edict), and states, !A king should not
XcontT) * " ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ’ ~~~
7f7, m . l ;  On Manu. VII.65; SDK, IV.p.33; Tkt., 75-76.p.II.
8
See R.P.Kangle, KA, vol. Ill, pp. 202-3•
1hekhapaddhati, p.52.
^Kharataragacchapattavali, v.1244 cited by D. Sharma, op.cit., p. 77 fn* 
Op.cit., p.67; cf. KA, II.10.1.
disregard a lekha ^document or letter) from any one. For kings
principally depend on documents ^ lekha), peace and war being rooted 
1in them.1 Itfhile it is possible to infer from Somadeva's statement
that lekha may include a treaty document, it does not follow either
from him or Kau$ilya that the ratification of a treaty was done by
means of royal wits. Perhaps the association of a writ or document
with matters of peace and war may imply a reference to royal wits
pertaining to an ultimatum to the enemy for peace or war,
2. Lhe binding character of treaties and their maintenance
In ancient times the sanctity of compacts or treaties (sandhi)
2was ensured by gods like Hitra, Yaru$La and Indra, who protected
compacts (sandhis) and punished their violation. It was thus the
fear of the wrath of these gods,as well as respect for virtues of
8-
truth and honesty,which gave^binding character to sandhi, besides- 
of course, mutual benefits and dreadful c o n s e q u e n c e s  of war. But / 
as suggested by Kau^ilya, who quotes an anonymous teacher, the 
invocation of gods and the fear of sin were found inadequate to 
guarantee the inviolability of agreements, with the consequence, 
that a system of sureties and hostages came to be instituted*
Later, ICaufilya disagrees with the teacher, and
1M , XXXII. 29.
2KV> • x.89.9, VII.49.3, See also,
S. B. Singh Ancient l~r>gtxan Wcn-fare wt€k 1 neferz.net to #>e Vedf'c Ehriodi p /S ’S'?
5KA, VII.17.3.
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oanfirwA
regards a treaty with solemn affirmation or by talking an o&th, or "by 
plighting one's troth, such as 'we have made a pact1, as more stable 
in the next world as well as here,than one- which onlyv seeks^uch 
mundane guarantees as sureties and hostages. In our period Soma­
deva follows Kaxsjilya in this respect and states that !the creation 
of confidence in others is the purpose of plighted word (satya), 
oa^  (sapatha), the surety of a principal officer or a hostage'.
Like Kau^ilya, he also considers a solemn oath as the best security 
against the violation of the treaty; for 1... while one whose word 
is like the written decree is honoured by all, ... he who breaks 
his word wins bliss neither here nor hereafter. There is no greater 
sin than teachery. * Somadeva further dilates upon the dreadful
consequences of false oath, treachery and dishonesty in this and 
4the next world. In fact, Somadeva is an agreement with ICaufilya 
that plighted word or solemn oath binds the conscience of a king which 
may prick if he were to contemplate violation of the terms of the 
treaty, whereas sureties and hostages do not involve moral scruples . 
and when grown stronger a king can secure their escape by some ruse 
and violate sandhi. It seems that during our period hostages were 
not normally exchanged, although the Lekhapaddhati mentions the
1KA, VII. 17.5-6.
2HV, XXIX.84; cf. KA., VII.17.1-2; lekhapaddhati. p.52.
5|[V. XXX.80,82-83.
Ibid., XXX.79, 84 - see also Ibid. (Delhi ed. fn* which has a few
more verses describing the evils of a false oath.)
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exchange of sureties (pratibhu) between Lavanaprasada and Sir^ ha^ ia
1in order that the terms of alliance should be observed. It may,
however, be contended that the princesses,given in max*riage to
the adversaries in order to conclude a peace-treaty,were hostages.
But these princesses do not really seem to be hostages because they
could not be freed from the enemy since Hindu marriage creates an
indissoluble bond, nor does the husband have the right to kill
his wife,which is the threat that hangs over the hostage1s head.
Moreover, Itaujilya himself says that a girl hostage cannot be 
2harassed. Further, these marriages were arranged to create
friendly relations and also to establish family connectinns.
Marriage was a sacred institution and, while it could serve political
purpose, the custom of diplomatic marriage was by no means tie same
as a system of hostages. The binding character of a treaty, there­
on.
fore, rested on oaths and possibly^sureties in our period.
The maintenance of a treaty involved the observance of its 
terms and conditions by both parties. A treaty providing for mutual 
benefits and goodwill had greater chances of being observed until 
such time as one of the parties, especially the stronger, did 
depart from JrVs pledges. The maintenance of a treaty really de- 
pended on diplomatic resources and upayas were employed to create 
conditins for the fulfilment of its provisons.
1Lekhapaddhati, p.52.
2KA, VII.17.16.
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The breaking of treaties
What we have written above does not mean that no treaty could
be violated by any king in any circumstances. In fact, it appears
that there were perhaps more cases of violations of treaties than of
their observance. In the ancient period gods like Yis&u and Indra
are accused of bad faith; Indra is alleged to have vioiabed his
pledge and slain Vptra and cut off the head of Namuci after having
1reached a mutual agreement not to kill each other. These examples
are quoted in the Epic and works on polity in support of a policy
of distrust and treachery against the enemy with whom a treaty has 
2been concluded. The tenor of inter-state diplomacy is selfishness 
and distrust. The nitisara works and sometimes the smyti commentators 
as well betray the rule of opportunism and expediency, which treats 
morality and virtue with slight respect.
Notwithstanding the fact that pledges are given and oaths are 
taken at the conclusion of a treaty, a king is normally ill-advised
3
to repose absolute confidence in the enemy. On the contrary, a 
king is advised to win the confidence of his powerful adversary 
and befriend his supporters in order to weaken them later by means
t fiSv
TS, YI. 5* 1*1-3 * A  XII. 6.8; P.B., XX.15.6i TB, I.T.l.G.ff, See
S.D.Singh, op.cit., pp. 156-57.w r i  i. in ■ f J- J. r r
2Cf. Mbh., IX.50.20s KN, IX.54.
5Xkt., 80.p.10; of. KN, IX.54; Mbhfe),XII.138.185"ff. 146.14 ff, 37 ff.
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— 1upayas. When he has succeeded in undermining the strength of
his rival and enhancing his own, he could disregard the treaty
obligations. Both ICauJilya and Kamandaka prescribe that when
grown in power after concluding a treaty, a king may contrive the
P
escape of hostages given to the enemy and thus break the treaty.
Even Medhatithi advises a king whose constituents of state 
(prakytis, i.e. ministers, etc.) are in excellent condition and 
who is rich in funds, beasts of burden, and other military potential 
T... to break the treaty under some false pretext and have recourse 
to war'. It follows that a treaty can be abrogated if the condition 
of the threefold power warranted it. The merest pretext may be 
enough to launch a war, as for example, the Caulukya king Mularaja 
did ag^ainst G-raharipu, the ruler of Saura^Jra, with whom he had 
previously made a settlement. The pretext for war in this case,
Jfel* 4#hW*
it is alleged, was the command of Lord Mahadeva,given to Mularaja 
in a dream,to exterminate Graharipu, who had become an oppressor 
of pilgrims.^ It seems that the sandhi which Mularaja had earlier 
concluded with Graharipu was unsatisfactory because Mularaja could
“^Cf. KM, IX. 55? 65 ff* described how a king should afflict his powerful 
enemy with whom he has concluded a treaty, by means of intrigues.
2cf. KA., VII. 17.32 ff.
*.0a Manu. VII. 170.
Is. *** j 4Kte
PXyasraya-w kavya, 11.59, A.K. Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 25 ff.
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not annex Sauragfra, Sandhi in many cases is a temporary measure 
and a king concludes it in order to bide his time until he is able 
to challenge his adversary. ^  Even aggressors, who concluded 
treaties owing to political and military handicaps in subjugating
their adversaries, are found to violate their agreements 
later when chances of a decisive victory appear certain. It there­
fore follows that might, political expediency and a favourable 
balance of power justified the violation of treaty. How precarious 
is the binding character and the efficacy of the oathi
In fact, neither the system of hostages and sureties nor 
even matrimonial alliances contracted mainly for the purpose of 
cementing the treaties could give adequate binding character to 
treaties and guarantee lasting peace. Of matrimonial alliances
mentioned earlier, we know that Ar$oraja desisted from hostility
u * to the Cajlukyas only during the life-time of Jayasi^uha Siddharaja.
He later opposed Kumarapala, with the consequence that two bloody
wars took place and he was ultimately defeated by the Caulukya king.
The marriage of the Cahamana princess Jhala^a with Kumarapala also
failed to bring peace; for Vigraharaja IV, soon after his accession
to the Cahamana throne, led expeditions against Kumarapala1 s
feudatories in order to avenge his father Ar#.oraja!s humilation.
Similarly the Gaha^avala king Govind/acandra spared the Pala king
1Medh. on Manu. VII.169. 
See above, pp. XQS-H-,
21
after his marriage with the Pala princess only for the time he 
took in consolidating his kingdom and subjugating the Kalacuris, 
his inveterate enemies* The case of the marriage between the 
Cahamana king Vigraharaja IV and the Tomara princess seems to 
have been different because the Tomara king accepted the position 
of a vassal after his defeat. Similarly,treaties of alliances for 
cooperation in war such as those entered between the Paramara king 
Bhoja and the Kalacuri Gangeyadeva for a joint military operation
ana m?* tna * ■
against the Calukyas of Kalya^i, between Lak$mikar#a and Bhima I, 
and even a treaty of non-aggressinn and mutual assistance as in "the 
case of Lavapaprasada and Simha^ayultimately failed to inaugurate any 
change in the traditional relationship of hostility beyond a temporary 
phase of opportune understanding. Unless the treaty provided for 
the subordination of a king, who was willing to be faithful to his 
pledges, its security hung in the balance of power.
It appears that normally there was one condition which overrode
all others in the matter of keeping treaties, viz. an essential
change of circumstances from those which prevailed when a treaty
was concluded. This change is primarily brought about by the aug-
the
mentation of the power of one party and^relative decline of that 
of the other. A king who had to submit to an invader on account of 
his weakness or some calamity he bad suffered, may set aside the 
treaty if the changed circumstances favour this. H. L, Chatterjee 
thinks that this condition is comparable to the modern principle of 
rebus sic stantibus or the principle that a treaty ceases to be
21
binding when an essential transformation in the circumstances in
1which it was concluded occurs.
In the last analysis, therefore, the security of a treaty 
depends on the vicissitudes of power, although it is said to be 
created by an oath or a surety or hostages, The sanctity of a treaty 
was not guaranteed by any inter-state organisation nor upheld by 
international law. There is no evidence in our period to suggest 
that a king violating a treaty suffered either in public estimation 
or in the gathering of kings. Once a king was able to extricate 
himself from overwhelmingly unfavourable circumstances, he could 
reject the treaty concluded under them,like the $ahi king Jayapala> 
who later refused to comply with the obligations of the treaty he 
had to acquiesce in on his defeat by Sultan Subuktagin ofGhazni.
Besides the changed circumstances created by the vicissitudes of 
power and political convenience which cause the violation of a treaty, 
the diplomacy and secret devices employed by a third party may also 
wreck an alliance (sandhl). As an example, we may refer to the 
machinations of the Caulukya agents who caused the break up of the
I *** m e
coalxtxon of the Paramara king Devapala, the Yadava king1 Si$ha&a,
and the Lajfa ruler Sai$grama Si$.ha organised for the purpose of
** 2joint attack on Gujarat. Thus, such violations of treaties (sandhi) 
may occur in many ways and the factors that contributed to these
1
Op.cito, p.69.
2
HM, ActTL. fp . t2 ff\, B.C.Ganguly, op.cit., pp. 215-16; A.K.Majumdar, 
op.cit., p.153-
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can be diverse. The real reason for honouring the terms of a treaty 
and maintaining it intact seems to have been weakness and fear of 
retaliation, and not pledges, sureties or hostages. Never­
theless, the fact that a king has to find some pretext for violating 
a treaty suggests that oaths and pledges carried weight and a fre­
quent disavowal of one's solemn promises affected one's
piestige. in inter-state dealings. Somadeva and Bhoja warn a king 
that he should conclude a treaty (sandhi) only when there is no 
danger of the violation of its stipulations by the other party,1
4. Repairing a treaty
It may be inferred from tie use of upayas that a treaty whose
w  «. iwnmi I 1
terms and conditions have been violated could be repaired, although
it is not clear whether it Involved the conclusion of another treaty
or the mere affirmation of the previous one. Except in the case of
kings under the overlordship of an emperor, there is hardly any
prospect of reconciliation and restoration of a treaty without a
recourse to war followed by another treaty. However, former allies,
who joined the enemy side, may return to the king when he is marching
against the same enemy. Medhatithi, who seems to be paraphrasing
Kaujilya, distinguishes four categories of allies who have gone
2to the enemy's side but have returned. Such persons, according to
NV, XXIX. 5D; Ykt.. 79-80.p.12.
2Medh. on Maim. VII.186; cf. KA, VII.6.23 ff.
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him, may be re-admitted' , to the alliance on the previous basis only
after the king has thoroughly investigated the motives and reasons
1for their actions. Those who are found to be fickle or
2in secret league with the enemy should not betaken back. In fact, 
whenever a treaty has to be concluded or repaired the king must 
scrutinize the motives of an enemy approaching for a sandhi.
In conclusion; we may remark that a sandhi means a treaty 
or an agreement, be it the result of defeat or brought about by the 
need of an alliance for war or the outcome of friendly feelings*
However, it is generally rooted ±l weakness of power and politico- * 
military inconveniences- of ukj who takes the initiative for the con­
clusion of a treaty. The king personally exercises the power of making 
treaties, but he sometimes entrusts the negotiations to a high-ranking 
minister or an envoy* The binding character of the treaty is derived 
from solemn affirmation and honesty, although the system of sureties 
and hostages is known to our authors. The duration of a treaty depends 
on the element of power, diplomacy and the inter-state alignments 
which may create an essential change of circumstances from those when 
it was concluded, and thus cause its repudiation; for, no king seems 
to observe commitments nor is he advised by political thinkers to 
do so, provided he can withstand the repercussions of the violation of
1 ^
Medh* on Manu, VII. 186; of. KA, V I I X X I X . 75.
a “
2MT, XXIX, 7«r.?D/«Jsc tW)v\ ,
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the treatyo The breaking away of feudatories from their suzerain 
during his decline in power stands on a different footing; for 
several other facto is, such as the sense of loyalty to the emperor 
and the counterbalancing jealousy and rivalry among the feudatories 
themselves influence the process of defection* However, the role of 
power and attendant diplomatic expedients is also evinced in such 
circumstances. The binding character and the duration of a treaty 
are therefore contingent upon the diplomatic resourcefulness, and 
changes in the balance of power in the circle of states. A treaty 
resulting in a coalition or confederacy of kings generally has a 
limited scope and a particular objective. Nevertheless,these 
occasions can be exploited for improving the reLations between 
rivals; but this does not seem to have been either attempted or 
achieved during or after such confederacies, which were indeed
the outcome of common interests and fears of short term duration.
Such.
Sandhi was a measure of policy as could be resorted to
before, during and after war. Before war it expressed the desire 
to achieve the mutual objective by agreement; during war it might 
be resorted to in order to seek politico-military help from others; 
and after war it embodied the settlement of the conquered kingdom.
Through sandhi it was possible for the kings of early mediaeval 
India to maintain friendly relations and desist from fighting, even 
though only for brief intervals. It was the only measure by which 
the relations with distant monarchs could be regulated until they 
entered the arena of strife. Since permanent peace or an honest policy
of peace, which demands areas of common interests and unity of 
purpose, was hard to realize in an age of mutual rivalry and 
struggle for empire, this measure of sandhi granted respite to 
the contestants and sometimes gave to declining dynasties a breathing 
spell in which they had a chance to revive their power and glory. 
Although the strains 011 the policy of peace were at all times heavy, 
and particularly so in the absence of any inter-state law or 
liter-state organisation, yet ^ by placing this measure first of 
the items of the sixfold policy^our authors suggested that a king 
should first seek the fulfilment of his designs and deal with inter­
state situations by its application. When the prospect of peace 
grew dim after an extensive employment of diplomatic expedients, 
a king was permitted to go to war. But the inevitability of war 
with an enemy and his allies did not mean all-out war on all sides.
A king could,therefore,fight with a few opponents and remain at 
peaoe with those not involved against him.
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Chapter Y 
SADGWTA: B. VICRAHA
(Hosmimr or war)
The term vigraha is opposed to sandhi. It expresses hostility
or a state of war between two states. Our authorities define vigraha
- 1 * 2  3by apakara, aparadha, or vaira which terms denote •offence1, * injury*,
•harm1, *wrong*, or hostility. It seems clear from various terms that
causing harm to another king constitutes vigraha. which according to
4 .
Bhoja may include even a battle. ICullulca says, • practising hostility
(T
on account of the excess of power constitutes vigraha /war7*. However, 
the act of any injury, which is called vigraha, is not a one-sided 
affair. Reproducing Kamandaka, the author of the Agni Purana explains 
that *a war is the direct result of injuries done to each other by 
hostile kings*.
It is evident from the above that for a state of vigraha io arise 
there must be hostility, which is different from an ordinary quarrel
1 mm
Hit, on YajH., 1.347. Yigraho*pakarah: Agni, 234.IB. cf. KA, VII.1.7.
*TJY, XXIZ/H-, Aparadho vigrahah.
^Apararka on Yajh.. 1.345; HA, II.6.
4Jkt., 56.p.8; cf. RHP, p.324; also Yiramitrodaya on Yajfi:.. 1.347.
^On Mam, VII. 160: Vairam vigrahacaranad^jadhikyenaj^ .
6 -
Agni. 240.14; cf. KN, X.l: Parasparapakarena punsaffi bhavati vigrahah.
Cf. Amarkosa, 11.8.18. comms.
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1or strife , and that there should he not only offensive acts hut also 
an explicit intention to use armed forces in order to settle a dispute 
or promote self-aggrandizement, and that there exists a state of 
mutual hostility. The outbreak of war has to he preceded by an active 
rivalry on both sides and when the antagonism reaches the climax a re­
course to force is taken to resolve it. According to the manuala con­
cept, there are enemies with whom a conflict is inevitable, and an 
ambitious king is advised to afflict his enemies in various ways accord­
ing to the condition of their relative strength in order to prepare 
grounds for the eventual aTssault on the vulnerable ones among them.
Even wars for self-aggrandizement are to be preceded by diplomatic 
activity in order to ascertain the strength of the adversary’s hostility 
and to explore the possibility of exacting submission without doing 
battle. The threatening messages to submit or fight, sent by an 
aggressor to his adversary, satisfy the last condition of war; for 
it is defiance that precipitates war; if, on the other hand, submission 
is forthcoming before battle, it ends in sandhi. Thus, the policy of 
vigraha creates a state of war*
There is some controversy about the precise meaning of vigraha.
Viswanatha-writes that ’probably the condition or attitude of belligerency
2was denoted by the term vigraha’. Manu, however, uses the word
1
£>ukra, IV.vii.501 distinguishes vigraha (war) from kalaha (strife) 
and says ’that is said to be vigraha or war by which an enemy is 
oppressed and subjugated’.
^Op.cit.t p . m .
T *m 2
yuddhamana for belligerents and yuddhamanatva means belligerency.
In view of these terms Visxranath^s interpretation seems untenable.
Talcing a partially correct view, Dikshitar states that 1 Vigraha is a 
diplomatic contest and is but a means to the end, viz., to avoid regular 
w a r I n  the first place vigraha is clearly not a means of avoiding 
war, but, on the contrary, is an invitation to it. In the second 
place, while diplomatic warfare characterizes the state of vigraha. 
being the form which hostilities take ii^ iriitial stages, it by no means 
sums up vigraha. which itself w«Cy have been created by the diplomatic 
expedients (upayas). Moreover, the diplomatic contest is sometimes 
an aftermath of vigraha and normally a necessary prelude to fighting. 
Moreover, it is a kind of fighting primarily suited to a weak king and 
for defensive purposes.^ Vigraha. on the other hand, is the state 
of war created by the aggressive decision of a powerful king, who is 
ready to strike with his army should hie demand for submission not be 
fulfilled through diplomatic expedients. It may be borne in mind 
that conquerors are of three kinds; righteous (dharmavijayin). greedy 
(lobhaTyi.i ayin) and demoniacal (asuravi.j ayin). $hile there is scope 
for diplomatic contest with the first two types, hardly any exists in 
the case of the last, who seeks to completely destroy the enemy and
^Manu, VII.p.199 and corams.
2H.L.Chatterjee, op.cit., p.73.
\ a i . p.3X9.
1appropriate his wives, wealth and land. Further, the means of dip­
lomatic confrontation are political expedients other than open force,
which, while primarily seeking to achieve objectives without hazarding
2battle, nevertheless simultaneously promote military strategy*
In addition to these considerations we may also take note of the fact 
that several authors regard diplomatic contest (mantra yuddha) as the 
first stage of armed rivalry and discuss the role of upayas under
— v  iminifrm iinHiijpiiiw* f t
yatra (expedition), an equivalent to yana (marching of troops against
the enemy), thus bringing diplomatic contest under the heading of
yana. not vigraha. It is striking that Bhoja Paramara understands
4
the dominant feature of vigraha to be regular war.
We may observe that vigraha is a state of war, whether it is 
sought to be resolved or aggravated by diplomatic ways of fighting. 
Vigraha may also demand the employment of force, which is aprakasa 
(not open or covert) during this stage of hostility.^ The rivals 
apply covert force against each other such as the execution of the 
enemy king and his supporters by poison, fire, assassination and in­
cantation, and the destruction of his subjects by poisoning wells,
6
corn, etc. before coming to grips, Vigraha. therefore, is an aggressive 
1
^See below pp.
3RBK, XCV. pp. 125 ff; Ykt.. p.7.
4Ykt .. 56-58, p.8. Bhoja devotes three verses to describe vigraha.
The first deals with the battle (yuddha), when destruction is certain 
whether one fights or not; the second explains the cause of vigraha. 
viz. * excess of power; and the third warns the king against the danger 
of personally fighting in the battle.
5Ami. 254.2-48-f.Vdh.11.146.1-5; of. KN, m i l .  10-12. Mit. on Yajg..
(cont. )
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war, which commences with hostile provocations, continues in dip­
lomatic moves, and ends either in l£he fulfilment of the^ gbj ective 
of the powerful rival, who initiated the hostility or in armed
conflict following the formal declaration of war or the failure 
1of the embassy,
H. L. Chatterjee says that to constitute vigraha 1 there must
be operations, i.e. hostilities or contest, there must be intention
to carry on such operations or, in other words, the intention to do
harm, and in fact there cannot be any offensive operation unless
2there is a desire backing it1. However, his statement is not free
from ambiguity, as is apparent if compared with the above.
The most precise interpretation is offered by Derrett who
renders vigraha as ’hostility possibly leading to war1. He further
writes, by way of elucidation, that * da&fla means actual application
3of force, vigraha the breach of relations which may lead to it1. 
However, we have to bear in mind certain features of vigraha in 
order to realise fully its meaning. In the first place, vigraha is 
created by a king who is rising in power and prosperity and has no
(cont.) 1.346, cf. me, XX,95; cf. also KWP, p.303.
6Ibid.
1HA, IX.20-28.
^Op.cit., p.70.
3J.D.M.Derrett, ’The Maintenance of Peace in the Hindu World: Practice
and Theory*, in XTBXA. VIII (1958), p.574.
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disaffection in M s  army, with a view to subduh^his enemy or settling
1
a dispute with him by an eventual appeal to arms. In the second
place, vigraha is the outcome of mutual hostilities. In this con­
nection it may be remembered that a king caused;offence to his power­
ful neighbour, especially to an aspirant to empire,by undertaking 
works calculated to consolidate his power and increase his defence 
potential. In the third place, our sources clearly distinguish 
between vigraha and yana (expedition) wMch shows that the state 
of war is different from actual military operations. Moreover, 
once vigraha has been embarked upon, the king has a choice of yana 
or asana (staying quiet). Vigraha, which expresses a warlike situation, 
thus falls short of actual invasion and is, therefore, not equivalent 
to battle. We may sum up that by vigraha is meant the outbreak of
hostilities, possibly leading to battle or breach of relations cul­
minating in a formal declaration of war by the aggressive party, This 
is indeed the escalation of mutually offensive acts, the outcome of 
unyielding antagonism and an unmistaken resolve to end the conflict 
by an appeal to arms. Thus, vigraha can be rendered as 1 state of war1.
HV, XXIX.51; Ykt., 5'J.p.8; HA, 11.10. On Mam, VII.170; 
Visvarupa on Yajfi.. 1.543 (Hit.. 547).
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Coneep;b o f _ m war
The policy of war recommended for dealing with the situations 
arising largely out of conflict for power among states cannot be 
adequately appreciated nor can the endemic warfare of early mediaeval 
India be explained without a knowledge of the concept of war. Echoing 
an early difference in the approach to war as found in the dharmasastra 
and the arthasastra works, our authorities also reflect a twin concept 
of war9which may be termed heroic and politic.
The heroic concept of war seems to be more ancient and may be traced 
back to the Vedic period, for the M ,  Veda recognises the Asvamedha yayfia 
(the Horse sacrifice), which is linked with the political ideal, of 
s^ rvabhaLia'na or samrat (lord of the whole earth or emperor) and his 
campaigns of conquest of the quarters (digvijaya) in the later liter­
ature, It is developed in the later Vedic literature especially the 
Brahmapas and the Pharmasutras, Smrtis, Epics, P nr an. as literary works 
and royal eulogies (prasastis). It became popular in the epic 
traditions when the essentially re1igio-po1111caI ideal of cakravaytin
(supreme emperor, or ’one who wields overlordship over a circle of 
\ 1kings’) overshadowed the ancient politic-religious ideal of sarva- 
bliai.una.
In contrast, the politic concept of war is later and seems to 
have followed in historical times with the establishment of terri­
torial monarchies and administrative institutions, which synchronised
1 H.D.S., M ,  pp. 6 6 - £ 7
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the
with development of the concept of the seven-limbed state. Among 
the extant sources, tie politic concept of war is systematically 
developed for the first time in the Arthasastralthough its 
several features can be traced back to the wars fought by rulers 
of Hagadha and other kingdoms for building up an empire at least 
from the times of Bxinbasara and Ajat as at m u  It Is further advocated 
by the nitisara authors like TC am an dak a , Somadeva and others and its 
several features are also found In the epics, purapas and smptl- 
commentaries. It Is no doubt inextricably connected with the ideal 
of overlordship, but, as we shall see, its chareacter is political 
and secular rather than rellglo-polltical or politico-religious,
In our sources the different strands of heroic and politic concepts 
of war cross each other^but can 1b distinguished by a comparative 
study of the different aspects of war and activities connected with 
them.
Heroic concept of war
tfith the establishment of several Aryan tribal kingdoms and 
the recognition of the grades of rulers such as rajan (king) and 
saiarat (, emperor; , war became a means to expansion and glory. A 
king endowed with valour and military strength fought with others 
as a part of his kingly obligations in the natural course of events.
The need for greater social cohesion, the desirability of the political 
unification of the various kingdoms, Aryan and non-Aryan alike, and 
the spirit of domination and paramountcy gave birth to the ideal of
231
the sayvabhauma (1 the lord of the whole earth bound b; sea up to 
its very extremities..,.1 and the digyijaya (conquest of the 
quarters of the earth). An emperor’s campaigns were further magni­
fied by linking them with the politico-religious ceremonies like the 
Asvamedha (the Horse sacrifice), the Eagjasuya (the ceremony of the 
royal consecration), the Vajapeya (the Drink of Strength), the 
Visvajiln (imperial ceremony related to the conquest of the world), 
and the Aindra-mahabhigeka (the great anointment ceremony of Indra,
performed for a king aspiring for the overlordship of the whole earth,
« .  2
sqrvabhauma) . -These ceremonies and sacrifices marked the initiation 
as well as the culmination of the politico-military exploits of an 
ambitious ruler, whom they promised power, glory, and heaven. The 
conquest of the whole earth for the assertion of prowess and paramountcy 
mas enjoined. War became ; a great and noble sacrifice and battle itself is 
equivalent to the performance of the Asyamedha. The elevation of the 
politico-military aspirations of an ambitious ruler to a religio- 
cultural plane crystallised a concept of war, which we may term heroic.
For an appreciation of the heroic concept of war we have to mention 
briefly the motive and nature of the conquest of a saryabhauma, which
1. .
2
Ait.Br., 39.1.1. ( 3 •,s■ I •)
Ibid., 39.1- jjatapatha Br., V.11.13; 1.6.4.21. for Vlsva.jlt
Ref. RV, 1. ,111 pp ."‘"'63 ff.
3,RDIC, XIV. pp. 133 f‘£» quotes Devala, Apas^amba and others; cf. DV, 
XXX.94; of. also Hit, on 1 .325* "  ^
Agni, 23 6. 56; cf. ICA, X . 3 «2& ff.
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later became synonymous with the term oakr avartin.^ It is, however, 
difficult to ascertain when the ideal of cakravartin (universal emperor) 
replaced that of the sarvabhauma, "but it is certain that the former 
is much popularized in the Buddhist texts and perhaps was adopted 
by the Hindu writers later as a substitute for the sarvabhauma which 
was also a politico-religious concept, although not quite in the same 
sense as the cakravartin. It is striking that while the ideal of 
cakravartin is very popular hi the epics, purapas and courtly literature 
including the prasastis (eulogies) of kings In the Inscriptions, both 
the dharmasastra and the nitisara works do not mention it In the 
discussion of mapflala. Although Kat^ilya implies a knowledge of the 
ideal of .cakravartin when he says that 'the region of the sovereign
ruler (cakravartin) extends northwards between the Himvat and the
2 -
sea...’ and twice mentions caturanta (the king ruling up to the
■Z
four quarters of the earth, i.e. the Indian sub-continent), yet the 
ideal for the vij igigu is said to be sarvabhauma. ^  Even Hedhatitlii 
says that the highest success that accrues to the vl'jiglsu is in
^ rr
the form of ekadhipatya (supreme sovereignty),J a term which is 
associated with the ideal of sarvabhauma. It seems that the uolitical
^Amarakosa 11,8.1; Abhidhanacintamap.1, III . 3 5 5  ff. 
2
K A, PC. 1.18.
^Ibid., 1.6.4; VI.1.17.
VI. 1.18, HV, XXIX. 67.
50n Manu, VII.1.
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theorists preferred the older term sarvabhauma to c/yik r av ar t in
not only because ‘Hie later was not only associated with Buddhism
but also was more religious than political. However, the impact
of the ideal of sarvabhauma or cakravartin on the concept of the
vijigigu is obvious from the fact that the vi.jigigu is called a
dharmavijayin (righteous conqueror) in some Purapas as he seeks
1to conquer the world by good policy/
notwithstanding the precise difference in the connotation of 
the terms sarvabhauma and cakravartin , the ideal is associated 
with the overlordship over all kings of the Indian subcontinent.
The motive of war is not so much gain as glory and campaigns of 
conquest are to be characterized by righteousness. An ideal cak­
ravartin does not desire the dethronement of the defeated kings or 
the annexation of their territories. He primarily seeks the acknow­
ledgement of his superior prowess by his opponents and is satisfied, 
with homage and tribute. Ideally he liberates the vanquished and 
restores them to their thrones, when they have madd obeisance to him.
Ills approach to war is heroic and he fights a righteous battle with-
Pout recourse to strategem to win victory.~ For it Is laid down;
A gill , 2 3 3 .2 6 ; cf. Vdh*? 11.145. 2 1 . Fven Katt^ilya (XII. 1.10-11) aid 
Somadeva (jjV, XXX.70-72) admit that a conqueror may be righteous, 
greedy or demoniacal, and state that the righteous conqueror is 
satisfied with the submission of the adversary who accepts his para­
mount cy.
20n layn^ X.324; On Manu,_ VII..87-90; EDIC, XIV. pp. 131-32.
Raghuyajflsa, IV. 113 - drahliapratlmokff asya sa dharmavi;j ayi nrpalj
Sriyaip mahendranathasya jaharaja^ujmedinrin; cf. also 
Allahabad P.Ins. for ’u  Samudraguptas conquests; Gririnar Ins, of 
Eudradaman; Vdh, 11.14-5.20; HA, XII. 1.10-11, IjV, XXX.70 - state^ that a 
righteous conqueror Is satisfied with submission. Mbh^jtl.chs.25-32;..
- , ffiSJXI, P-6 8,
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A king (cakravartin) should not attempt 
to gain the aarth unrighteously,
For who reveres the king 
Who wins unrighteous victory?
Unrighteous victory is impermanent 
and does not lead to heaven.^
Svery powerful Icing always longed to attain the status of a
cakravartin by undertaking imperial campaigns extending over a
vast country bound by the Himalayas on the north, by Rama's Bridge
on the south and by the ocean on the eastern aid western sides.
The literary accounts of wars fought according to the ideal of
cakravartin large-scale armed tournaments and sometimes they
seem almost festive occasions. The fruits of victory are tribute
and homage to superior power. War becomes a noble act of bravery
and sublime means for the realisation of politico-religious ideals.
It Is no longer animated by .sordid motives nor is it conducted without
regard to rules of chivalry and fair play or a humane ethic of 
2
war. However in the ultimate analysis, even according to the heroic 
ideals, war remains a means of exercising and vindicating power and 
prowess, although its ultimate goal is righteousness and merit.
In our period almost every king of some military power aspired
for the overlordship over others and many kings like fAe. Cahamana
Pythviraja 111 v a & t c .  described as cakravartins in the dynastic chronicles
tin ,
and courtly literature. But^ cakravartin ideals had undergone serious
^Hbh, XII. 97.1-2. Cited in A. L. Basham, op.cit., p.124 
"73ee below, pp. 7v .
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devaluation as not only miner kings assumed this title hut literary 
accounts of digvij ay a often more poetic than historical. Never­
theless, the ideal remained almost as a passion with kings and did 
account for many wars of aggression marked by feats of heroism in 
the pursuit of glory. But/as will be evident in the following pages? 
even the righteous victors found it difficult to live up to the 
traditional heroic ideals in practice.
far as a duty
While war is glorified by the ideal of cakravartin, the heroic
spirit is rooted in the king’s duty to fight not only in defence of
his kingdom, but also to suppress his enemies by force, which may
1
lead to aggressive wars, Kami and his commentator enjoin a king to
2
keep his troops in readiness and to fight in the true spirit of the
imperious law when challenged or provoked . J  ’I'To shirking from battle,
A
protecting the people,and attending on the Brahmapas,i are three 
duties of the king which bring equal rewards. Beside being impelled 
by political considerations, a king can look forward to accumulating 
religious merit by waging aggressive wars, which enable him to distri­
bute the wealth acquired in them among the Brahmapas and give im- 
munity to his subjects from harm or fear. There are profuse ex-
On Kami, VII.87, 32, 1 G 3 ;  RDK, XIV. p.131; of. Mbh, XXI.138,5" ff; 
90 .-9'. U ,
2Ibid., VII.102-103.
h b i a ., VII.87; 33K, XIV.p.131.
Medli. Ibid. , VII.88. 
in Ysrifi, 1.323.
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hortations to the king to undertake defensive as well as offensive
wars for the protection of a cow, a Brahmajja, a friendya.refugee,
yarnasranadharrna and religion, to free the land from the oppression 
1
of a vile king. In the event of death, a king is certain of attain™
ing heaven, hut in the case of victory he obtains fame, and material
gains together with the religious merit. ~ 'Jar is thus not only
incumbent on the defendant,^ but also obligatory for the aggressor in
the pursuit of merit.
Besides that of the king, every kgatriya's svadharma (distinctive
duty) required him to be always ready to fight,for1 nothing was more
beneficial than to fight a just battle. Our sources echo with the
glorification of kgatradharma which €*naobled war. It was an occasion
for a kgatriya to fulfil the obligation of his class, to discharge
his duty, to repay the debt of his master, to acquire earthly riches,
honour, and merit and, in the event of being slain while fighting
heroically, to ascend to heaven which sages obtain after hard penances.
A
Jar was thus enjoined on the grounds of Yarnadharrna and gu&adharma.
In fact the dharmasastra authorities could mt deprecate war as such 
because it would have been Inconsistent with their advocacy of fight­
ing as the duty of the lcgatriya class.
1EDE, XXV np. 133 ff. Of. I£bh., XII.90.114^66.V.iS-Kf 21.10; 79.i7.ff; 
101.37-38, '
2_ ** ** 
ibid . I  On Yajh, 1.324 especially Apararka who mentions war In
defence as well as offence.
50n Manu, VII.89? On Ya;jn, 1.324; RDIC, XIV. pp. 133 ff.
4See also RDIC, intr .,p,72 ff.
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In addition to the ideal of cakravartin and the approach to war 
as duty, the raap^ala pattern of inter-state relations also contributed 
to the heroic concept of war by summarizing the inter-state politics 
as a science of enmity, which gave some sort of inevitability to 
both defensive and offensive wars owing to the natural tendency of 
every state to pursue greater security and prosperity in Inter­
state sphere. As already remarked, the element of power in the con­
cept of mag._g.ala is adequately appreciated In the arthasastra or nitisara 
works, which are utilized by the smyti commentators and the Purapas,
But It is absent in purely dharmeQs as t r a works which indicates that 
the problem of vigraha is approached not so much from tie standpoint 
of power 'politics as from that of geo-politics.
However, according to both the heroic aid politic concepts, 
the duty to fight in defence is greater than the obligation to subdue 
one’s rivals in the larger interests of the state or for the vindi­
cation of one's prowess and power. The stakes In defence are vital, whil 
the gains in offensive wars are laudable. The heroic approach to de­
fensive war is characterized more by imperativeness and virtue than 
political and military expediency, which figure in the politic con­
cept. The dharmasastras recommend the use of means of diplomacy, 
conciliation, gifts or bribery, sowing dissension, and. threat or 
application of force^in order to avoid battle even In defence and 
to seek an honourable treaty. If, however, the aggressor cannot 
be dissuaded from his invasion, the defending king has to take 
recourse to the measures of dvaidhibliava (bifurcation of troops) and
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sajjsraya (seeking shelter) , in order to avert annihilation. But if
1
no course is honourable and expedient a reckless fight is enjoined.
Yajhavallcya does not mention retreat and flight, and Manu, while 
a 2showingknowledge, does not discuss it in the context of battle, 
since probably it was considered unheroic. Kedhatithi, however,
3recommends retreat to a king who has been overwhelmed by his enemies,
4as well as to an aggressor who is faced with certain destruction.
But he also reiterates that victory is possible even in a desperate 
battle because those fighting after having given up all hopes of
p.
life are difficult to overcome.' Further, victory in either case,
whether one wins battle or dies fighting, is certain, because in
case of the former., he gains a kingdom, and in the case of the latter,
he attains heaven. However,Medhatithi is against an aggressor
fighting a reckless battle, but he concedes it to a defensive king,
when talcing shelter is destructive or inglorious. The Mahab^r^ta and
SomePurapas regard retreat and flight as an act of wisdom and poli™
6
tical necessity. But,by and large^retreat and flight from battle 
are not considered heroic, certainly with the presence of an honour­
able alternative.
ICanu, VI1 .17b also comms.
2Ibil*w VI1• 106; cf. also VII. 213.
■^ Qn Hanu, VII *1 0 6 . 
it bid., VII.20C.
h b ta. , VII. 176, 200; see also EA, IX. 15-16. 
Ifbb. XII. 13V. 12; Agni, 236.34.
239
Kautilya is against a reckless fight * like a moth flying into
the fire* , but Somadeva is rather equivocal on the issue. For in
the context of the policy of seeking .shelter, he and Hemacandra
state that a proud defender may die fighting rather than take
shelter, which involves the selling of oneself, that is, abject
2
submission and a servile status. Hemacandra repeats the religious
rewards of heaven to desperate fightew and asks why one should be
afraid of death in battle for the sake of this body, which is 
3destructible. Both Somadeva and Bhoja urge fighting when destruction
A.
is certain whether one fights or not, but Somadeva at the same
time counsels against a suicidal battle and urges retreat.'
It is clear that, by and large, our sources recommend„desperate
fight when there is no honourable alternative, although Somadeva
simultaneously recommends retreat in the event of a suicidal battle.
The difference between the heroic and the politic concepts on the 
a
question of^desperate fight in defence is that the latter does em­
phasize retreat in battle and recommends the use of all means, fair 
and foul, to afflict the enemy, while the former takes general 
notice of the retreat and prohibits the use of stratagems, fire, 
and poison as their employment would debar their user from heaven 
should he die in battle, >
It appears that the heroic traditions of just war and a fight
ly., ¥11.15.14 ff. ; ..
2H¥, sax.58; HA, II.lfiT-lS. 
llA, 11.15.
%¥, XXX. 12; TJrt, 56.p.8.
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to the finish9 the hope that the valour of a desperate warrior or cm 
army makes him invincible, and the faith that victory in the form 
of attaining heaven is certain, contributed to the desperate fight 
which someHajput kings offered to the Muslim invaders. The practice 
of iauhara followed by fighting to the last man which characterised 
many a siege in mediaeval India derived its ideas and the necessary 
religious fortitude of those who took part from the heroic ideals 
of reckless fighting.
The Politic concept of war
In contrast to the heroic concept, the politic approach is based 
on the stark realisation cf the conflict of power in inter-state 
relations. The problems of war and peace are approached from the 
standpoints of the concepts of nafi&ala, ^a^gupLja and up ay as which 
together betray the complexities of the policy of a state pursuing 
security and prosperity through inter-state relations with the 
ultimate objective of establishing its pareunountcy ovor others. The 
pragmatic thinking of the arthasastra and nitisara writers revealed 
to them that neither the tribal type of war with Its characteristic 
absence of ethical considerations, lust for booty,and the seizure 
of cultivated land, nor the digvljayinTs approach to war with its 
predominantly politico-religious features and righteous military 
code could be conducive to the needs and interests of a territorial 
monarchy. As their approach to the state is institutional in character 
,^n<X is marked by an attempt to identify politics with the material
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well-being of the subjects, they tend to subordinate the religious 
ethics to political and economic principles or sublimate them in 
a general philosophy of power (saktl).
While these thinkers were not averse to religion and morality, 
they often treat moral maxims of statecraft in a rather cavalier 
manner. The standards of political life are viewed as being above 
the social and individual morality. Acts which ordinarily provoke 
social condemnation are not only condoned9but o ] l & &  - considered virtuous 
By and large, they posit that expediency is the criterion of policy; 
power is the justification of action; material gains are the proof
1
of righteousness, for do not dharma as well as kama depend on artlia?
In every sphere of state activity power and success, not so much 
righteousness, are cherished because, as already noted, they deter­
mine the condition of state, whether advancing, stable or declining.
The problem of war, therefore, is not viewed from the predominantly 
idealistic standpoint but is approached from the political, military 
and economic necessities. This is evident not only from the prag­
matic approach to the inter-state relations?but also from the three 
kinds of war; open or righteous (prakasa ynddha), concealed (ku&a
W  «r» 2
yuddha) and secret (tusphjiyuddha) , which take into account the
T^HT, ll.l; 1 1 1 .1 7  - dh arm ak am ay o r ar thamulat vat (BY, Delhi edition • )
cf. KA, 1.7* 6-7J Vthz.
KbhjfjSil.134-. 6 ff; I. ch. 142. 6„ff. . J XII. ch. 97.1/jf;Rainayapa, II.
lGi.8~10.9fc state that right leans on might and kga^ tigac^ s^ imia (i.e. duty 
of kings) transforms sin into righteousness and invites hypocrisy.
'"See below, pp. %
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political and military factors determining the course of hostilities.
Like the advocates of the heroic concept, those of the politic 
concept of war also state that protection of the kingdom and subjects 
is the supreme duty of the ruler.^ Blit they insist that this las to 
be discharged primarily by increasing the economic and defence poten­
tial of the kingdom, which require peace rather than continual cam­
paigning. However,the promotion of the material progress of the king­
dom in itself constitutes a threat to weak neighbours and an offence 
to stronger ones. For this reason, a king has carefully to adjust 
his foreign policy particularly in relation to his rivals. Although 
the advocates of the politic concept emphasize that it is cause 
(k an art a) and interests (svartha) that create hostile relations, yet 
they admit that a struggle for power is inherent in the very nature 
of the inter-state structure. The quest for security against ex­
ternal dangers necessitates war, but they advise a weak king against 
aggression even on the grounds of defence. It is the excess of power and
prosperity and the prospect of political and material gains that
2
justifies an expedition. It follows that while rulership carries 
the duty of protection which involves fighting, statesmanship de­
mands a knowledge of relative strength and cool calciilation of the 
consequences rather than an adherence to the imperious law of the
X1W, VII. 21. £>a kiifl raja yo na rakgati prajafc.
1]¥, XXIX.51y53; lit, 51,p.8. Aanl. 234.21; 240.25-26.
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Kgatriya order to fight heroically when challenged or provoked, 
iar in defence is incumbent, but it is not imperative, for pro­
tection can be secured by other measures involving even complete 
submission. Only in a really desperate situation is war ' 
permitted.
The nitisara authors also uphold the traditional varj^a^ana. -
system and recognise the ICgatriya's distinctive duty to fight7
although Somadeva is conspicuous by disqualifying a Kgatriya for
appointment as a minister or counsellor owing to the ICsatriya' s
aggressive nature and tendency to settle every issue by the sword
since war would justify his importance for the kingdom and offer an
1
opportunity to fulfil his ambition. But they emphasize military 
organization and disciplined force, which offer better defence and 
reduce contingencies which stimulate a more heroic and martial
spirit. It is noteworthy that while Bhigma describes eight divisions
o ^
of the array,*- most of our sources including the smytls and the PurSgas
detail six kinds of troops which include even forest troops. The 
king enlisted the services of other sections of community for mili­
tary duty, and the ICsatriya class alone was not enough. On account 
of the war-mongering attitude of Kgatriyas, Snmadeva even ddvises 
their exclusion from the deliberations and decisions about state policy.
XM ,  X. 1C 1-104. 
I^-Ibhj XIX. 59. 4*0-41; quoted in RDK, p.95* see above, pp. 77. 
%V, X. 101-3.04.
P
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It seems that the politic concept advocates a realistic and sober 
approach to war in contrast to its spirited advocacy by the ex­
ponents of the heroic concept.
The realistic approach to Inter-state relations, however, does 
not curb the aggressive spirit of the ruler for whom the Ideal of 
supreme suzerainty or paramountcy (sarvabhauma) Is advocated by 
the exponents of the politic concept of war. Bach king^especially 
the vijirlsu 3 is urged to maintain his initiative in Inter-state 
relations. The ma&dala theory visualizes the possibility of the
vi.jiglsu1 s sway eventually extending over the ma&flala, if he suc­
ceeds in fulfilling his ambition by a policy of self-aggrandisement. 
However, the ideal of the vl.jigjgu is secular as compared to that 
of the cakravartin which is religious. A king becomes vjyjy^hpu 
when he is endowed with personal qualities, fortune (daiva), 
excellent material constituents of the state, statesmanship, and 
valour,and not by being born as a semi-divine figure. It is on
account of his prowess, power, and good policy that he is urged to
make himself the overlord of the mapdala. Military and economic 
superiority are the prerequisites of paramountcy, and , wars of 
aggrandisement are the result of . conflict for power and supremacy 
rather than the outcome of politico-religious ambition. Vi.gr ah a, as a 
policy to realise the ambition of paramountcy, is viewed as an act 
of political necessity. Bnmity and friendliness, the prevailing 
norms of the circle of states, impart some sort of inevitability 
to war. The politic approach differs from the heroic in the sense
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that its basic premise is the conflict of power and the whole
issue is appi’oached from pragmatic, material, and even diplomatic
standpoints. The probabilities of victory and defeat are matters
1 ^
of concern even for a heroic king, but a vljlglgu is vexed, in
addition, about the cost of war in men and material as compared
with gains, which again have to be estimated with reference to
1time, amount, propinquity, and continuity, further, the inter-state 
reactions to war have also to be anticipated and the necessary 
measures to avoid complications have to be undertaken. War is not 
viewed as a purely military affair; it becomes a political and 
diplomatic proposition. The diplomatic warfare forms an indispensible 
element in the armed conflict. In the approach to war the politic 
concept emphasizes expediency, profit, and political success; and 
it is not concerned with the acquisition of religious merit and 
righteousness for the king or the state except by implication for 
the king in person.
Pauses of vlqraha
There was no lack of casi bellorum for those Intending to 
start vicjralia. Our sources mention numerous causes of war which 
range from the politico-economic factors to socio-religious and 
even compassionate considerations. The d h arm a s a s t r a s describe
^On Hanu, VII.199•
2M ? XXIX.85 ff; cf. O ,  X. 19-26, IX.61, XVI.23; KA, IX.11 If,
4.Iff.
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various sources of vlcjraha which include among others the protection 
of the cow, Brahniana, friends or allies, wealth, etc. and the ac­
quisition of other’s treasury, troops and territory and also a new 
1
ally. The Ayni Purapa, reproducing Kamandaka, enumerates such causes of
vicjraha as the usurpation, of a kingdom, abduction of a woman, capture
of a fort, seizure of territory, frontier bickerings, carrying away
of men of learning or soldiex^s, arrogance, morbid sense of honour,
extinction of erudition, devastation of property, predatory raids,
decay of power, evil influence of destiny, for the aid of allies,
insult, destruction of a friend or relation, want of compassion
towards creatures, disaffection of the map.dala, and common eagerness
2for the possession of the same object. However^the sources of
hostility are reduced to five; rivalry, dispute about .
a woman, t b x e ,  Xo (cuXI/ujj s p e a c A  and offence (aparadha). 'J  Somes vara
u p
III has, however, summedrthe prolific sources of war under eight 
headings; l) lust for woman, 2) greed for another's property,
3) territory, 4) pride and prestige, 5) grant of asylum to the enemy's 
opponent, 6) desire for helping allies, relations andservants, 7) arro­
gance, and 8) common eagerness for the acquisition cf the same object/1* 
It is evident from these sources of war that greed is equalled 
by the desire to maintain prestige. The powerful motive of political 
rivalry for the acquisition of a common object as well as for the
1
Un Kanu, VII. 164; On YajfL, 1.324; SDK, XIV. p.133; of. Kbh., 
XII.90.11fFj66. 9>iV/0 ; 21.18; 79.27,fT; 101, 37r3g,
/hyii, 24C. 16“ 18; Kh, X.2 ff.
5, Ibl3,, 2-fo* 1 9 . - 
4~ aMxifwx.f , n TT f x//- ~
mastery over others who have become weak or are in decline is given 
due prominence. Further0the obligations towards allies, friends, 
relations and dependants also create wax’ either for the sake of 
helping them, against their enemies or for avenging their destruction. 
It is striking to note that love for a woman is considered as a 
cause of war, which hardly served any purpose except the gratifi­
cation of a ruler's desire. Significantly the Indian kings are per­
mitted to risk war by granting; shelter or asylum to the victim of 
another king's wrath. In fact the texts prescribe that granting 
freedom from fear to any distressed person is the noble duty of a 
king, and several kings like Eammira of H ay a t h a m bh e r suffered dire 
consequences for living up to this ideal. Wars fought for economic 
gain and even territorial annexations are numerous during our period. 
It appears that even those who pursued the ideal of cakravartin did 
not really seek empty glory, but had their eyes an enormous booty 
and the prospect of tribute from the vanquished kings if their 
campaigns were successful. The tributary arrangements, if they em­
bodied the terms as Medhatithi has outlined, really secured for the 
victor immense benefits, provided he could ensure their continuance 
by his military superiority or by some other means. It may be 
conceded that the prospect of financial gain was present in most 
of the campaigns for conquest, although the economic motive was 
not the most characteristic feature of every war. Wars of our period 
can be said to have sprung from any one or a combination of the 
causes mentioned- above.
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0y  ectlves of war
The objectives of both the heroic and politic war are land,
wealth, and an ally. But in opposition to the latter, the former
regards the gain of an ally as superior to money, whichagain is
1
preferable to land. This reflects the impact of the ideal of the 
cakravartln and the digvljaya, which discouraged territorial annexa­
tions. Nevertheless, the srnrti commentators agree that territory is 
an objective of war and territorial annexations have to be given 
up only if the ministers and subjects of the occupied kingdom cannot 
be persuaded to accept the victor's rule.*" The Arthasastra,and 
n:Ltisara works, however, distinguish three classes of conqueror, 
righteous, greedy and demoniacal, accordingly as they seek to exact 
submission and tribute, to sieze the treasury, and to appropriate 
the kingdom, wives and sons of the adversary.^ The territorial gains 
are cherished provided they can be made without provoking the 
mandala or causing rebellion in one's own kingdom.4 Gome territorial 
gains could, however, be secured by peace treaty, which, enabled 
Soruatleva to follow Ihmp.lya with regard to the three types of terri- 
torial acquisitions, new, formerly possessed, and inherited.'' The
0.1 Kanu, 207; On la.jfi.,, 1.352; XV, XXIX. 78-79; of KA, VII.9.1;
KIT, X.29-30. Kara and aka, however, adopts a middle position in his 
preferential order which is land, ally, and money.
^Medh*on Menu, 201, 212; On TajS, 1.324; KDK, XIV. p.132.
MV, XXX.7C-72; KA, XII.2.10-15.
4Cf. KA, VII. I B -  3o-3a..
IJV, XXIX. 1C2; cf. IvA, XIII. 5.1.
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objectives of the politic concept of war are materialistic as
well as imperialistic, while . those of the heroic concept
are primarily imperialistic. It seems that a middle way between
the conflicting priorities of the three kinds of gains' was found
in the system of feudatories with the result that in many cases
victors in our period allowed the vanquished to retain their
possessions if they accepted ' tributary status and observed the
1treaty obligations. This does not, however, mean that the 
territorial annexations were not made during our period, but the 
dynastic wars for supremacy are often characterised by gains of a 
subordinate ally and money, more than territory. The seizure of 
some territories and the establishment of the victor’s rule over 
parts of the vanquished territories often followed battle when the 
defeated king refused to come to terms as, for example, the Paramara 
king Yakpatiraja II Muhja occupied territories in southern Raja- 
putana and appointed his sons Arapyaraja and Candana and his nephew 
Dugala to the governorships respectively of Kount Abu, Jabalipur 
(mod. Jaler in Jodhpur), and Bhillamala (mod. Bhinamala in Jodhpur)
when the defeated Cahamana king Baliraj a proferred flight to tributary
, , 2 status.
Scone for diplomatic expedients
Notwithstanding the idealisation of war and the inevitability
*Hfedh on Manu, VII.202. mentions the financial and military gains as well 
as the acquisition of a vassal by treaty.
2
D. C. Ganguly, op.cit., p.52. The Age of Imperial Kanauj, p.96.
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of hostility in inter-state relations, the advocates of both the 
heroic and politic concepts of war urge the rivals to apply 
diplomatic expedients (upayas) on the outbreak of hostilities in 
order to achieve their objectives without fighting a full-scale 
war. It is stressed that recourse to the application of force,
i.e. battle, should be the last resort. The diplomacy embodied in 
the artful employment of means (upayas) other than open force (da^ gjja) 
seeks to bring about an end to hostilities either by contriving 
the submission of the aggrieved on the aggressor’s terms or by 
forestalling the invasion by forcing the aggressor to realize the 
futility of war. The envoys, messengers and spies are despatched 
to deal with the enemy in various ways.
The diplomatic contest culminates in^sending^an envoy by the 
aggressor to his adversary with an ultimatum to submit or fight.
If the opponent persists in defiance, and the diplomatic mission 
fails, it is considered a valid justification to wage war. The 
defensive king likewise may despatch an envoy with counter­
proposals to forestall the invasion of his kingdom, and if unsuccessful, 
he may feel justified in resorting to violence. It is indeed heroic 
to give a chance to the rival to come to terms, but it is difficult 
to ascertain what moral overtones the failure of the diplomatic 
mission added to a war of aggression for the demonstration of prowess 
and power, although it could be an argument to vindicate violence.
In fact, the straightforward diplomacy of the heroic concept only 
offers an alternative between submission and fight. If it succeeds,
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it is not because of any genuine desire to avoid Violence or the 
resourcefulness of diplomacy but because the aggressor is righteous 
who wants only homage and tribute, and the aggrieved is 'weaker and 
fears no significant loss. But if both the rivals are proud kings, 
or one of the belligerents is unrighteous, war is unavoidable.
However, while concentrating on the realisation of objectives 
without battle, diplomacy does not overlook the possibility of 
eventual war. Hence * during the phase of the diplomatic contest 
rivals ascertain through envoys and spies their relative strength 
and employ expedients to weaken each other1s power by weaning away 
the alienable persons and supporters as well as by creating dis­
sension among the enemy1s kinsmen, ministers, warriors, feudatories, 
allies and others. Ilf forts are also made to isolate the enemy 
from the middle and neutral kings. In fact, the tasks of diplomacy 
in the contest of vicyraha and yana are manifold, They range from 
securing the objectives of hostility without battle to manipulating 
the political and military strategy for the eventual war. During 
war and between its intervals the belligerents improve their re­
spective position by the separate collective use of the upayas, 
which means that diplomacy does not cease its work even in war, al­
though its role becomes secondary.
Notwithstanding the forceful advocacy that a king should fight 
only when all the three expedients, viz. conciliation, gifts or 
bribery, and sowing dissension-have proved of no avail, the role 
of diplomacy in a’Heroic war is limited because of its straightforward
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character as regards means and manner of their application. The 
advocates of the heroic concept do not permit the use of secret means 
of violence3 like assassination, poisoning, etc. nor do they allow 
recourse to treachery and strategems. It is true that sowing dis­
sension involves recourse to unfair means, hut Manu and his commentators 
imply that alienation (upa,japa) in general is practised as a counter­
measure and they even show preference for conciliation and force, 
though admitting the utility of gifts or bribery and sowing dis­
sension.^- By and large the scope for diplomatic expedients is limited 
by the contents of the means aid the manner of their application on 
the one hand, and the presumption that rivals axe always righteous 
on the other.
In contrast, the advocates of the politic concept of war describe" 
diplomatic war (raantrayuddha or buddhiyuddha) as a necessary prelude 
to fighting as well as an indispensable concomitant of three kinds 
of war; open, concealed, and secret. They not only enjoin the use 
of the above mentioned four expedients and sanction the application 
of secret force (apr akasadanj,a) involving treacherous acts of violence, 
poisoning, arson, assassination etc., but also add three more ex­
pedients; illusion (maya), indifference (ugekga.) and incantation 
or magic (indrajala). These later upayas seek to translate dafl&a 
(punishment) into reality by accentuating its impact with or without 
battle, to intensify psychological warfare by causing stupefaction
X0n Manu, VII.104, 107-109.
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and panic in the enemy’s camp and subjects through psychic spectres 
and acts of heartless cruelty, and, above all, to accelerate or impede 
military victory in the event of inevitable battle. They contribute . 
more to the military strategy and tactics rather than to the poli­
tical manoeuvrability, but as an adjunct of diplomacy immediately 
before battle, they could be employed to impress the opponent with 
the grim consequences of war and uncertainty of his victory. However^ 
indifference (upelcga) is itself a means of diplomacy of war which 
may bring hostilities to a standstill and offer a chance of recon­
ciliation. Further, these expedients are used to cause damage to the
enemy's war potential with a view to backing the threat of force 
-infr
and bring^sufficient pressure on him to compromise.
A defensive king is advised to wage diplomatic warfare before 
the aggression and continue to do so even after the commencement 
of aggression. Kaufilya has detailed the various activities connected 
with diplomatic warfare, which involve various kinds of treachery, 
stratagem and secret violence, but these details are largely 
omitted in cur sources in the interest of public morality. In fact, 
with a variety of weapons ranging from simple conciliation to 
murderous spells, diplomacy becomes resourceful enough to deal 
with enemies of different character, both righteous and demoniacal, 
in diverse circumstances. Secret (tusnim) war is largely waged with 
these weapons of diplomacy and normally excludes the military 'En­
gagements. Thus the scope of diplomacy is widened to include all 
sorts of enemies and to deal with diverse circumstances in hostile
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relations. Diplomacy is largely freed from righteous inhibitions 
and brought closer to the realities of inter-state politics.
The military code
hhile justifying violence, the advocates of the heroic concept
of war insist upon the strict observance of war ethics on the
battlefield. They approve only of open war (prakasa yuddha) or
righteous battle (dharma yuddha). It is laid down that one must
fight according to the just principles of war, not with feelings
1of wrath and murderous intention. Although earlier sources speak
2
of the use of poison and stratagem to over-power enemies, this is 
outlawed by later dharmasastras. Maim and his commentator pro-
hibit warriors from striking with concealed weapons and arrows
A
that are poisoned, barbed, or with flaming shafts. Kedhatithi even 
asks a king fighting a desperate battle 1... to eschew all treacherous 
ways of fighting; so also all such operations as would bring about 
either the utter annihilation of the enemy or too much harrassment.1^
1Gf. Mbh, XII.96.11.
2R.V., VI .75.15; cf. also A.V., IV. 6.7.8;
JManu, VII. 90 also comm s. Yajji, 1.324 also comm&, cf. Mbh, X U .
96.11 - only unrighteous warriors fight with poisoned arrows or 
dangerous projectiles. HA, 11.59.60; cf.KA, XIII.7.22 forbids 
the use of fire if fighting is possible.
A n  Manu, VII.90.
hold. , VII.200.
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Yajhavalkya and liis commentators restrict entry to heaven only to
those who fight according to the chivalrous code of war and without
using treacherous ways, traps, weapons dipped in poison in both
1
offensive and defensive war.' Even the advocates of the politic
concept of war forbid the escessive harassment or torture of a broken 
%
enemy, although not so much owing to any religious or moral scruples 
but rather because the vehemence of one returning to fight despairing 
of life becomes irresi stable, J  and Hazily a adds, 'he becomes the 
object of favour of the circle /of kings/’^  These rules of chivalry 
reflect the approach to battle and discourage excess.’-.of violence in 
war. It is said that these principles anticipate certain provisions
V
as the Fourth Hague Convention (Art. 33),  ^but in an entirely different 
way, rather they remind one of mediaeval codes of chivalrous spirit.
The heroic traditions of combat required fighting with those 
e y a d i  in rank, armament, and strength; elephants were to oppose ele­
phants, and so chariots, cavalry and infantry their respective counter- 
6
parts. A warrior was ideally to fight with only one person at a time;
1 «
Yajfl., 1.324 and. comms; also Manu , VII.98.
SlV, SCC. 66. ITatibhagnatu pi&ayet.
^Jbld. , 6 3 ;  KA, Fit . 3*11; X. 3- 56-57; also I-Iedh. on Kanu, ¥311.200 
quotes Vyasa who gives this reason in order to discourage torturing 
of an enemy.
% A ,  VII.3.12.
5K. L. Ohatterjee, op.cit., p.114.
6
Agni, 236.37, Medh. on Manu, VI 1.91-92; Kit. on Yajfi., 1.326; cf. Hbh. 
Vl" 1.27, 23, All.96, 7 - l C ~  97.7; 286.p.
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one unable to fight was left out; an attack at army strength was to
be opposed by an army; and when challenged the fate of battle
1
could be decided by a duel between the rival kings. These pro- 
visions visualise war as in the nature of a duel on a large scale.
It is, however, difficult to imagine how all these rules could be 
strictly observed in the melee of a raging battle.
The chivalrous and righteous military code prescribed that ’a 
warrior shall not fight with those in fear, intoxiated, insane, 
or out of their minds, those who have lost their armour, nor with
9
women, infants, old people and Br airman as. ’ He is further forbidden
to strike at spectators, eunuchs, messengers, attendants, non- 
combatants, and an envoy or a Brahmana come for truce. ^ As regards 
opponents Gautama, quoted by Lakpaidhara, lays down that ’no 
sin is incurred in slaying foes in battle excepting those who have 
lost' their horses, chariots, arms, those who join ;■/. their hands 
in supplication, those who flee with flying hair, those who sit down 
with averted fa.ce, those who have climbed in flight on eminences 
or trees, messengers, and those who declare themselves to be cows 
or Brahmapas1.^  A warrior is further prohibited to kill nne who is
1
Cf.
66.
'IBaq.dhayana, 1*18.11 quoted in HDIC, XIV. p.131*
50n Mann, VII.91-92; On Yajfb, 1.326. Agni, 236.58.
4.
Gautama, 10.16,17 quoted in IfDIy , XIV. p. 131 and also in Kit,
113267“
See HAI, pp. 67 ff; S. D . Singh, op.cit., pp. lo4'
asleep, imprepared, not fighting or fighting with another,
drinking water or eating, taking off his shoes or departing, dying
or fatally wounded, one who is frightened or has turned back.'*'
These rules are repeated in our sources and Medhatithi declares
2that 'these are positive rules to he observed'. Manu and his
commentators emphatically enjoin a Kgatriya never to deviate
from them. The battle is considered a sacrifice (yajha); it
should be performed righteously. There is firm faith in the victory 
. 4of the just.
Even hie advocates of the politic concept of war recognize
r~WDthese rules of fair fighting. ICau^ilya enjoins the soldier to
grant quarter to those fallen down, those turning back, those
surrendering, those with loose hair, those without weapons or
with broken weapons, those disfigured by terror and those not 
6fighting. Somadeva equates the slaughter of such soldiers with
7
the murder of a Brahmaoja.
The Hindu kings and warriors generally tried to live up to 
these ideals, although deviations from them occurred in times of
^On Mann, VII. 91-93; On Yajh-, 1.326. Mit. quotes oehkha; HJ3E 
XIY, pp. 130-132 quotes several authorities; Agni, 236.58=
2°n Manu, Vll.93.
•^Ibid. , VII.98.
4Of. Hbh., 71.21.11-
W, XXX.75; Manas,, 11. XX. 1222; HA, II. 31-62 paraphrase Manu and 
Yajn and others quoted above; ICA, XIII.4-52.
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distress because of the impracticability of rules or through human
weakness. The many rules governing the treatment of soldiers in
distress seem to have been normally adhered to. The principle of
not fighting with an enemjr or his troops flying from the battle
may be exemplified by Pythvlraja Ill’s action of not pursuing the
retreating hordes of the wounded Mohammad Ghori in 1192. A. L.
Basham rightly observes, ’It is doubtful if any other ancient
civilisation set such humane ideals of warfare’
Once it was conceded that war Is justifiable and righteous,
it became obligatory for the combatants to fight to the finish.
The zealous exertion of warriors participating in war was needed
for victory. Martial spirit must be roused; doubts reassured;
and assurances of advantages accruing through war, both earthly
and heavenly, must be held out to the fighters. All our sources
proraise heaven to those killed in fighting and to those living
a.
after victory, pleasing experience of life. Devalswrti, quoted
 ----------------- —/ v ----------2—— .
by Lakgmidhara, says that a Kgatriya who dies fighting wins the same
fruit which one obtains through the performance of the horse sacrifice
(Asvejjiedha) and goes to the heaven of Indra. ’The Kgsatriya killed In
the defence of the property of a brahmapa is the spirit of sacrifice 
3
incarnate.’ There is no other way of repaying the master’s wages than 
dying for him In battle. Soldiers dying in battle do not stand In 
need of the usual obsequies, nor do they communicate any Impurity
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to their relations by their death. These religious rewards, which 
accrue to saints by hard, penances, besides mundane allurements 
of honour, fame, booty arid the rest, instilled in warriors a sense 
of dedication to fighting and made war an overpowering passion 
with them.
In contrast the greatest ignominy and sin befalls a warrior 
who is either unwilling to fight or deserts his master in battle 
or flees from the combat. If he escapes alive, he suffers the 
agony of humiliation and popular reproach, which is worse than death, 
and if he is slain while flying from battle, he takes upon hrimself 
the sins of his master, who conversely appropriates all his accumu­
lated merit.^ Vyasa proclaims that there is no greater sin for a
2 »Itgatriya than fleeing from battle, and Parasara equates every step 
taken by such a deserter as equal in sin to brahmayici.de. Even 
the advocates of the politic concept of war emphasize the heavenly 
rewards to soldiers killed in battle and fear of the punishment of 
hell and loss of earthly well-being to the deserters.^ Somadeva 
says that the march of a soldier to the battle is equivalent in merit 
to the horse sacrifice (Asvamedha) and a soldier deserting his master 
on the battlefield destroys his well-being both here and hereafter 
by his act.' These religious fears as well as the prospect of
h i e dh. on Manu, VII.94 
2SDK, XIV, p.154.
J - rIbid., XIV. p. 135? Laksmidliara also quotes Yam a, ibid., pp. 130-31; 
Agar, 236-55.
4.Of. Ka, X »3 .45*
5wv, 94-95. cf: Hbh, XII.93.21-23 prescribes mundane puniehnent for
—  '" (oont.)
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humiliations by and large goaded a warrior to fight to the finish* 
Hcvreverj there are references in inscriptions, literary works and 
Muslim accounts id soldiers firming from the battlefield* But it may 
be pointed out that the king in distress could always order a retreat 
of troops which may create situations of flight* The death or capture 
of the king in the battlefield caused confusion and panic and often 
put soldiers to flight. These are, however, contingencies of war 
and it cannot be conclusively shorn that all wars were righteous or that 
soldiers could never succumb to mortal fears.
Military code
In contrast to the dh arm as a s t ra authorities who normally condemn
Imtayncldha (concealed warfare), the advocates of politic concept
allow pr ale a s a-yud dha (open war) only when the invader is superior
in troops and has the advantages of time, place and season together
with success in secret instigation and division in the enemy’s camp
1as well as his kingdom. They recognise three kinds of war: 
p r ak a say/ u d dha, 'jvita-yuddha; and tugaim yuddha (silent warfare). 
Brakasa-yuddha is fighting at an indicated place and time and/indeed 
a righteous war. Kufra-yuddha is fighting with a feint. J It includes 
creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is operational
(cont.) the deserter, who could be storied to death or burnt to death.
A m i . 242.12-13; of. I l M XIX.54; cf. tCAl, X.31-2 
2m ,  XXX.90-91; of. K k  , ¥11.6.40-41. 
tl¥, XXX.90.
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error or calamity in rival troops, giving way in one place in 
order to strike hard at another, ambuscades, night attack, killing enemy 
troops while asleep or fatigued and resting, and employing all kinds 
of stratagems, traps and strategic and tactical bluffs to annihilate
*1 ^
the enemy. Tuggrm-yufldha is that which involves secret practices
like poisoning, instigations through secret agents and incantations
?
contriving the destruction of the rival.
Somadevajwho begins his discussion on war by first taking into
account the condition of a defensive king, describes in general the
diplomatic war without EauJ/ilyan details; discusses open war without
saying so, and, finally, notes the concealed and secret kinds of war
without dilating upon the manner of their prosecution. "Jar nay pass
through all these stages and the question as to its ethics has, therefore,
to be determined in relation to the particular type of war.
\Je have already noted that the advocates of the politic concept
1U
of war are substantially in agreement with those of^heroic concept 
as regards the righteous or open war, although it is not clear whether 
all of them prohibit the use of treacherous means and contrivances or 
weapons of large scale destruction altogether."* It is, however, clear
try, XXX.90; A m i . 236, 58-61, 243.13-23; Of. k N  , XIX. 55-67; Kft., 
X.3.2-25. Ibid.', X.6.48-50. 
Ibid., 91; Cf. . K A , VII.6.41, XII.2-5.
HA, II. 59“60 forbids the means and methods of kufa-yuddha, fire, 
poisonous arrows, etc. and enjoins the conduct of battle according to 
rules of propriety (nlti yuddha), but it also adds that if the enemy 
follows unjust ways of doing harm the king may take recourse to
whatever is expedient.
1that they also consider a battle as a sacrifice; uphold that a
soldier hilled in battle attains heaven and one who deserts destroys
2
his welfare here as well as in the next world. But in encouraging
troops, the promise of material rewards accordingly as soldiers
hill the enemy king, crown prince, commander by their individual
feats and cause significant damage to the opposing troops are
3equally emphasized. The promise of double ■ pay and whatever
4one seizes as booty is made. Bo the prospect of madcerial gains 
animates warriors together with the assurance of heaven in the event 
of death.
As regards the humane ethic of war, that is, the positive rules 
of not killing opponents in fright and various kinds of distressing 
situaiyyons, and non-combatants, this is to be observed, in any
r“
kind of fighting,p although the observance would be difficult 
in concealed warfare.
However there was not much scope for rules of fair fighting 
in Kufa-yuddha and 'fcugg.Tm-yuddh a . In fact, stratagem, strategic 
bluffs and tactical deception are planned in these types of warfare,
hsv, XXX.94; KA> X.3.9.6 ff.
2Ibld., 95; Ibid.
O teii, 242.34 ff; cf. gff, XX36-21; Sanaa. II. XX.1163-67; KA,
X.3.45; cf. also Medh on Man.u , VII. 194» emphasises the gain of 
wealth, the promotion of the happiness of one's dependents, and the 
acquisition of heaven and repayment of the debt owing to employer ar 
incentives to soldier to fight to the finish.
/rgA, X.3.43; IQT, X ^ J  ; same as Manu, VII.96.
% e e  above, p , 2 57 t Katqbilya' s enumeration of these rules in the 
context of the capture of fort is significant.
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The use of poison, fire, secret murder, incantation, nocturnal 
attacks, brutal killing of rival troops caught in any operational 
quandary etc. constitute the effective means of contriving the 
enemy’s discomfiture. Ingenious victory and not a fair combat 
is the goal, which indeed negates the presence of any chivalrous 
code of war. The political authors do not condemn these wars nor do 
they advocate any restraint on treachery; instead Kamandaka rules 
that 'a king should always slay his foes by concealed war. The 
slaughter of foe by deceitful measures is not detrimental to 
righteousness. The son of Drona (As vatt Hainan, the Mahabharata 
warrior) with his sharp weapons slew the Papglavas (sons of Bmupadi) 
when they were unsuspectingly locked in the arms of sleep at night’.  ^
However the Agnl Pura&a restricts the Ku£a-yuddha to distressing 
conditions.^
Devastation of the enemy’s kingdom and the oppression of his subjects 
Since the devastation of the enemy kingdom especially terri­
tories through which the invading army marched and the places of 
resistance such as forts was inevitable as well as an act of mili­
tary necessity, the advocates of both the heroic and politic con­
cepts of war countenance it. The cutting of forests, the dislocation 
of inhabitants of the places through which the army passed, the
KN., XIX. 71
2ARni, 236.59
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seizure and destruction of the enemys crops standing in the fields
were normal activities during a caiapaign.^ Kami and his commentator
permit an invader who has besieged his enemy in the fort to harass
the inhabitants of the territory outside the fort by kidnapping
•the
them and persecuting them in various ways, to vitiate^enemy1s supply
of food, fodder, fuel, and water, to destroy tanks, ditches, water
reservoirs and embankments, ramparts, to assail '’die enemy in the fort
and its breaches, aid even to frighten the besieged at night by means
of men holding jars of flaming fire and crying like jackals in order
to cause fatigue by keeping them awake so that the garrison may be 
2easily reduced. liaiatilya also details similar ravages during war­
fare for capturing a fort. The defensive king', according to early 
authorities, may also resort to something like 'the scorched earth 
policy* in order to prevent the invader from living off the country 
and from finding a place to entrench himself against the harassing 
tactics of the defenders."*
But no wanton destruction of the life and property of the enemy 
kingdom on a large scale is encouraged. Medhatithi says that 'when 
a king is attacking another kingdom he does not destroy the irihabi- 
tants of that realm if it is at all possible to save them’.1 Katyayana
XHedh on Kanu, VII.182.
On Kanu, VII. 195-196; also Hit. on Tajh, I. 342-343- ?J)K, XIV. 
pp. 125”! 26 quotes Manu and Yajn .A; cf. also Kbtj^\XII. 140-. 61.
%bh,, XII. 69.33" 3:0; KA, XII. 3.9.12 ff
^On Kanu, VII.32.
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also forbids the destruction of the territory and people of even
a wicked enemy on the ground that the subjects did not consent to
1his taking to an unjust course that precipitated warn hven 
Kaufilya restrains a Icing engaged in the conquest from ravaging 
the countryside and exterminating the people, and from the whole­
sale destruction of the life and property inside enemy forts, because
2
the conquest would be fruitless at the end.
However, according to the advocates of^politic concept of war, 
the devastation of the enemy kingdom may even precede actual in­
vasion. Vicyraha nay lead to the application of secret danda com­
prising the destruction of enemy property, burning; of crops and 
V_rllages, poisoning of wells etc.,' which equally hit the hostile 
king and his subjects. During the phase of diplomatic warfare, rival; 
indulged in damaging each other* s defence potentials and creating; 
disorder which affected the subjects as well. Further, even the 
application of open force, according to Oomesvara III, is of twelve 
types which include the devastation of country (desanasa), muti­
lation of hostile people (janangacchedalza), burning and sacking 
of towns, depriving the enemy of his entire possessions etc/f
"HDK, XiY, p.139 quotes Katyayan (Kane, v.2l) - Dugjasyapi narendrasya 
tad ragfrraift na vlnasayet / Ha pra,j annua to yasmadjjmyayegu p r av an t a t e J j
2KA,KXt|.4o , 2-5, 22-24.
^Agni, 234.3; cf. Vdh, II. 146.4“5.
4Manaa, II. 20.1035 ff, see below pp. 4 & 0-/3
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which amply bear out that the people were oppressed and their
sufferings were great. 'The dynastic chronicles and inscriptions
record the burning of villages, sack of cities and devastation
X
of the country by invaders. It seems that devastations of the
enemy country and deprivations of people were greater in a war
of attrition or revenge or when an aggressor had to make a quick
job of his expedition owing to an invasion into his own kingdom
or some Internal troubles. As for example Pythviraja Ill's
devastation of the Oandella territories might have been caused
by his anxiety to hurry home where meanwhile Bhima II had made 
2
an invasion. Further, invaders sometimes caused havoc In order 
to create panic in the subjects of a, stubborn enemy,and thus 
unde mine his resistance or even force him to sue for peace. The 
destruction of the life and property w as somewhat greater in the 
concealed and secret kinds of warfare than in righteous war. 
hhatevei’ the contingencies and consideration it cannot be denied 
that the invading hordes devastated the country under their feet
1
Somes vara1 s hprbrkaumudi, id. 42-53 for an account of the Yadava 
invasion into Gujarat. Ho narrates, ’The enemy burnt villages on 
their way and the volume of smoke that rose up hi the air showed 
the position of their camp to the terrified people and enabled them 
to direct their moves accordingly. The Yadavas overran the country 
about Bfciygukaccha while the plentiful crops were still standing in 
the fields.’
§I», XXVI. p. 150 Bijolia Ins. records that Vicjraharaja IV turned 
KagL^ula into a bed of reeds, Jalor into ’a city of flames’ and 
Pallika or Pali into ’a small hamlet*.
2
Archaeological Survey of India Report, X.p.598, XXII* pp. 137 if. 
See also D. Sharma, pp.cit■, p.73.
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and sometimes even did not spare places of public norship from 
the cataclysm^ of war. nevertheless;while engaged in the con­
quest 5 an invader normally restricted his depredations to the place; 
of resistance and avoided a wholesale destruction of the enemy 
kingdom because it was neither righteous nor politic.
On storming the enemy capital the victor might seize the 
enjoyable commodities and indulge in such acts of destruction 
as were imperative to break the back of the enemy’s resistance.
But once he has occupied, a. territory, the violence and destruction 
must cease, although those who persisted :i.r^ )fforing resistance 
could be persecuted and punished. Buty in general 9the jieople were
granted safety, their property was left unmolested, and the places
2of public worship were protected.
It is contrary to the heroic ideals of war to sack a town or 
indulge in systematic plunder and looting of the property of the 
subjects of -hie enemy. Booty, by and large, consists of what is 
acquired hi the battlefield or in storming a fort or capital, 
and it does not include loot. Gautama, quoted by Lakgmidhara, lays 
down that ’the victor should receive the booty gained in battle
1 rf
Sukrt&kirti kallol jni, v.175; Sukytisanicirtana, XT.. v .33
see also A. K. Hajumdar, op.clt., pp. 147 ff.
2,
Agnl, 2p6. 22 ff; see below pp.17/ if. settlement of the conquered 
kingdom.
pDK, SIT. p. 157.
and having won booty from Kgatriyas killed in battle, if a soldier
does not take to himself any of the booty, he goes to heaven. If
a kinghaving overrun a kingdon but desisting from taking any
i.
booty therefrom, happens to be killed,he- goes to heaven.' liuiever^
huge booty consisting of elephants, horses, wealth, cattle, grain,
various rich articles and even women is mention ed as being seized
during the course of a campaign of conquest.
Regarding rules of apportionment of booty, Kanu says, 'chariots
and horses, elephants, umbrellas, wealth, grains, animals, women,
all goods and baser metals belong to bin who wins them *.^ Ileclhatith
comments, 'The king being the master of all he might take away
all the spoils of war; hence the text mentions a few” exceptions' .
But lie goes further by ruling that ’gold, silver, lands, buildings
and so forth accrue to the king ... , . arms and conveyances also
accrue to the king.... It Is in view of all this that there is
4-the popular saying "Half belongs to the king’". 3further<the 
Ye die tradition upheld by the dh.arm.as as tr as and also quoted by 
Hedhatithi required that notwithstanding this rule every soldier 
should voluntarily present to the king the choice portion from 
the booty Individually seized by him in war. Eedhatithi thus
1 " ESKt x v r - p . w .
2 ftl fl-nu t \ru , gg j ttIso comiv\.<r«; X I V ,  ) 3 7
5 M u-hu,f V7/.0fi
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not only asserts the royal right to the spoils of war but also
urges that soldiers have an obligation to share their booty with
their king. The Agni Purana, however, clearly recognises the royal right
to the spoils of war by ruling that 'gems and wealth acquired in war
conducted even by ministers of a king should be held as belonging
]
to the sovereign by the right of conquest. 1 The rules regarding; 
the apportionment of the booty were nevertheless flexible. Lak~ 
gmidhara who quotes Manu with approval also cites Gautama who 
held that the booty (sahgramlicam vi11am) belongs to the captor, 
but the conveyances (vahana)(which should include the elephants, 
chariots and horses etc.) go to the king1 even though they have 
been won by soldiers in single combat.^ It may be mentioned 
that Medhatithi also says that conveyances accrue to the king 
but he does not elaborate it because if it included the chariots 
etc. it would bo against the provisions of Kanu. However^it seems 
that rules regarding the conveyances were uncertain. Booty won 
by the king or his troops collectively is to be apportioned by 
the king among his supporters and, servants T in accordance with 
the naxin of bestowing on worthy recipients’ . J
It is clear that with certain exceptions the royal right t o  
the spoils of war is recognised. But H* L. Shatterjee is wrong
\dfguL, 2 ‘Ib.op.
2p E ,  XIV. pp. 137-38
"Ibid.j Kedh. on Hanu, VII.97
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when lie asserts that the booty seised in war first went over
to the king who later distributed the same among his soldiers
simply remembering that an article seised by a soldier would
1
have to be made over to him. What Kanu lays down is that 
the various articles mentioned above belonged to the individual 
captor, who, according to the Vedic tradition or convention^ was 
required to present to the king the best object from his booty.
‘j?he royal right over the immovable property seized as booty was, 
however, undisputed as also over those movable objects not men™ 
tioned by our authorities.
The advocates ox the politic concept of war, however, do not 
place any restrictioi^n the objects which could be seized as 
booty, and seem to have followed the rules of the smytls regarding 
the apportionment. Kaujllya mentions in connection with the re­
wards promised to soldiers on the eve of battle that the soldiers
are to be encouraged by promising them the right to retain what™
2
ever they seize in battle . Kamandaka also says that the con­
veyances, gold srd base metal or minor objects of utility will
3belong to one who seizes them in battle.
Settlement of the conquered kingdom
Violence and harassment ceased with the occupation of the 
enemy kingdom and the conqueror proceeded to pacify its inhabitants
1
Op.cit., p. 9b
‘TCA, X.3*45.
" " " T  Ol
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1
by various measures, The dhannasastras emphatically stated tliax
»the very duty which exists for a sovereign for the protection
of his own country, that very one in entirety he incurs, when lie
Xbrings under his sway his enemy’s .kingdom’. The conqueror was
to proclaim a general amnesty to the people forgiving them for
what they had done by virtue of their loyalty to their former
master and assuring them of their freedom to take to their normal
callings, to worship the geds and the righteous Brahama^as, to
give gifts to his people, to grant remissions of the burdensome
taxes to the householder for a year or two in order to enable them
to provide for their livelihood and to bear the sufferings of 
- 3war and to recu:/perate. He was further to observe, maintain
and affirm the laws, customs, family usages obtaining in the
country before his conquest unless otherwise repugnant to the
sastrac or contrary to dharua (lav), and to confirm customs
relating to the property of Brahraapas or temples and to the duties
of the people as also those relating to the status and economic
5position of the leading men. These measures were undertaken in 
order to ingratiate the conqueror to the vanquished people with
h i t . Oil Ya.jS., 1.343.
2
Jaqft, 1.342, also comms.
^Kedh. on Hanu, ¥11.201, Agni, 236.22-23. HhK, XIV. pp. 137~3B. 
A  ,
’Vis. and Hit. on Ya,jfi, 1.343; Medh on Hanu, ¥11.203;
SDK, XI¥,"~pp. 138-397 Aaii, 236.22.
5Hedh. on Hanu, ¥il,203.
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Ia view to establishing his rule. ICantilya also details these
measures for the pacification of the occupied kingdom and the
2establishment of the conqueror’s government. It is striking to 
note that notwithstanding the ideal objective of viqraha which 
according to the dharmasastras is the acquisition of an ally , 
the smyti commentators enjoin the victor to first endeavour to 
establish his rule. In this regard the commentators 011 Yajhavalkya 
are more consistent as they maintain that the objective of an 
expedition is the annexation of the enemy’s kingdom/ and they, 
therefore, recommend how the conqueror has to accomplish this 
after victory in the battlefield.
However Medliatithi observes, ’if even after bestowing of such 
favours /i.e. as mentioned above/ he finds that the citizens and
people are so loyal to their former master that they still cherish
feelings of attachment towards his dynasty, and that any govern­
ment of his own would not be lasting’ then after ascertaining the 
wishes of the citizens and people the victor is to instal a scion
of the fallen enemy on the latter's throne and conclude a treaty
A
with him. fho terms of the treaty are: 'You and I shall have
1
RDK) XXV. p.1^8. Lakgmidhara says that remission of portion of
taxes is advised for favouring the people (jauamirsypsu’ldiam)
and creating attachment for oneself; also Kedh. on Hanu, VII. 2C1--203
Ya, AIII. 5. 3ff.
on Ya j :n,X,f jo p ar ara s jb ra,r ja. in a s vraj et; see also
on Yaju, 1,324.
vKedh. on Hanu, VII. 202; yA, XX. 67-68.
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equal shares in your income, you shall consult me ±1 all that
you do or do not do, at the proper time you shall come and help
1
me with your treasury and force and so forth*, ’ fhe terms
are indeed stringent; and they institute vassalage. Having made
the political settlement with the new king promising obedience and
loyalty, the victor would honour him with presents of weapons,
money, grains, ornaments, conveyances, umbrellas, throne, crown
and so forth and confirm the religious grants and usages relating
to the family status and economic stakes of the leading men in
2
order to create attachment among them for himself.
But the general tone of Kami seems to favour the installation 
of a scion of the fallen king, conclusion of a treaty with him, 
and finalise evacuation of the enemy kingdom even though it may be 
very safe and conducive to the victor’s prosperity. Lakgmidliara, 
who quotes Hanu and Yaj havalky a , J  also cites the Vijpu to the 
effect that the victor should set up a member of the fallen king’s
family and, after having made a settlement with him, return to
4his ora kingdom. Hanu and Vigpu and also the Agni Purapa cherish 
the heroic ideal of war according to which the conqueror is to 
seek gratification in glory and in acquixulng a tributary ally.
*LI‘ledh. on Eanu, VII.202; HA, 11.67-68, 
2Kedh. on Hanu, VII. 203; BA, il.68-. 
"Td k, XIV. ->p. 137-39.
Abid., u.133.
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But, as already observed, Kodhatithi ascribes the creation of
a vassal to a conqueror’s inability to establish hio rule on
lasting ground owing to the loyalty of the people to their
forncr master. Evenxegarding the evacuation of the enemy kingdom
so forcefully enjoined in the text, Kedhatithi observes ’ho
/the victor/ shall not evacuate in a hurry the territory occupied
by him; lie should give up only that territory with regard to
which he feels that if he continued to stay the people of the
land will try to recover it from hin. So as soon as he finds
that evacuation would not mean any financial or strategic h a m
to himself and his allies , he shall give up the territory even
]though it possess all the qualities...’ ' viz. it is safe, fertile
2and conducive to the increase of cattle. it is obvious that 
Kodhatithi would prefer, the creation of a vassal to the victor's 
unstable rule and concede evacuation only when it is not financially 
and strategically harmful. He is in fact reconciling the tradi­
tional objectives of the righteous conquest with the political 
practice of his age which favoured the creation of vassals or 
feudatories. Medhatithi is also closer to the politic concept
which favours annexation if it does not involve loss and create
3enmity with another king.
Cn I-lanu . VII. 212
2Ibid
3Cf. KH, VIII.67
It appears that the tradj.tiorxal settlement of the conquered
kingdom required the victor first to pacify the ministers, relations
and subjects of the defeated king. Then he should reinstate the
vanquished or install a scion of his family and conclude a treaty
providing for the tributary obligations, after which the victor
was to evacuate the enemy territory. This is in accordance with
the ideal of a righteous conqueror even according to Kaufilya,
]
Kamandaka and others who recommend similar settlement. lienacandra
2also favours such a settlementy Somadeva is not very clear,
although from his statements that the victor should do good to
(L b
the enjny king captured in war and liberate him, that after reducing
the enemy the conqueror should win over his kinsmen by granting
then lands, and in the alternative, l' i.e. if they persist in
hostility, afflict them, and that tho territorial rains are of 
three kinds: new, formerly possessed, and inherited,' it may be
inferred that he also preferred annexation as well as reducing 
the enemy kingdom to vassalage. Thus the settlement of the con­
quered kingdom may mean either the establishment of the victor’s 
rule or creation of vassalage. The latter arrangement was more
276
popular during our period as is known from the dynastic records
1
and is also testified by the Arab merchant Suleiman. Annexations
also took place but the practice of reducing the defeated kingdom
to tributary status was preferable as it was apparently in
keeping with the heroic traditions of conquest and it ensured
the political, military and financial gains to the victor ax
well, without involving administrative responsibilities and creating
permanent bitterness with the enemy house and his loyal subjects.
nlliot and Dowson, History.of India, as told by its own historians, 
vol. x, p,7.
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Chapter "VI
"II ■" ' * *■ ...........   ■<1 C X .
SADGUHYA: C. YANA 
( EXPEDITION OB MARQHIN&)
^ en ' i^graha (ifar) has been declared yana (expedition or 
marching) naturally follows in the normal course of events.
Several authors of our period have dealt with yana under the term
mm m t 1
yatra (expedition), which means a ’journey1 in its ordinary use.
But, as an equivalent of yana, it is concerned with the details of
military marching and is a synonym for yana in the context of the
- - 2gadgupya. Apararka sayss ’Marching is expedition*; the author
of the Agni Pura&a tells us that c yatra means the
3marching of a king desix^ ous of victory against his adversary*.
It appears, however, from the Yuktikalpataru that our authors*
4 M  M  JOT
preference for the term yatra against yana is due to the latter*s 
association with a conveyance in popular usage. In fact, Bhoja 
himself details various kinds of conveyances such as elephants, 
horses, palanquins, boats and aerial cars under yana^ and treats it
jw« R
as an instrument of the sixfold policy under yatra.
1Ykt., p.7; RDK, XIV.p.115 ff • Lak^midhara, however, deals with 
yana as an instrument of the sixfold policy in the previous chapter, 
’gadgupyam* (RBK, XIII,pp.111-13). Of. Mbh., XII.69.67.
^On Yajft., 345 -Jfanam yatra; cf. Matm, VII. 182 - Margasirge
subhe masi yayad yatram mahipatih.
rz  „  f  mm m t
Agni, 234*18 “ Jigigdi s a t r u v i . j s y a n a m  yatra abhidhiyate. 
4Ykt.. 48-50. p. 7,
5Ibid.. 51 ff. p-7.
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1
Hedhatithi defines yana as going forward with a single purpose, 
and other commentators on Hanu explain that 'a march against the 
enemy is yana1.^ Somadeva says, ’Rise /of power and prosperity
3
is marching . ' It is evident that he describes the condition of
power in which the policy of yana is appropriate. But the commentator
the.
of the Niti vakyampta interprets it as marching of a king against
4
his foe for the rise of his powers. Commenting on Yajfiavalkya , 
Visvarupa states that 'marching against an enemy on account of the
r
excessive augmentation /of powers/ Is yana.' Vijhanesvara singly 
remarks that ’yana means march against an enemy’.
the
It is evident from the above that by yana was meant actual 
march of troops against an enemy for battle. It is further obvious 
that yana was generally construed as an aggressive expedition,because 
Visvarupa and Somadeva clearly state that the cause of the expedition 
is the excess of a king’s power in contrast to his enemy^and the 
motive is ambition and greed to attain further rise of power j  ■ 
o speri  fcy and politic al as c endan cy through
 ^On Manu9 VI1.160 ~ gleantata~gamanam yanam. 
2
Ibid. f Kulluka, Yanam satruiwprat jJgamanam.
NV» XXIX.45 - Abhyudayo yanam; cf. ICA, VII.1.9 
4Ibid.
On Yatjh., 343 - Abhyuccayatireka -ripunv pratj|gajnanagi yanam. 
^Ibid . f 347 ™ Yanam p ara^ ajprat iy atra.
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military victory. According to VIjftanesvara the object of yana
1
is the annexation of enemy’s territory,
ors *»
RacbA and circumstances connected with yana.
Recourse to the policy of yana is beset with many serious 
political and military complications and fraught with internal as 
well as external risks. It demands a correct estimate of the re­
lative strength of the adversary and his allies, an appraisal of 
the chances of success in view of the material condition of the 
enemy’s kingdom and his subjects, a knowledge of the diplomatic
moves of the enemy especially his secret approaches to the middle
2
and neutral kings; and, finally, the assessment of the measure of 
precautions and preparations required to stave off any internal 
trouble ar\cL a threat from the enemy in the rear. The conditions 
for an actual expedition are different from those of the outbreak 
of hostilities (vigraha).
The predominant factor which prompts the marching of a king 
against his enemy is the excess of his power In comparison with the 
weakness of the rival. Our authorities unanimously deblare that 
’when a king thinks that his army is happy and strong in condition’ 
or ’abounds in high spirited and mighty warriors and various kinds of 
draught animals’, ’and that of the enemy is in the r e v e r s e fthen
"Mit. on Yafffi ., 1.348® Tada para-»rastram atmsatOcartum vrajet
1— rL-'" 1 LP- "n'*1" “--■ 1 -I n j | m rifiiiT~T~i" w i - r <«-i>irni ■■ i    n m>i ii ■■■ ■! m u ■MHiii.Bi ii<iiMir<i».ii.»w n j»»n.iiV  r-|~ —-nr- r
Medh. on Manu. VII.184, 197.
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1shall he march against the enemy* We have already noticed that
the policy of vlgraha is vouchsafed by the advancement (vpddhl)
of powers and the zealous loyalty of the allies,, But since the army
accomplished the objective of the expedition its superiority has
overriding priority when actual operations of war become imminent *
Some Purapas also attribute yana primarily to the plethora of one’s
military strength, the loyalty of warriors and servants, capability to
protect his capital from the enemy in the rear and to crush internal
2troubles during his absence on expedition.
Somadeva and Bhoja lay down that’when possessed of a pre­
ponderance of the excellent qualities (of constituents) a king should 
march against his enemy provided there is no thorn (i.e. trouble or 
rebellion) in his kingdom and no disturbance in the rear.’ It is 
evident that Somadeva, who regards a contented and high-spirited 
army together with the rising strength in general as a necessary 
condition of vigraha,^  emphasizes all-round superiority of power and 
prosperity as an essential pre-requisite of yana.
However, a mere preponderance of the excellent qualities is not 
enough. The aggressive king must have fully consolidated his power
'L' Hanu, VIII. 171; also coinms. j, On Yajh., I, 348; 11.11.
A^gnl, 228, 2ff; Matsya, 240.3 ff* quoted in EDIC, XIV. 115-16.
HV, XXIX. 53 - Gupatisayayukto yayaqjya^i na santi ragstra^kapfaka 
madhye na bhavatl pascat kr oc]hahT^ . gg p
4F\r, XXIX.51; Cf. KA, VII.1.14>33.
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in his own kingdom by oles'troyin^  internal thorns and eradicating
internecine feuds. I*or an expedition may turn into a fiasco if
internal troubles break out while the king is away in the enemy
kingdom. The chances of internal uprisings on such occasions were
greater during our period because feudatories were always anxious
to exploit situations created by the absence of the king on ex™
pedition in a distant country;especially when he met with failure
or waged a protracted war.
Somadeva strongly counsels against an invasion of the enemy
in the front when there is the danger of even a small disturbance
in the rear. He stresses its magnitude by saying that ‘when advantage
from the gain in front is one-thousandth while the disturbance in
1the rear is one-hundredth, he should not march.* ’Misfortunes*
indeed,have the eye of a needle , which though small, enables the
* 2
huge thread to pierce it. He further expresses the importance of 
the protection of one’s own kingdom before under talcing an expedition 
through a homely simile. He says, ’A king invading his enemy’s 
country without having fully protected his own, acts like a naked 
man wearing the garment on his head.’
The Hatsya Pura&a and the Agni Purana state that a favourable 
political opportunity for yana arises when the vijigigu’s ally
1HT, XXIX.85; of. KA, IX.3.4; KN, XVI.14. 
2Ibid.. .XXIX.86; Ibid., IX.3.4; Ibid.. XVI.15.
Hbid., XXIX. 54.
in the rear (akranda) is powerful and is  press inj h a rd  a g a in s t fvg neai
vsrxr<i enemy f  p d x f s & n o -) Alternatively, a king may march against
his enemy in front if he is in a position to leave behind troops
superior to those of the enemy in the rear in order to protect his
capital and kingdom and to quell any internal disturbance during 
2his absence. Manu and his commentators also emphasize that a
king should make suitable arrangements for safeguarding bis own king-
3dom before setting out 011 an expedition. It may be^ioted that 
the danger of such an eventuality was considerably greater during 
our age in which the political atmosphere was charged with bitter 
dynastic rivalries. Often the hereditary rivals exploited such 
situations and forced even the successful conquerors to abandon 
their expeditions at an indecisive stage or suffer some losses in 
the rear of their kingdoms. As for example? the Paramara king 
Bhoja who sent his general Kulacandra to sack AgJbdJC&vada, 'the 
capital of the Caulukya kingdom when Bhima I (c.1022-1066 A.D.) 
was away on an expedition in Sindh.^ Another instance is the attack 
on A&i*sAaiaks& by the Caulukya king Bhima II probably at the time when
Agni, 228.1; Matsya, 240.2 quoted in SDK, XXV.p.115.
Ibid.. 228.2; Ibid., 240.3-4.
Manu. VII.184; RDIC, XIV.p.122. 
h.K.Majumdar, op.cit., p.52.
the Cahamana king Pythviraja was subjugating the Candella kingdom
1of Jejakabhukti during the course of his digvijaya. These instances
show that the political advice of our authors was based on historical 
experience, and although the kings generally heeded it and took 
necessary precautions, these sometimes proved inadequate. Sometimes, 
however, these considerations seem to have checked aggressive cam­
paigns in certain directions. It appears that the Pratihara kings 
of Kanauj, although hostile to the Arabs, never sincerely attempted 
the liquidation of their principality of Sindh because of the fear 
of an invasion in the rear from the Ragjrakutas or the Palas.
In addition to these prerequisites of power and precautions, 
and the existence of a favourable balance of power in the circle 
of kings, the deterioration of an enemy’s constituents could provoke 
an attack on him by a powerful rival. Medhatithi asserts that ’the 
causes that prompt actual marching against the enemy are not the 
same that lead the king to make war; in fact, these latter,as also
the loss of happiness and strength of the enemy’s people are the
2
causes thht should prompt actual marching.’ It is evident from
his comments that ’condition’ (hhava) which is the causejof happiness
and dsrength’ expresses the general situation of the constituents.
The weakness and distress of the army is symptomatic of the decline
of the kingdom and subjects; and it is the latter which causes an 
_ _ _ _ _  ~ = —  —  * —  —  —  - —
A.K.Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 140-141; D. Sharma, op.cit., pp. 74-77.
^0n Manu, Vii.17}.; cf. On Manu, VII. 165; also 164; of. KA, VII.4-14 ff.
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invasion. Some Purapas also prescribe that a king should proceed
against his enemy without delay when he finds him in calamities,
his country struck by such visitations of nature as earthquakes,
heavenly disturbances, famine etc,; his army discontented and
afflicted with vices; and his country full of disturbances and 
2 *uprisings, Somesvara mainly concentrates on the calamities and 
weaknesses of the enemy which justify an attack on him by the 
vijlgigu. He states that a king should march against one whom 
an adverse fate has deprived of his revenue, one who is struck down 
with disease, one whose mind is drawn towards vices, or one who 
is oppressed by his enemy, a foe who is without adequate troops 
and revenue or who has been deserted by his friends and allies.
The vijigisu is sure to achieve sweeping success in his expedition 
against such a rival.
It is striking to note that Bhoja and Somesvara warn that a 
march should not be undertaken against a country struck down with 
drought, famine, epidemics and other grave calamities including 
internal disturbances.^ We may recall that Yajfiavalkya advises
10n. Manu, VII. 164-65, 171.
2
Afini, 228.3.-4; Matsya, 240. 7, 9, 10, 15 quoted in RDK,
XIV. pp. 115-16. 
%anas.. XX, xiii.743-44; of. KA, VII.4.14. ff. 
Ykt., 53.p.7; Manas., II,xiii.928.
an expedition when the enemy country is rich in corn, water, and
fodder.*^ * It appears that Somesvara’s prohibitions have in view
practical difficulties of procuring food, fodder, and water for the
troops which would also he exposed to the hazards of the raging
epidemics in enemy country. Bhoja Paramara is, however, actuated
by chivalrous ideals since he says that a vi jigigu desires victory
over an adversary, who is without panic, calamity, affliction and 
2disease.
It is thus evident that a policy of yana is justifiable mainly 
on three conditinns;
the superiority of military strength over an enemy and superiority 
in other constituents as well;
a favourable balance of power in the inter-state sphere created 
by the rising strength of allies, especially in the rear; 
and finally, calamities suffered by the enemy both human 
and divine In political, economic and personal fields.
In comparison with the factors precipitating war, those of yana are 
the same^in addition to the loss of happiness and strength ofA enemy’s 
subjects and his politico-military disadvantages brought about by his 
fate, folly and vices as well as the corrosive effect of the expedients 
employed against him by the aggressive king.
^Yajh., 1.348; also conims.; RDK, XIV.p. 115-
As to the actual invasion, however, other factors, especially
1
those of place and time^must be taken into account. The geography 
of the country to be attacked, whether it is plain, hilly, marshy, 
desert or forest, had to be ascertained for operational and strategic 
reasons. The condition of the highways and the regions through which 
they run have to be scrutinized to minimise the hazards of the journey. 
Further, the seasonal considerations which greatly affect the efficacy 
of the different kinds of troops must be evaluated. In view of the 
problems of supply, food, fodder and water, and the climatic conditions 
in the different seasons which have an influence on the physical stamina 
of soldiers and beasts of burden the advantages of the proper time 
are emphasized. Most of our authors favour the months of Margasirgsa 
(Movember-December), Phalgu^a (February-March) and Caitra (March- 
May) for undertaking an expedition. Explaining the reasons for this 
Medhatithi writes: 'When he /the king/ is going to undertake an
expedition involving a campaign that might be a long one ... he shall 
march against the hostile kingdom in the month of Marg a shir g a..,
Starting about this time, he can easily carry with him the autumn fruits 
garnered in the house and is cheered by the prospects of the spring 
harvest. The time is quite fit for the work of laying siege to fort­
resses and so forth, and the ps,thjis also not beset with deviations and 
diversions due to the overgrowth of grass or the overflowing of rivers;
^Qn Manu, ¥11,181-85; Ykt., 52 ff.p.7; Manas., II.xiii.754; Agni, 
228.1*ff; Matsya, 240. 19-27, 47-49; RgK, XIV, pp. 115,123-4,
cf. KN, XVI.5 ff.
2071 .KSanu, VII. 184-185; RIDE, XIV.p. 125 quotes Saokhalikhita.
and the season is neither too hot nor too cold* At any other time of
the year good grains, even though sufficient, cannot he of sufficiently
diverse quality, the seasons for the three harvests being far off,
so that the enemy would he likely to take shelter under a powerful
king, which would lead to unnecessary expenditure of the stock of
food-grains of both parties, and the attacking king’s own forces would
become weakened,1
*Xf, however, the king is desirous only of inflicting some injury
on the enemy’s territory, or when the expedition is expected to take
a short time, and his force is sufficiently strong, then he may start
also during the months of Phalgupa and Oaitra, especially against a
country which is rich in spring harvests. At this time of the year
also, he can obtain fodder, and at the same time inflict injury upon
1
the other party, by destroying the crops standing on the fields•1
If, however, a campaign has to be undertaken in months other
than those Indicated, the king should equip himself with that parti-
cular division of the army which would be decisive in the field of
operation such as infantry and elephants in the rainy season, chariots
and cavalry in the winter, and all the four divisions of the army 
2in the spring. This seasonal consideration has another motive, 
which is to deprive 'the enemy of his harvest* However, an expedition
1Medh. on Manu. VII.182.
Agni, 228.7; Matsya, 240.19-27 quoted in RPK. pp. 124-5.
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could be undertaken at any time when the king sees certain prospects
1
of victory owing to the difficulties of the enemy.
Pven when factors of power, place and time are all favourable, 
a king is not to commence the marching of troops without consulting 
astrologers and prognostics. Many works, especially the Pura&as» 
give detailed accounts of numerous auspicious and inauspicious asterisms, 
dreams, omens, portents and prognostics of various kinds such as the 
voices of birds , jackals, etc. which indicated the success or other-
p
wise of an expedition." We have already noted that the divine agency
(daiya) had a tremendous impact on the state policy, and our sources
bear out the hold of daiva on the royal disposition for military
action. Bhoja Paramara says that a king should march when his Pate
(daiya) is propitious and the enemy’s in the reverse state.^ We
often come across discussions on the relative importance of hitman
4endeavour and Pate, which together are said to control the course 
of action. It was therefore by no means unusual if .kings consulted 
astrologers in order to determine an auspicious day and time for 
commencing the expedition and paid heed to the physical portents
1Medh. on Manu, VII.182.
H i d .. VII.197. Agni. 228.7-8, chs. 229, 230, 231, and 232 are devoted
to the discussion of the nature and significance of dreams, auspicious 
articles, animals,birds etc. and the indications from the voices of 
crow, jackal, horse and the rest; cf. Matsya, chs. 241-243; RDM, 
XlVVpp. 116-122 quotes Matsya, 241. 2, 12, 14? 242.^2ff. and the 
Ramay ana, S un d erakapda, Sarga 27 on this subject; Manas, II.xiii.755 ff*
;>Ykt., 54*p.7, cf. Manas., II.xiii.745*
40n Hanu, VII.205 5 On Yajft., 1.349-50; SDK, XIV.pp. 139-141 quotes
Ramayana, Ayodl^akanda, 23*1^-18 and Vyasa. Agni, 226,1-5; cf. Matsya, 
*22178 ff; YasjntTIifa, Act III. See above ppT/^-5*
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ih*
such as spontaneous throbbing of muscles, reflected upon dreams,
A
and tried to familiarise themselves with good and bad portents,
omens and objects. The influence of dalva indeed grew greater with
the tim§; This probably follows from the V1 gnud.harmo11ara Parana1 s
raising it to the status of a fourthpower, the other three being those
2of counsel, might and energy. On account of the increased importance 
a large body of prognostics came into existence, A king 
was naturally inclined to consult every extra-mundane factor because 
he had not only to strengthen his psychological condition but also 
to boost the morale of his troops by proclaiming that every factor, 
human and divine, promised victory in the undertaking and their 
tails and tribulations during the war would be richly rewarded.
While the fighting zeal of troops would not be unduly undermined, 
if they were asked to engage in a battle in which all the prognostics 
were arrayed against them, a king was advised to attach greater 
importance to human endeavours and discount fate and prognostics 
when an urgent occasion arose. But kings who undertook imperial 
campaigns of conquest (digvijaya) "could always afford to take all 
necessary measures, real and superstitious, which enabled them to 
anticipate their success and to encourage their soldiers.
1
Agni, 228.7-8; RDK, XIV.p.116 quotes Matsya, 241.2, 12, 14, see ecbove 
fn. jl. p.X^S,
2
Vdh., 11.71.11.
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Kinds of yana
Our authors distinguish several kinds of yana by taking into
consideration factors of power, place and time as well as allies
and inter-state developments. Commentators on Manu explain two
kinds of yana desci*ibed in the text. They are; one led by the
vijIg'igu all alone, when the enemy has been reduced to difficult
straits by calamities and has impoverished and disaffected subjects,
which situation is tailed an ’emergent occasion’ promising sure success;
and the other, led by the vijigigu accompanied by his allies obviously
1in a situation of his own indecisive superiority over the enemy.
Reproducing Kamandaka, the author of the Agni Purapa mentions
Jf« .fa* Ml *^4 ^
five kinds of yana: vigyhya, sandhaya, sambhuya, prasanga and upeksa.
rz
Bhoja describes only two kinds of yana; vigyhya and sandhaya.
Somesvara, however, details seven types of yatra; sandhanaja, 
pargpirodha, mitravigrahapi, dvandvaja, niryya.ja,ja, kulya and sighraga,^ 
but some of these are sub-types of the yigyhyayana.
Vigyhyayana is the marching after a declaration of war. This 
is the expedition of an eminently powerful king, undertaken when his 
own constituents of state are in excellent condition and those of the
enemy in an unsatisfactory state, or his own allies are devoted and
5strong and those of the enemy are in the reverse condition. Thus
1 ’ ' ' ' ' ” " * —  —
On Manu, VII.165. comments on the verse are Kaujilyan in substance;
cf. KA, VII.4.15.
2Agni. 24®?.26-27; cf. KN, XI.2; KA, VII.4.15 ff.
?Ykt„ 51-52. p. 7.
Manas., II.xiii.746.
5 Arm, 240.26; ffl, XI.3-4; KA, Vll.4.17 ff.
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the king obviously marches all alone owing to his own superiority
of power, or he undertakes the expedition owing to a favourable
balance of power between his and his enemy's allies. Somesvarais
Avandvaja (expedition born of a duel or due to opposition between
two rulers) and nirvyaja(ya (expedition without deceit) come under
this category, for, according to him, the former kind of expedition
is that which is undertaken by the king himself against that enemy
1
whom he faces through his policy and the latter type means an
expedition without deceit which the strong king undertakes with a
2
calm mind in order to destroy his enemy. It appears, however, that 
the dvandva.j a expedition involves the use of political expedients 
and even strategem in order to create conflict between the enemy 
and another king, which provides the opportunity for the marching 
of the king, while the niryyajajAis an open challenge to fight, 
similar to the expedition of a digvijayin. As an example of the 
latter, we may mention the expedition of Pythviraja III (A.B. c. 1178- 
1192), the Cahamana king of Sakambhari, against the Oandella king 
Paramardideva in A.D. 1182. This was an expedition of the Nlr%aiaja
hmiiHihjiI ii »|IW
type because Pythviraj a III is not known to have undertaken the ex­
pedition by preparing its grounds through policy and stratagem.
svayam yayad anayet tad arlm nayat.
Sa vatra dvandvaja prokta ripu samharakarini The literal meaning
of the verse does not make much sense. It seems that an expedition 
which is undertaken in order to exploit a situation created by war be­
tween two kings is intended. The king is advised to march against an 
enemy who is at war with anotherj this war may have been created by 
the king's own policy or diplomacy. It may well correspond to another 
type of vigyhyayana in which one's own allies fight with enemy’s 
allies on all sides, and the king proceeds against the adversary to 
destroy him. Cf. KH, XX«4 9 ^ukra (tr. ) alV. VII. 510.5H»
/cont.)
Manas.,^11.xiii.750 s Yasyopari
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Besides these, Somes vara's pargairodha and mltra-vigraharil 
expeditions are also the sub-types of vigff'hyayana. According to 
him, when a king marches against the enemy after committing a portion
of his stupendous forces to make war upon thexear enemy, it is
* -  1 called parg&irodha ox* march after obstructing the rear enemy.
2
Kaufilya describes such an expedition as vigff" hyayana . The 
mitra vigrahapi yatra is when the king proceeds against his
enemy accompanied by his allies who have already embroiled the 
enemy and his allies in war. This is also included by Kaufilya 
under vigyhyayanaf It is evident that not only Somesvara* s four 
types of yatra but also Manu's two kinds are indeed different sub- 
types of vlgyhyayana. Somesvara1s differentiation of these kinds 
is, however, significant on account of the particular feature in 
each. Parsnirodha emphasises the stupendous forces of the king
tmmrntm Irnti.mWvtM lim**!* ■     «*•
and simultaneous expeditins both in the rear and in the front; 
bbe mitravigralifii stresses the importance of allies obstructing
A
enemies; the dvand.va,ja indicates the role of policy, and nirvya.1 a,ja 
displays the straightforward character of the expedition.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
2. *Haras., II.xiii.751.
5
..D.Bharma, op.cit.g pp. 74-75? N. S. Bose, History of the Candellas, pp.^ff 
S. II. Mitra, The Marly Rulers of Kha,juraho, pp. 120-24-
•’Manas., XI.XIII.748.
2KA, VII.4.17; of. Df, XVI. 18.
Manas., II.xiii.749.
%A, VII.4.16.
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S an dhay ay an a is when a king marches against the adversary
in front after concluding a treaty or an agreement (sanclhi) with
his rear enemy (parg&igraha), which obviously provides for the
cessation of hostilities between them and binds the rear enemy
not to invade his kingdom while he is engaged in warfare elsewhere.
This kind of expedition thus involves the arrangements for safeguarding
the kingdom at the rear and at the same time strikes at the adversary’s
power, whose potential ally has been weaned away. Somesvara calls
it sandhana.ja because the expedition is created by an alliance with
*■ ****2the rear enemy (pargfllgraha). The rear enemy may be obliged to 
actively cooperate in the expedition under the terms of the compact^ 
as was done,for example,,by Jagaddeva alias Laksijmadeva, the king of
tty *eai xri tk* ^
Malwa on joining with Vikramaditya VI of Kalyani against the Hoysalas
alias, , IX.xiii.747? Ykt., 57.p«7 (the verse seems to be corrupt as 
a comparison with |QJ, XI.5. will show); cf. oukra (tr.) IV.vii.
512-13; ICA.J ¥11.4.18. There is some confusion about this kind of yana 
due to R.P.ICangle’s explanatory remark on Kau^ilya’ s verse referred to 
above, Kangle translates Tsandhaya y ay at1 as ’make peace and march1 
to which he adds M s  remark that ’this is downright duplicity, making 
peace and then attacking the enemy when he is least expecting such 
an attack’» But his remark seems to be unjust because the king does not 
attack M s  rear enemy, but an enemy in the front* — — — --  ■— ----- ~>
 ------- —> Kalman dak a (1X1*5)) and his commentators say that
having allied with the rear enemy the king marches elsewhere (sandhayanyatr) 
ya yatra pargpigrahepa satrupa). In fact the vijigigu concludes an 
alliance with his enemy in the rear, who is the natural ally of his ad­
versary (ari) and marches against the latter. So it is duplicityjin a 
different sense and not as understood by Kang3.e.
^Manas., II0 xiii.747•
■%,Yasdani (ed.), op.cit., vol. I, pp. 560 ff.
» * "     »'"■ * * *  *“*
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or simply to give an undertaking that he would create no troubles
0/TV
in the rear while the ambitious king ..is away on ^ expedition elsewhere as 
perhaps was given by Kumatrapala, the Caulukya king of Gujarat to the 
Cahamana king Vigraharaja IV, as the latter could not have successfully 
led expeditions in Northern India conquering the kingdom of Delhi 
and others unless the former had given an under talcing not to  
creat.e troubles In the rear.
3. Sambhuya yanas when a king{joining forces with powerful 
and sincere samantas (feudatories or kim^s of neighbouring kingdoms 
or both), undertakes an expedition against a common enemy to attain a 
single specified objective, it is called sambhuya yana.2 Normally 
such a contingency arises when the middle or neutral king assumes 
a threatening posture or invades an ally of the vljigigu and thus 
acts as the arbiter of the balance of power in the inter-state 
sphere and the vijigigu finds it necessary to march but is powerless 
to do so without the cooperation of other kings.^ In another situation 
when two neighbours join forces for marching against a common enemy
t AoK. Majumdar, p.109; D. Sharma, op.cit.» pp. 56”59o 
Agni, 240.26;_ RJJ, XX.6; of. KA, VII.4.19-21. .
®Cf. D, VIXX.55-56; IO., VII. 18, 6-10.
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it is also sargbhuya yana, as for example, when Hie confederacy 
of the Cahamana king Arporaja of Sakambhari and Ballala, the king 
of Mai wa, marched. against Caulukya Kumarapala of Gujarat at the 
beginning of ICumarapala’ s reign when Arporaj a is said to have 
invaded Gujarat.**" Another example of such a type of yana is that 
organized by Bhoja Paramara of Malwa against the Calukyas of
«3fi tm.
ICalyapi in alliance with Gangeyadeva, the king of Tripuri and the
 ^ ‘•"1-='
Co|.a king PLajendra I. Paramara king Devapala later organised
another confederacy with the Yadava king Simhapa and the Laja ruler
Samgr amasirpha for a simultaneous invasion of Gujarat about A.D.1228.:'i
The ^ahi king of Punjab, Jayapala, is alleged by Firishta to have
eL
organised^confederacy in A.D.991 against the Ghaznivid ruler 
Subuktagin.’ It is said that Jayapala commanded a huge army which 
consisted of contingents of troops sent to him by kings of Kalinjir,
A
ICanauj and Ajmera when he invaded Ghazni in A.D.991. It is thus 
apparent that the expeditions at the head of confederate forces 
were possible, provided that the neighbouring kings could override their 
political prejudices and dynastic rivalries.
4* The prasanga yana is that kind of expedition which takes 
place when a king, obviously marching against a particular enemy,
1
A .Iv.Kajumdar, op. cit., pp. 104-108; D„ Sharma, op. cit. , pp. 48 ff.
2D.C.Ganguly, op.cit., pp. 92 ff; G. Yazdani, op.cit., I.pp.926 ff.
■^ D. Co Ganguly, op. cit., pp. 215 ff? A.K.Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 150 ff
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afterwards, through some contingency, proceeds against another.
As an example, we may mention the diversion of Bhoja Paramara1s
expedition towards the Oalukyas of Kalyapi, although he lad
originally intended to invade the Caulukya kingdom of Gujarat*
This , according to Merutunga, was affected through the ingenuity
of the crafty Damodara, the agent of Bhima 1 of Gujarat, who was
commissioned to prevent the imminent Paramara invasion.’*'
Upekgayana is when the conqueror, marching against a foe,
has every chance of complete victory but, disregarding itjhe proceeds
2against the latter*s ally.' Prom Kamandaka*s example of Arjuna*s 
vanquishing the Nivatakavacas hut neglecting the fruits of victory 
and destroying the dwellers of the Golden City, it appears that 
this kind of sjoa involves the victor's indifference to the spoils 
of victory. It also implies neglecting the gains from the defeated 
kings as, for example, did Mahmud of Ghazni with his hostile opponents 
of Hajputana during his invasion of Somanath* Another explanation 
of the upekgayana as suggested by M. N» Butt is that the conqueror 
does not consolidate his victory over his adversary but, disregarding 
it, assaults the latter*s allies, who, all the time thinking him to 
be satisfied with the victory obtained, were off their guard.^
4),C.Ganguly, op k cit., p.^j see A.K.Maj umdar, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
2Agni, 24CU7) KN> XI.9- 
XI. 10.
A *WS JSi.' jtt-
ICamandakiya Nitisara, p.155°
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We may refer to Lakgmikarjgia* s (A.D.c*1042-72) expedition against
the Laja country and also the feudatories of the Calukyas of
Kalyay.1L after his military triumph over the Paramaras,^" It may
he remembered in this connexion that Calukya Somesvara I had become
friendly to Jayasimha, the successor of Bhoja when the latter lad
2lost his kingdom to Lakgmikar^a. There were many instances when 
a conqueror passed on to another enemy after victory over the kngdom 
antagonistic to him*, Such diversionary ox* extended expeditions 
were quite common during the course of a digvijaya.
Somesvara1s ^ighraga yatra (hurried expedition) presents 
another side of this indifference, although an opposite one. He 
says that ’when a king leaving aside other mishaps or accidents’ or 
in other words ignoring or disregarding his own shortcomings,
’undertakes a violently sudden expedition for exterminating his enemy,
Adi w  *\
it is called sighraga yatpa,* In fact,this kind of expedition involves 
indifference towards one's own weaknesses for the purpose of conquest 
of the enemy which is its distinctive feature in addition to itJ being 
a sudden march. It apparently appropriates the feature of indifference 
as well as the march after declaring war (vlgyhyayana )^, It further 
suggests a condition of urgency,when the success of an expedition 
depends on the rapidity of attack, and may, therefore, be similar 
to a surprise expedition,
■ C.Ganguly, op. cit. pp. 11 -2!i  ,
2Ibid., p. 1SMh 
^Manas., II.xiii.753•
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5- Kulya yatra. We have already remarked that Kulya yatra seems 
to be an original contribution of Somesvara to the variety of ex­
peditions, although it is by no means novel in view of its main 
distinctive mark, fie says, ’When a king, assisted by the relatives 
of the enemy /such asabrother,&son,agueen or any other scion of the
same dynasty probably a claimant to the throne/ marches against the
— ]
adversary, it is called kulya, which causes terror to the opponent.’
It appears that Somesvara has such expeditions in mind which were
undertaken at the time of either disputed succession or when the
2
enemy’s relations,including ministers,have been won over; as for
example Ariyoraja theShamana king invaded Gujarat at the instigation
and assistance of Bahama or Caha$a, whom Merutunga calls an adopted
son of Jayasigtha Siddharaja* Besides this version of kulya, we may
further state that the aggressors always tried to enlist the services
of the frustrated elements of the enemy’s family because they greatly
4contributed to a military victory', especially during a siege.
Thus /the policy of yana meant the actual march of troops against
the adversary for victory. The different varieties of yana were based
on the particular dominant factor which caused the expedition. The
success of yana depended on the military strength and prosperity of
the
the consolidated kingdom, condition of allies,and regional and seasonalA
Hi an as., II.xiiA.752.
^Cf. £>ukra (tr.) IV.vii.498-500.
3
A.K.Majumdar, op.cit.t pp. 104 ff; D. Sharma, op.cit.g pp. 48 ff. 
4Medh. on Manu, Til.197; NT, XXX.54-56.
1considerations, which affected the supply and strategy.
I). ASANA (Staying quiet or pause: policy of watchful waiting)
Asana is opposed to yana and our authorities suggest that vigraha is
followed either by asana or yana, or both, one after the other, according
to the circumstances. But the term asana, which literally means 1 sitting’
or * sitting down*, has aroused a good deal of controversy among modern
scholars, who have rendere^d it into English in many ways and given
divergent interpretations, which often tend to confuse its meaning and
significance as an instrument of the sixfold policy in inter-state re-
? 5lations. Asana has been rendered as ’halting’," ’neutrality’, ’an
attitude of indifference* pawned and veahj to iniermm ^  ’maintaining a post
6 7against an enemy’, and ’staying quiet’, etc. Its interpretation has been
approached from two points of view; one, that it indicates a certain posi­
tion :in which the vijigigu and his enemyjare equally matched, and the other, 
that asana corresponds to the policy of neutrality, the latter being the
1  ABI. «Ul ttfc * *
"Manas., II. xiii .754. Desakalajg. tat ha mitraift nlmlttiifl balatmanajul Vlcarya 
kurvato nityeug yatra bhavati siddhad'a. RDIClflyp.124 quotes the Matsya, 
240.267y^ e aXss *7.
G.N, Jha’s translation of the Manusmyti with the commentary of 
Medhatithi, vii•160ff.
S^haraas as try, Arth (tr.), vii. 1 & 4. pp. 295? 295? 50 Iff. Yiswnath^, 
op.cit., pp. 183 H,L.Chatterjee, op.cit., pp. 150ff; WA1, pp. 520ff.
^U.N.Ghoshal, op.cit., pp. 94, 159; H.D.S.,XII, p.225.
■^ RDK, In tr o. p. 8 6.
M.H.Dutt, KH. (tr.), p.155 fn.; WAX, p.520. 
R.P.Kangle, KA, (tr.), vii.1.8.
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view of some modern scholars® But these interpretations are 
unsatisfactory® Therefore, in order to express the full impact of 
the term, we need to examine our source materis.1 in detail®
According to Visvarupa 'Non-commencement (of yana) is staying 
quiet (asana)*, which is caused by two factors s the weak condition 
of one's own power, especially of the troops, and the consideration for
2  . , 4-
ally® Medhatithi says, 'Ignoring Q the enemy) is
*7 _
(asana) I n  another context, however, he also says, 'Asana means 
withdrawing (lit® hiding or covering) of oneself',^ apparently 
from a collision with the enemy® The Agni Purana explains that 
'asana consists in the halt of a king(with his army fully mobilised)
5
in his own country after declaring war', thus suggesting that it is 
readiness for attack or a pause in an expedition® Elsewhere, however, 
reproducing Karaandaka, it defines asana as a policy expressing a
condition 'when the vijigisu and the ari are capable of destroying
6 — —
each other1, thereby defining it by the situation when it is
1® On Yain,flI® 3^3 • Anarambhakatvam asanam>.!»!> ®HlV■ ■ I!■ /
mnm+mr*ianvm\ r •tn»n»®«Mliirrin.ia. iwi  ... ..
2® Ibid®
On ^anu i VII® 160* Upeksjyam asanam t 
k . Ibid®, VII® 166® Atmasamvaranam asanam
5° Agni, 23k . 19® Vigrahena svake dese sthitir asanam ucyate®
6® Ibid®, 2AO® 27o Parasparasya samarthyavighatad asanam smrtam,
cf® KN, XI. 12® w f r ^ h , though one Ms. 
agrees with Agni®
^  twaJWwli n nniTi
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appropriate and implying that it is a kind of balance of pokier.
Reproducing Kautilya^Somadeva says, 'Remaining indifferent is
staying quiet (asana)', a definition which is repeated by several
2smrti commentators and other writers on polity„ The commentator of 
the Nitivakyamrta, however, states that when the invader is 
endeavouring to attack, the defensive king should adopt a policy of 
indifference 'tow a rds him and suddenly abandoning his place, withdraw 
to another^irrespective of the fact whether or not he has the power 
to fight him«^ He thus understands asana as a policy of strategic 
withdrawal from one place to another which proceeds from indifference 
to the invasion* In contrast, however, we may adduce the evidence of 
the lexicographer Halayudha who explains asana as a strategic position 
which a vxjigisu adopts for assaulting forts, etc*, which shows thatJ
it is an instrument of aggression* Somesvara . also understands by 
the term asana 'a position of watchful waiting', 'halt of troops', 
'encampment', 'siege' or any strategic pause or position to v/hich an 
invader resorts under varying circumstances before, during, and after
1* NV, xxixo 46* Upeksananr. asanam; cf* KA, VII* 1*8 
2* Kulluka on Manu, VII* 160; Mit* on Ya jn^  I* 347; also 
Ap^ararka; Raj. R*, p* 58*
3c HV, XXIXo 46*
4* Halayudha Sabdakosa (Abhidhana Ratnamala), p» !?8 - Vijigisordurgadin
dharsayatah sthitih* cf* Hariharacaturahga, VI* 85« It is a 
16th "centufPy" v7ork on the military system and inter-state relations 
which was written by GodaVara Misra, a Brahmana protege of the 
King Pratapa Rudradeva of Orissa.. It defines asana as a strategic 
position enabling the vijigisxr to triumph over his enemy (sthanam 
satru-jayartham t a jetsanamjlhocyate); see also Sukra, IV* 7 * ^ rfT P  
sV-araksanaWsat runas o bhavet sthanat tadlasanam; cf* also
11 11 ■ in n Tin T n ~--------------- mi'fti irrr imi nwnn minnnm L—r 11 ~l................ ..
Bhasakautallyam commentary on KA, VII* 4* 13° cited by Kangie*
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1an invasion-
It is evident from the preceding statements that the essence of 
the policy of asana is said to be indifference against the enemy, 
which leads to maintaining a particular politico-military position 
against him by an intending conqueror or any other kingo A recourse 
to asana brings to a stand-still active military operations such as 
the mobilisation of troops to the enemy frontier, the expedition 
already commenced, and even the fighting itself because of either the 
enemy shutting himself up in a fort or the aggressor’s tactical 
withdrawal of troops from a challenging posture to that of discrete 
manipulation through policy^ while apparently maintaining his position 
of hostility and possible armed encounter- However, the attitude of 
indifference and the resultant military position are evidently a 
matter of stra.tegy and tactics rather than a change in the nature of 
the policy leading to peace- It is thus possible to remark that 
asana does not strictly profess to serve as an instrument of either 
peace or actual warfare, but certainly a measure involving the 
cessation of hostilities and a means to gain respite without incurring 
any major loss in prestige and property on this account» It is a 
policy which seeks to retain the politico-military status quo between 
the belligerents in which neither side • suffers directly but both are 
restrained from moving towards the cataclysm of mutual destruction.*
It must not, however, be forgotten that asana primarily expresses the 
relationship at a certain stage in the belligerency between rivals and
Manas„^ lla XIV- 930ff-
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is not concerned with kings standing aloof from conflict - Further,it 
also conveys the sense of a. unilateral decision and action in the 
face of hostility- It is thus evident that the policy of asana 
operates on the base of enjmity and the indifference or inactivity 
that attends it is,in fact,treated as an expedient- Because 
hostilities persist the maintenance of a militarily deterrent position 
against the enemy becomes indispensable-
In order to realize the full import of the term asana we have to 
regard it as an instrument of policy comprising two elementss an 
attitude of indifference and a measure for maintaining a strategic 
position against the enemy- While these two constituents of asana 
are distinguishable,they are by no means separable- In actual 
application, however, strategic position generally assumes predominance 
over the attitude of indifference involving military inactivity in 
face of hostility- In a situation which requires a temporary cessation 
of fighting and not the abandonment of hostility indifference is a 
misleading equivalent for asana- Indifference (upeksana) as an 
elucidation of asana in our authorities appears to be rather a 
misnomer in many cases because it is precisely applicable to under­
taking an expedition or actual fighting and not to the enemy in
_ 1
general; for discussing asana Medhatithi and Hemacandra urge the
pacification of the enemy by the upayas which involes diplomatic 
intercourse with the enemy rather than indifference towards him-
On Manu, VII- 172; Hfr. II; 12-
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Whatever the purpose of asana, be it the promotion of one's undertakings
and causing simultaneous deterioration of those of the enemy or only
the recuperation of the suddenly weakened strength, it cannot be
fulfilled without the acquiescence of the enemy, who has been engaged
in, or is about to commence hostilities* Except in situations preceding
the invasion into the enemy's territory, a king’s 'indifference1 is
meaninglesss Since Kautilya is concerned with asana as an alternative
to yana, he is successful in balancing its two constituents, viz*,the 
(xftthule. of indifference and. th-e strategic
position, in which he is greatly helped by his constant theme being
the advancement of a king's powers mainly through the completion of
his economic and defensive undertakings* But the later authors such
as Kamandaka, commentators of smrtis, Bhoja and Somesvara,
who extended the meaning of asana and the scope of its application
succumbed to the realities of the situations and largely considered
asana as an expedient with a pronounced emphasis on a strategic
position, militarily feasible and temporarily profitable* Except such
I ~~ d.situations where upeksarysana, pritysana, or svasthasana is possible 
the element of indifference is a feature of asana gets lost and asana 
gradually becomes identical with a strategic position that awaits the 
fulfilment of a certain specific objective of short term duration or 
an increase of military and financial strength through recuperation or 
reorganisation of forces and change of tactics* It may be pointed out
1* of. KA, VII. 1. 22, VII* *f. kit*
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that asana if applied to an attempt at averting a mutual disaster
normally before an invasion implies a balance beti^een an attitude of
indifference and a position of armed intervention; when addressed to
the advanced stage of belligerency after expedition it means either a
pause or withdrawal of troops even after an inconclusive battle* when
incidental upon sudden losses in might during warfare it leads to a
truce or armistice but not to peace* However,, whether or not an
attitude of indifference is present, asana in all cases corresponds to 
o£
a positionAwatchful waiting and involves a pause in hostilities- 
Factors and circumstances connected with asana
The factors which obliged one of the belligerents, especially the
(M
vijigisu, to take recourse to asana vary from parity of strength to
11 V T-"
sudden weakness due to military, financial, even strategical and 
topographical handicaps- Repeating Kautilya0Somadeva says: (,(when a 
king thinks),^The enemy is not able to do me harm, nor I him,^ he
should stay quiet perceiving his good (i.e* his safety and the
2 . -
advancement of power) in the long run o'1 Reproducing Kamandaka ,the
Agni Purana states that a king should resort to asana when he and his
3
enemy are capable of ruining each other- It is apparent that the
1- As an example, we may refer to the strategic withdrawal of the 
Candella king Vidyadhara in the darkness of night after a day­
long inconclusive battle with Mahmud of Ghazni in AID, 1019° It 
was not a flight nor abandonment of hostility,but a change from 
attack to defensive position- See for details, H« C- Ray, op-cit-, 
II, ppo 690-9^°
2- NV, XXIX- 92; KA, VII- 1* 19°
9- Agni, 2^0- 27; KN, XI. 12-
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equal power of the rivals for mutual destruction induces indifference 
towards each other and imposes inactivity as far as the ensuing military 
operations are concerned® However, Somadeva adds the prospect of 
improvement of one's own power in the long run when the king would be 
able to overreach his enemy® He has, however, omitted detailed 
explanations given in the Arthasastra how the policy of asana following 
that of vigraha can produce future benefits® But it is clear that it 
is not only the inability to do any harm on account of equal power or 
the terror of mutual destruction but also the prospect of eventual 
superiority vis-a-vis the enemy that determines a recourse to asana®
/  (A
Visvarupa on Yajnavalkya and the commentators on Manu, however,
prescribe a recourse to asana mainly on the crippling of a king's
might - soldiers, elephants, horses, military equipment etc® - and the
inadequacy of funds (kosa) suddenly caused by chance (daiva) or his own
#
2
imprudence® Further, the weakness of a king's ally on account of which
he does not find it safe to rise against the king's enemy also forces
3the king to adopt the policy of asana® Bhoja and Hemacandra also 
recommend asana when a king has become weak in military strength on 
account of fighting with the rival or loss of superiority acquired in
k -previous encounters® The policy of asana is implemented by effecting
1® See KA, VII® 1® 22, 3 ^  VII® k* 1-13° where Kaaatilya discusses how 
a king can utilize the interval between vigraha and yana by 
adopting a policy of asana in order to promote his power and cause 
strain to the enemysresources by various measures®
2. On Manu, VII. 166, 172; On YajnS) I, 3l+3- (Mit. I, 3^7-)
>u n w «i — .if, I niBvrir
3 - Ibid.
k . Ykt„. 87. p. 13; H  n . II. 12.
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a pause in one’s own hostile activities or military operations and 
quietly pacifying one’s enemy by conciliation ’consisting in peaceful 
overtures and gifts’- A king is thus able to effect his withdrawal 
from war. It is noteworthy that this situation is radically different 
from that described/by Somadeva and the Agni Purana because it is 
characterised neither by mutual parity of strength of the belligerents 
nor by an attitude of indifference to the enemy„ Although Medhatithi 
says that the king should ignore the * enemy *, he clearly means ignoring
Io.tter
battle and not the enemy himself asthe/vhas to be pacified by overtures
of peace leading to some sort of truce which is made feasible by the
successful employment of conciliation, gifts, and even sowing
dissension which involve diplomatic contact, not indifference- It is
not merely the fear of mutual ruin which induces the opponent to
adopt reciprocal measures in order to bring about a temporary cessation
of active hostilities, but a kind of truce or understanding quietly
reached through diplomatic means- The initiative for asana is taken
by a king, who realizes his sudden military weakness, although he may
2be otherwise prosperous* While adopting the policy of asana, he 
however, does not renounce hostilities but merely suspends active 
military operations- Asana thus emerges as a policy leading to passive 
confrontation, which implies an indifference to battle but signifies a 
wait-and-watch policy because the truce or understanding with the enemy
1. Medh- on Manu, VII. 172; H ft T II- 12-
2- Medh- on Manu, VII-
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neither provides for peace based on treaty (sandhi) nor involves the
repudiation of the state of war (vigraha)D
Bhoja further enumerates three more factors for taking recourse to
asanas causing the seizure of the enemy through someone else,
apprehension of invasion from the middle or neutral king (madhyama or
udasina), and a desire to create amity with others, i\rhich, as we shall
1 /
see later, produce different kinds of asana * Somesvara takes into
account as many as ten factors such as the destruction of the enemy
circle, natural calamities suffered by the enemy, siege strategy,
seasonal obstruction of the highway, fascination for a pleasant site
after military victory, need for encampment near the enemyrs kingdom,
who is to be invaded, great distance of one!s own capital from the
occupied kingdom, allurements promised by the enemy, and dependence on
another^ which produce ten kinds of asana.> Some of these factors
simply imply a halt of troops or taking up a strategic position, while
a
a few indicate a change in politico-military strategy emnatxng from a 
policy of watchful waitingo
The motives behind the policy of asana are largely self-preservation, 
promotion of one!s power and the maintenance of the politico-military 
status quo without prejudice to hostility*. The main concern is to ward 
off an imminent danger or to put off a crucial moment mainly because of 
the indecisive balance of power* .. In some cases, it is a
1. Ykt ,T 86-89, pp° 12-13'*
2*. Manas,., . II. XIV. 930ff„
369
protective measure, in others a deterrent, and yet in several others, 
asana serves as an instrument of self-aggrandisement against the enemy•
It thus serves the temporary requirements of belligerency and also 
preserves the King, who adopts it, from a further deterioration of 
his position«
Kinds of Asana
The commentators on Manu describe two types of asanas one resorted
to by the king because of his own weakness in army and loss of
treasury, and the other out of consideration for his ally’s reduced
powero Thus,recourse to asana in the former case is in the king’s
self-interest and the decision is independent, but in case of the
latter, it is dependent on the ally, who requests the king to pause
because he apprehends peril from the enemy, if he rose against him while
in a precarious condition.^ In both cases, however, asana indicates
a stage in belligerency after declaring war, and therefore these may
be regarded as sub-types of the vigrhyasana (staying quiet after
declaring war) as understood by Kaiatilya, Kamandaka and the others.
Reproducing Kamandaka, the author of the Agni Purana mentions
$
five kinds of asanas
1C On Manu, VII. 166; KDK, XIII, pp. 112-113* quotes Manu 
See also Visvarupa on Yajn0., I. 3^3*
Zo Ibid.
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(1) Viguhyasana (staying quiet after declaring or making war)
ft
^  ^audhayasana (staying quiet after making truce with the enemy)
(3) Sainbhu^yasana (staying quiet after organising a confederacy)
(W Prasahgasana (staying quiet incidental upon a - contingency)
5^) Upeksasana (staying quiet 011 account of an attitude of indifference
* to the hostile acts of the stronger aggressor)
Bhoja repeats only the first three of these types but adds a fourth
called ffrityasana, which he considers to be the best of all.^
Somesvara, however, makes an exhaustive study of the different kinds of
asana and details as many as ten varieties; svasthasana, upeksasana,
W  «  ,n r ■ «  n r - - . - *
margarodhasana, durgasadhyasana, rastrasvikaranasana, ramaniyasana, - f"“ — 1 ”
nikatasaim, duram&rgasana, pralobhasana, and paradhinasana. While it
- w — j- - « i ■“  «-r - - i - * -r r - r  «--i
is possible to group Somesvara’s dur gasadhyasana, and nikatasana 
under vigrhyasana, and to connect his svasthasana with Bhojafs 
prityasana, the others are different from the known categories.
Vigrhyasana
Kamandaka says, ’MJhen both the ari and the vijigisu endeavour to
* “
overpower the other (by thwarting each other’s plan of operation in war),
A
this is called vigrhyasana.* This definition implies that both
P
1. Affni, 2 k 0 ,  28; KN, XI. 13-22.
2 . Ykt., 86-8 9 , p. 1 2 ; KH, XI. 13, 16, 18.
3 . Minas,.II, XIV, 930-31.
k . KN, XI. 13.
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cL
observe^pause in their large scale military operations by taking up a
strategic position and engage themselves in such political moves and
military manoeuvres which enable one of them to over^run the other®
Kamandaka describes under the vigrh?};&isana a king's position on
*
1besieging his foe in a stronghold, which is also precisely the
meaning of Somesvara's durgasadhyasana (staying quiet or pause by
2 •—laying siege for the capture of the fort)® Asana for the capture of 
a fort involves a sort of land blockade of the area around the fort in 
order to cut off the enenuys supplies of food, fodder* etc. and prevent 
any reinforcements reaching the beleagured from the oiitside*^ While 
the besieger tightens his hold on the besieged, he has to wait until 
the garrisons stirrender or sally forth when they have run out of 
essential commodities or he himself is able to storm the fort*., Asana 
in this case is thus identical with siege which creates a pause in 
regular fighting on any large scale and involves a policy of waiting 
for overcoming the enemy® Such kinds of asana were familiar in an 
age when fortifications dominated defence in many parts of India® We 
may allude to Mahmud’s siege of Kalinjara in A®D® 1022 and Prthviraja 
Ill’s siege of Bhatinda to illustrate the durgasadhyasana® ^ 'rniim i in w " W i
Other subtypes of the vigrhyasana mentioned by Bhoja are that 
which occur when a king stays quiet after having the enemy seized
1 « Ibid®, XI' t, 13-1^®
2. Manas,, II. XIV. 937; of also ; Sukra (tr), IV. ?. 568-73.
3. Manas,, II. XIV. 937; KN» XI* see also JayaBiangala
commentary®
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through some one else or when he remains at his place after declaring
1 -
war with the enemy* In both circumstances asana indicates a pause in
direct hostilities* In the former case, however, the pause and the
) vz
policy of waiting are doe to the fact that the object''of hostility is
sought to be accomplished possibly by allies and no need is felt for
direct intervention, but in the latter case recourse to asana is taken
due to the 'King's own calculations of advantages and disadvantages*
/ —Somesvara's nikatasana means a king's encamping near the kingdom of
*
x
a distant enemy whom he wants to fight, which merely indicates that 
asana is a military halt for the purpose of finalising the actual plan 
of operations, while awaiting the opponent's political and military 
moves*
It is evident that these sub-types of the vigrhyasana do not 
precisely indicate a policy of neutrality or an attitude of indifference, 
although they imply an absence of fighting on any significant scale*
On the contrary, these suggest that asana implied a temporary 
cASscJrio'n, of military expedition, or halt of troops due to the 
strategic consideration or change in the nature of fighting, or a 
mere lull before the storm* In all aspects of vigrhyasana, it is a 
question of military strategy and tactics and an adjustment of 
political expedients to the needs of situations* These in a way express 
the policy decision as well, for a king may return after the victory
1 * Ykt*, 86* p* 12*
2* Manas „ ? II* XIV* 9^°
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in a few engagements with the enemy and disdain besieging him in the
fort since it involves tiresome tactics, long waiting and much hardship®
Recourse to asana by rival kings after declaring war or undertaking
an expedition was not, however, unusual during our period* Inter-
dynastic relations suggest that every king endeavoured to maintain a
watchful position against his enemy during a state of vigraha and
the outbreak of hostilities did not always immediately lead to battle
as may be inferred from the CaolLukya king Bhima ITs relations with the
Paramara Bhoja when he had to wait for a favourable balance of power
in order to avenge the wrongs done by the latter during his absence
1
on expedition in Sindh*
Sandhayasana
Reproducing Kamandaka, Bhoja says, !When the enemy and the
vijigisu both being weakened in v/ar stop it by concluding an agreement 
»*”
(that is, by agreeing on a truce or an armistice), it is called 
.2 This kind of asana also retains hostility while 
providing for the end of war, which, however, does not inaugurate 
peace but affords an interval for the recuperation of strength that 
may again cause a flare up at an opportune moment*
JL‘(V
Ao Ko Majbmdar, op* cit*, p* (53,
2o Ykto, 87* p0 12;cf.KN, XI* 16* jSee also M* N* Butt's translation, 
Anyaisjca vijiglsosfca vigrahe hiyamanayoh | San dhay a yadjavasthanam 
sandljya'sanamucyate^Kamandaka has aresjca * in place of anyaisca » '
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When apprehending hostility in the neutral king (udasina), the
middle king (madhyama) or one equal to them, the vi.jigisu united with
*
his confederates waits, mustering up all his forces for invasion
from any one of them, it is called sambhuyasana0  ^ Asana in this case
*
is a policy of waiting for an encounter after having made arrangements
for a united front with other kings including onefs enemy or enemies®
The policy of sambhuyasana further involves taking up a strategic
position of military preparedness against the aggressor by collecting
together one*s own forces and those of confederate princes® It implies
suspension of hostilities by the vi.jigisu against his enemy (ari)
*
or enemies in order that he may be able not only to muster up all his
forces by reducing tension on other fronts, but also to secureAlatterfs
active or even passive help in an emergency created by the apprehended
invasion from the neutral or middle kings, either of whom^according to
the concept of mandala, is superior in power to the viiigisu disunited
» • *
from or at war with his enemy (ari) ® It has been already pointed out 
that Kamandaka and others advise the vi.jigisu to form a confederacy
t
of kings to oppose an aggressive neutral or middle king, and
seems to be related to this kind of situation® Sambhuyasana
iuy%ana (confederate expedition),is really an alternative to
YktajL 87® p® 12 -
lldasine madhyame va samane pratisanKayag HiKipnuya 
sambhuyis^nam^i^'ate f^f cf® KW, XI® 18-195 also the
an<T™Bib!lJoth£ca commentaries® K&mandaka, however, reads
1»® ® madhyame ca samanajpratisankaya®}
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which, as already noted, requires the vijigisu to march after joining
*
forces with his samantas (neighbouring kings or feudatories or both) in
order to subdue a common ene^ ray- Kamandaka suggests that sambhuyasana
— r
is also appropriate in the circumstances when the common foe (that is
the neutral or the middle king) wants to destroy both the vijigisu and
*
his enemy, who should therefore form a confederacy dxcordiii^ fa the. rule of
union (samgha-dhartna) in order to defeat the invader» Theoretically
the united front is possible because the aggressiveness of the
middle or neutral king presents a threat to the whole circle of kings
(mandala) and the vijigisu may be able to rouse common fear0 It 
/ » ™ *
seems, however, that during our period sambhuyasana indicated a policy
t
of waiting against a powerful aggressor, which required the king 
adopting it to arrange for a united front by mustering up all his 
samantas (feudatory or tributary kings) and by ceasing hostilities 
with his neighbouring kings (also called samanta), some of whom might 
be persuaded to join together in the spirit of union against a common 
foe* We may refer to the Cahamana king Prthviraja IIIfs policy towards 
Muhammad Ghori in AoD* 1190-9^ in order vaguely to illustrate
■» — 2 T - .
sambhuyasanao When threatened with the Muslim invasion Prthviraja III
<p
seems to have taken recourse to something like sambhuyasana, which 
enabled him to muster up a huge force consisting of many samantas
1. KN, XI. 19, VIII. 56o
Do Sharma, opa cit«,, pp* 77ff •
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united with whom he awaited Muhammad Ghori at the field of Tarain®
We do not know whether his neighbouring enemy kings, Jayacandra of
Kanauj and Bhima IX of Gujarat, rendered him any assistance on this
occasion;but it seems certain that neither of them distracted
Prthvlrajafs attempt to present a united front, though limited to his
own s^mantas, which enabled the Cahamanas to defeat Muhammad Ghori in
1191* But when passive confrontation between Prthviraja III and
Jayacandra was ignited by the abduction of Jayacandrafs daughter
Samyogita from her svayamvara at Kanauj by Prthviraja late in 1191 or
early in 1192, the Cahamana king had probably to fight on two fronts
-  2when Muhammad Ghori again invaded his kingdom In 1192® This shows
that the s amb huyas ana has its own limitations and can be realised 
/
only if the king adopting it is able to cease hostilities with his
neighbouring kings (samantas) and unite., together all his resources®
Sambhuyasana is a defensive policy and is made feasible through a 
»
confederacy of princes® It is alleged by Firishta that the Sahi king
Anandapala organised a confederacy in A„D® 1008-9 in order to oppose 
- 3 «
Mahmud of Ghazni® Anandapalafs policy on this occasion seems to be 
similar to the sambhuyasana® It ^Koweverlseems that the chances for
*D '— ^ ______
1® Firishta (TF*, I, p0 179°) mentions one hundred and fifty rulers
(Eai i.eB s'aidant as) who fought under Prthviraja III against
Mohammad Ghoio.T"Hs ee also D* Sharma, op® cit®, p® 213»
2® The Struggle for Empire, p® 112®
3® Jo Briggs, Tarikh-i-Firlshta (tr®), vol® I® p® A-6®
adopting the policy of sambhuyasana during our period were few and far
between, because of inter-dynastic rivalry and personal enmity, as well
as the narrow political outlook which militated against a confederate
position and action® The united front which is essential for the
sambhuyasana, was generally limited to onefs own feudatories or 
*
tributaries (samantas)■> It is possible to attribute the failure to
appreciate the merits of sambhuyasana to the confused character of
aggressors, who could seldom be represented as a common foe by partaking
the characteristics of a neutral or middle king nor their aggressive
-their- vicfcifp
designs be interpreted by^as a threat to other neighbouring kings as 
w ell«
Kamandaka says, *When a king desirous of going to a certain 
place (or person) halts through some contingency or other at a place
different from where he intended to go at first, it is called
** 1 .
prasahgasana by those well-versed in the science of polity® This
kind of asana appears to be related to a military halt during the 
course of marching, which, however, may be caused by some contingency 
such as topographical and seasonal obstacles^ the politico-military
or th
attitude of an intervening king,Aunexpected fall of an ally before 
joining him etc®
UpekSasana
l(amandaka writes, *The apparently Indifferent attitude of a 
KN, XLo 20® See also M® N® Buttes translation p« 1^8®
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king before an enemy more powerful than himself is called staying
I
quiet owing to indifference.1 His two illustrations, namely the 
attitude of Indra when Kr^sna carried away the farijata flowers from his
gardens, and Kukmafs inactivity when Kr^jsna abducted his sister
.2 ✓
Rukmini suggest that two factors especially favour upeksasana:
greater power of the aggressor who intends to cause slight injury and
a certain specific reason or secret motive. As an example,we may refer
to the policy and position adopted by the Candella king Madanavarman
when faced with an invasion of„ his kingdom by Caulukya Jayasimha
Siddharaja. The aggressor in this instance did not aim at the
■WcMrted
subjugation of the Candella king but merely to put an end to the 
latter*s claim on the Paramara kingdom of Malwa^which he had conquered. 
Knowing the objective of the invader Madanavarman initially ignored
3
him and is alleged to have later befriended him without giving battle, 
The Gujarat chroniclers exaggerate the course and consequence of the 
rivalry^ but the above conclusion is unavoidable on the sifting of
1o Ibid., XX. 21.
2. Ibid., XI. 21-22.
3o A. K. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 76-77 esp. the account of
Jayasimhars relations with Madanavarman as given by Jina 
Mandana.
the related accounts and the events that followed* It may be remarked
en passant that upeksasana serves defensive requirements and suggests
that when material losses in battle are greater and the loss without
doing it negligible, as ana is the best policy..
Quite contrary to Kaman'T daka's explanation of upeksasana,
Somesvara says, *¥hen that which one king seeks to accomplish (by
expedition against the enemy, that is,the latterTs destruction) is
being done by Fate (daiva), through the employment of severe punishment,
calamities, (orvenemy*s vices), unseen acts, famine, epidemic, which
would cause certain destruction of the enemy, the king stays quiet
~ 1
ignoring the enemy suffering from calamities, it is called upeksasana**
It is evident that Somesvara explains upeksasana by reference to 
the policy of an aggressive king towards his declining enemy* He 
ignores the enemy because the latter is being destroyed by his own 
vices or by natural calamities* He,however, maintains a position of 
military preparedness against him' since the state of war persists* But 
he refrains from invasion because the objective of destroying the 
enemy is being accomplished without fighting, and there are chances 
that when the enemy would have been considerably weakened in 
consequence of calamities he might submit of his own accord or be 
easily vanquished* Moreover, it was against the heroic ideals to 
invade a king In extreme distress. Furthermore, Somesvara forbids
a king to march against a kingdom struck down with drought, famine, and
1 * Manas fl 7II * XIV„ 93^-35-
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pestilence probably in view of the hardships and contagion to which 
even the invading troops would be exposed*
It is evident that while approaching the explanation of upeksasana 
from different standpoints, both Kamandaka and JSomesvara agree 
that the result of this measure of policy is the absence of armed 
encounter3 whether owing to defensive motives or to politic calculations 
that serve offensive designs* With Kamandaka it is ignoring the 
aggressor*s intrusion because of his greater power and with Somesvara 
it is refraining from invasion because the enemy is himself being 
hopelessly weakened* In each case, however, upeksasana involves a 
policy of prudent waiting presumably with military preparedness until 
further political and military developments*
Prityasana
According to Bhoja prityasana is that which creates amity with
all and Is the characteristic quality of onefs state- This is the best 
2of all asanas. It is not very clear what the author really wants 
to convey, and .whether or not prityasana has any direct relation to 
war* Perhaps he means it as a policy of friendliness and no war 
together with the maintenance of a position of effective resistance 
shoixld any other king attack the kingdom of the person observing 
prityasana* If prityasana is to be understood as a policy that 
follows vigraha, in that case it means suspension of hostilities 
and creation of amity with the rival, which brings peace* It is striking
1( Manas„, II XIV, 928*
2* Ykt*, 89* p. 13 o Sarvesam pritijananara nijarastrasya laksanamJ 
Etat prityasanam nama sarvasana mahattaramJl
that prityasana is not said to involve sandhi (treaty or compact) ,
although it creates goodwill among rivalsQ It seems to be a policy of
peace, which is different from sandhi involving comp.romise or settlement,
and the king pursuing it is able to avoid war by creating amity and
good-will among the enemies despite their j>olicy to start hostilities»
Since prityasana is described as the mark (laksana) of oneTs kingdom,
it envisages a general policy of peace in the fullest sense of the
term, which is conducive to the kingfs own interests as well as to
inter-state accord«,
Somesvarafs svasthasana, which means 1staying quiet when the
kingdom is free from dangers (lit. thorns) and the enemy circle is
destroyed,f^  seems to be somewhat associated with prityasana as it
also indicates a policy of self-abiding,though made feasible by the
presence of internal security and the absence of war with enemies« It
seems to have characterized relations of a powerful king who had
consolidated his power in his own kingdom and subdued his external
enemies, as for example, the relations of the Cawiukya king
Jayasimha Siddharaja with his neighbouring kings after his conquest 
_ *.o,
of Malwa in about 1138 and the settlement of conflict with the Candella
A
king Madanavarman. This may be said to correspond to svasthasana. 
Similarly his successor Kumarapala's policy after his war with 
Kohkana may be described as svasthasana. It may be added that this 
self-abiding policy could not be pursued without maintaining a watchful
1 o Manas, II. XIV® 933=*
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position of military preparedness, which is one of the main 
characteristics of asana in general-
M M M
However, svasthasana is different from prityasana as it implies 
a rather negative approach to hostile relations in contrast to the 
positivd character of the latter suggested by its quality of creating 
amity and accord with all kings, especially enemies., Svasthasana marks 
a pause in the policy of self-aggrandizement at the expense of enemies 
on the achievement of sufficient success in ensuring internal
tm  mm
solidarity and external supremacy over enemies, but prityasana implies 
good neighbourly relations, and while it may assume internal security 
of the kingdom, it does not necessarily indicate any superiority over
enemies in external relations-
/ “ *■*Among Somesvarals ten kinds of asanas we have already discussed
the svasthasana, the durgasadhyasana, nikatasana, and upeksasana- We
§ f
will now explain the remaining types- 
Margarodhasana
Somesvara says, fIf the march (of troops) is obstructed by the
river in spate and the king halts at that place, it is called staying
1quiet on account of the obstruction in the way-1 This is clearly a 
halting or stoppage necessitated by natural barriers-
1- M a n a s II, XIV- 936*
Has trasvikaranas ana
• t i
Having aquired a country by force,, when a king stays there for 
the consolidation of his rule, this is called staying quiet for 
annexing a country. Victory on the field of battle entitles a victor 
to rule over a country,.but the conqueror needs the temporary occupation 
of the vanquished kingdom to finalise its political settlement, to 
approve laws and customs of the land, to confirm grants and other 
arrangements of the vanquished king, and to introduce necessary 
political, fiscal and even religious measures that may ingratiate 
him to his new subjects. This kind of temporary stay is in no way 
connected with any attitude of indifference, on the contrary jit is 
taking up a position of power and authority in an occupied kingdom for 
the purpose of reducing it to lasting subjection. During our periods 
victors are known to have temporarily stayed in the occupied, kingdom 
for the purpose of celebrating their victory and annexing the territory. 
They sometimes appointed a governor in charge of the administration and
defence of the country or divided it among several feudatories, who
2
extended their rule over those areas. Thus,the arrangements for 
annexing a territory or kingdom required the victor to stay temporarily 
in the occupied kingdom/for it also helped the consolidation of his 
authority since his awe and majesty could easily evoke loyalty from the
1” :K>U.,H;Xjy..938, 2. See above. , p. 27! ,
e.g. Jayasimha Siddharaja appointed Mahadeva as his governor 
in Malwa in'A.Do 113$; see A. K. Majtemdara, op. cit», p„ 76;
3
hostile subjects and discourage any further resistance®
Ramaniyasana
’Having marched against the enemy and killed him in the battle, 
when a king seeing the pleasant surroundings stays (encamps) together 
with his followers at a place full of corn, water, fuel, and fodder,
T - 1this is called ramaniyasana®’ This is simply a halt probably on -bh&
way back home from a successful expedition, which the victor makes in 
order to remove fatigue and indulge in camp revelries®
Puram&rgas ana
’Having gone to a distant (enemy) country and having fully
accomplished, his business, when a king, realizing that his own capital
is far away, stays there unperplexed during the rainy season until the
advent of sarad (October - November), that halting at a proper place
-  2far away is called duramargasana»’ This is again a temporary stay 
together with the army probably in the enemy kingdom or at the
3capital of a submissive king®
1. Manas, II- XIV® 939-*K).
2® Manas, II® 9^ +2-A3 °
At
3® ^»g® the stay of the Rastral^uta emperor Govinda III at
Sribhavana, the capital of Sarva, a Vindhya chief, during the 
rainy season,, w h i le  he was returning from his successful 
Northern Indian campaign® See, A® S® Altaker,
TbeRastrakutas and their Times, (Poona, 193^)® PP° 67-68®*» r
Pralobhasana
’When the king stops there, tempted by the inducements of another 
ruler, who asks; ’Stay a while, I will give you elephants, horses, 
wealth, jewels, a fort and territory after killing my enemy,* this is 
called pralobhasana® ’When another ruler allures the king to stay by
ghj—  ,ui> i m m w m b i h p i u p nBii.»tn «
promising him gifts within a month, a fortnight, ten days or five days 
and the king bearing that hope awaits for a long time, this is called 
pralobhasana®’^  It appears that in this kind of asana the alluring 
promises are made by a ruler who has submitted to a treaty providing 
for the yielding of treasury and territory® It may again be presumed 
to correspond to the position of an invader, who has halted with his 
troops at a strategic place and demanded treasury, beasts of burden, and 
even territory from the enemy, who is engaged in a war with another 
foe® The aggrieved ruler in his predicament promises to pay rich 
gifts and puts off the invasion by requesting the Invader to stay quiet 
for some time® In both cases, asana involves inactivity and the 
maintenance of a post against the enemy on the part of the king who 
stays quiet in view of the tempting offers®
Paradhinasana
When a king stays at some place because he cannot go to his own 
country owing to either affection or hostility (of another ruler), this 
is called paradhinasana or staying quiet owing to dependence upon
ir-— rir— i ■-----—
Manas, IX, XIV. 9¥t-*f7.
1
another. Such situations, when the king is immobilised or stranded,
may arise after the occupation of a hostile kingdom where the king
has installed one of his relatives or proteges for whose stability he
has to stay for some time, and also when he apprehends hostility from
the vanquished if he quits his kingdom without crushing his sinews 
2
of power* This kin^ d of asana emphasises the stranded position of a
king with his troops in a foreign country and his policy to stay on
owing to factors which he is unable to overcome otherwise*,
Having discussed asana at length we now propose to examine the
contention of those scholars who interpret it as a policy of neutrality,
We have, however, to remember that neutrality as a concept of
international relations is of relatively recent origin* Neutrality
3
means fa neutral attitude between contending parties or powers1, or 
•the condition of a state which abstains from taking part in a dispute 
between two other states*1 As a modern concept> neutrality is a legal
1X0 XIVo 9^3*
2o As an illustration of such a situation we may refer to the position
of the Calukya Vikramaditya VI, while he was still a prince, In
the Cola kingdom, where he had to secure the throne for his brother-
in-law Adhirajendra* He stayed there for about a month in order
to suppress rebellion against the new king* His departure from the
Cola capital for his seat of power on the TuAgabhadra must have
been delayed by his affection for Adhirajendra, and when it
occurred the popular uprising swallowed the new Cola king within a
few weeks * Although this asana was not ultimately successful,
the fact that Vikramaditya stayed owing to his concern for
Adhirajendra is relevant to one purpose* See Vikamankadevacarita,
VII, 5-25; G. Ya'adani, opo cit», I* p. 550; K. A* N«
Sastri, Colas, I, pp. 352ff. 
d k &w *
3* English Dictionary on Historical Principle.s, (Oxford, 1908) ,
A Vo’io vi* p* no*
h-0 Encyclopaedia Britannica, (19^) Vol. XIX, p. h b 'i.
position of a state which intends to remain neutral from war between
two states or groups of states while maintaining certain rights towards
1belligerents and observing certain duties prescribed by customary law*
Oppenheim states: 'Neutrality may be defined as the attitiide of
impartiality adopted by third states towards belligerents and
recognised by belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties
2
between the impartial states and belligerents»1 In view of these 
definitions we have to examine how far the policy of asana squares 
with the concept of neutrality..
So Vo Viswanatha. and, following him, H. L. Chatterjee begin with
the premise that asana is neutrality because our authorities equate
3it with upeksananio H„ Lo Chatterjee claims to addtice a new piece of
evidence from the Kulluka's commentary on Manu, for, he says
•Kullukabhatta uses the term 'nairapeksya1 (impartiality) to
explain the term asana o' This is, however, due to a complete
misunderstanding of the text, because kulluka does not use the
word nairapeksya to clarify the meaning of asana in the context at all.
What Kulluka really means by it in the original line is that sandhi, etc®
5are independently explained later on* Thus H. L. Chatterjee imputes a
1o Co Go Fenwick, International Law (2nd ed°), ch.. 32° PP° 530ff°
2. International Law, ( . ed) Vol. II. pp.
3° Op. cit., p. ; op. cito, p. 130
k e  Op. cit., p. 130°
5. Kulluka on Manu, VII. 161 ~ Asanam iti 1 ^hich is his shorthand
way of referring to the entire verse of Manu, wherein all six
gunas are mentioned (not only asana), before proceeding to his 
comments/ Sandhyadigunanam naiTH^el^yenanusthanam-
&nantaramuktam tadu'cltlnusth^&r^yamarambhah
meaning to asana on the strength of an interpretation of the Kullukafs 
commentary which is absolutely wrong- He further quotes Ksirasvamin, 
a commentator of the Amarakosa, who writes, asanam vigrahadinivrttih,$ tiy #
v/hich Chatterjee translates as 'abstention from war is neutrality-T 
It may^ however, be translated as 1 asana (a pause) is cessation of 
fighting etc - 1 Even Ksirasvaminfs explanation does not refer to asana 
being a policy of a king towards belligerents; on the contrary it is 
a policy of one of the belligerents that brings about the cessation of 
fighting etc- We are thus finally left with the laconic definition: 
upeksanam asanam- Can this mean neutrality?
Our discussion of asana has shown that while indifference to war 
is an attribute of asana, indifference (upeksana) really denotes
—  I  ^ it P
waiting patiently in a state of war (vigraha) until one’s own power 
becomes superior to that of the adversary, who Is equal when recourse 
to asana is taken- Further, indifference is in fact an expedient to 
translate the policy of asana by bringing about a suspension of 
military operations; it does not, however, end hostilities- On the 
contrary as already noted, asana retains the state of vigraha while 
involving non-commencement of an expedition or pause or cessation of 
fighting- Thus,the indifference (upeksana) which is equated with 
asana cannot be construed as neutrality, because the latter regards 
an absence of war between the parties concerned as a prerequisite of
art
Furthex1, since asaiia is not normad-ly construed as instrument of 
peace, a strategic position of military preparedness for offensive 
or defensive reasons became the predominant feature of asana* This 
position against the enemy gradually subordinated the element of
indifference which asana originally implied with the result that
-  /
Kamandaka and Somesvara included even a siege strategy among many
kings of asana * Commentators on Manu and Yajnaualkya emphasised the 
withdrav/al of the king from an. armed conflict with the adversary as an 
important aspect of asana, thus denoting that asana is a policy of 
seeking cover (atmasamvaranam) when the king has become weakened*» a
Some^vara further reduced asana in some cases to a military halting,
encamping and even temporary staying of a victor in an occuj)ied
kingdom for some compelling reasons; thereby showing that asana does
not even imply any indifference to war as such* Asana really denotes
a policy of waiting in a particular position, which is far removed
from that of neutrality*
According to the modern view ’neutrality denotes the condition
of impartiality or non-belligerence in war or rights and duties of
1 -
states enjoying such a condition* * But asana does not indicate 
these features; on the contrary, it ^r^best^denotes^inactive
confrontation, avoidance of direct clash of arms and lack of any rights
tka - -
and duties excepting those entailed byAtruce in^case of sandhayasana*
It may, however, be pointed out that even prityasana and svasthasana t,
10 A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, (London, 19&W p® -^68*
which denote the condition of a king who seeks to create good neighbourly 
relations or to avoid war with enemies^do not in any way correspond 
to neutrality.
In fact the equation of asana with neutrality is rather irrelevant 
mainly because the latter is the policy or condition of non-belligerence 
adopted by a third party towards belligerents or a third party attitude 
of not taking part in an armed conflict between two contending powers.
In other words, neutrality in inter-state relations is possible in 
the presence of belligerents or two mutually conflicting powers. There 
cannot be any neutrality between the belligerents themselves, which 
is what is described by the policy of asana. Asana is applicable to 
situations of hostility between rivals and it may be adopted by either 
the aggressor or his adversary in certain circumstances. Asana primarily 
describes an intermediary relationship between contending parties 
following the declaration of war (vigraha). Thus/the basic premises of 
asana and neutrality are different.
Further, neutrality as a modern principle of foreign policy is
possible only if both the contenders consent to respect the neutrality
of a state, which wishes to keep aloof from the conflict and observe
impartiality. But asana normally involves an unilateral decision of
either of the belligerents to put off the moment of mutual destruction
or to manipulate one’s own escape from a war that no longer promises
any benefit or to wait until the removal of certain obstacles or the ful- 
of
filment calculated objectives. This unilateral decision is possible 
because of the power and readiness to take counter-measures should the
3
-pQ-Tsjit i n  prv.cj.pi faking nva.7- or
adversary^continue fighting. Sometimes, however, the acquiescence of
the adversary is managed through the quiet use of political means
such as conciliation or through a truce.
It is only in one stanza that Somesvara writess 'A wise (king)
stays until the destruction of his enemies who are weakening owing to
their mutual conflict. 1 This may imply that the policy of asana is
a third party attitude of non-intervention but it really means a policy
of waiting and not precipitating war when the object of hostility Is
being served without direct involvement. Asana. in this instance may
be said to be *the continuation of the previously existing stateT, a
£
definition of neutrality, but it is of hostility (vigraha), which is 
inconsistent with the concept of neutrality. In fact, the king is 
advised to adopt asana in such a situation as the task of subjugating 
the weakened enemies would be easier later while the Invasion would 
bring them together and adversely affect the balance of power.
It is thus evident that the concept of asana does not fulfil 
the basic requirements of neutrality, not to say of 'neixtrality as a 
legal position of a state.*
To sum up our discussion we feel that there are no sufficient 
grounds to describe asana as neutrality eithei* on the basis of its 
definition or by connecting it with the madhyarna or the udasina kings^; 
for the former is related to a stage in the belligerency between rivals 
and also underlies a position of military preparedness, and the
1. Manas, II. XIV. 9^9 - /
Paraspara—virodhena ksiyamanesu satrusu |
T^h^ids^^lhmved yavat tavat tisthat^iuddhiman. I)
/<?/ „
3. See above,pp. i£7-3
C
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latter essays an arbitration of^context in which asana is explained®
In addition, while modern neutrality is an attitude of a third
party and presupposes an absence of hostility, asana is invariably a
policy and position of one of the belligerents® In the strict sense
of the term asana indicates an absence of armed encounter in a state
of mutual hostility® If this aspect of asana is developed without any
reference to our authorities in the light of the modern concept of
neutrality then alone it may correspond to neutrality® But this
would be^new and modern principle and not the traditional and
historical asana®
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SADGUUY-,: g ) B V A X D H X X ^ T A
(dual rougg c.ii duplicity)
Our authorities differ on the meaning and interpretation
of the terrgdvaldhlbhaya, wliich may be rendered as 'dual policy'
regardless of its elucidation in several sources as 'the bifurcation 
of troops'.'1' Defining dvaldhibhava Visvarupa says, 'Employment 
of/, two seeds /policies?/ peace (sandhi) and -war (y^Lgraha)
is the dual policy'.- Hedhatithi writes, *.
of peace and war is dvaldhihhava. ! ^ Somadeva explains it as 
'concluding peace (sandhi) with one and /thereafter/ waging ear 
(vigraha) upon another or mahing ssAidhi /truce or treaty) with
a
the foe first and fighting with him afterwards. I<v These authors
o
apparently repeat Kautilya without modification except the ex­
tension of the applicability of dnraidhibhava to a swngle powerful 
invader at alternate stages in the belligerency, which, however, 
implies that dyaidhibhava is also a policy of duplicity. In ICsu- 
£ilya!s terms, ^eniadeva's second definition of dvaldhibhava should
? P
2  .. -  ~
Ca l a;jfi. ? i. 145. 8 and h 1 - v i g r aha - d v ay a hi,j u p ad anayi dveiidliibhava^i.
JCii Ihanu, VII.ISO. Sancailvigrahopadanarfl dvaidhihhavaji.
I^TV, XXIX. 43. Ekena salia sandhayanyena s ah a _v :l g r ah ak ar on am elcena 
va 6 at to s andhanapnrv am vig;r aho dvaldiilbhavaly.
3
ISA? Vii.l.ll. §audhipvi_grallonyfypisyi . dperlaM.bh a va iti.
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properly be called saiidhayayana.~ kau$ilya keeps the two terns 
separate P hut our authorities expand the definitions of both con­
cepts so that they overlap.
The essential features of the dual policy consist in practising* 
peace and war simultaneously or alternately in order to aggrandize 
and safeguard his interests as the king has to deal with two enemies 
on different sides or a single powerful foe. The duality of the meas­
ures of sandhi and vigraha smacks of duplicity in as much as a king 
treats his two enemies in different ways or the same enemy differently 
after an interval. Dvaldhibhava thus demands deftness and secrecy 
because its success depends largely on the confidence a king is able 
to instil in his enemy with whom he has concluded a s^andtii^ which he
really does not intend to endure for long. Soraadeva rightly says
-  2 
that dvaldhibhava is dependent on intelligence and its success}
according to oomesvara,depends on the ingenuity of the king to keep 
his counsel (mantra) strictly secret.^
Kedhatithi, however, departs from Kaujiilya when later con­
fronted with Kanu’s explicit definition that dvaldhibhava consists 
in the bifurcation of troops.^ he says, 1 when different positions
1~* -vIt,A3 vXl.dvL8. See also Dangle' s explanatory notes.
hr, ;ca;c.49.
^Hanas., II, XVI.969.
Hanu, VII.167; BDK, XIII.112-13 also quotes Kanu, VII.167, 173.
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are taken up by the Master and his ,,rny - the Master with a small 
force, remains in the fort, while the Commander, with a larger 
force proceeds elsewhere. Cr, some sort of "bifurcation" is re­
sorted to by way of favouring the different divisions, in the
way of allowing all the divisions opportunities for securing booties
1 —  ✓
of gold and other things.’* VijSanecvara and Apa&arka on Yajhavalkya W
kulluka on Manu agree with this explanation and define dvaldhibhava
2as 'bifurcation of troops'" for the accomplishment of some pur­
pose.^ a? he Agni pur aria also repeats the idea when it says^ 
TBvaidM]^ava signifies the mobilisation of half of the army 
against an enemy1 It is clear that, according to these authorities j> 
divaildliibhava comprises the division of troops into two strategic 
formations or positions, whether during the cour we of an invasion 
or defensive operation. This kind of interpretation reduces 
dvaldhibhava to a mere military strategy regardless of the subtlety 
of policy or cunningness of diplomacy. Obviously this explanation 
gives an altogether different meaning hardly consistent with the 
original idea of dual policy which combines measures of sandhi and 
vigraha as two prongs of political actinn. dome of our modern 
scholars, without being aware of the contradiction between dvaldhibhava
1Cn Manu, VII.167? see also HA, 11.7, 13-14; SDK, XIII. p.112.
2On Yajn. , 1. 34-7 - svabalasya dvidhakaragam .
^kulluka on Manu VII. 160'. Mvarthaslddhaye balasyadyldhakarap-am dmUUfrKavfih. 
AdhA? 234.19. Balardhena prpya^ gemp tu dvaidhibhava^sa -ucyate.
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as a politic measure and as a military bifurcation, interpret at 
as ’division of forces into two, one apparently marching against 
the enemy while the other remains behind to prevent a rear attach 
by the neighbour on the other side, who is also a potential foey1"
o
indeed, ari enact equivalent of ■ >ars:ri 1 rodh a j a ysftfa; or as a 
measure of military necessity which requires giving up the con­
centration of resources and forces of a fortified capital when 
a division is rendered necessary by the fear of an aggressor 
encircling the army. Medhatithi also says that in certain cir­
cumstances an invading army is divided into two so as to give all
A
divisions of the army equal opp or tun?, ties of securing booty, 
while it may be conceded that dvaidhibliava is sometimes expressed 
through bhe division of troops for either invasion or defence, these 
positions hov/ever do not sum it up. Govindaraja and bandana, the 
two later commentators on Manu, realised the confusion in mistak­
ing strategy for policy and hence explained it away by quo ting-
13
hem andaha on the issue. But this in no way helps in resolving 
the confusion of the Sr.pt i text. It - is Visvarupa who attempted 
to remove the incongruity between dyaicTliibhava as either a strategic
SDK, Intr. pp. 87 ff.
See above, p. 2AZ *
H^DIC, Intr. p. 6 6.
4 Ch\ Tdo-jwf , \l\\» ^
5On Manu, VII•167 -
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division of forces or a politic expedient. Commenting on 
Y a j nava'lky a he says that, though near, a Icing should stand firm 
hy dividing his forces Into two strategic formations and resort 
to the dual policy of sganplhi and _y:Lg,naha. ^  It Is apparent 
that Visvarupa retains Menu's explanation but he attempts to 
harmonise It with his previous definition which, as already 
noted, is Kaujilyan in diction. Wliat he seeras to indicate is 
that these military divisions help the execution of dual policy 
as the king from hie secure place (i.e. his capital or fort) 
may carry on negotiations for sandhi with the assailant himself 
or another invader co-operating with him, while the larger division 
of his troops is poised for the counter-offensive. The bifurcation 
of forces thus expresses the twin measures of sandhi and vigraha 
and is construed as a means to the end. The measure of the dual 
policy in defensive position aims at avoiding a military defeat 
and an abject surrender by negotiating a sandhi while threatening 
to fight, If forced. It is a pity that none of the commentators 
on Hanu realised the contribution of Visvarupa In this regard.
We may, however, add that the commentators on Kanu ^ancl Iicnacaadra 
who follows Manu,indirectly Imply the combination of sandhi and 
vigraha as characteristic features of the dvaldhibhava. ?his is
1qi1 I* 34-3.
2 -
fur not hcufilyaa in substances for faujnlya, dvaldhibhava is
not duplicity. Of. 1CA, VII.1.37.
338
indicated by their relating avaldhibhava to a king;1 c. seeking
1shelter in a fort in the event of an attach on him. this is 
followed by his efforts to secure outside help from friends or 
to seek shelter with another powerful ruler for which negotiations 
are to be initiated while he is still able to withstand the in­
vading hordes. These approaches culminate in some sort of a 
sandhi. with those sympathetic to the king’s distress. It is 
thus by implication and in an extended application of the 
dvaidhibhava defined as bifurcation of troops that we may 
discern its original meaning.
A more pointed explanation of dvaidhibhava as a defensive
measure of the foreign policy is given by Kamandaka, who has been
repeated by the author of the Agni Pura&a, Bhoja Paramara,
Govindaraja and Handana on Kanu, and Somesvara. He says, ’when
placed between two powerful enemies a king; should verbally
surrender /to both/ and himself remain imperceptible like the
2snngle eye-ball of the crow’. The king should try assiduously 
to put off by empty promises one of the two powerful enemies who 
is dangerously close at hand. But if both assail him simultaneously 
he should ally himself to the stronger of the two.^ If, however,
1
in Kanu, Vil.173, HA, 11.13-14; see also EA, Vil.2.17.where it is 
stated that by taking shelter in a fort, a king should resort to 
the dual policy.
2__ - Vl1* 
hH, XI.23; Agni, 240.28-29; Govindaraja on Kanu,/167.; Ykt0.
90. p. 13; I-ianas. , II, XVI. 956. *
ML> XI.24; igtni, 240.29; Ykt# 91.p. 13
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both enemies have been convinced of his duplicity and ofach 
rejects his overtures of s_andhi the king should seek shelter 
with the enemy of them both or surrender to the .stronger of 
the assailants.'*' It is clear that the dual policy involves 
recourse to both sandM and v:graha in a dubious way. The ex­
posure of the duplicity in putting forward, empty promises and 
piaying off one enemy against another would result in either 
seeking shelter with an eiien^/jof his assailants or surrender 
to the stronger of the assailants. In the event of an invasion 
from two sides a king is advised to ally with the stronger of 
the two invaders for crushing; another when he finds that duplicity 
is of no avail. It is apparent that Kamandaka and his followers 
realize the role of sandhi and ylgraha as combined elements of 
dvaidnibhava, which is implemented through guile and. even crooked­
ness .
Explaining ilyoi;k-jkijihag/o:? 3 ones vara further regards it
as a policy of duplicity and deceit. “ It involves double-dealing 
with two kings hostile to each other and even double-efcosEing 
them. Taking recourse to dvaidhibhava a king may secure illicit 
emoluments from the enemy of his overlord, while really serving 
his overlord in all circumstances or dodge his two neighbours 
inimical to each other by pretending to be friendly to each and
KIT, XI. 25; A/kliv 240.pO. ±he text of the Agni furapa has the 
word Vraje t instead of Sayasrayet, which is obviously an
error of the copyist.
^Lianas. , II, XVI .956, 960-9 6p.
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promising to co-operate in war against the other but actually 
promoting his own advancement by robbing them of their richer 
and beasts of burden.^ Besides it being the policy of the 
vyir:yru for dealing with his enemies in a straitened condition, 
it also cori’ecponds to the policy of a buffer hing I &ntardhiX  
who is apparently friendly to his neighbours but evades each in 
turn. In nature dvai dhibhava is full of treachery and deceit 
and may imperil the pursuer if his secrets of counsel are
o
divulge d.^ *
It is now evident that dvaldhibhava is an ingenious measure 
of the sixfold policy which needs pursuing both sandhi and vigraha 
as instruments of a single policy in a dubious way for the saie 
of safeguarding and promoting one's interests in inter-state 
conflict. There is no sincerity as far as parties to pauidhy and 
vigraha are conccrnefd; on the contrary, the hing attempts to 
dupe his enemies by false pretensions. However^it may be mentioned 
that the implications of dvai dhibhava in the Arthasastra _ are polil 
but not treacherous in as much as the illustrations hardly go 
beyond sa&bhuya~yana; in the l-Ianu-sraptt and its commentaries, 
they are only strategically deceptive; but in the later works like 
Kanandal:iya ITltisara, the ITitivakyamyta, the Kanasollasa, etc. they
1I:hnas. , XI.AVI,963-968; of. KA? VII.2.1p ff.
2
Ibid.
ic
the
3 4 i
are dubious, deceptive and even treacherous, bhile duplicity 
characterises the modus operandi of the d vaidhibhava according’ 
to later texts, there is no justification fox* Prof. Dikshitar’s 
bold but erroneous suggestion that hr. bhamasastry ’ s inter­
pretation of dvaidhlbhava as Tmaking peace with one and waging 
war with another1 is subject to correction." It is in later works 
that dyandlru^ fflfs came to be closely associated with a confidence 
trick created by false pretensions of friendship and hostility. 
These remarks become more poignant in view of the narrowest 
explanation of ^a^hib^^va expressed in the overtures of
Gandhi made by belligerents to each other varying in initiative
2
according to circumstance, while intensely preparing for war.
In a sense dvai dhibhava may also correspond to an ultimatum of 
we„r reiterated before the rival armies come to grips with each 
other. In such cases it indicates an element of indeterninafion 
born of weakness to plunge into warfare. A resort to the dual 
policy after talcing shelter In the fort marks a precarious state 
of affairs, which, leans on another measure called carps ray a
Pactors and circumstances connected with dvaidhibhava.
1 ./bother Impelled by d.esire for .gain or by 
fear, or having well-being as his aim, a king 
residing between two /hostile states remains
1 T ,
wAI, p. 324. Prof. dangle follows Dr. bliamasastry 1 s in i* erp> re t a t io:
of this passage in his translation, ICA, VII. 1.11.
2kV, ICiXC.49 9 6 2 - 6 b .
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secure/ for a long time by resorting 
dvaidh^hava. 1 ^
The situations amenable to dvai_6^ i^ liava vary from, the
expedition against an enemy to defensive resistance and even
to the maintenance of a precarious balance of power. In all
circumstances, however, the inferiority of the strength of
the king in comparison to that of his enemies seems to be
the determining factor. This weakness is sought to be overcome
by overtures for sandhi with one of the foes, who binds
himself to help the king with treasury and troops for a fair
return at the t e rni in a 11 o rjo f the king1 s expedition as well as to
o
desist from active hostility during this period.^ Thus
strengthened the king is able to march against his enemy in
order to subdue him and enhance his power. Ihile this explanation
of the cause and circumstances is plausible a discordant note is
tJk
struck by the author of, ilgn 1 Ikirapa and by Kedhatithi, who 
disavow that dvaidhibliava Is always rooted in weakness. Accord­
ing to them it springs from the greater strength of the aggressive
’Manas. , II. XVI. 957.^ Labhad ya?pi bhayad vafp/ yogakgemarthafl udyatah j 
.dvayo^madhye clra:g kalaip dvaidhTI^
In view of this evidence we disagree with Prof. Dikshitar’s statement 
that ' dvaidhibliava means practising duplicity against one's enemies 
invariably through fear of them1, for fear is but only one of many 
motives.
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king. *' Kedhatithi says, 1_ ft- is
tKoJt . it is only the more r)overful king who divides his
2
forces, when under difficulties', or ' .. . by -jay of allowing 
all the divisions / o f  troops/ opportunities for securing booties 
of gold and other things' , J But for the interpretation of
dvaidhibliava as bifurcation of troops, the position of Medhatithi 
would be inexplicable.
Dvaidhibliava is also a qualified expedient to deal with 
the situation created by an invasion of a kingdom by its tiro 
enemies y two sides or by a single powerful foe. The victim 
opens negotiations for sanflhl with both in order to dupe them
or concludes it with the more powerful of the two assailants
&
and proceeds to exterminate the other, r We may illustrate this by 
a reference to an event in the reign of the 0aulu1 ;:ya king hula- 
raja X of G,uj^rIt , According to I-lerutunga, kularaja war 
simultaneously attacked by Barapa from Lata and the Oahamana 
king Vigi*aharaja II of Sapadalaksa. Though lie tried to overcome 
his predicament by despatching troops towards both enemies and. 
himself taking shelter in a fortress called. ICanthadurga (hanthakota
1
bn hanu, V I l , Y J  3 9 XL? 234.19; _ RDh, XIII. pp. f IX “13 quotes Kami*
Ballyaheva hi vyasane balagL dvldhakaroti iti_drsyato,
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in dutch) he had finally to negotiate a sand hi with Viqraharaja II, 
whom he approached personally in the latter1s camp. After the 
conclusion of this agreement Vigraliaraja joined Mularaja in the latter's 
expedition against Barapa.^ This one historical event hears out the 
essential features of dvaldhibhava as found in I-lanu and his com­
mentator, Iledhatithi , etc. as well as in the ‘W ltisara works.
Another historical event connected with the reign of the Oaulukya 
king Bhima II, namely the invasion of Gujarat by the Yadava king
Siiphapa, which finally ended in a sen.dhi, also bears out the
~  ±
application of dTOi^bi^bh^va. In this instance the Oa.uf.ukya
minister Lavapaprasada first advanced to oppose the Yadava assail- 
iLxfkti.,
\
ant,but/ opened negotiation for sandhi because of the simultaneous
uprising of the kings of Harwad. hhilo negotiations were yet in 
progress lie had managed to send an army under his son Vrradhavala 
to ravage the territory of the Yadavas. Thus, by practising an 
alternate policy of war and peace with one and the same ruler and 
finally concluding a sandhi because of war on another front 
L a v a yanr a sa d a  succeeded in defending the Oauluhya kingdom.
In both these instances the weakness of forces in coping with 
the invasions was the main factor in favour of a dual policy 
which, in such circumstances, is even admitted by Me&hatithi for, 
he says, 1ihen a * g has been attacked by a strong king recouping
PC J ' i 23-4 i , Fytlivira.ja.vij ay a, V.yv. 30-33; Dvyasrayakavya,
VI. w . 1-9 C; Ilf , IX. f; A . K . Kaj uradar, oynjcjl. , pp. 28-29;
D . Sharma, op.cit., p .30.
I^ffrtikauffludi, IV.42 ff; Leldiapaddkati, pp. 32, 45; A.K.IIajundar.
op.cit., pp. 150 ff.
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is impossible; what is beneficial is resorting to a fortress,
1
and this means garrisoning, which involves bifurcation.^
It is, however, surprising that Medhatithi never returns to his
previous definition but sticks to Manu's interpretion of
dvaidhibhava, whatever the circumstance.
In addition to the situations of aggression and self-defence,
Somesvara recommends to a king the application of dvaidhibhava
towards his two neighbours inimical to one another when he finds
that an estrangement with either would imperil his interests and
by playing off one against the other he would not only maintain
the precarious balance of power but also increase his own treasury 
2and troops. In such a situation the king concludes a sandhi with
each and pledges to cooperate in vigraha against the other and thus
secretly profits by their credulity in his false pretentions, while
3
himself remaining virtually hostile to both of them. It is, 
however, indicated that such a king succeeds because each of the 
two rivals wants to make him a scapegoat of their rivalry without 
realizing the dodges being administered to themselves.
*&/
Kinds of Dvaidhibhava
Medhatithi describes two kinds of dvaidhibham (bifurcation 
of troops), viz. l) that which is done for one's own sake and
X0n Manu, 173.
2Hanas., II, XVI.966-68. 
^ibid.
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2) that done fcr the sake o;C others.‘ farayapa, however, 
supposes that in one ca.ee the army stops in front of the enemy 
under the command of a general, while the king marches with 
a portion f his forces, and that in other cases the contrary 
takes place."- It an an dak a,-whose definition of dvaidhibliava is
quoted by Govindaraja on I-Ianu,also distinguishes its two types:
t]iat which is done independently (svatantra) because it is
conducive to the interests of the king himself and that which
is dependent upon others (jqarjat^tra) owing to the king’s re-
3ceiving remuneration from two kings inimical to each other.
This latter variety resembles the policy of the buffer king 
whose main characteristic is proclivity to dodge his neighbours 
by accepting remuneration dr an both in return for his partisan
A
L \-
pretentions to each.
Somes vara has further described five kinds of clvaihiibhava
o
interpreted as duplicity.'' iiithyacitta refers to a king who 
is really hostile tc the other in his heart of hearts but speaks 
in pleasant terms, that is, pretends to be friendly towards him
1
"On Kanu, VI1.1 S'7.
2T1 . , jdjijd.
^Ibid., cf. KA, XI.2d5.
rfee above, p. /2,3 An taro hi is called Ubhayavetana by Gomadcva
XV, XXIX.Z^
^Kanas. , XI, XVI. 958-i59.
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f *
while virtually harbouring enmity,~ nithyavao.aua sanjflaya near.s
speaking out agreeable things to others bub acting contrariwise,
2
that is, performing harmful acta. hi thy alan?aga consist:: an 
fal roly performing bit by bit desirable acta with a view to
itiq /%"
rain- c onfi dene e of the other but subverting him oy destroy in 3;
g
his great uorhs at the end;' ubhayavetana comprises the policy
of a king who stealthily accepts illicit emoluments from the
enemy of his master in addition to the payment from his overlord but
reveals the fact to the latter and pries into the secrets of the
former's counsel in confidence^but betrays these to hir real master.
Hie policy of receiving payment from both, i.e. his real master
as well as hie enemy, corresponds to the conduct of a deceitful spy
who enters the enemy side by hiding bis real character but serves
the interests of his master, while also enjoying the benefits
conferred by the enemy/1' finally, yugmaprabhytaka is indeed a
policy of downright duplicity. It involves a .king's seere\ j a o ceptance
/
of huge gifts from each of the two mutually hostile rulers for 
accomplishing identically inimical purposes. The king accepts 
large presents from one ruler who asks him to restrain his enemy 
but at the same time he also receives horses and elephants etc. 
from the batter's enemy for suppressing him (i.e. the ruler who
jL
Hanas., II. XYI.960.
2Ibid., 961.
Ibid. , 962-~6p.
4tyn, d. , 964”65.
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lias already approached for just the oj)posite reason) . The
Icing promises to the one to overpower his enemy and to his enemy
to despatch troops for the subjugation of the other^but pretending
so he actually robs both of their treasury and beasts of burden
by playing off one against another and thus swells up his strength
1in order to aggrandize his interests. This conduct of apparent 
treachery is conducive to a ruler who cannot afford antagonizing 
either of the two rivals but concentrates on securing his own 
advancement by exploiting their mutual hostility. It appears 
that besides vljigigu who takes recourse to this policy when 
in troubles, it normally characterises the policy of such buffer 
kings as antardhis in the ma&flala. It may be noted enjgassaiit 
■‘chat these different kinds amply demonstrate that the dvaidhibhava 
consists of two apparently contradictory elements and the real 
motive i s sought to be cloaked in pretentious appearances which 
others mistake for genuineness. It is a policy of dodging the 
enemy or enemies when one is in a precarious position.
Thus dvai dhibhava means dual policy which combines the 
measures of sandhi and vlgraha. It is expedient in a particular
1 ~
Han as., II, XVI.966-69# Prof. Dikshitar's explanation of these 
five kinds of dvai dhi bhava on the basis of a late work, 
&iyatattvaratnakara (5-12.30-41) could have been refreshing 
if he had taken into account the H an a s o1las a, where these are 
discussed, for the first time. In several instances his interpretations 
seem to indicate slightly different implications. Vide MI, pp. 325-26,
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situation especially when one lias to deal with two enemies
at the same time. Although in the Arthasastra it is not described
as duplicity nor is it said to be so in its interpretatio 11 as
’bifurcation of troops’? but in several texts of our period
dvai dhibhava is clearly considered, a policy of duplicity,deceit 
" " '* A
and even double dealing.
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F , SAMgRAYA (SEEKTUG SHELTER^
When dvaidhlbhava becomes increasingly precarious and the 
king no longer feels himself secure even in his fort because of 
his reduced strength, he is advised to resort to the policy of
Ft.
samsraya (or asaya, ) in a last bid to stave off the impending
disaster* Samsraya has bean variously rendered as ‘support1, or
‘support of allies*, ‘protection1, ‘subordinate alliance1, ‘seeking 
1refuge1, but it is felt that its translation as ‘seeking shelter*
adopted by many learned translators of ancient works on law and 
2
polity is more appropriate because it adequately expresses the 
meaning and conveys the full import of the term.
Samsraya has been defined by the commentator Visvarupa as
3‘seeking shelter with another when one is reduced in power1*
In agreement with Kaufilya both Medhatithi and Somadeva say ‘sub-
* 4mitting of oneself to another is samsrava*. Qualifying the pro­
tector Vijflanesvara observes: ‘Seeking protection of a stronger
one1 is samsraya* *' ^  Apararka and ICulluka explain it as: *£e.exiug
~4lIHC, Intr. p*86; WAI, p*323; of. G. Btthler, haws of Manu, v i \ J & 8 . 
2Cf. G. Jha, tr. Manusmrti; a. P. Kangle; KA, VII.1.2.
50n Ya.ifUI.543.
On Manu, VII.160; UV._XXIX.47. . Parasyatmaraanam samsrayab:
Cf. KA, VII.1.10. Pararpaaaai samsrayab.
5 , — /
On Y&jh., I, 347. Samsrayo balavadasrayanam.
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■wivtA flu pcriA/cv^L iN/i&n p^Y'^e.c.ut &cL. — ?
1
a-n- ^ r v e m ^  .* m The Agni Purapa at one plaoe merely states, ’entrusting
* 2
to the udasina or madhyama (the middle or neutral king) is sa&sraya*.
However, repeating Kamandaka the author of the Agni Pura&a elsewhere
and Bhoja Paramara say that ’when one. H&5 n o  mesLns of
coo-rvt-^ r-d-chiori. is being Aeytro^ed by ct strong k i n j
he should seek shelter with a mighty ruler of noble lineage and truth-
3 *ful disposition*. Somesvara also writes; ’Hhen the enemy is oppress­
ive and the king is himself we ale and sees no chance of success, he should 
seek shelter at a place of safety’.^ ’
These definitions clearly indicate that sa^sraya involves self­
submission of a king usually to another powerful ruler in order to 
escape extermination at the Kpands of an oppressive enemy:. 
real character and form depend on the specific situations during 
the state of war. For, before the actual invasion of the kingdom, 
it constitutes a kind of protective subordinate alliance which may 
deter the aggressive enemy; during warfare, it expresses an appeal 
for military help on the basis of self-subrnission; and after sustain­
ing a decisive defeat at the hands of the invader, it is simply seeking
Ya.jfi.» ^.345. Parapidltasya prabalara.iantarasrayaqj.ata.; On Manu,
VII.160. $atru piditasya prabsQjarajantarasrayanam samsrayah.
[■wrifw ifiiiw m i i w .winirfii. ni— m i. in»iwil.i >mn iuin«S  H H *  .■ m iw iiiw i ■ i nTTT"fi*Iwi«»i"ii'T .i*» mu»tfnMi» iB-firt-— f~*—Jr irrtV^
^  4CM J>/5i J  A^d J
Agni, 234.20. TJdasino madhyama va sagisrayatsaflisrayab snip tali, 
cf. gA, VII.2.21 ff; X.2.13.
Agni, ^2 40.31; Ykt, 93.p. 13? Jgg[-, XI.27. Ucchidyamano balina 
nirupayah pratikriyab| kulodkatagi satyamaryamasrayeta balotkatam.il
^Manas. ^ II.XV.949- Svayarj. hinabalo raja jayahetuiji na pasyati f Balina 
pi&yamano yah kgemasthanagi samasrayet.I
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1shelter to protect life and recover the kingdom later on. However, 
in certain circumstances flight to a place of safety such as a fort 
or secret stronghold is also called samsrava, a measure akin to the 
dual policy, which, however, overlaps with samsraya in several other 
ways.
According to Medhatithi^ samsraya in another context means
Entering into a protective alliance with another mighty ruler in 
2normal times . The object in such cases is to acquire a political 
status in the interstate sphere that would save the king from the
future harassment of his enemies because they would be restrained
3by the fear of retaliation from his protector in such an event.
It may be remarked that such kinds of subordinate alliances for pro­
tection often created protectorates because the weak king not only 
acknowledged the suzerainty of an overlord but willingly took upon 
himself the duties and obligations of a tributary king or political 
satellite. Samsraya seems to differ from sandhi in the respect 
that it institutes a subordinate alliance for protection based upon 
self-submission of the king seeking shelter, while the latter means 
a compact for both undertaking and terminating war.^ Sandhi may 
lead to friendship and to the ending of disputes, while samsraya
*Sledh. on Manu, VII. 168 - '5 ay s. that a king seeking shelter may 
have to give up his kingdom and go^o the realm of his protector.
20n Manu. VII.168.
3lbid.
4 -Sandhi is generally between equals, although hina-sandhi is a
subordinate treaty.
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brings safety* The essence of the former is an accord between two 
parties and that of the latter is self-submission of the one and 
condescension of the other.
Factors and circumstances connected with samsraya
Our authorities agree that the compelling factor which obliges
a king to resort to samsraya is the depletion of his power beyond
hope of timely recuperation and, in contrast, the overwhelmingly
1superior might of the assailant. The king who seeks shelter also
realizes th,eC inadequacy of his diplomacy to persuade the aggressor
to conclude a sandhi, the weakness of his forces as well as those
of his allies to withstand the aggression for a desirable period;
and, above all, his helplessness even to protect his own person
in an extremely disastrous situation. The motive behind sagtsraya
2is not fear but the welfare of his government and people. The
immediate purpose is to secure protection in order to put an end
to the enemyfs oppression and ward off the impending peril of
3annihilation at his hands. It may be even necessary for accom­
plishing this purpose that the king should give up his own territory 
and go over to the realm of his powerful protector.^
The circumstances for samsraya normally arise in^  face of con­
tinual harassment by the enemy and in the wake of an aggression
On Manu. VII.168, 174; on 1.347; Agni, 234.25; NT, XXIX, 55;
Ykt., 93, p.14; HA, II. 14; RDK. XIII.pp.112-13 quotes Manu:
-Manas.. II. XT.949 ff.
Aani. 2 M . 2 5 ; NV, XXIX.59; Ykt., 92, p.13.
50n Manu. VII.168.
on Manu, VII.168.
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on a weak king, who perceives his certain collapse at some stage
during the war, Medhatithi says: ’When he /the king7 finds that
while in fortress he is quite liable to be assailed, then quickly
he shall give up the fortress and take refuge with another righteous 
1 *king.1 In fact samsraya is a measure for a helpless situation
when the victim of aggression is completely devoid of power; the
constituent parts of his kingdom (prakrti) are in distress; and
2he himself is liable to be seized and exterminated. Sometimes 
in circumstances of inferior power in general without there being 
a threat of extermination from any of his enemies, a king seeks 
^y samsraya a status in the inter-state sphere, for this serves
3
as armour against his enemies’ future harassment. Thus the cir­
cumstances created by the enemy’s oppression^whether real or potential 
lead to samsraya. But a continued dependenceon others for one’s
£v\CJL I
security in of any imminent threat of war doubtless brings
scorn from others as Cakrayudha, the king of Kanauj, received from
— — 4
the Pratihara king Wagabhajija II, who ultimately exterminated..hirrf.
It may be added in passing that an invader whose plans of operation 
have gone astray, could also be forced to take shelter in extreme 
hardship when even his withdrawal promised no safety.
1
On Manu, VII.174; other commentators also agree with this 
elucidation; HA, 11.14.
^Agni, 254.25; On Manu, VII. 168; On Ya.jfi., 1.547; see above 
p.3S3 , fn 1
Medh. on Manu. VII.168.
4 —HI, XVIII. p.108. v.9. ... Jitva parOasrava-krta-sphuta-nicabhavam 
Oakravudham... (Gwalior Prasaiti of Bhoja;
Kinds of samsraya
The commentators on Manu distinguish two kinds of samsraya, 
one, which is resorted to in order to put an end to harassment and 
invasion by onefs enemy, and the other^to acquire political status 
among other kings of the inter-state system and so to forestall 
any future harassment.1 It is evident that the real distinction 
lies in the form and not in the nature of samsraya , for self­
submission for protectinn in a weakened condition of power character­
ises the alliance of both kinds. Somesvara, however, has further
divided sagisraya into three kinds on the basis of differences with
2regard to shelterer. Firstly, when, oppressed by a powerful enemy, 
a weak king takes shelter with the foe himself knowing him to have 
many allies and great virtues, it is called satsamsraya.^  Secondly, 
when knowing his foe, who is intent on annihilating him, to be 
devoid of virtues, a king lacking in means to withstand him seeks 
shelter with another ruler who is more powerful, righteous, truthful 
and has performed goods deeds, it is known as anya-samsraya.^  Thirdly, 
when oppressed by a powerful assailant, a king, unequal to him in 
might, takes shelter in a fort, it is said to be durga-sagtsraya.^
^On Manu, VII. 168; RDK, XIII.p. 112 quotes Manu.
“lianas.. XI.XV.950 ff.
Ibid.. II.XV.951-52; of. FV, XXIX, 59; Ykt.. 94,, p.14, repeats KF,
XI.30; also, see KA., VII.2.7. for advocating samsraya with the invader.
4Ibid.. 953-54.
'’ibid.. 955.
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It is clear that Somesvara’s distinctions take into account the 
nature and qualities of the assailant, the relative weakness of 
the king seeking shelter, and the variety of refuge. It may he 
mentioned that apart from the clarity and distinct terminology, 
there is nothing original in these three types of samsraya for 
the^ are discussed in the Arthasastra and the Kamandakiya. ^
Samsraya with whom?
A king in distress could seek shelter with any ruler because
ideally every king in ancient India had the duty to grant freedom
fr cm fear to any suppliant in distress including his most despicable 
2foe. Traditionally, request for protection and political asylum 
was not to be refused since protection of the refugee was considered 
highly meritorious and its disregard a denial of moral obligation 
of rulership. Kings who staked their life and kingdom on the pro­
tection of refugees at their courts were praised for their liberality,
3
uprightness, and heroism, but those who turned away the suppliants
4were charged with avarice and cowardice. A king betraying his 
refugee by secretly contemplating to hand him over to the latter1s 
enemy might alienate some of his own supporters and fall a victim to
■*14. VII.2.6ff; M ,  XI.29 ff.
Agni, 220.17; Matsya, 215*63; cf. Markaa&eya#^131.32. Manas., I.
XX. 305-7; II,XII.738. Of. Br.Arth., III, 51-52. RgK, III. p.2£ 
quotes i^ahkhalikhita; cf. KN, VIII. 10.
3
Ra,1atarahgjai. VII. 144; HM., Intro, p.9 and text.
4 *“ **. -» *;.-Prthvira.ia Raso, p.58 ff. Visaladeva did not offer refuge to any 
one and amassed wealth in his treasury.
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1his refugee*s intrigues in his own capital. It was thus possible
to find kings willing to protect any ruler in distress and even
2to go to war with his enemy, if needed.
The easy availability of a protector, however, does not imply 
the ability of every king to give efficient protection. Our authors, 
therefore, advise the king who seeks shelter to approach another
3 -  -
powerful ruler in general, and name the madhyama and the udasina 
4in particular. Failing to find a suitable protector anywhere,
5
a distressed king is asked to resort to the invader himself. It
is thus evident that any other powerful king even outside the
man&ala, the madhyama, or the udasina and lastly the invader himself
6may become protector. It is wrong to suggest, as R.C.P.Singh does,
tfa.
that the victor or invader could not be protector in^face of the 
direct evidence of the Arthasastra, the Kamandakiya, the Nitivakyamrta.
m m  m t  7
the Yuktikalpatam and the Manasollasa. It follows that the weaker
kings should not be embarrassed with an appeal to grant shelter.
1 -  -
I).C.Ganguly, op.cit. ,_j>.226. The Malwa king Jayavarmau II was killed 
by VagbhaJifca, a Cahamana refugee at his court, when the former had 
agreed to hand over the latter to the Sultan Jalaluddin of Delhi; see also
HM , IV^  V, l O l f f .  S&e oJso I n t r o ,  p 2 £ ,
2 «
Manas,, II.211.738 mentions abhayakhyab as one of the causes of vigraha. 
^See above, p.3^-1 fns s ; <>3 -
Aft-ni. 234.20; cf. KIT, VII.2.23-24; X.2.13; Kulluka on Mann. VII.XU.
-See also above, p , i s o ,
KA, VII.2.7 ff; H[, XI.30; HV, XXIX.59; Ykt, 94.p.14; Minas. II.XV.
JL51-2.
6R.C.P.Singh, op.cit., p.430.
7See above fn,5.
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Whoever is resorted to must have the requisit^qualifications
to protect the suppliant and ensure his welfare. The prerequisite
of a protector is his greater power, for samsraya by the weak
with the weak is useless, for what safety is there to a person who
2takes shelter on a castor plant from fear of an elephant. Deter­
mining the criterion of the powerfulness M u d h a .t i- th x .  
says *¥ith that king alone he shall seek shelter, who is capable
of chastising the enemy^forces,as also the disloyal subjects of
Vis 3
the king seeking^ shelter.1 The specific mention of the madhyama
the udasina as probable protectois further indicates the strength 
required of a protector; for, as already stated, they are success­
ively more powerful rulers of the ma&dala and designed to hold the 
balance of power between belligerents; thus they seem to be specially 
competent to entertain requests for shelter. But power to protect 
is not enough to attract a king in distress. Ideally a protector 
should be highborn, noble, righteous, truthful, not greedy, one 
at whose hand no ill-treatment need be feared, who has a reputation 
for his calm and dispassionate nature. A king with whom the an­
cestors of the king seeking shelter may have resorted to, and who 
belongs to friendly circles, is preferable.^ It is pointed out in the
3 “  ! ! ' ' ™ ’' ' ' ' “  ' ' ’See above, p. 3SI , fns, 1 -3 ,
2W, XXIX. 55 ff.
3
On Manu, VII. 175/ <x^ °  oth&r ctmms; , p. / /3  cjuoi-as r
^On Yajfl, 347; On Manu, VII.168, 174; 0n,Yajfi,I.343 - Visvarupa 
seems to repeat KA, VII. 2.:A4yAgni, 240.31 quotes KN, XI. 27; Ykt., 
93-94. p.14. Manas„ II.XV.952-54; RDK, XII.p.113.
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Manasollasa that if the invader is endowed with good qualities and
1has many allies, the victim may well seek shelter with him. It 
is obvious from these qualifications that a protector should he 
powerful and virtuous enough to allay the fears of the king seeking 
shelter that he will come to no harm afterwards.
Ihe question arises whether or not the protector is obliged to 
fight the enemy of the king seeking shelter with him and to assist 
the latter to recover his kingdom, if lost? Its answer is indeed 
difficult because our authors do not mention what obligations a 
protector takes upon himself except that of protecting the king 
from his enemy. It appears that the nature of virtual support 
depends on the exigencies of the circumstances when shelter is 
sought. If it is resorted to before actual military collapse the 
protector may be bound to defend his protege; but after the destruction 
of the army and the loss of kingdom sajpsraya may guarantee only 
political asylum without any commitment to help in the recovery 
of the kingdom. However, in certain cases the protector may take 
up the cudgels and fight to restore the king (seeking shelter)to his 
throne, as did Somesvara I,^
b f ICalyayi on granting shelter to Jayasijpha, the Paramara 
Prince of Malwa,^ The Ragjiralcuja king Dhavala of Hastikundi (Rajasthan)
1Manaa, II. XV.951-52
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is known to have given shelter to one Dharayl.varaha, probably the
king of Sauragfcra, and to the armies of a Gurjara king, probably
-* — 1Mularaja X, worsted in the battle by Vakpatiraja XI Muh|a, but
it is not known for certain what he did for them. Kalhapa tells
us that the King Ananta of Kashmir spent a huge sum of money in
caring for the welfare of the sSahi princes, who had sought refuge
o
with him after being driven out of their kingdom by the Muslims.
Although the Kashmiri king Sanagramaraja had actively associated
himself with ^ahis in their resistance to Mahmud, we do not know ^ 9
Sm*
if Ananta was able to help the Sahis regain their kingdom. Besides 
these examples, we may also mention the policy of protectors to­
wards their proteges. Although Gakrayudha of ICanauj was a protege 
of the Pala king Dharmapala and so was Trilocanapala^the Pratihara 
ruler, of the Candella king Vidyadhara, it is not known what actual 
assistance these proteges obtained from their protectors when their 
enemies, the Pratihara MagabhaJta II in the case of Gakrayudha, and 
Mahmud and later Bhoja Paramara in the case of Trilocanapala, 
invaded their kingdoms. Both of these protected kings had to flee 
for safety and ended their life in obscurity. It can be concluded 
that the role of the protector in the hostility between the king 
seeking shelter and his enemy was always a matter of political ex­
pediency. The interests of the protector were supreme. Xn fact
1
BX,vv,S'kp^ -2p. C. Ganguly, op.cit., p.54; A. IC. Majumdar, 
op.cit., p*30 also fn. 48.
2 - *
Ran atarahgini > VII. 144.
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the political motives and considerations of the balance of power 
determined the role of the protector, although these were not always 
primary factors for extending the protection as suggested by 
R.C.P. Singh. Xndeed^the obligations of the protector towards the 
king seeking shelter with him were determined by the extent of his 
own politico-military involvement in the conflict and prospect of 
material gain. The protector thus undertook only the obligation 
of protecting the king seeking shelter against his enemy and to 
fight if the latter attacked his own kingdom. When the invader 
himself U.as the shelterer his only obligation ms to put an end to
to
his own harassment of the victim who had submitted^and^allow him 
to rule his kingdom as a tributary.
Obligations of the king seeking shelter
Self-submission being the essence of samsraya, the king taking
recourses to it undertakes all sorts of obligations towards his
protector. In general he is advised to behave submissively, to
adopt a respectful attitude towards his protector and to perform
2 —any service for him including personal attendance. Medhatithi 
states that a protector ’shall be served like a preceptor; and 
in so doing the king shall not consider his dignity at all; he 
should have no such notion as he also is a great king, so I shall
^op.cit.,pp♦ 4-30-3/,
2Agni, 240.32; Ykt., 93.p.14; of. KN, XI.28-29.
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treat him as my equalF, in fact he shall he attended upon like a
master1. The king taking shelter shall please his protector
!by all such means as saying agreeable things, attending on him
and so forth1. It is evident that the king completely subordinates
himself to his protector and relinquishes his independence of
decision and action with regard to his own affairs. That samsraya
entails burdensome obligations is also borne out by the Agni Burana
which regards it as the lowest and worst measure of the sixTTold
policy because it involves depletion of power, great loss and ex~
2
penditure. If the protector is the virtuous invader himself, 
the king should satisfy him with his troops, treasury, and territory, 
which virtually amounts to self-surrender for protection. Thus., the 
obligations of one who submits himself have no limits difid it seems 
that the danger of a king becoming a tool in the hands of his pro­
tectors for the latter1s ambition was always present; for Somadeva 
cautions the king that he should seek shelter when there is no fear 
of being swallowed up thereafter and that the samsraya should 
ideally create such a union or alliance as that between two inter-
4
twined strands of a rope, which, while mutually increasing the 
strength, remain recognisable. Somadeva thus expands the meaning
'*’°n Manu. VII. 175.
^Agni, 234» 24.
3Xkt.. 94.p. 135 of. M >  XI.30;_fe3,. w/.p,.? .
4MV, XXIX. 55.
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of samsraya so that it overlaps with that of sandhi.
Our authors in general are critical about the advisability 
of the policy of samsraya mainly because the king serves the
1interests of his protector for a time to the abandonment of his own.
Sagtsraya is conceded in an extreme situation for positive purposes
2
of protectinn and future advantages, The approach is purely 
utilitarian and the method is political expediency. The nitisara 
authorities would recommend the policy of samsraya if it eventually
ensures the material interests and the welfare of the king seeking
7^ 4
shelter and, smrti commentators would add the preservation of honour 
and self-respect, for they say that the protector may grant pro- 
tection^butj if he ill-treats the king in distress by showing dis­
respect, describing misdeeds, .inattention,disagreeable speech 
or repents after having given shelter, the king should prefer 
a desperate charge against his enemy and heroic death on the battle-
■x
field. Somadeva also says that if samsrava involves the selling
of oneself, it is better for an honourable king to die fighting.^
^ af  \r$\0S& ^
ICamandaka j whose many ^verses are reproduced in the Agni Purana and
the Tuktikalpataru ^ also advises against a hasty samsraya. It is
Agni. 234. 24; of. KKf, XI.33; KA, VII.2.5.
2M ,  XXIX.55, 59; Ykt’t 92. p.13.
%
Comms. on Manu, VII. 168, *76 ,
^mr, xxix. m ;  see. also .
5k h » 21.33.
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thus evident that the policy of sagisraya is subject to 
several requirements and it is to be resorted to as a
last measure.
The discourse on^sagtsraya ends with a heroic alternative, 
which is a desperate fight to the last man. It is, however, signi­
ficant to note that the earlier nitisara authorities like Kamandaka, 
who is repeated by Bhoja, concede the policy of self-surrender to 
the enemy for protection, to which Somesvara adds that this should 
be done only i£ the enemy is virtuous.’*' Since the policy of 
sagisraya involves the loss of pride and appear? unchivalrous D  
we find both the dharmasastra and the nitisara authors justifying
it on the grounds that !to a living man joy will come, even if it
2
be after the lapse of a century*; *one who remains alive passes 
through pleasing experience and accomplishes his purpose*. For 
justifying the policy of samsraya both smrti and nitisara writers 
permit retreat from battle and allow the king to forsake his 
wife, wealth, and even kingdom for the sake of self-preservation. 
But,the force of material advantages seems to be on the decline 
in later times and that of pride and honour on the increase. This 
further suggests that the materialistic aspects of the politic 
concept of war were giving way to the heroic ideals. If the com­
1. Manas *> IT, XV * 95'2-'~ 3
j m----
Ttedh. on Manu. VII.200.
5Ibid.
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mentators like Medhatithi approve that if the king finds any 
wrong., such as disrespect on the part of his protector,he should
die fighting his enemy, an act considered to he honourable even
then
by Somadeva, Awe should not be surprised when we find that many 
proud Rajput kings preferred to court death on the battlefield 
or to disappear in obscurity rather than sacrifice their self-respect. 
While we have some historical instances of defeated kings seeking
shelter with others, such as the Paramara Prince Jayasi^ha taking
■tu
refuge with Calukya Somesvara I and^Sahi princes fleeing to Kashmir
for shelter at the court of King Ananta, it appears that samsraya
fco
as a measure of the sixjfold policy fell in' disfavour with the 
rising sense of clanish pride, which was much stimulated by mutual 
rivalry and inter-dynastic warfare. This pride heightened to the 
extent of morbidity when the Muslim invaders entered the arena of 
political strife. The alternative of samsraya. fight to the last 
man, became more attractive since it had a heroic appeal and the 
approval of the smyti writers as well as authors like Somadeva.
In fact, when a protector superior to an unvirtuous invader, 
especially the Muslim could not be found, the result was a reckless 
and desperate type of warfare,which was, however, exceptional in 
Northern India. This naturally led to the grim practice of jauhar,
g
a last right of defenders, ghatly, appalling, cruel, but indeed 
chivalrous and heroic!
Although earlier authorities like Kaujilya and Kamandaka did 
not enjoin suicidal warfare, they could not approve of a kingfs
remaining under another's protection for a long time* After having 
sought shelter a king was to try his best to regain his independence 
by means of upayas other than war. If the invader was the protector ,
the king taking shelter was to undermine his strength and create
l
conditions of his own liberation. All kinds of treacherous means 
could be employed to this end. Thus, the policy of samsraya was 
a temporary measure and a compelling necessity to ward off annihilation. 
It had only the grudging approval of our authorities.
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Chapter VIII.
UPAYAS (POLITICAL EBCP5DIEKT3)
Politics consists in the formulation and pursuit of policies 
with 6.ue regard to interest and power, The terms naya (good policy) 
and gag-gu&ya are mainly concerned with the framing of policy in 
general and the determination of appropriate policies in situations 
of inter-state conflict in particular, in order to fulfil the two­
fold obligation of government, yiz„, the security and well-being 
of one's own ma^.|.ala (geo-political sphere) and the acquisition o f 
the enemy's mandala/' But the pursuit of policy or policies and 
the implementation of particular measures in all situations of 
friendly and hostile intercourse are tasks to be accomplished by 
upayas. The concept of upayas thus deals with the operation of 
policies and .embodies ways and means appropriate to achieving their 
objectives.
The term upaya literally means 'that by which one reaches 
one's aim', 'means or expedient* and is sometimes translated as 
'stratagem or artifice'. However, it stands for 'means of success 
against an enemy'. In other words, upaya denotes an expedient 
or the means to overcome opposition to accomplishing a task or 
achieving an objective. In its very nature upaya indicates 
both a method and a means to secure compliance of others
_^W, XXX.45-47; HAC> 111,379; HDK., XIV". p. 142 quotes Vippu; 
On Maim, VII.32"*
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to one*s ora will or policy.
In politics, however, upayas are the expe^ ie^ k or means to translate
policy into action by overcoming opposition and obstacles. Our
texts state that the king should endeavour to achieve success in his
undertakings by employing,separately or collectively, upayas, which
can remove all kinds of troubles and calamities (vyasanas), both
human and divine, hampering the amelioration of an adverse state
1of affairs or the augmentation of power.
It is during the discussion of internal administration that
upay&s are first mentioned in the Arthasastra, the topic being
*toeeping a watch over the seducible and non-seducible parties in
2
onefs own territory*. It is prescribed in this connexion that 
the king should discover the contentedness and discontentedness
^On Menu,vh214: Agni, 226.5; Ykt., 99.p. 14*
HA, 11.18. v
^KA, I, 13.15-26. It has been alleged by It. P. Jayaswal, P. V. Itane
and other scholars that upayas became popular long before the 
Hathigumpha inscription of Kharavela of Italinga (1st B.C.9) in which 
it is written *... /he/ following /?he threefold policy/ chastise­
ment, alliance and conciliation (danda sandhi sa/ma/) sends out an 
expedition against Bharatavasa...1 and brings about the conquest of 
the land /or country/* • • obtains jewels and precious things of /^ Ehe 
kings/ attacked.* (B.I., XX.79,88). Some scholars think that there 
are three upayas but they fail to notice that sandhi and sama overlap. 
It appears to me that it is not very certain whether upayas are at 
all mentioned in the inscription because letters after sa are com­
pletely effaced and restorations and emendations which have been 
suggested are,^therefore, speculative. Moreover, the sequence, 
danda sandhi sama is unusual and I have not come across such a 
formulation in the theoretical texts.
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among prominent and common people of his kingdom through spies and 
should ‘manage those who are discontented by means (upayas) of con- 
ciliation (sama), gifts (dana), dissension (bheda) and force (danda).*
In this way he should guard against the secret instigations of his 
enemy. However, his own secret agents have to employ these very
expedients to win over the seducible elements of his enemy*s kingdom
2 —with a view to weaken the letter’s strength. Again^these upayas
are discussed by Kaujilya under ’the topic of ,,edictp,l which comprise
3matters of internal as well as external affairs'. In this context, 
it is evident that upayas were the acknowledged means of implementing 
policies and measures and of overcoming opposition and 
resolving conflicts in the way of success. On the ground that 
upayas are usefully applicable to internal problems^ including their 
effectiveness against a recalcitrant son, brother or kinsman, intriguing 
minister, rebellious subjects, fi’ontier governors, forest chieftains 
etc. on the eve of a war, it has been suggested that the intro­
duction of the upayas in matters of foreign policy is secondary.^- 
The suggestion may be strengthened by adducing evidence from the 
Manusmrti and its commentaries, the YuktikalQpataru etc. which ascribe
1KA, 1.13.15-26.
2Ibid.. 1.14.12.
Ibid.. 11.10.47-56; also II.10.2. 'Kings primarily depend, on edicts, 
peace and war being rooted in_them.1 Compare NV, XXXII.29.
Lekhapradhana hi raj anas tanmulatvat sandhi vigrahayob...
4
ICangle, op.cit., p.255.
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almost universal competence and utility* to the upayas in dealng
with problems of statecraft and calamities of the constituents of
states. Some Purapas distinguish internal dan&a (sva&ese), in
which case it means punishment, from external (paradese), meaning 
2war, which further supports the preceding view.
It may, however, be further suggested that the introduction 
upayas to the political theory itself represents an extension 
of the precepts of prudence and tact observed by men in their 
dealings. For, Vijfianesvara says: f,These /expedients/ conciliation
etc. are not only applicable in regard to the affair of state, 
but they are also resorts for every day dealing of the people, as
for instance, "Study 0 child study, I shall give you modakas /sweet™
-v 3meat/ or I shall give these to others, and pull out thy;* ears".1.
It is evident that a father or a teacher addresses his son or pupil 
making use of the traditional four expedients with a view to educating 
the unwilling ward. The Agni Fura&a elsewhere illustrates the use­
fulness of upayas in the training and management of a horse.4 It thus
*4see above, p26% ; RSIC, XIV, p. 128 quotes Matsya 223.8-9. Manas., II.
XIX. 1006-9.
2Agni. 234.1-2? 226.13f£; c£. Vdh., H.eNBtfjof. Matsya. 225.Iff;
226.1 ff. cf. HHP, pp.^ i$-Ff . Mitramisra brings a resume of 
criminal law under_daada, the fourth upaya, which is certainly due to 
the belief that upayas are equally valid with regard to internal as 
well as external affairs. See also RDK, Intr. p.86, It is interesting 
to note that Hemacandra^in his Arhanniti distinguishes between war, 
which he calls 1yuddhaniti1, and criminal punishment, which he calls
1dandaniti *. Some puranas discuss both aspects of dan&a often 
in continuation, but clearly point out the implications of the external 
dan da.
^0n Ya.jfl., 1.346,
4Agni, 288.29 ff
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appears that the upayas were considered means of securing the sub­
mission of others to onefs own will. Nevertheless>upayas obtained 
formal definition: as part of political theory rather than as a 
part of every-day life.
Notwithstanding the preceding possibilities, the concept of 
upayas seems to have developed in its extant form and character 
as an integral part of the theory of inter-state relations. Our 
sources,including those which bear out the association of upayas 
with everyday dealings of men and internal administration elucidate
upayas, discuss their contents, and outline their scope and utility,.
the,
mainly in relation to the enemies of state in particular and all
1
types of foreign rulers in general. It may be^  alsq^pointed out
that the context in which upayas first occur in the Arthasastra,
viz. as means of maintaining internal security and consolidation of
power, bears cross-reference to the external enemies who constantly
seek to exploit the weaknesses of their rival in order to safeguard
> 2and promote theirfchterests. It would be more correct to say that 
upayas were considered effective expedients mainly against those
1
On Manu, VII.107-9, 159, 177, 180, 198; E2K, XII.p.108; XIII.pz115, 
XIV,^pp. 126 ff quotes Manu, Ya.jfi., Matsya, Brahma j?. and Ram ay ana;
On Tajfl.» 1.345-46; Agni, chs. 226, 5 ff; 234.1 ff; 241, 46-68; cf. KN, 
XVIII. 3ff; m , XXIX. 69-74, XXX. 25 ff, 53-56; Ykt., 99-102. p.14, 
114-115.p.16, HA, 11.17 ff; Manas., II. chs, XVII-XX.w.972 ff;
HE* VIII.72-105. Of. KA, IX.3.6 ff; IX.6.20 ff; IX.7.67-68; XII. 1.18, 
, XIII.4.13. Matsya, 148.63-74; also chs. 222-225; Vdh., II. 
chs. 67-70, 72, 147-149.
2Cf. KA, 1.13.15 ff; 1.14.1 ff; also IX.3.6 ff., 5.9 ff, 7.68 ff.
Medh. on Manu, VII. 104-5, 197; See below, pp. 3 9 $ tf. „ alienable 
parties.
elements of one's own kingdom such as seditious people, intriguing 
kinsmen, refractory frontier governors, and perfidious forest chief­
tains etc., whose activities adversely affected the power of the 
state in relation to its external affairs. For the pursuit of foreign 
policy it was necessary that advances ..made by foreign rulers with
upayas against oneself inside one1 s own kingdom as well as among
1allies, must be counteracted by similar methods and means. In this
respect upayas were equally useful for putting down internal troubles
pot
as for overcoming external difficulties, which couM be divorced 
from internal policy.
In fact, the upayas attained greater relevance to foreign affairs, 
perhaps because unlike the internal sphere of state activity, which 
was governed by law and included a system of punishment and reward, 
an organized government and a sovereign responsible for law and order, 
the inter-state sphere was regulated merely by dharma, capable of 
elastic interpretation, and lacked inter-state organization or any 
recognised system to deal with disputes and problems arising out of 
conflict for power among states. Owing to these factors, while 
justice and adjustment of conflicting interests could be had in 
matters internal, by asserting political authority, these depended 
on the artful management, power and necessities of the rivals in 
inter-state sphere. Despite the claims of dharma being the law
*^ Medh, on Manu, VII. 104-5; Agni, 24I.46.ff
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among kings and the fact that conventions connected with war and 
with conquered kingdoms were well established, it cannot be denied 
that in the last analysis the foreign policy was based on power 
and conducted on the basis of expediency rather than religious 
principle.1 And upayas were rules of expediency by their very con­
notation. Moreover; the contents of upayas and the mechanics of 
their application leave no doubt as to their indispensability in 
conducting foreign affairs anaalso^their validity In dealing with 
internal matters affecting the security and power of the kingdom.
In inter-state politics the concept of upayas embodies ex­
pedients of statesmanship and diplomacy seeking artfully to arrange 
and regulate the inter-state system to one’s own best political 
and material advantages by constantly endeavouring to create a 
favourable balance of power in order to attain success in one’s 
internal undertakings and external enterprizes. Manu and Xajnavalkya 
and their commentators prescribe that a king should employ upayas 
in order to deal withfSrole of kings (mandala) in such a way 
that he makes himself greater than his allies, enemies and neutrals 
in respect of the threefold power, which sustains and expands his 
political supremacy. Like Visvarupa, Medhatithi clearly states:
1The classic illustration of the way in which the king should conduct 
himself is furnished by Manu, who repeats the Arthasastra tradition 
of expediency a^§uiding principle in politics. Bakavac cintayed arth 
simhavac ca psrakramet. Vrlcavac cavalumpeta sasavac ca vinispatet.
Manu VII. 106; see also Commentaries of Medh. and ICulluka; cf. Mhh/tq,
XII.140-62 ff.
20n Manu. VII.159, 177, 180/^also quoted in RDK. XII.p.108, XIII.p.113. 
On Ya.ifl.. 1.345; Aani. 233.23, cf. Vdh.. III.38.
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’By means of these expedients, the king shall deliberate upon his 
whole circle* (mandala)»’ and later commentators repeat such 
expressions. Manu says: ’All these /allies, enemies, middle and 
neutral kings/ he / t h e  kin^ shall win over by means of conciliation 
and the other expedients, severally as well as collectively, as 
also by prowess and policy.* Visvarupa and Apararka further 
elucidate the suitability of different expedients for prevailing 
over these kings of the mandala, the general rule being that the 
neighbouring enemy should be dealt with by force (dam&a), the 
ally by conciliation and also gifts, and showing gains or advantages 
(sama-dana), the neutrals by gifts and conciliationand all others
7
especially the enemy’s partisans,, by sowing dissension (bheda).
It is further emphasized that these guide lines with regard to 
the suitability of the particular expedients should never be divorced 
from the relative power of the parties, as for instance*Apararka 
says that the king shuuld overcome weaker kings of his mandala by 
force (dan&a), equals by conciliation^ kings by gifts (dana) and 
those even more powerful by sowing dissension (bheda).^
ITurther, the implementation of gadgunya against enemies involves 
the separate or collective employment of upayas according to the
10n Manu. VII.177; On Ya.in. 1.345.
^Manu. VII.159; of. Kk , VII.16.4.
Visvaiupa on Ya.jh, 1.342; Apararka on Ya.jfi. t 1.343*
Xbid.; cf KA, VIEL6.3; CaksMiyam. III.39.p.17.
factors of power, place and time,, are particularly addressed to a 
state of war(vigraha), battle and siege. Even the policies of 
sandhi, asana, dvaidhibhava and samsraya cannot be executed without 
their application. Indeed, according to Medhatithi and Hemacandra* 
the policy of asana is made feasible by sama, dana, and bheda,^
It may be reiterated that upayas are detailed in connexion with 
gadgunya in general and yana or yatra in particular.2 Thus,upayas 
constitute means of diplomacy and war, which were employed to 
conduct one* s external relations and to cope with problems arising 
out of conflict for power.
Having discussed the meaning of the upayas we shall now proceed 
to describe their contents and mechanics.
The concept of upayas developed and expanded its contents 
and character as it comprised the four expedients of sama (conciliation), 
dana (gifts, concession or bribery), bheda (sowing dissension) and 
dan&a (punishment or force). These principal upayas were further 
crystallised into several sub-types in the Arthasastra
and later nitisara works. Our sources carry forward two distinct 
traditions. The earlier of these comprises the aforementioned four 
upayas, while the latter adds three more, viz., maya (illusion or 
deceitful trick), upekga (indifference) and indrajala (magic or 
incantation). While the commentators on Manu and Yajftavalkya, Somadeva,
10n Manu. VII.172; HA., 11.12.
On Manu. VII.197-98; RDK. XIV,pp.116 ff. See above p .371 fn. 1
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/ 1Bhoja, Hemacandra, Somesvara III mainly mention the principal four
—  —  2upayas, the Pura$as, viz., the Matsya, the 7ignudharmo11ara and
Agni, enumerate all the seven expedients. Lakgmidhara quotes 
that very verse from the Matsya Purana which describes all the seven
3
expedients, although, like its author, he also omits the three 
later upayas from his discussion as he follows * a higher ethics of
/j
sastras condemning the use of deception and unfair means1. Hans 
5Losch has been misled by Prof. K. 7. Rang^swam^s sweeping remark 
into believing that the three later upayas do not occur in the 
krtyakalpataru. Hemacandra also elsewhere betrays his knowledge of
all the seven expedients, although he stigmatizes the later three
* 6as kgudropaya (inferior expedients). Even Somesvara shows his
knowledge of maya lndra.jala ~ - a a upekga in a different fashion 
for he describes upekgasana, includes maya as a treacherous way
of killing the enemy^and mentions abhicara (same as indrajala)
7 *
under different kinds of danda. It seems that while some Purapas
1
See above, p.£'7* fn. 1 ,
Matsya. 222.2; Vdh.. IX.67.2; Agni. 226.5-6, 254. Iff, 241. 46-68.
^RDK. XIV. pp. 126-27.
4Ibid., Intro, p.86.
HAC. Ill, 400-402.
Planas., II .xii.933-35, XX.1237 ff.
and the ICamandakiya gave full recognition to the three later ex­
pedients, other authorities countenanced them grudgingly in such 
contexts where these were expedient to success or to counteract 
similar stratagems of the enemy. This conclusion is further 
strengthened by the fact that though deprecating the use of maya 
(deceitful trick) in an ideal king's conduct towards his enemies,
Manu and his commentators admit that other kings applied it to
1alienate the seducible parties of their enemy's kingdom with a view 
itv}/
to weaken-^their strength. Further, in connexion with siege warfare >
Manu and his commentators recommend that 'the king shall frighten
his enemy during the night by means of men holding on their heads
jars of flaming fire, and crying like jackals. People seeing such
portents would keep up during the night; and being fatigued by
2the waking would be easily reducible.' This is just a device of 
practising rnaya.^  Furthermore, Kaujilya has also described the 
foul practices of fire, poison and assassination, trickery, magic 
and spells and various other devices of deception and instigation 
to rebellion and treachery (upajapa) in order to exasperate the 
enemy as means of concealed, secret and diplomatic kinds of war 
(lcuta, t/ugsam and mantra yuddha).^  In fact, the practice of maya 
and indrajala goes further back to the Atharva Veda samhita and its
Medh. on Manu. VII.104-5.
Slanu. VII.196; cf. KA., X.3.19-20.
3
See below, pp. 4*^ 0 *
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1tenets, which describe a number of spells and charms, surely of baser 
kinds, to achieve one’s object' against an enemy. Even the Buddhist
A
canonical books, as for example the Brahmajala sutta of the Digha 
«* 2Nakaya^ countenance these superstitions*mysterious practices and
stratagems, Thus* it is evident that these later practices are not
to
unknown to earlier authorities norAthe later Smyti commentators.
What some Furagtas  ^the -Parhaspatya Arthasastra and the Kamandakiya 
did;w&3to systematize and regularize these deceptive expedients 
and advocate them as norms of diplomacy and war.
It is, however, difficult to ascertain when upekga, maya, and
indrajala became regular upayas. The Barhaspatya Sutra (Arthasastra)
 ___ 3 a
has upekga, maya and vadha and expressly forbids practising indrajala.
But, as pointed out earlier, the Matsya Furana mentions them.^ It seems
that the tradition of these baser practices of statecraft was old r  ■ ■/;
but they obtained full recognition after the Gupta period. It is not
unlikely that growing superstitions and interest in tantra during
our period gave an impetus to such practices as recognised means of
achieving political objectives.
In the end it may be pointed out that the full recognition of
these later practices as independent expedients enriched the art of
1  ; ! ■ —  ; 7  1 ™  -  ■ : : ■
AV, Bk. X. 5• (6> n f f i t h r Vol. U , p  /?, n JA/A /. p g-Sf ^
2
Vol. 1 pp. 146; see also B.C.Law, A History of Pali literature, pp. 81 f. 
cf. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II.p.36. All these 
references are cited from WAI, p.335*
^Bar. Sutra, V.J,
4 - -Ibid., 1.8. Indrajaliko na kuryat.
^Matsya, 222.2; Mbh., III.M9.42 - mentions five upayas and gives in- 
’dependent status Vo upekga.
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diplomacy and war, which obtained new weapons to cause psychological 
disturbances in the enemy*s ranks. The concept of upayas was brought 
to completion by the addition of upekga (indifference or inaction), 
which was advocated as an alternative expedient to all the four 
upayas of action. Indifference was, however, not equivalent to 
apathy^ but mpant an expedient calculated to approximate ends without 
direct involvement < wktJi the enemy in a state of hostilities. It 
was an expedient to execute the policy of as ana in which respect 
it would have deserved its place in the concept of upayas much
‘m&jj
earlier. its later recognition^suggest that the independent
tradition of the upayas reasserted its distinct character against 
the concept of ga&gunya and claimed equal, if not more, importance 
by increasing the number of its expedients thereby demonstrating i tco id d  
sum up all that was worthwhile in statecraft;" As sandhi- and vigraha 
were the two basic policies, so sama and dan&a were the basic 
expedients. But^as the gadguaya developed six forms of foreign 
policy it was natural that the concept of upavas would also accj(.tic€ 
new expedients. Maya and indrajala further marked the exploitation 
of superstitions and popular beliefs for the purpose of promoting 
political objectives. In this respect diplomacy was freed from 
religio-ethical inhibitions and politics became a rather unrighteous 
pursuit of power and material well-being of subjects.
We shall now proceed to examine these seven expedients of
txrvid  to a ji.
diplomacy^ with regard to their nature and application.
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SAMA (conciliation)
The foremost expedient sama means ’conciliation1. In its
application, however, it comprises various methods and means to
win over hostile elements of one’s own kingdom suchjas rebels,
feudatories, disaffected ministers etc® or to overcome adversaries
in inter-state relations.^ ’Sama consists in [pleasant] speeck and
2[winsome] gestures*’ Hemecandra says, ’Pacification by reception,
3
honour, favour, pleasant conversation etc* is conciliation.’
These ways of conciliation are repeated in other sources.^ Medha-
tithi further elucidates that a king 1 should not go to war in a
hurry. At first he should try conciliation, that is, friendly
meetings, sitting together, conversing, seeking each other’s wife
6and so forth.„. ’ It Is evident that sama involves conciliatory talks 
and persuasion, which obviously imply some kind of negotiation.
The talks are held in a cordial atmosphere, pursued with suavity 
and facilitated by exchange of courtesies and friendly visits to 
each other’s family. Whatever the political objectives, whether
Ami. 225.11; on Man.ii, VII.198; of. KA, IX.5.9 ff; IX.3.6 ff,
■ 1.346. Visvarupa -_Sama vaoikag kayikagi ca.
Vijftanesvara and Apararka - Sama priyabhagajaarn > ___
Agni. 241.54; same as M, XVIII.15; HA, flJ.7; Ykt.. 100.p.14; 
Manas.. II.XVII.978 ff.
^HA., 11.18 c;. p.26.
4 «
'Hull. on Manu, 198; cf. KA, IX.5* 10. Sthana-mana-karma santvam,
On Manu, VII.198- Ma sahasa yuddhate, dtavat prathamam visistasthaoano- 
padesanadsumulchatii ca mitho saliasanakatha sahadaradarsanadi.
demanding submission or suing for peace, it is sought to be accom­
plished by pleasing the opponent.
Repeating ICauJiilya/Somadeva says, 1 sama is fivefold: praising
of merits, mention of relationship, pointing out mutual benefits,
showing (advantages in) the future, and placing oneself at the (other1s) 
1disposal.1 These five forms are further elaborated by ICauJilya as 
follows: ”Among these, appreciation of the merits of birth, body,
occupation, nature, learning property and so on, praise, adulation, 
this is praising of merits. The praising of (common) kinship, marriage 
relationship, relationship through teaching, relationship through 
sacrificial performances, (common) family, (affection of) the heart, 
and (common) friend, this is mention of relationship. The praising 
of mutual benefits accruing to one's party and the party of the 
other, this is pointing out mutual benefits.5 fIf this were done 
in this way, this will happen to us (both)^this raising of hope is 
showing (advantages) in the future.1' 'What I am is you, what object 
belongs to me should be used by you in your works/ this is placing
A
oneself at the (other's) disposal.**
The Matsya quoted by Lakgmidhara and the Agni Purana also 
describe similar ways of conciliating righteous adversaries, viz., 
by extolling his family and good conduct, by mentioning services
XXIX, 70 - TaTtra pahcavidham sama. gunasankirtanam sambandhopakhyanam 
paropakaradarsanam _ayatipradarsanam atmopanibandhanam iti: same as
KA, 11.10.48; cf. g ,  XVIII.4-5.
^KA, 11.10.49-53; Somadeva omits the eLucidation of the first four^but 
reproduces the fifthrone, see NV, XXIX.71 - Ian mama 
svakytyegu prayujyatam ity atmopanidhanam.
rendered, by approving his activities in other spheres, by express-
1ing gratitude, and by pointing to mutual benefits in the future.
The Agni Purana discusses four kinds of conciliation, which are
w  2
virtually a: repetition of the last four aforementioned sama.
Somesvara, however, has somewhat different fivefold classi- 
fications of sama. ICar&asubhaga (pleasant to ears) consists in 
sweet and pleasant conversation between two parties who have 
different objectives at heart,^ Daivika (involving gods) is 
that in which oaths are taken by invoking gods in order to create 
confidence in the sincerity of conciliatory talks or negotiations of
5 wm O '  mm mm
peace and amity. Smaijka is the same as sambandhopakhyana of
Kau^ilya, Kamandaka, and Somadeva. It consists in reminding the
6enemy of the former kinship now forgotten by him. hobha.j a is
virtually the appeasement of the greedy antagonist. It involves
offering a village,atown,acountry, elephants, horses, and. money
7
in order to conciliate an enemy. This kind of sama is probably 
advisable for a weak king in order to induce the invader to conclude 
a treaty, Somadeva has also recommended the expedient of sama
Matsya. 222.6-7, quoted in RDIC, XIV.p.X27. Agni. 226,-8; 241.47-8; 
of. Vdh., IX.67.6-7.
2Agni, 243.47-4-8. Same as KN, XVIII. 4-5.
M^anas.. II.XVII.979-80.
4
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involving the payment of money for dissuading a powerful adversary 
from invading one!s kingdom* A vi,1 igigu may also practise it 
for conciliating his refractory feudatories, disloyal allies, 
enemy*s confederates, people offering resistance in a conquered 
kingdom etc. It may, however, he remarked that lobhaja combines 
sama with another expedient, viz. dana. The fifth, ni.jarpa&a, is 
the same as described by Kaujilya, Kamandaka and Somadeva, in which
conciliation is practised by verbally placing one*s property and
&
oneself entirely at the service of another. It is evident that 
Somesvara* s lobha,ja and daivilca are rather new kinds of sama, 
which seem to be connected with overtures of sandhi (peace cj.% 
treaty), which entailed the offer of beasts of burden, wealth and
QTi
territory and depended on^oath for its binding.
Further, some Furaffas distinguish only two kinds of sama; 
satya-sama (sincere conciliation) and asatya-sahia (insincere con- 
ciliation). They lay down that the former is to be practised 
towards enemies,, who ace of high pedigree, upright, righteous and 
possess control over their senses^ and the latter toxfards unrighteous
7
and unscrupulous opponents. It is emphasized that sama could not 
be effective against all kinds of enemies. For some Pura^as affirm 
that though it is said that even the Ralcgasas were won over by sama, 
it should not be applied to overcome a wicked enemy^because he re­
gards the conciliatory advances of the king as signs of the latter*s
1KV, XXX.32-33. 2  U  - 7fry.
Agni, 226.6; Matsya. 222.3 quoted in KDK. XX?.p.127. cf. ?dh.,
IX.67.3
Ibid.. 226.7; Ibid.. 222.5, quoted in BEK. XI7.p.l27. cf. Vdfa., 
II*67.4-5f 10; see also Matsya, 222.10.
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1weakness and indulges in greater mischief. On account of this *>
the application of sama is ordinarily discouraged wvtk enemies 
a
of highly suspicious nature, wicked disposition, and unrighteous
A
2
conduct. If, however, the conciliation of such enemies becomes 
necessary, it has to be insincere in nature and purely expedient 
in character. On the contrary, sincere conciliation is recommended 
as the best expedient to win over opponents who are noble, grateful, 
compassionate and righteous, and also those attaching importance 
to friendship and of honourable intentions,^
It is evident that in practising sama an appeal is made to 
the adversary’s conscience, common sense and reason. Helms to 
be persuaded to realize the mutual benefits of abandoning hostility, 
fhe stress is upon amity, attachment, friendship and future ad­
vantages, as against hostility, bitterness and loss, which unark
the-
the existing rupture. Sama also involves granting of favours of  A
1
Agni, 226.8; Matsya, 222.8 (luoted in RDK, XIV.p. 127. cf.
148.69 ff; cf. Vdh., II.67.8.
2Mafaaya. 222.9; quoted in RDK. XXV, 126-27. KDK also quotes 
Ramayaaa; Ylck, llh.p.16; cf. Matsya » 148.69 ff.
^Manas., XVII.978; see above, p. fn. 3 .
^Agni, 241.60 - maitripradhanam kalyanabuddhim santvena sadhayet, 
same as KN, XVIII.46, ICA,' IX.6.22. Both Kautilya (ibid.) and 
Kamandaka (XVIII. 45-46y~recommend sama towards ’one whose energy 
has left him, one weary of war, one whose efforts are ."frustrated, 
one distressed by losses and expenses and by the expedition abroad, 
one seeking another /ally7 with Chi s) integrity, one afraid of another..., 
a foolish king, women, boy king and one given to religion and others.
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•crx^i. *x-
various kinds as, for instance, in^case of internal enemies ' giving a.poSLXjan
1and showing honour1, during an expedition, the protection of those
dwelling in villages ^  for estreat tie ... ' and trade routes., and
handing over of those who are discarded, who have deserted and
2who have done harm, and in the course of negotiations making con­
cessions of villages, towns and territory etc. and approval of t>\^ _ 
enemy's action in other spheres. An aggrieved king or a frightened 
rebellious feudatory may practice sama by making a verbal surrender 
of himself, and his resources. Thus,, the expedient of sama consists 
of many measures in different circumstances^ and is the best ex­
pedient to remove hostility, having at its root animosity, insult, 
injustice, wounded pride and other grievances or disaffection 
among one's own constituents (prakrtis) of state. Conciliation 
has to be practised to win over submissive kings and those defeated 
in battle in order to ensure their loyalty to oneself as well as
3
to one's descendants. Enemies whose strength has broken down 
and ministers and subjects of an occupied country should be brought 
under control by sama^' In fact, the entire range of hostile acti­
vities has to be accompanied with conciliatory measures of some 
kind if one wishes to extend his sway over others. However, sama 
alone does not go much further without dana and is limited in its
1KA., IX.5.10.
2m & - ,  VII.16.5,
3Cf. BU, VII.16.3, 17-29.
40n Menu. VII.201-4, 206-7; RDK. XIV. 137-138; see above, p . W  fn4 .
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application by the virtuous disposition of opponents , sljicL 
is not only ineffective but also risky -with the wicked and un­
righteous.
D M  A (Gifts, concessions or bribery)
Dana is a very comprehensive term which literally means * gifts 
or donation* of anything made for various purposes. As apolitical 
expedient, however, it denotes an agreeable transaction between two 
parties, one making gifts of his own possessions and the other 
accepting without anger whatever is being offered.^ According to 
Medhatithi, ‘presents of gold and other things in token of affection 
for the purpose of creating mutual attachment is making gifts (dana,). * ^ 
Somadeva says, 1 Giving away a little money to appease the enemy for 
the protection of a great wealth j/?rom his wrath or invasion/ is 
making gifts (dana)*1^  Somesvara, however, construes dana to consist 
in gifts of desired objects, grains, gold and other precious jewels 
and articles, elephants, horses, a village, territory or province,
sea-caast including port and town, rank or honour, courtesans and girls
4
or princesses in marriage. Our other sources repeat that dana
comprises these objects and also granting of safety of life (abhaya-dana),
5
exemptions and even employment in works.
1 / *Visvarupa on Yajn., 1.342 - Danam diyamanasyakopena grahanam, 
svakiyasya/danam.
20n Manu. VXX.198'.
3SV, XXIX.73. Bahvarthasamraksanayalparthapradanena paraprassQdanam 
M^ anas,iL-XI3C. 1010 ff.
^HA. 11.17.18^5 Commentators on Manu. VII. 193• on
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It is apparent from these statements that dana comprises 
temptations, blandishments, and inducements of various kinds to 
win over opponents, to establish a liaison between oneself and the 
enemy*s subjects who are disaffected or greedy, to maintain friendly 
relations and to wean away inimical forces in the inter-state sphere, 
as well as to overcome the? " discontented elements within one*s ora 
kingdom. In fact, dana is capable of dealing with all kinds of 
internal troubles as well as achieving the objectives of policies 
against external enemies, friends and neutrals. In its application 
dana may take the form of gifts, concessions, or bribery or rewards
according to the motives and purposes to be achieved and the character
*tbe.
of ^parties involved in the transaction.
Medhatithi elucidates dana in the context of expedition and 
siege, which implies that presents of precious objects are given
by the vijigigu to the adversary or his feudatory to win over the
1 Sifts the.
latter as an ally, or^mean, bribery toAenemy,s supporter^troops
and allies and temptations to deserters in order to weaken the enemy* s
resistance or to create internal dangers for him; or, after the
pif’ts OXQ Ofib.V'SxL
battle^ to pacify the conquered subjects, to conciliate t/he
enemy’s followers and to ensure the loyalty of the newly created
2 ■* vassal; or,before battle„dana may indicate gifts to one*s own
(cont.) Apararka on Ya.iK.. 1.343. KA, 11.10.54, VII.16.6; 1X.5.11 .
On Manu. VII.198.
2Ibid., VII.201,203'4,
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warriors and other supporters. The employment of dana by the
aggrieved king may denote presents to the invader or offer of
financial concessions with a view to creating attachment for
1
himself and thus to induce the latter to conclude a sandhi.
Xn this case dana may also imply tribute or. indemnity# or both. 
Likewise*it may mean bribery if the victim seeks to win over the
aggressor*s allies, feudatories, ministers, military officers
'in
with a viexf to compelling him to relentAhis onslaught. The uses 
of dana,in the sense of bribery^are many.
It h $brCkuy 'H'uut jS o r^ d & m - to mean either
tribute or presents to a powerful ruler in order to avert invasion 
or to maintain friendly relations. He makes a strong plea for paying 
tribute when a powerful adversary asks for it>either regularly or 
occasionally, especially when the demand is backed by a threat of 
invasion. He says, *only a fool courts destruction for the sake 
of avoiding a small expenditure, for what wise man would abandon 
his merchandise for fear of paying the tolls and duties.* !Is that 
an expense,* continues the author, *which protects a great' wealth.* 
*When one refuses wealth to a strong enemy, his life along with 
his wealth is taken away by the latter.* Thus^  he advises a weak 
king to avoid war by paying tribute when asked to do so by the 
strong aggressor. He further counsels a king to keep his powerful
^See above, pp. JLd 3 - 4  . cf. KA, YXI. 15.20. 
2W . XXX, 27-29,51.
neighbour gratified by giving him wealth under some pretext on
occasions of marriage, festival, entry into a new house etc,
because j by not giving him wealth under some pretext for a long
time,he runs the risk of being subjugated and bound bynvictor*s
1
orders to pay regular tribute. Thus,Somadeva distinguishes be­
tween two kinds of kings, one who should pay tribute when the 
powerful king desires, as was probably the case between the over­
lord and feudatory, and another an unequal king,who, under some 
pretext,offers presents to his strong neighbour in order to ensure 
the security of his possessions and maintain peaceful relations. 
Thus,the expedient of dana applies to inter-state relations 
both in times of war and peace. Somadeva is, however, also aware 
of the ordinary connotations of dana as making gifts of land, con­
ferring favours on the enemy*s relatives and gratifying one's 
own ministers and troops with money and other objects.
Somesvara construes the expedient of dana mainly in the sense 
of bribing the enemy*s ministers, officials, kinsmen, feudatories, 
vassals and his supporters in war and diplomacy, all those close 
to the enemy, his servants etc. who are disaffected yviih their 
master for various reasons, such as the lcing*s expensive habit of 
giving away lai*gesses of wealth, pretensions to family inheritance
(e.g. a pretender to the throne), non-receipt of salary, and the
2 -seizure of wealth. He further advises the king to employ dana
1m ,  XXX. 32-33.
2
^Qaaa. ,T1-XIX. 1005-1008.
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towards his own ministers and others who have no attachment for
1 ~himself. Thus his interpretation of dana(hoth as bribery and
gif ts> make it to overlap bheda on the one hand and sama on
the other.
The Agni Pur ana, repeating Kamandaka, holds that 1 giving 
away of acquired wealth in large, small or middle /quantity?/
m 2
is making gifts (dana),1 It is fivefold: return (or exchange)
of gifts, acquiescence in £he seizure, bestowal of something not
given before; permission (to seize or to keep) one's own acquisition
(in the enemy country or from the enemy property), and remission 
3
of dues.1
Manas.JDXXX.1009.
2 j m
Agni, 241,48 - Yah samprapta-dhanotsarga uttamadhamacmadhyajnaji*; 
same as KN, XVIII,6, cf. KA, 11.10.54 - ITpapradanam arthopakarah.
It may be pointed out that 1uttamadhamamadhyamah* may also refer 
to the three classes of people receiving gifts according to their 
character and qualifications. Sa&cararya on KH, thinks that they 
refer to three kinds of allies in war.
^Agnlt 241.49-50 - firatidanam tadalbasya ^rhitasyanumodanamI .Bravyadanam 
apurvam ca svayamgraha daharji pancavidham
smytaml the same as Ktf, XVIII. 6-7 f with slight difference in the 
last linej which reads 'jfteyasya pratimokgasya ... * The translation 
and interpretation of these verses are divergent and faulty. Hr, H.H.
Dutt ,who translated both the Agni P. and the Kamandakiya.failed to
im.t. «i* n i*n iifr i^ ipii^  “
noticefTormer1s reproduction from the latter and hence there is . n o t  
much coherence in his translations. (See Agni Purapa (tr.) vol. II. 
p. 868; KH, (tr.) p.231. P. V. Kane (H.D.S., III.p.174) confusedly 
translates these verses without specifying the source. He, however, 
ventures no interpretation, nor is he able to make anything clear as 
reg^ards the fivefold gifts. In f ac 19Kamandaka himself ha& reproduced 
Kaujfcilya, who clearly describes?, the fivefold gifts as follows: Deya
vlsargo grhitanuvartanam attapratidanam svadrayyadanacpurvam parasvegu- 
svayamgrahadanam ca. KA, IX.6.24.
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These cryptic statements admit of divergent interpretations,
Kaujilya, who first distinguished these five modes of making gifts’^
elsewhere,elucidates the second, third, and fourth in dealing with
a rebellious son, brother or kinsman. He advises that fif lacking
in energy1 to put down the rebel planning to seize the kingdom1,
the king should overcome the rebel *by acquiescing In what is seized...1;
1 or he should create confidence in him by grants of land to others
/not made before^ like him1, for he should send /against hima/ troops
2
superior to him that are permitted to seize what they can.,.1 
Thus,in the first case it is a concession; in the second, it is an 
extension of gifts to the other in consequence of the former actj 
and in the third, it is a permission to plunder one^ own acquisition^ - 
now fallen into the possession of the enemyy In other contexts 
he .. shows how the king has to practise dana in subjugating other 
kings by force, when they behave submissively;^ hiier-e alSo
those contexts where dana is really bribery. The Jayamahgala
■ "•■■in i-.Ji1fi.iniM' in.
commentary on the Kamandaklya, however, construes the fivefold 
dana as exemplified by a kingTs ways of their application towards 
his confederates or allied troops in order to keep them under con-
f w Jnavixicj ^
trol. Sankararya comments ; that ^distinguished; between sara (an 
ally or confederate prince) and asara (a rearward ally) a king
mm
should practise dana by making return gifts from his acquired wealth
1KA, XX. 6.24.
2Ibid.. XX.3.15-17.
'’ibid.. IX.6.23; VII.16.3.6.
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(that is, probahly^wealtS^obtained with their assistance), by
approving of what they have seized (during war), by granting new
valuables from his treasury not given before, by permitting them
to seize what they<an (i.e. permission to plunder) from the enemy1 s
property, and by remitting what is due (that is his own share of
spoils or tribute due to himself).
However, the fivefold dana may be given a broader application
during war itself. It may be suggested that return gifts (pratidana)
can be practised between two antagonists intending anagreement or
treaty (sandhi) as, for instance, between Sultan Mahmud and the
Candella king Vidyadharu when the latter decided to come to honourable
2
terms with the former. The 1 acquiescence in seizure1 may signify
a king*s acceptance of a fait accompli such as the capture of valuables,
a fort or a territory by his adversary because he wants a rapprochement,
as probably happened between the Oaulukya king Kumarapala and the
Cahamana king Vigraharaja IV, when the former approved of the latter1s
encroachments on his empire, whereupon Vigraharaja IV diverted his
3later expeditions against kings to the north of his kingdom. The
1 gifts of things not given before1 may imply a conquerorfs giving of
precious gifts of a weapon, umbrella, throne, crown and so forth
to the new king, whom he has installed in a vanquished realm.
1CT. XVIII.6-7. of. BA, VII.5.48-49.
2
N.S.Bose, op.cit., pp. 60 ff.
3D. Sharma, op.cit., pp. 57 ff.
"^On Medh. on Manu, VII. 2®g.
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'The permission to one*s own acquisition* may imply a concession^
from the conqueror to an ally, or feudatory, to seize what he
can during or after a campaign, *The remission of what is due*
may just indicate the conquerors liberality to forego’ his tributes
from a vassal in order to win him over. In the ICamandakiya and the
Agni purana these different ways of practising dana are described
from the point of view of a conqueror, but these may also be
interpreted from thejpoint of view of a submissive king or a king
seeking to remove dangers from internal revolts and the collusion
between enemies and allies,
Somesvara has detailed sixteen kinds of dana, Abhista is
the gift of suitable things or desired objects to appropriate
2persons,* according to their qualifications, Giving away as much 
grain as is sufficient for tie whole family for a year is called
*■ "5 mm A
hay ana. Desya is the gift of land or country (ragfra). Karaj a
is making a gift of taxes or revenue of a country or province (ragfrra).
6Gifts of elephants are called danti, and of horses saptiia. Givins:
r ai  •  «  ■ j i  *  i n  m n i m m  una W
a tax-free village or one with taxes is grama.ja. das ana is a royal
1Manas.;iT>XIX. 1010-11.
2Ibid.. 1012.
■Abid., 1013.
Abicl.. 1014.
5Ibid.
Ibid., 1015.
7lbid., 1016.
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grant or charter making gifts of land etc. in perpetuity, heritable
! '•by the donorfs descendants.* The gift;, of beautiful jewels and
• »  mm ■ « *  Q
decorations is known as bhuga-dana.' The gift of various kinds of
3clothes is called vasana. Pratipatti is conferring high rank, 
honour, title or rule. It involves offering a seat (asana) and
4
giving a chowrie, parasol, conveyance xri-th due honour and dignity. 
This may signify gifts made to a newly installed king in a vanquished 
country, as described by Medhatithi > or the grant of status such as 
the creatinn of a feudatory or appointment of a person to a position 
of authority and influence. It is also likely that pratipatti-dana 
was practised in other contexts as well, but the articles involved 
in the gift largely imply the conferment of some political or ad­
ministrative position. Akara is gifts of mines of silver, gold and
jewels^ The gift of choicest gold ornaments for neck or breast
*  y
(nigka&i) (also used as money) is called rukma.‘ Giving away of
a girl possessed of good marks and adorned with ornaments in a
o
proper manner (i.e. observing rites and ceremonies) is kanyadana.
1Manas. .(7-XIX.1017.
2Ibid.. 1018.
3Ittd., 1019-20.
4Ibid.. 1021.
50n Manu. VII.203.
Mana3,)i;XIX. 1022. 
h b i d .. 1023.
8Ibid.. 1024.
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gift of a beautiful, youthful courtesan, who is proficient in
music and dance is called vaisya . Yelalcara is the gift of a
sea-coast along with a port and flourishing town inhabited by
2
seafaring mercantile people, who deal in rich commodities.
These sixteen kinds of gifts are treated by Som@|vara as
comprising dana, which is used as a political expedient. He also
3
describes gifts of animals,probably for religious sacrifices, 
which wan both worlds. The various articles of gifts for practising 
dana suggest that it could be^very effective expedient towards 
opponents who would succumb to temptations or be won over by 
financial and territorial concessions or grant of rule. Dana also 
includes political marriages and these were frequently contracted 
during our period. Many of these, as for instance, that of Kaft- 
camdeva, the daughter of the Caulukya king Jayasimha Siddharaja with 
the Cahamana king A^oraja; of Jehala^a, Arnoraja's daughter with the 
Caulukya king Kumarapala,and many others,had only political purposes 
for both parties. Political marriages were indeed a powerful means 
to overcome an enemy an! also a factor of great importance in inter­
state politics. Somesvarafs long list of objects involved in making 
gifts suggests that dana was applied to achieve manifold political 
objectives ranging from the consolidation of power to the conquest
HKanas. JpCIX.1025.
2Xbid.. 1026-27.
Ibid.. 1028,
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and pacification of enemies in the inter-state sphere.
The expedient of dana is particularly recommended for use
towards those who are greedy by nature, weakened in resources, and
1 *given to various kinds of vices. Dana , in fact,is said to be
2
capable of accomplishing all objectives. In general, our sources 
consider it an irresistable expedient to avoid war, to pacify enemies 
in the inter-state sphere as well as within one’s own kingdom,
3
to sever the fastest of alliances, to win over the enemy’s men
to one’s own side and to approximate numerous other political
objectives.The-Pura^ias and Somesvara declare that there is none in
this world who cannot be overcome by dana; even gods are won
over by gifts, what then of mortals.^ Even virtuous persons devoid
of avarice? though they do not accept
gifts, nevertheless side with the king who makes such a gesture.
A king practising gifts wins both worlds and is worshipped like a
6god by the people.
hgni, 241.612 cf. KN, XVIII.47; KDK. XIV, p.129; Ykt., 101.p.14, 
115*p.l6. Manas,!?. XIX. 1008.
Manas. .1T.-XEX.1050: cf. Matsya. 224.3.
3
Agni, 226.13; of. Matsya, 224.4; Vdh, II.69.3.
4 *
Ibid., 226.12, cf. Ibid., 224.2-3; Ibid., II.69.2. ManagJPXIX.1029.
Matsya, 224.5 quoted in RDIC, XIV.p.129; cf. yah. .V 69.5 -
g
Agni, 226.12; Matsya. 224.1 quoted in SDK. XIV.p.129; Manas-,S/XIX. 
1029-30; cf. Vdh., 69.1, 5-6.
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BHBDA (Sowing dissension)
The expedient of bheda (sowing dissension) is a method 
to safeguard,as well as to promote,one's own interests in inter­
state relations by creating mutual dissension and strife among 
enemies and their allies and alienating their men to serve one's 
own cause against the interests of their masters. According to
Visvarupa bheda means * division of united /parties/ by in-
1 —
stigation to rebellion or treachery1. Medhatithi writes^ 'bheda 
is the winning orer of his /the enemy's/ family members. This
2last means also the arousing of fear in his mind and so forth.'
Somadeva defines bheda as 'Sowing mutual apprehension and reprimanding 
/i.e. strife by admonition/among the enemy troox^ s by the agency of 
a bravo, a secret agent, a spy in the pay of both /Le. the king and 
his enemy/'^ Hemacandra states; 'generating mutual contrariness 
of purpose or will among /the opponents_'/ ministers and others 
/government authorities/ by temptations of wealth etc. and cleverness
4
of speech is bheda.' Vijflanesvara says, 'bheda is causing etjvistons.;
1 „ ,  «. . „
Oh Yajh., 1.342. Bhedah samhatayor upajapya vlsleganam.
2 «*»
^anu, VII. 198. Bhedas tafeokulinadeilupasamgrahab <- Tato vis<
tatra vitrasanam ityadaya karanam. ’ 6 *
 ^ M ti
W » XXXIX. 74. Yoga tikgna gujliapurugobhayavetan.aih par,balasya paraspara- 
sanka.jananam nirbhartsanam va bheda^ .; of. KA, IIJilXxfT~
^HA, 11.18eH1. Dravyadilobhadarsanena vakcaturyena vamatyadinauL
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that consists in causing enmity among neighbouring kings with each 
1 /other.* Somesvara also understands bheda to consist in separating
well united enemies from each other by employing onefs own men in
the enemy1 s kingdom, secret agents, and spies in the pay of both,
2
the king and his enemy.
These statements are self- explanatory as regards the meaning 
and nature of bheda. It consists in creating mutual distrust, 
suspicion, apprehension, division, alienation, hatred, rivalry, 
rancour, and hostility in the enemy*s ranks especially among his 
queen, crown prince, ministers, commander-in-chief, troops, feudatories, 
frontier governors, forest chieftains and other leading men and sub­
jects,as well as in sowing discord among his neighbours and in separ­
ating him from his allies. Bheda is practised by means of secret 
overtures, temptations of wealth, honour, rank, etc., secret in­
stigations to treachery and rebellion, false insinuations and other 
stratagems employed through many classes of secret agents and spies 
and also by making a demand for funds, troops, land, inheritance by 
supporting a neighbouring prince, a pretender from the family and a 
prince in disfavour or other such deserters or parties who have 
some following in the enemy's rank. However in. general bheda^
On Yajh., 1.346; Bhedo bhedakaranam, taijsamantadinain parasparato 
vairasyo tpadanagi.
Tlanas., XVIII.987-88; Ylct., 101.p.14.
3ef. KA,- VII.16.7; Meah. on Mam, VII.197; A m i . 241.62; KH,
XVIII.51-52.
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is practised by creating fear amongst the enemy*s men through the
suggestion of their own king’s displeasure; and by showing the benefits
1should they come over to oneself. Our authorities emphasise the aliena­
tion of the members of the enemy’s family and employing them to destroy
the enemy in the same way as one removes a thorn by means of another
2thorn or breaks a vilva fruit with another.
Bheda partakes of the nature of intrigue and secret in­
stigation to treachery, desertion and rebellion. Its operational 
character is twofold: to sow dissension in the enemy’s 3?anks and
thus disrupt his united front and weaken his power of resistance 
or to cause internal revolts in his kingdom, which dissipate his 
resources and undermine his strength, and to alienate the enemy’s 
supporters and bring them to one’s side so that they may be exploited 
forharming the enemy in various ways. This latter aspect of 
practising bheda is distinctly called upa.japa, which means alienation, 
secret instigation or seduction of enemy’s men. ’The act of 
alienating consists in estranging the dependent from his chief and
3
inciting him to take his own advantage at the cost of the latter,’
The modus operand! of bheda, as well as of upajapa, is manifold, asi n *    twH^Tiw iiT ini  ■■«.«■ . mi  mm n . im n m n n n n n tM .1 1  r   -1_:----- 1 - /  _ . i ,  /
it is directed against four groups of alienable or seducible persons
^Matsya, 223.3 quoted in RDIC, XIV.127; Agni, 226.9-10 
Agni, 226.10; NV, ECS.53-55; cf. Matsya. 223.12-15. 
MecLh. on Manu, VII. 197.
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(krbya)9 namely, the enraged (kruddha) , the greedy (luhdha), the 
frightened(bhita) and the despised (avamanita) . ^ The Matsya Purana 
quoted by Lakgmidhara, adds to these classes the wicked (dust a) ^  
Medhatithi, after Kaujdlya, details their characteristics and points 
out their different motives and reasons which prompt them to easily 
succumb to the foreign machinations and to act against the interests 
of their own king and country. The Agni Pura&a, repeating Kamandaka, 
advises the king to employ bheda through the enemy*s men who have 
been falsely reviled, those who are desirous of glory, those who 
have been invited but insulted, those who entertain hostility to­
wards the sovereign, those who have been unjustly superseded in 
rank or honour, those who are filled with self-conceit, ‘those 
who are prevented from pursuing virtue (dhafewa'Q, wealth (artha) 
and desire (kama), those who are enraged, those proud persons who 
have been insulted, those who have been banished or deserted without 
cause, those who assume a calm exterior though injured by their
king, those whose wives and wealth have been forcibly taken away,
%
and those who are worthy of honour but have been disregarded.
These kinds of persons are classified under the preceding four groups 
of seducible parties by Kaujilya, Medhatithi and Kamandaka, who
Medh. on Manu, VII.105; KA, 1.14.2 ff.
Matsya, 223,lquoted by RDIC, XIV.p. 127; '
5 Ami, 241.55-57; cf. M ,  XVIII.33-35,37-39; Medh. on Manu.
VII.105; cf. KA, 1.14.2£f.
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clearly recommend their alienation by intrigue.
The Agni Purapa states that bheda is of three kinds % to
destroy affection and amity between two persons (i,e. by creating
suspicion), to generate rivalry or mutual attrition, and to
1
separate those who are united. It is evident that bheda can be 
any
practised intone of these ways. However,these three types of 
distinctions in the application of bheda can be differentiated 
in actual practice, although they do not mark any definite advance 
from Somadevat s statement that bheda consists in either creating 
suspicion or reprimanding.^
7
Somesvara has, however, distinguished six kinds of bheda.
Pra^apaha means creating fright for life in a person (of the enemy1s
side or the enemy's ally etc.) by betraying to him the alleged
secrets of counsel of his king to have him murdered by a bravado
or poisoner or some other secret means. ^  Manabhanga is that in
which it is alleged that the honour of the person to be alienated
is at stake because, impelled by his enemies, the king dishonours
5 h ^
him; thus should one sow dissension. Ijjanahani involves exploitation
1
Agni 9 241.50-51; Sneharagapanayana saffthargotpadanajfl tathall Mitho 
bhedaspa bhedajfiair bhedaSoaftrividhah smytabl This is same as KH, 
XVIII.8 with the difference as regards the third. Kamandaka has 
* santarjanam* in place of 'mitho bhedas ca1. Kamandaka thus em­
phasises sowing dissension by creating fright or threatening^which 
would be expedient in the case of internal revolt or confederacy of 
hostile kings.
OT, XXIX.73; same as KA, 11.10.55.
^Manas.51: XVIII. 989.
tfonas. ,T1-XVIII.990-91.
5Ibid., 992.
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of a rich person’s avarice. The spy in the pay of both (ubhayavetana) 
insinuates to the enemy king that a certain person is very rich 
but never gives anything to the king. His wealth should, there­
fore, be seized by any means. Having thus advised the king, the 
spy should disclose to the rich man that the king is very greedy and
wants to seize his wealth. The spy thus sows dissension by such 
1backbiting. Bandhaka is creating fear of imprisonment in those 
who are devoted to their master’s interests by insinuating that 
their king does not trust them any more and would have them enchained 
and thrown into the dungeon. Darabhilaga consists in a spy’s 
sowing dissension between the enemy king and another person or 
his ally who has access to the king* s harem. The spy alleges that 
the king has confided in him that the person concerned is voluptuous, 
lascivious, and^libertine and lias an eye on one of his wives. The 
king himself has seen him -winking at his wife in the harem and 
decided that he deserves to be killed for his licentiousness.
The spy may also allege to an ally of the enemy that the king was 
admiring his wife’s beauty, youth, and grace before him,obviously 
with the desire to possess her. But as the king cannot do so while
'StanasJF.SCVlII. 993-995. 
2Ibid.. 996-97. 
3Ibid.. 998-999.
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Iafter is living, he would create enmity with him, suggesting
thereby, that the king would have him killed in a war so that he
can obtain his wife* Thus the spy creates division by exploiting
the alleged desire to possess another’s wife. Angabhahga is
that mode of sowing dissension in which the fear of mutilation
is raised. The spy divulges to one of the members of the enemy’s
family that the king suspects him of being desirous of the kingdom
because of his birth in the same family. Therefore, the king would
2surely have his fingers chopped off or his eyes taken out.
It would appear that Somesvara1s six kinds of bheda make 
hardly any significant advance upon earlier methods of practising 
bheda. He emphasizes the creation of suspicion and fright by 
exploiting vices of others or attributing allegations through 
intrigue. He, however, combines the nature of bheda, with the 
mechanics of upajapa, and the two together are employed to afflict 
the enemy. In fact, upatjapa and bheda are inseparable,for 
Visvarupa implies that having seduced persons of the enemy’s side,
3
one sows dissensions in his ranks. Our authorities warn every 
king against the constant threat of secret instigations to treachery
■MganasJl-XX. 1000-1001.
2Ibid.. XVIII. 1002-3.
30n Ya.ifl,. 1.342.
104
and rebellion among his ranks due to foreign intrigues and espionage,
which he must foil by counter-measures in his own kingdom and against
his external enemies. In this connection, it is pointed out that
internal dangers especially from onefs ownf amily members, ministers,
and other elements of his government and revolts in the interior
region are much more serious than those in frontier regions and
3
from the outside.' The purpose of these pronouncements is to stress 
the crucial importance of internal solidarity, which was also con­
stantly undermined by secret accomplices of enemies in one’s own 
kingdom. These persons harm their king In two ways1 by disrupting 
his strength and by giving information to the outside enemy as regards 
the vulnerability of their master.
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the expedient of bheda, 
which is similar, in some ways, to the method of divide and rule as 
regards enemies of state, a king would be ill-advised if he tried 
to divide his owijmen and set some of them against others. The 
Brahma Purapa, quoted with approval by Lakgmidhara, deprecates practis- 
ing bheda, in other words a policy of divide and rule, as a measure 
of exercising control in one’s own kingdom. It warns that the king
sowing dissension in his own side would ruin his forts, treasury and
fyViu
country even without a foreign enemy to assail^ although his subjects 
are finitely rooted.^ However this advice of the Brahma Purana
 ^Agni, 226.11; Matsya, 223.8-9 quoted in RDK, XIV.p.128.
2
RDK, XIV.p. 128s Svapakga bhedo yatnena na kartvyafc. kadacana. Durgagt 
kosas ca desas ca pararagtra bhayam vina. Svabhedenaiva nasyanti
I H I T 1 W IW .PH.. .!■ I!**. ■! . Ill  I  ^ . ... - . I If- m — ■ . ...------ f HI., .  I.M H>,|------------ J | | | L|r|||||| fl^T f
baddhamula api prajak.
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seems 'mainly! to concern the rajaprakytis (i.e. the queen, crown
prince, ministers, commander-in-chief and those very close to
the king) because other sources advocate the use of bheda and
danda (force) against feudatories, forest chieftains, frontier
governors etc. when thesebave become rebellious,*^
The dynastic chroniclers of our period have stories of how
enemy partisans were sought to be divided and hostile confederacies
split through stratagems and artifices wielded by a host of 
2spies. It appears that the easy prey to an enemy’s blandishments 
and stratagems-were one’s own kinsmen,who either aspired to. the 
kingdom or felt their claims superseded or dishonoured, and corrupt 
ministers, intriguing feudatories many of whom painfully remembered 
their lost independence and injury to their pride in the past by 
their present overlord. More often than not these constituents of 
the government became willing associates of their master’s enemies 
or themselves created dissensions which were exploited by outside 
rivals. There are some historical instances of-the application of 
bheda, for example during the long war between the Caulukya king 
Kumarapala and the Cahamana Mng Arp^raja, in which the latter was 
joined by Cahada, a claimant to the Caulukya throne, who alienated 
several supporters of Kumarapala including his mahauta (elephant-
1
Agni, 241.62, cf. KM, m i l . 51-52.
2
Disloyalty and defection of the feudatories had become such a common 
phenomenon that Jayanaka regards it a natural effect of the Kali Age 
(P.V. 1.32); cf. K. Gopa& op_.cit., pp. 97-98; vide also
VIII.923, 927? 281 ff, 282 ff;" also
m . t in.
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1driver).' imotlier example is the severance of the confederacy
between the Paramara king Bevapala, the Lata chieftain Samgrama
Sicilia, and the Tadava king Simhapa against the Caulukya king Bhima XI
2by the spies of the Caulukya minister Vastux>ala. The defection
of the enemy* s frontier feudatories could be effected by theda and
they could even be instigated to murder their overlord secretly,
as for example, Vikramasi^ha, the feudatory of Kumarapala in the Mt.
Abu region, plotted to murder his overlord when he encamped there
•m  3
during his expedition against Arporaja. There is a strong possibility 
that Vikramasigiha was won over by Arporaja or Cahada by means of 
bheda.
In the end it may be said that kings seem to have indulged in 
dynastic Intrigues and plots to weaken their rivals by creating 
dissensions among their ranks and alienating their men. It is in 
relation to bheda that the role of spies becomes very prominent 
and our authorities especially mention ubhayavetana (an agent in 
the pay of both) who seems to have had a sort of permanent commission 
at the enemy*s court. Our authors betray a knowledge of psychology 
in their description of various groups of alienable parties and ex­
ploit It for sowing dissension.
      ■ j... l » iiiw .ii> l. * n * . i i w w n i . u » v i i .M . in . . ' r . * * . il. . l l M 1 ' ■*  ' ■■ — ■■ '    if , ... ,r —■ ..T ... ,ft m „  „ . » „  r ,» ■«»,...i. m mm« ...................................   T , ,lw , JL h-HWnnarrr ■ i.y- n
1A.IC.Hajumdar^op.cit., p. 105; B.Sharma, op.cit. » pp. 52 ff. 
Prabandhacintama&i, pp.UJVdZf t
2
A.K.Majumdar, p.153- 
"’ibid., p. 110.
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DAlFpA (ForceJ chastisement or war)
The last of the four traditional expedients is daijpla, which,
r 1
according to Visvarupa, means 'to reduce to subjection by force'.
It is, in fact, the use of force to achieve political objectives.
Our other authorities state, 'killing, tormenting and seizure
2 — 
of property constitute force*. However, Yijftanesvara says:
'chastisement /i.e. causing injury, dag-da/ by secret and open
means commencing with the deprivation of property leading up to
killing' is dap da (force). Da&da is thus an instrument of physical
coercion, used to stibjugate enemies by violence, bodily injury
or imprisonment, or damage to puroperty. These different forms
may foe practised separately or collectively. It is,
however, the ultimate expedient to overcome dangers of all sorts
inside one's kingdom and in the inter-state sphere.
As an expedient of inter-state policy the application o f
d a n leads to war or brings about the destruction and seizure
of the enemy's men and material bys ecret ways of perpetrating
violence. It is striking that dapja, which is an expedient of
force, also indicates the forces of the state. These are dividdd
into two kinds, firstly, prakasa-dapda (open force) comprising
eight classes of troops, viz. infantry, cavalry, chariots, elephants
etc. and secondly, aprakasa dapda (secret force) consisting of many
On Yajn., 1,342. Dapdo hathat prasadhanam.
2 , ,
NV, XXIX. 75. Vadhah parikleso rthaharapart ca dapdafo. Agni,
24. .51; same as KH, XVTII.9;. BA, 11.17, 16g.'Manas., II.XX.IO34.
^Mlt.on lajh., I.34S.
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types of secret agents, such as spies, bravadoes, assassins,
1poisoners and saboteurs. The latter class of forces is con-
sidered more deadly for inflicting danda upon the enemy. These
agencies of dag.fla further bear out the preceding connotation
of da&da as chastisement by force in order to overcome enemies.
Two types of danda, prakasa (open) and aprakasa (secret or
covert) are distinguished in our sources in view of the means
2and instruments of its application. The open force is exercised 
through armed forces and means fighting andwr that causes the 
devastation of villages in the enemy country, destruction of
3crops, arson and killing of the enemy and his supporters in battle.
The secret da&da is inflicted by means of assassination, poison, fire
and incantations.^' Many classes of spies, bravadoes, poisoners are
employed to carry out the killing of the foe, his ministers, princes
of royal blood and others, pollution of crops, food, fodder and 
5water. They also sow dissension in the enemy’s rank and break 
his strength by stratagems and sabotage. The Brahma^as and others
^RDK, IX.p.95 quotes Mbh.; cf. Mbh., XXI.59.40-42.
2 Agni, 234.2, 241.52; Mit,,. on TajH., 1.345; of. Mf, XVIII.10,
Agni, 234.2, 241.52; of. Vdil.. II.146,l,ff; RNP, p.303. KN, m i l . 10.
The text of the Agni Purana seems to be corrupt, but the Vi^&udharmot- 
"tara P., which records the same tradition, gives a clear account of 
these two kinds of danfta.
4Cf. vail.. II.146.4ff; KN, XVIII.12.
Agni. 234.3; cf. J d h . , II.146.4-5. Manas.. II.XX.1224-42; cf. also 
on Manu. VII.195-96; RKP, p.303.
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adept at administeri^ deadly charms and spells use these to
ruin the opponents. These open and secret modes of practising
da&da conform to the nature and tactics of three kinds of war,
2
open, concealed, and secret. It may, therefore, be observed 
that the employment of da&da in inter-state relations normalljr 
denotes one of these kinds of war.
Somesvara has detailed twelve kinds of da&da for employment 
by a powerful ruler and three more for a weak king in order to 
subdue intransigent enemies by chastisement and force.^ Desanasaka- 
comprises the cutting down of forests, the breaking up of
water reservoirs and the destruction of villages by fire in the 
enemy country.^ Janangacchedaka constitutes . the mutilation 
of the enemy’s people by chopping off their nose and ears.
CrOgraha daji&a involves a sudden seizure of all cattle of a country 
by force . Dhanyahara&a da&da consists in forcibly carrying away 
the entire crop of the enemy territory and seizing all grains stored 
in the granaries and market places. This kind of punishment causes
1
M L > P• 303,; quotes .y;dli-a. Il.146.4ff. KA, X.48-50.
2m , XXX.90-91; Agni, 236-59-61; cf. KA,. VII.16.8; ICI, XIX.54 ff; 
Manas.. II.XX.1034 ff.
7)
Manas.. II.XX.1035-1037. 
Ibid.. II.XX.1038.
5Ibid.. II.XX. 1039.
6
Ibid., II.XX.1040.
depletion, of food and fodder and produces famine in the enemy 
1country. Bandigraha is the imprisonment of the householders
having large families, rich merchants and others of the enemy
kingdom,probably with a view to forcing the enemy to abandon
2 £ -hostility and also to obtain ransom. De^haraka da&&a means
the annexation of a country by establishing oneself or cne!s
administration there after having granted safety of life to^ bhe 
3 „ «
hostile people. Dhanadana consists in the forcible seizure of
gold and wealth of villages by invading troops, in other words, a mere
raid of the enemy villages.^’ Sarvasvaharana da&fla means forcibly
seizing all kinds of movable property, wealth, corn, cattle, stocks
of iron and weapons, clothes and household implements of the
enemy1s flourishing city or tom after investing it with a great
army. This again implies a plundering expedition aimed at robbing
enemy cities. Durgabhaliga is the destruction of different kinds
of enemy forts by means of siege, assault, machines, mines, fire
and also stratagems and incantations that help to reduce enemy
5 ***
strongholds in various ways. Sthanadahaka dapda is sacking of the
1
Manas., II.XX.1041-42.
Ibid., XX.XX.1043. 
hbld.. II.XX.1044.
4Ibid.. II.XX.1045.
Ibid.. XX.1046-47.
6
Ibid.9 XX.1048-1074« Somesvara brings in a resume of siege warfare and 
means to capture a fort ■ in the discussion, of clurgabhariga da&d.a.
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enemy capital by destroying ramparts, royal palaces, mansions of
princes, ministers and other high officials and other dwelling
places together with stables for horses, elephants and various 
1 ✓ r **
storehouses. De saniyas aka danda means the banishment of^enemy
from his kingdom and thus condemning him to mental torture and
physical hardships caused by the deprivation of family, wealth,
2conveyances, dwelling, food and water, and other amenities.
The twelfth kind of danda is yuddha or battle which is also called 
m a h a d a n & a  (great punishment) that ruins the enemyf Somesvara discusses 
under it all kinds of activities connected with expedition, camping 
strategy, troop-formations, fighting and rules of war. It appears 
from these twelve kinds of application of force that a powerful 
ruler could adopt various ways to crush his enemies but he should 
not transgress beyond raids, plunder and open and concealed kinds 
of war.
However, a weak king is permitted to take recourse to three
„„ ^ '4-
additional kinds of danda called visa danda, ghala danda and abhicarakatfevnl**
Viga danda means the application of various kinds of poisons and
deadly venoms through different devices in order to kill the foe,
1Manas., XX.1075-1078.
2Ibxd.. XX.1079-81. 
hbid.. XX.1037-1082 ff. 
ttbid., XX.1225. .
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his crown prince, secretaries, ministers, commanders, deadly
elephants, best horses etc. The spies as.,well as the alienated
enemy’s ranks should be used to administer poison in order to
create dissension through causing suspicion among the enemy’s
warriors and to pollute tanks, wells and ponds. They should also
cause to be poisoned bathing tanks, oil, footwear and all other
articles and places likely to come in contact with the enemy and
1
his leading men. Thus should a weak king afflict his powerful
enemy and destroy his strength.
Ghata danda means the assassination of the enemy by employing
agents who are brave, loyal, not afraid for their lives, daring,
who know the right time for action, who are skilled in ways and
means of murder, the spy in the pay of both who has been given an
enormous amount of money^and other, reliable agents. They would
contrive to kill the enemy when he would be off his guard, when he is
absorbed in music and dance, gambling, hunting, visiting temples,
pleasures of wrestling and other festivities; indulging in his
harem, engrossed in worship.,, and other activites or on occasions when
the enemy is impatient. The assassins and bravadoes would kill him
on these occasions by dropping weapons or other mechanisms through
2various ways of creating illusions.
Manas.. II.XX.1226-31.
2m a ., XX. 1232-37.
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The last is abhicaraka dap&a which is wrought by magic
and incantatinns. It consists in the six acts of magic performance
known as $a£karma t each of which involves the invocation of
supernatural powers to fulfil of the six objects, namely
averting calamity (santi), bringing the enemy under the power of one1s
own will (vasya, probably to bewitch him to accede to sandhi),
paralysing or stopping (stambhana, that is, his powers or military
advance), causing the enemy to quit his occupation (uccatana,
for instance by creating violent psychic disturbance in the enemy
so tha,t he suddenly abandons his expedition), creating enmity (vidvega)
6among the enmy*s allies, and finally, killing the enemy by spells
(maranci). The Brahma^as adept in the magical formularies of the
Atharva Veda and other kinds of incantations (tantras) are to be
employed to afflict and destrcy the enemy from a distance by con™
X **juring up deadly spells through weird ceremonies. Abhicaraka danda
actually comprises the last five acts, while santi (alleviation
of deadly spells of the enemy) is a counter-measure. The various
malevolent magical practices are,in fact, included in the means of
waging secret war (t u M f l h a ). ^  Somesvara's discussion thus
leaves no doubt as to what constitutes da^La because he nearly ex™ 
the,
hausts^different kinds of injuries that can be done to the enemy1s
^Manas., II.XX. 1238f-4'l; cf. KA, X.3«44, X.6.48-50 and other contexts 
where Kaujilya describes the practices of black magic and sorcery in war.
2NV, XXX.91.
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power and resources "by direct force, secret agents and conjurers 
of deadly spells. It may be doubted whether he shows any striking 
originality, nevertheless, he seems to countenance the prevailing 
practices of the application of force in a systematic way, which 
helps the appraisal of force in inter-state politics and its 
consequences.
It is thus evident that da#da means force or use of force.
Its application involves injury and destruction. As an expedient 
of diplomacy it means a threat of war or commencement of expedition 
leading to battle (yuddha), However secret danda may be used to 
force the rival into submission without battle or to impair his war 
potential preceding battle. Similarly the aggrieved king may employ 
secret danda to afflict the aggressive enemy In order to dissuade 
him from invasion or avert his own annihilatinn. While each application 
of danda may not necessarily lead to battle, it nevertheless results 
in the infliction of injury to the enemy's power.
UPBKgA (indifference)
Taking recourse to pretended indifference on account of un­
favourable circumstances as an expedient of policy to deal with the 
enemy is called upekga (indifference). Repeating Kamandaka, the
fra JO*
Agni Purana states: 'upekga consists in not preventing the enemy
i
from indulging in unjust acts /i.e.. wrongful policy/? vices and
1 « 
in w a r s . . T h i s  indicates that upekga involves a feigned indifference
^Agni^ 24J.66: Anyaye vyasane lynddhe pravrtasylSinivara&aml irpekgeyaffi
smyta bhratopekgitas ca Hidimbayall KIT, XVIII. 57^59.
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to the enemy*s committing acts of injustice against one*s frontier 
country or within his own kingdom, thereby causing grave provocation, 
or to his falling into vices like huntingjetc*, thei*eby offering an 
opportunity for invasion, or to his prosecuting war against oneself 
or one’s allies or elsewhere thereby inviting intervention. We 
have already seen that since the enemy is himself on the road to 
destruction one should adopt an indifferent altitude because the ob~ 
jective of policy is being achieved without any loss.
The Agni Pur ana states that upekssa is the only possible 
expedient when a king finds that ^.conciliatory measures (sama) 
would extol the enemy to the sky J o t would be derogatory to onese i*7 . 
that the attempt to buy him off i.e. dana 7 would be nothing more 
than ^ squandering good money, and that in striving to create dis­
sensions (bheda) among his [~the enemy*£ j ranks, he would be detected 
2
and punished.* It is clear that a king adopting the expedient
of upekga has no other means except to wait for a favourable
situation when another of the four expedients would be employed.
It is also evident that the use of force (danda) by the king himself
is ruled out because it would be disastrous as the factors of power,
place and time appear to be unfavourable. It thus appears that
upeksa is an expedient of inter-state politics that . *
See above, p* 3/9 *
2 A m i . 234.4-7.
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brings about a stalemate in hostilities,despite the fact that these
are not renounced. It may be a situation following hostilities
between rivals of near-equal power in which the aggrieved king
takes no apparent action against the enemy. In fact, he does
not employ any other means (upaya) because none is advantageous,
although the expedient of indifference against the enemy may in- 
s
volve his sustaining some injuries. Further, a recourse to indifference
by an aggressive king may imply a change of methods and means owing
to the loss of opportune time of the expedition, inability to
force the matter to a final conclusion, or the realisation of the
enemy's grave difficulties,which would oblige him a little later
1to acknowledge his sway without battle.
This interpretation of upelcga as feigned indifference towards 
the enemy, involving suspension of all the four expedients of foreign 
policy,is further clarified by some Pura&as by a direct reference 
to foreign policy. They state that a king should emplpy indifference 
when he finds that he can neither conclude sandhi (treaty or peace) 
because it is harmful,nor fight a battle (rapa) following hostility 
(vigraha) because it would prove disastrous. Our authorities
further associate the expedient of upekga with the policy of asana
1
See above, pp.
2ARni. 234.4-5; of. Ydh.. IX.147.1 ff.
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(•watchful waiting or pause) and attribute its adoption to the 
weakening of strength in men and material (lit, loss and expense).1 
If this loss and expense is consequent upon initial armed en­
gagements then the expedient of upelcga would imply a discreet with­
drawal without achieving the objective as, for instance, the pulling 
back of forces by Cahdella King Vidyadhara after a day-long battle 
with Sultan Hahmud in A.D.1019 because strategic factors went
i *
2
against him. A recourse to indifference may be had before 
launching an expedition against the enemy or the aggrieved king 
may resort to it against an aggressor who does not intend to 
inflict great injuries *as in the case of a powerful king trespassing 
on one’s territory during an expedition against another king and 
thereby doing some damage. However, we have already discussed 
the implications of asana and upelcsa and remarked that the latter 
is directed to the battle and not to the enemy. But from the view­
point of an aggrieved king it may relate to both,because he may 
suffer certain injuries at the hands of the aggressor and yet 
adopt the expedient of indifference for fear of a disastrous battle. 
The Gujarati chronicles tell us that when Jayasimha Siddharaja 
invaded the Candella kingdom.its ruler Madanavarman took no notice 
of the invasion probably because he could see that the former had
•hail. IX. 147.Iff; of. BMP, p.3o4;«a 3T7-2.0 .
^S.K.Hitra, op.cit., pp. 78-79.
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no intention of ravaging his kingdom,as Jayasimha’s object seems
to have been to forestall any possible Candella interference in
his recently conquered kingdom of Malwa. The chronicler narrates
that Jayasimha, finding no resistance to his expedition,demanded
a substantial sum of gold from Madanavarman, who was celebrating
festivities. The Candella king contemptuously asked his ministers
to pay off the money, whereupon Jayasimha was so much impressed
by his graceful indifference that he insisted on being received
1by Madanavarmana probably as a guest and friend. This instance 
of practising indifference may suggest that it could be an effective 
expedient provided the stakes are not too high. A king may further 
adopt this expedient against an enemy who has done harm inAabsence 
and instant retaliation is likely to prove ruinous. Thus, for in­
stance, Bhima I of Gujarat temporarily ignored Paramara Bhoja’s 
reassertion of overlordship over the Paramara principality of Mt. 
Abu, which he lad reduced to submission, and also the sack of his
capital by the Paramara general Kulacandra while he was away
2 *“ on expedition in Sindh. The expedient of upekga could therefore
be practised as long as one is unable to employ other expedients.
ICautilya has described an aspect of asana called upelcgasana
as ’non-employment of means1. This seems to correspond to a phase
1A . K. Mazumdar, , pp. 76-77.
2Ibid. , p. 50 ff? D*C.Ganguly, p.UA,
mvt BXb
IC.A, VI1.4.3* Upayanam aprayoga upekganam.
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in inter-state relations -when the policy of asana is executed
with the expedient of upeksa. Earlier we have noted a kind of
asana called upekgajna which is characterized by indifference
to an enemy who is doomed to destruction without direct military
1
intervention by a powerful king who wants to subjugate him.
The explanation of some Purag.as implies the adoption cf the expedient 
of indifference before precipitating a battle. It seems that, as
•tun
as ana is an alternative to yana, so upelcga is an alternative
2
to daada, and therefore an independent expedient by itself.
In fact, it is an alternative to all the four upayas, and, as 
already observed, implies inaction as opposed to action. However, 
its application saves the king from shame and ensures his self- 
preservation in a state of very delicate balance of power.
MAYA (illusion)
Haya means illusion, which is created by ingenious contrivances 
and false proclamations about favourable omens, divine blessings, 
oracles and astrological predictions in order to hoodwink and 
frighten the enemy and to cause consternation among his ranks.
1See above, p. $19*- o
o „it
./4<3 • 42 gives independent status to upeksa as a fifth means.
3
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It consists in deceptive appearances engineered to exploit super­
stitious fears of the enemy and his troops,with a view to advancing 
one’s war strategy by breaking their morale and causing a, scare 
abou_t the dreadful consequences, which are shown to be inevitable, 
Maya also consists in exploiting objects of worship and superstition 
to contrive the enemy’s destruction. It has, however, to be pointed 
out that while maya consists in the use of illusory powers, deception, 
cunning and cruel intrigues, it Is not created by spells or magic 
but is the product of human and material contrivances,
Agni Purana, repeating Kamandaka, furnishes details of
■ray / fai
practising maya which is of two kinds, human (manugij and superhuman
(amanugi). The former consists in concealing men in cavities of
divine images carved in stone pillars and other places of worship,
and clothing males in female costumes with a view to killing the
1enemy or his prominent supporters unawares. It is also practised
by showing portents at night (betokening victory over the enemy)
and by displaying live forms of vampires, meteors (this is produced
by letting fly over the enemy line birds of strong and extensive
plumage with lighted wicks attached to their tails), demons, stones
2and creating other physical disturbances. The latter consists
in changing forms at will and in dropping weapons, stones and
1Agni, 241.63-64; cf. Htf, XVIII.53-54.
2Xbid., 241.64, 234.8-10; cf. Ibid.; Ydh., II.148.1-4.
waterin producing darkness, heavy winds, fire and clouds*
These illusory phenomena are created to terrorize the enemy*
It is evident from the devices of practising maya that this 
has a twofold application? firstly, to encompass the murder of 
the enemy by hiding assassins behind the objects of worship and 
in religious places or by men disguised as women, and secondly^to 
scare the enemy, his troops and subjects by displaying ominous 
spectres in the night before the battle or to use illusory devices 
of producing darkness, wind, fire, clouds and rain In the midst 
of fighting,in order to frighten and confuse enemy hordes, which 
can thus be destroyed. The second way of practising maya may also 
indicate the creation of a camouflage for one!s own troops which 
enables them to exterminate the enemy1s men*bewildered and frightened 
by strange physical disturbances,
fhe Agnj Pura&a elsewhere also elaborates the methods for 
practising maya as deception and guile. It says that the king 
should prompt ascetics and astrologers to proclaim among the enemyfs 
men the preordained., fall of their master in the ensuing battle*
He should further propagate that his cause has been favoured with 
the blessings of the immortal gods, and that their wrath has alighted 
upon his enemies. At some tune during the war,he should falsely 
declare that he has been reinforced by the timely arrival of fresh
422
allies, whereby the enemy would lose heart and he put to rout.
Further, war whoops and jubilant shouts of victory should be raised 
£ *.$<JL<Usn*JLc/L
and it should bey openly (although falsely) , that the
1
enemy has been irretrievably beaten. Thus)by various treacherous
devices and deceptive methods a king is encouraged to destroy his 
enemy in battle. It may be mentioned that such deception and 
bluff are considered to be part of concealed fighting as also is 
siege warfare.
The deceptive devices connected with the application of m a y a
are mentioned in several other sources, which do not regard maya
as a regular expedient. Kaufilya has recommended them to weaken kintp atvi their
secret agents in order to dispose of the enemy. Even Somesvara
discusses them in ord„er to contrive the assassination of the
enemy. It seems that he considers vadha (assassination) and
maya inseparable,as the latter Is created to contrive the former
in places of worship and amusement etc. where the enemy can be 
3
caught unaware. These treacherous ways were sometimes really 
used to kill the enemy king, Merutunga’s accounts of how the Paramara
***** fi-X
king Khoja was apprehended notably by two Gujarati soldiers, Aluya and 
Koluya, while he had gone to worship in his family temple situated 
at the outskirts of Bhara, indicates that they attempted his assassin­
ation but failed because Bhoja, though hotly pursued by them,
Aani. 234.11-14; 236.60-63; cf. Vdh.. II.14S.4 ffj/7?, 80. tf.
“~KA, XII.+4-S’, •
Manas., II.XX.1232 ff.
managed to run away from the temple on his swift steed. The 
incident seems tc^ have taken place shortly before the invasion 
of Malwa by the Caulukya king Bhima I, who might have commissioned 
these bravadoes to kill Bhoja. The legends recorded in the semi- 
historical chronicles and story books like the Nava&ahasahkacarita 
of Padmagupta and the ICathasarltasagara show the use of different 
types of illusions in order to deceive and frighten the opponents 
in battle, although no actual historical examples can be quoted.
It may, however, be conceded that the rivals used the expedient 
of maya as bluffs and strategic tricks in fighting and ■ '/ 
utilized deceptive objects to contrive the secret murder of the 
enemy king or his prominent men. In fact, maya was an expedient 
of causing disturbance among enemy1s ranks and harassing him by 
terrifying appearances and ill-omen or killing him by guile. The 
psychological persecution of the enemy and personal afflictions
■** "1* fits *34
were contrived by tie expedient of maya. In war, maya meant strategic 
illusion and tactical bluffs which aim at producing psychic dis­
turbance in the enemy and panic in his troops and subjects.
IMDRAJALA'k (Black magic or incantation)
Indrajala is the last of the expedients. It means magic, 
incantation or illusion created by incantation (mantra) and magical 
contrivances (tantra). As an expedient of policy and diplomacy it
1 / \B.C., (hr) .p.70; cf. A.K.Majumdar, op.cit., p.52.
2
Literally 1 snare of Indra*.
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denotes the employment of occult powers invoked by various mysterious 
practices to achieve^,political objectives of destroying the enemy 
by charms or causing panic in his troops and subjects and thus 
enervating them. It consists in practising exorcism, charms and 
performing various kinds of weird ceremonies, which create psychic 
spectres of horror that are directed to accomplish objects ranging 
from the killing' of the enemy to creating hindrances in his war­
like activities.
  its#
According to some Fura&as and later nitisara writers ,
indrajala is practised by displaying miracles of different varieties,
such as of fourfold troops at a distance so as to delude the enemy
that they have been sent by gods to strengthen the already powerful
arms of the invading monarch, of bodies with torn limbs and dripping
with blood, of a similar severed head of the enemy king (to be
exhibited at the terrace of his palace), of artificial clouds,
hills or darkness, of a mirage like a picture of the enemy*s
1
imminent reverses and his entire annihilation etc. The purpose
of practising indrajala is to make the enemy troops and people
2
dispirited and panic-stricken. It is indeed some kind of terrorization 
of the enemy.
Somesvara , _ describes the use of magic as an expedient of 
inflicting punishment (danda) on the enemy., although he uses the
Afcnl. 234.14-16; 241-67-68; of. Yah., XI.149.1-2; cf. KH, XVIII.60-61.
2Ibid.
425
term abhicara instead of indrajala, which, means more or less the
same. It is, however, significant to mention that while Kaufilya,^
2Kamandaka and some Pura^as recommend the use of indrajala by the 
vi.jigigu during his expedition, Sornesvara, on the contrary, re­
stricts it to a weak king who had hardly any : alternative 
to stave off his annihilation. Irrespective of the strength of 
rivals, the employment of black magic and sorcery is part of the 
secret war (tug&igi yuddha).
In the early medieval period mantra (incantation) and tantra 
(magic) had become recognized as potent means of creating or 
averting calamities of various sorts. Brahma^as and other persons 
proficient in magic and spells especially lived in the capital to 
protect the king and the kingdom against the enemy’s malevolent 
incantations or^perform these in distress in order to destroy 
the enemy king and create terror among his men. Men adept in charms 
and spells accompanied the king to the battle field. Even some 
of the kings, as for example Jayasigiha Siddharaja of Gujarat , 
strived to acquire magical skill. Siddharaja is said tojhave vanquished
1KA, X.3.44, X.6.43-50; WT, XXX.91.
2 ^
Vdh., 11.149*3 distinguishes between Indrajala and maheyadra jala
(great snare of Indra or deadly black magicT"which is resorted to by
one desirous of maintaining treaty, although he is devoid of good
qualities.
5Cf. KA, x.3.44.
a forest chieftain, Barabaraka, by his superior magical power, 
Somesvara states that when the kingdom of the Paramara king ^ . - - 
*was overrun by the Oaulukyas, the former’s priest called up
O/YV
by^incantation an evil spirit for tie destruction of his master’s
enemy /the Caulukya king/* But Ama ^the priest of Kai*p.a£ also
an ancestor of the author] succeeded in counter-acting by other
potent incantations and turned back the evil spirit against the
2conjurer, who was immediately killed as a result’. It is not 
therefore unlikely that black magic was practised on occasions 
in war with a view to destroying the rivals.
The precepts of the application of u.payas or guide lines of diplomacy
Statesmanship and diplomacy consist in the right selection 
from and effective application of upayas, which may lead to success 
in political relations. Our authorities show considerable political 
discernment and pragmatism in laying down the guide lines of dip­
lomacy and general rules of application of upayas.
The main function of diplomacy is the execution of foreign 
policy with particular regard to the types of kings or states to 
be dealt with. As we have already noted, diplomacy is to make use 
of force towards enemies, conciliation and gifts, concession or
1A.K.Majumdar, op*cit*, p.81,
'  I I llBp >'1111' I Ji ■ M ll■ *
2
Surathotsava, XV.v,20; A.K.Majumdar, pp, 57-58,
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bribery towards allies as well as neutrals and sowing dissension 
(bhfeda) towards the enemy1s partisans. This precept obviously 
has in view the geo-political factors in inter-state relations.
It is reinforced by another precept that a king shall overcome 
weaker kings of the man&ala by force, equals by conciliation , 
stronger by gifts, and still more powerful by sowing dissension, 
which adequately appreciates the factor of power-politics.^ These 
two precepts are much too generalised, but they take full cog­
nisance of the political character, policies or political tendencies, 
and power of the various types of states or kings involved in inter­
state politics. The third, precept of diplomacy takes into accoixnt 
the psychological and human element in politics. It is laid down 
that conciliation should be practised towards the virtuous, sincere, 
and compassionate; gifts, concession and bribery towards the
greedy; sowing dissension towards the wicked, enraged,frightened
2
etc.; and force towards irreconcilable and wicked adversaries.
Thus,it is evident that the success of diplomacy depends on its 
ability to assess factors of geo-political relations, power 
political compulsions and human virtues and vices, which have to 
be so artfully exploited by these expedients that the objectives 
are attained.
1 -
Apararka on Ya.jft., 1.343•
2jyX, XIV.p. 129 quotes Ramayana; Ykt., 100-102,
p.14, 113.p.16.
According to Manu and his commentators, the tasks of diplomacy
*Kt
contained in the employment of upayas are threefold. Its first con-
1 2 cern is 'the employer of the expedients’, that is 'the king himself1,
3also 'his ministers and others' who are directly associated with the 
employment of means, Medhatithi's sparing comments suggest that this 
involves self-examination and critical self-reliance as regards 
character, intelligence and motives of oneself as also persons con­
nected with the conduct of diplomacy. This seems to imply a comparative 
assessment of one's power of intelligence and good counsel (mantrasakti) 
in relation to that possessed by the opposite side. The second task 
of diplomacy is to detexmiine what objectives are to be attained by 
expedients in view of the existing factors of power, place and tirne,^  
This involves weighing one's own objectives, power and policy against 
those of other kings in the inter-state sphere, who would be directly 
or indirectly affected by one's activities. The idea underlying 
this business of deliberation _____ _ ______ .
Manu. VII.215.
2Medli. on Manu. VII.215.
JNandana Ibid., cited by Btihler, haws of Manu.
^Medh, and others on Manu, VII.215; On Ya.jft., 1,346.
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and decision on the specific objectives in a given situation is
to strive^for only those which are feasible and profitable.
The third task of diplomacy consists in the selection and application 
6t
of particular expedient or expedients capable of accomplishing the
1objectives in view. This has to be done with full consideration
2of theielative factors of power, place, and time in given situations. 
The art of diplomacy consists in making the appropriate selection 
and putting the correct emphasis on particular means at the right 
time. Our authorities emphasize pragmatism in diplomacy by 
advising the king to act according to prudence, need and time.
There is distinct gradation and preference in the selection 
and application of upayas. Sama is definitely said to be the•*" lim p  ipiapm^ujii v
best by all authorities, although the Pura$.as attribute almost 
equal importance to dana. Menu's preference lies with sama and 
dan da for the subjugation cf enemies and tie advancement cf the
A
kingdom. Hedhatithi comments: 'While there is conciliation 1here
is no disturbance; and when force is employed everything becomes 
5 'accomplished'. Somesvara, however, determining his preferential
^On Yajfi., 1.346; Agni, 241*60.
^Ii>ld.» cf. Matsya, 14S.65 ff.
4 Manu., 711.109 quoted in M ,  XIV.p. 126;Sec also cm *** **  ihU  , 
^Medh. on Manu, Y1I.109.
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order in view of the nature of each upaya and the fairness and 
risk involved in its employment states that sama is best for it* 
brings success without injury to others and loss of substance; 
bheda is meddling by creating suspicion among those evil men who 
are thus divided from their master; dana is regarded as low, as 
it involves expense while its success is dependent upon destiny; 
and force is the worst of all, as victory, the kingdom and life it­
self are brought into jeopardy by war*'*' Other authorities, however, 
prefer a graduated, application of sama, dana, bheda and finally 
danda. Their order of preference depends on the realities of 
inter-state politics and forces of opposition which have to be 
overcome.
2
The employment of upayas may be separate or collective,
*that is gifts preceded by conciliation, dissension preceded by
conciliation /and gifts/, fighting accompanied by conciliation,
3
gifts and dissensinn, or gifts along with others and so on..S 
In fact,where a single upaya is sufficient,others ate unnecessary, 
but it is realized that a combination of upayas may be imperative 
in case of allies and enemies, *for, the means help each other*.^
•'Manas.. XVII.972-976.
On Manu. VII.198, 159,214; On Ya.in.. 1.345. Cf. KA, VII.16.3-4.
3
Medh. on Manu., VII.214; of. KA, IX.6.58-61.
4Cf. KA, IX.7.70 ff.
We have already seen that even normally the upayas in their
application may overlap, as a few forms of conciliation include
some features of gifts,and so also each following one does not
ignore the utility of each preceding one. Several authorities
point out that conciliation and gifts,as well as sowing dissension
1and force,form distinct units in actual practice. It is also
stated that commanders and leading subjects of a country should be
weaned away by distribution of gifts and soxong dissension,and
the feudatories and forest chieftains etc* should be subjugated by
2
sowing dissension and force. It seems likely,that more often than 
not,a combination of means is to be resorted to for the accomplishment 
of the objective in foreign affairs,probably because of the multi­
plicity of inter-state forces and the close connexion between dip­
lomacy and war. It may be added that upekga, maya and indrajala 
are generally combined with the use of force (dan&a).
Our authorities insist that a king should strive to attain 
success in foreign affairs by the separate and collective application 
of the first three expedients.^ Thus in the normal conduct of inter-
^Cf. KA, V1I.16.3W?* 9 ff. advises the application of sama and dana 
towards weak kings and rebels in the Interior region,and bheda and 
da&&a towards strong enemies and rebels in outer regions.
2 ximc
Agni, 241.62; cf. KN,a 51-52':■ ■ f
3 o f .  m , XVIII. 61. c~<wvm •
On Ya.ifi.. 1.345; On Manu. VII. 107-108, 198-200; MV, XXX.25-26, 
39-40; HA, II.19-21; Aani. 226.13; cf. KH, XIX.1; RDK, XIV.
pp. 126, 129 quotes Matsya, 225.1, Manu and
state relations the employment of force is expressly discouraged*
It is only when dangers cannot he overcome or enemies cannot be 
persuaded to submit that the use of force is permitted os a  last 
resort. However, this restraint on the use of force concerns a 
full-scale war, and not Its employment by secret methods. This 
is evident from the recommendations of the nitisara writers and 
Vijftanesvara,who ask the king to weaken and oppress his enemies
o'n3er to
and haughty allies growing unco-operative i n  A retain a favourable 
balance of power as well as to prepare the ground for the eventual 
subjugation cf enemies. The acts of weakening (karga&a) and 
affliction (pi&ana) consist in destruction of property, affliction 
of enemy1s troops, secret murders of his ministers, commanders etc., 
and other acts of sabotage and secret instigation to treachery or
*~| fra*
rebellion. These have to be done by upayas and clearly involve
the use of force which is not the same as -fighting. Further, vigraha
(hostility) itself is the outcome of causing injury, which implies
acts of destruction and even violence; but it does not constitute
battle. It is thus evident that when our authors ask to use force
as a last expedient, they mean the commencement of a full-scale
war and not the use of force, either in the preceding manner or as
a threat of war or bold challenge, so far as it remains within
2
the re&traints of diplomacy.
"‘lit*, on Yajg.. 1.346; MY, XXIX.32. of. J3J, VIII.60 ff; KA, VI.2.16.
^The Manu and iT&jnavalkya smptis perhapgf are^more straightforward in 
their recommendations since they do not directly advocate treacherous 
war- Hbh., XII.69.23 emphasises three upayas by prohibiting war.
/cont.
43
Furthermore ?there arise certain grave situations in inter­
state relations when the use of force lias to he the first expedient,
for the use of others would he ’like the oblation of clarified
1
butter into the fire’. However,other expedients may be used 
during intervals between the fighting in order to avoid great loss 
in men and material. The reasons for advocating force as the last 
expedient are those noted earlier, namely, loss of men and material, 
and uncertainty about victory. It seems, however, that diplomacy 
between rivals stands more often than not on the brink of destruction 
and violence in some way or other. Force is implicit in the employ­
ment of other expedients as an ultimate sanction or as a grand 
arbiter of contentions.
As regards war being the last resort ltrof. Derrett writes,
’This sounds well, but means little.’ Force is said to be the last 
step in the process.1.., but this is not to say that a Hindu ruler 
hesitated to make mr when there was a good chance that a bold 
challenge would end in the enlargement of his territory. He struck 
with his army as the last stage in a process that commenced with
Vcont.j^ In fact the Mahahharata in this instnace does not advocate 
that upayas are three but that the king should acquire domininn by 
sama, dana and bheda and not by force (danda), which means war or 
battle (yuddha). For a different view of Bgdiaspati on upayas 
especially the need of danda, see Matsya, 148.66 ff.
1OT, XXX.39; of. Matsya. 148.66 ff.
demands, continued with intrigues and threats, and matured with 
plots engineered insurrections, dynastic feuds, revolts, and the 
like. Hindu kings were ordinary citizens in this way that they 
were willing to bargain with one another, but objected to complying 
with orders: however it was as unbecoming to issue requests as it
was to comply with them, and threats and bluffs played a very large 
part in diplomacy,
These observations, however, do not affect the role and importance 
of upaya,s other than force, which deal with inter-state situations 
when the application of danda may be foolhardy or suicidal. In 
all situations, they canalize even the course of events calling for 
the use of force. On the very eve of battle messengers are to be 
sent to elicit submission without fight, a practice that was scrupu­
lously followed by the Hindu kings and even Muslim invaders; the 
latter, however, sometimes exploited this opportunity to practise 
treachery by duping the rival through false statements of intent as 
for instance Muhammad G-hori did toward X^rithviraja III before the 
second battle of Tarain in A.D.1192. In fact, tXie entire burden cf 
the concept of upayas is to minimize the chances of a full-scale 
war and, when Xfc becomes inevitable, to have already laid the 
foundations of the eventual triumph by having demonstrated the 
justness of one's cause and taken all political and military measures 
which contribute to enemy's discomfiture. The process of the application
■^ J.D.M. herrett, "The maintenance of peace in the Hindu ¥orld: Practice
and theory", in The Indian Tear Book of International Affairs t(1998) 
pp. 377-78.
of upayas or conduct of diplomacy between rivals is, however, 
the same, whether provoking war or trying to avoid it; henoe
ambiguity about their character and role. Nevertheless it is
the suck
emphasized that aims of many kinds of war n as those having as their
causes extermination of an ally, predatory raids, morbid sense of
honour etc. should be reached by upayas other than open force.
However,it is felt that the success of upayas in avoiding battle
primarily depends on the magnitude of the cause of war and the
relative strength of rivals.
Further, as inter-state relations are distinguished as friendly,
hostile and neutral, the use of force,especially full-scale war ,
has but a restricted scope. Hence other means of diplomacy tend 
&
to assume greater role in theory and practice. Furthermore, the 
time spent In actual warfare during the reign>of most king's of our 
period is short in relation to the length of their reign, which 
may imply that means of diplomacy other than open force were fre­
quently applied.
The application of upayas other than open force is the 
business and art of diplomacy. Diplomacy is finally extended to 
include war. But it must also employ other means,even in situations 
when battle is unavoidable,In order to establish the justness of 
one’s cause and the wrongfulness cf the opposite side an the ensuing 
conflict. Medhatithi quotes: ’The careful man makes peace,
the careful man has recourse to his own prowess; both these should 
be equipped with statesmanship /i.e. knowledge of the employment of
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1
upayasj without which one would he as good as a thief.1 Before 
an
launching expedition or talcing field against an enemy in battle 
an envoy or a messenger is to be sent to make the last bid to avoid
bloodshed, failing which,to demonstrate that the opposite party
. . 11 2as :i_n the wrong*
Scope and role of the upayas
Our authorities make the scope of the npayas_ co-extensive
with the policy of state. As regards their applicability, it is
laid down that whatever cannot be accomplished by these means,
should not be tinder taken. However, their role in internal matters
is greatly exaggerated when it is said that they can cope with all
4kinds of human and divine calamities befalling the kingdom. Neverthe­
less, their precise role is exemplified with regard to disaffection 
among one's own ranks, which may be exploited or fomented by stratagems
10n Manu, ¥11.215
HA. IX.21-28, of. KA, VII.15.18-20. Asked by Draixpacli about the purpose
of his hopeless mission as,an envoy of Yuddhisjhira to the Kaurava 
court Kyg$a replied that he would put forward the Papglavas’ case in 
the best light and make the former accept the latter*s demands with 
the help of upayas 1.•• and if my efforts fail and war becomes in­
evitable we shall show the world how we are right and they are wrong 
so that world may not misjudge between us.1 Cited by IC.M.PamklcaT,
Phe Principles. and Practices of Diplomacy, p.7•
llA, 11.18.
40n Manu. VII.214.
of the enemy. Another example cf their application is that directed 
towards onefs feudatories, vassals, leading commanders, probably 
those in charge of forts aid strategic posts, wardencf the marches, 
and forest chieftains or such leaders of political units who enjoy 
greater degree of autonomy within their jurisdiction.
¥e may specially single out an overlord*s relations with his 
vassals or feudatories, and forest chieftains which substantially 
partook of the character of inter-state relations. The epigraphic 
evidence bears out that many feudatories were more or less inde­
pendent in their actions not prejudicial to the authority of their 
overlord. They claimed in tieir records victories won by their over­
lord in which they successfully participated, undertook expeditions 
against ether kingdoms, apparently on their own,in order to increase 
their resources and prestige in the imperial court, and also fought
battles sometimes with another feudatory of their overlord with 
2impunity, " They had all the paraphernalia of an autonomous state 
within the empire, although their independence of action depended on 
their resources and intelligence to hoodwink their arerlord in matters 
detrimental to the latter. Many feudatories entertained ambition 
for independence and raised revolts whenever their overlords were 
weak or a foreign enemy could effect their defection by seduction.
hg a i . 241.62; cf. KN, XVIII.51-52. See above, _p.3S9.
2 ***I.A. , XVII.p.202 ff, refers to a fight between Guparaja and
TJ^abhaJfJa, who were feudatories of the Pratihara emperor
Mahendrapala. See B.h .Puri, op.cit., p.72.
Because of their political power and autonomy and financial and 
military resources their relations with their overlord were re­
gulated by means of upayas rather than by an internal legal or 
political system. Our authorities are aware of this feature of 
the political organisation of empire; for, Somesvara III entrusts 
the feudal relations to the sandhivlgrahika (Minister or Secretary 
for Peace and War). We have already noted in the preceding pages 
the application of particular upayas against internal enemies.
Moreover, when feudatories rebelled the methods and means cf their 
subjugation would be the same as those applied against an external 
enemy; for, these were beyond the competence of civil and criminal 
law, as feudatory relations themselves were normally based on
2political agreements rather than any legal code or constitution.
Indeed the problems of infctftX-state adjustment, that is,between 
the interests of the overlord and his feudatory or other autonomous 
political units,were more or less of tie same pattern as those of 
inter-state relations. This feature of political organisation of an 
empire became more pronounced during the period of decline of an 
imperial dynasty, as for instance,of the Pratiharas of Kanauj, when 
feudatories strived to throw away the yoke of vassalage. Upayas
as M/eJl,
were, therefore, the means of accomplishing irfegr-state adjustments^
Manas.. II.It. 128.
Cf. Medh. on Manu, VII.202,
In relation to foreign affairs the scope of upayas is much 
more extensive than that of ga&gu&ya, as '^ he latter deals mainly 
with the problems of inter-state conflict, especiallsr war and 
peace. However^the role of upayas is exemplified in the execution 
°£ ga&gugya. rfhe proficiency in the artful employment of upayas 
is considered an indispensable qualification of a king aspiring 
to. imperial status. A king pursues the policy of sandhi with 
the help of upayas as they help in negotiation of terms of com­
pacts for war or peace. Upayas further""ar3vapplied to maintain
to
these compacts or break them through diplomacy, which can 
engineer conditions conducive to either requirement.
The role of expedients in conducting hostilities against
rivals is both conspicuous and comprehensive. Our authors never
allow a king to embark upon a full-scale war without a thorough
application of upayas. It is stated that wise men make an end
to hostilities by expedients other than open force. Indeed the
first phase of vigraha is marked by intense diplomatic activity,
and Somadeva's statement that military operations follow the
failure of^  battle of wits (buddhi-yuddha) or diplomatic struggle
1expresses the general opinion on this issue. While our authorities 
discourage war when the objective can be attained by the separate 
or collective employment of other expedients, they nevertheless 
concede the use of force as a surgical or caustic operation in
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order to cure the malady when the medicine like the other ex-
1pedients has proved of no avail. We have already seen that 
upayas canalize vigraha and determine the kind of fighting'.
They continue to he relentlessly employed in all phases of hostility 
and war in order to contrive diplomatic strategy which aids the 
military subjugation of the enemy by enmeshing, in its network, outside 
elements likely to fish in the troubled waters. The isolation of 
enemies from his allies and the neutralization of non-committed 
kings like the madhyama and udasina are as important as fighting 
a successful battle.
The policy of asana is translated into practice by the ex-
J** a w  2 BW
pedients of sama, dana and bheda. Dvaidhibhava is itself called
an upaya in which sense, however, it demands a considerable
amount of diplomatic skill to practice a dual policy towards two
enemies at one and the same time or dupe the enemy by diplomatic 
expedients to conclude a sandhi and afterwards to so manipulate 
oneTs affairs as to be able to engage the same enemy in war. The 
policy of sa&sraya again demands the employment of all expedients 
to secure safety of life and later to extricate oneself from 
humiliating and self-smothering obliga,tions.
V )  XXX.39-40; HA., II.28; Aftm. 22G-13. On Manu. VII.108,200; 
On Ya.jn., 1.345." ~RDK, XIV.p.126, 129; Manas, .ffXX.1031-32.
2HA, 11.12; Medli. on Manu. VII. 172.
3Medh. on Manu, VII.167.
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Instruments of Diplomacy
The instruments of modern diplomacy are two: the ministry
of external affairs and Hie diplomatic representations abroad.
Our authorities also ascribe the conduct of diplomacy to the
king*'*" his foreign office under a minister called sandhi-vigrahika
2 \ 3(Minister for peace and War)* the king’s secretary (lekhaka)
at home and envoys sent to foreign kings, Even the commander-in­
chief is to be adept in the act of the application of upayas,
While our sources describe three categories of envoys, detail
their qualifications, functions and immunities, and proclaim their
the 4
importance by stating that war and peace depend uponvambassador’,
it is not possible to ascertain whether the kings of our period 
had any system of maintaining permanent diplomatic agents at 
other courts. It is further difficult to find out whether agents 
were exchanged on a reciprocal basis, although certain individual 
agents seem to have played vital roles as emissaries for a long 
time between two rulers. Thus, Damodara, a shrewd Gujarati statesman, 
is said to have adroitly managed the relations between his master
A*# ***
Bhima 1 and the Baramara king Bhoja on several occasions.
m ,  xxxii. 29.
Agni, 220.&; RDIC, IV.p.26 quotes Matsya, 215.16; M ,  XXXII.2; Manas. 
it.127-130.
JHBK, IV.27 quotes Matsya, 215.26-29 - with slight difference from
A.S.S. printed text, Manas., II.II.131.
40n Hanu, VII.65,66; RDM, IV.p.33.
5A. K • Majnmdar, qp.plt ., pp. 5-1 ff.
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The agencies of the upayas other than open force were,
however, kings, ministers, envoys, emissaries and above all }
secret agents. The Agni Pura&a states that an ambassador is but 
1an open spy, which indicates the importance of a host of spies
engaged in the same kind of work without privileges and immunities.
It seems that each king has to maintain an inter-state intelligence
service which virtually conducts diplomacy by means other than
open force. When tie Lise of open force becomes inevitable the
formalities are completed by despatching an ambassador who brings
the issues to a final conclusion. It appears that an agent called
ubhayavetana ('in the pay of both®) is to be retained at the other
king's court probably to serve as a permanent channel of diplomatic
activity. There may be more than one ubhayavetana agent at one
court, but they would in most cases lave been spies rather than
2
diplomatic agents. However the spiestn‘he pay of both kings play a 
prominent part in 'sowing dissension in the enemy's ranks and con­
tribute immensely to the implementation of other upayas.
Diplomacy is both open and secret. When upayas are employed by a 
king, his ministers, envoys, it may be said to be op>en,but when they are 
implemented by secret agents, it can be called secret.
hgni. 244.12; cf. KH_, XIII.33.
2Prof. Dikshitar (Mauryan Polity, p.180) wrongly suggests that 
ubhayavetana was probably a permanent ambassador in the foreign 
courts.
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It is evident that upayas comprised the expedients of inter- 
state politics; statesmanship (naya) consisted ix the artful manage­
ment of foreign relations through separate or collective employment 
of upayas, which could effectively execute foreign policy with regard 
to all types of kings of a maMala in all conditions of peace and 
war. In this respect it must he pointed out that the possibilities of 
the upayas exceeded the limits of sa&gunya.as the latter only took
■ ■ Iu * I-J.j II» rmH'ln '■t&'wT'rta .i.fcWN Jr ■
cognisance of inter-state conflicts. Thus, upayas are means of
diplomacy, in as much as their nature and contents include persuasion,
conciliation, gifts or bribery, sowing dissension, and finally a
threat of force, and they are employed by the king in his talks
and edicts and by his agents, especially envoys and spies. It may,
the **
however, be added that^concept of upayas reflects the proximity
and co-ordination between diplomacy and war, especially when we
recall Clausewitz1s classic definition of war as the continuation
1
of diplomacy by other means, For the application of upayas never
ceases. Further,the diplomacy understood as an art of the employ-
ment of upayas by a host of agents using bewildering ax^tifices is
in itself a variety of warfare termed - mantra yuddha (diplomatic
warfare or war of witsX> which was considered to be the deadliest 
2
of fighting in view of the fact that power of counsel and intelligence
is regarded as superior to all others.
_ _  _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  — —  -
Morgen thau., Politics among nations, p.339>
2IW , XXX.4-5 Somadeva calls it buddhi-yuddha (fighting with the aid of 
intellect) and Hemacandra (EA, 11.60; calls it nitiyuddha (politic 
fighting).
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CHAPTER R
CONCLUSION
The foregoing study shows that the sources bearing on polity 
were greatly concerned with the theory of inter-state relations, 
which, however, was expounded long before our period. The source 
material is mainly theoretical in nature and lacks originality as 
regards the basic approach to the pattern and problems of inter-state 
relations. The :gmp;bi commentators are notable for the utilization 
of the Arthasastra or nitisara sources in order to elucidate the 
passages of their texts relating to the theory of inter-state re­
lations. This imparts an authority to the nitisara literature and 
shows the dependence of the dharmasastras on it for a detailed study 
of its ora political ideas, especially those concerning inter-state 
relations. This admixture of sources produces a similarity of views 
between the smpti commentators and the nitisara writers on many aspects 
of inter-state relations, Even the Jain authors repeat the Hindu theory 
of inter-state relations and have no specifically Jain characteristics. 
There is a common agreement among our various authorities on the main 
principles of inter-state politics and the nature of inter-state re­
lations, which proves the idealogical unity in this respect amidst the 
dynastic diversity in Northern India of our period.
The exponents of the theory of inter-state relations hold orthodox 
views. Arid intellectuality is noticeable in the repetitiousness of 
our texts and a concern for the preservation of the conventional inter­
pretations, which points to the scholastic interest in the theory
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rather than an endeavour to enhance its practical utility. The 
nature of political writings is such that it is often difficult to 
distinguish between those traditional principles which were pre­
valent in practice and those which had fallen into desuetude. This 
is due to the inability or unwillingness of our sources to draw 
upon history in order to illustrate their principles and fortify their 
conclusions. The atithors of our period base their theories on the 
traditional classics and lack novel ideas. However, some originality 
is noticeable in their interpretations of the traditional concepts, 
as for example, the explanations of the sixfold policy, especially 
asana and dvaidhibhava, and the discussion of the different kinds 
of upayas and their subtypes in the Yuktikalpataru and Manas o lias a, 
which indicate that an attempt was made to reinter|)ret, synthesize 
and even to develop some of the traditional ideas. Certain additions, 
such as the terms of agreement between the victor and the newly in­
stalled king in the conquered kingdom, are sometimes made, which 
suggest that our authorities assimilated those contemporaiy political 
practices which were in accord with the traditional ideals.
The state (rajya) is described by its seven constituents (prakytis 
or ahga), which determine its form and nature. tSomadeva is the only 
notable exception. This author defines the state as the ruler’s 
activity appropriate to protecting the earth having var.pasrama system 
(i.e. social organization) and bestowing natural means of life and 
prosperity. The state is approached as a matter of practical concern 
rather than of philosophical interest. The political entity created
by the integration of the seven constituents is historically real 
as the kingdoms of our £>eriod present a similar picture. But the 
political organization, envisaged by the seven constituents of the 
state, does not embrace all facts of the contemporary political 
order, as it omits any clear reference to the samanta system. In 
this respect, our authorities failed to alter the traditional theory 
of the state and confined themselves to interpreting and advocating 
conventional ideas.
Sovereignty is conceived of as the supreme power to command and 
shows the independence of the sovereign (svamiri) to award punishment 
and reward. The sovereign is defined as an independent ruler without 
any precise limitations on the exercise of his autocratic power in 
internal and external affairs. However, the problem of the actual 
exercise of sovereign power is acknowledged by Somesvara whose
/ V
distinction of three types of government Crajyaj, viz., firstly, 
that In which the ministerb . exercise the sovereign's power and relegate 
the king Into the background; secondly,that in which the king and 
ministers are mutually dependent for the exercise of sovereign power; 
and thirdly, that in which the king himself exercises his sovereign 
power and has his ministers under control, seem to be based on the 
historical experience of the working of the government. Even in 
these types of government there is no indication of any precise limita­
tion on the autocracy of the ruler; on the contrary, Somesvara him­
self regards the third type of the government as best. It seems 
that these t3?-pes of government only indicate practical handicaps
occasioned by the inability of the ruler to exercise his autocratic 
powers owing to his weakness or absorption in amusements on the one 
hand and the tendency of the ministers to usurp the royal authority 
on the other.
Sovereignty is, however, a relative concept in inter-state re­
lations. Kings are graded as superior, equal, and inferior, according 
to their relative power, and they are to be treated accordingly in 
peace and war. Rulers are further classified as samraj; (emperor), 
akara (semi-independent) and Sahara (tributary) according to their 
political relations based on tribute and also to their independence 
in regard to the exercise of coercive authority (da&da) within 
their kingdom. The akara has special relationship with the emperor in 
his external sphere and the sakara is a feudatory. A fourth type 
of king is one who is under the protection of another powerful king. 
His kingdom may be vaguely called a ’protectorate’. His status is, 
however, that of a dependent king. Thus inter-state relations are 
graded on the basis of power, independence, and political allegiance.
The theory of Inter-state relations in ancient India was developed 
as a corollary of the concept of state. It ms based on the assumption 
that conflict of power between neighbouring states was natural, and 
that a struggle for political supremacy was inevitable, owing to 
the twofold asxoect of state activity, viz. protection of one’s own 
territory and the acquisition of wealth and territory belonging to 
others. The ideals of sarvabhauma or oakravartin ’(the lord of the 
whole world i.e. the Indian iUb-continent) accentuated the ambition
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for paramountcy and encouraged the policy of the aggrandizement of 
power. The three concepts of the theory of inter-state relations, 
viz., the ma&dala (circle of states), gaflgupya (sixfold policy) and 
upayas (means or political expedients) were formulated to offer guidance 
on the conduct of the external relations of a state, with a view to 
promoting the aggrandizement of power in prosperity and to maintaining a, 
balance of power in inter-state sphere during vicissitudes.
It seems that the concept of mandala underwent development in 
three stages by the time it assumed its standard form in the Arthasastra, 
which explained the geo-political and power-political basis of the 
hypothetical pattern of inter-state relations among a group of states, 
situated at varying distances from the vijigigu (the king intending 
conquest), who was fundamental to it. The various types of ma&flala 
indicated the extremely theoretical nature of the geo-political structure 
envisaged by our authorities, who never described the historical ar­
rangement of kingdoms at any given period in Indian history. The 
concept of maftflala was valid for deliberative purposes as it out­
lined the sphere of action of the vi.jigigu; disclosed that conflict 
of power and tie struggle for hegemony were norms cf inter-state 
politics, and emphasized that enmity, friendship and neutrality, in 
relation to the vi.jigigu* s policy of conquest, were determined by 
the relative degree of power, motives of interest and specific causes 
(karapa), and not on the mere geo-political contiguit5r or remoteness, 
thus showing that the ma&flala system is flexible and essential power- 
political in nature. The fundamental political entity of the mBp^ala
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'bhe vljigigu, is a power-political entity, and other kings, designated 
as enemy, ally, middle and neutral, obtain their positions according 
to their power, policy, and geo-political continguity in relation to 
him. This was also implied by talcing into account the political and not 
the territorial boundaries in the delineation of the system.
The mapdala approach to inter-state relations suggested a system of a 
balance of power which initially'emerged from the presence of the potential 
belligerents, viz., the vl;j Igigu and his enemy, having prospective 
allies and enemies in alternative zones, both in front and in the rear, 
but it was only secured by the introduction of the middle and neutral 
kings, who could be approached by either of the belligerents in cata­
strophe in order to preserve the status quo. However, the mapdala system 
was j^ostulated -go enable the vitjigigu to establish his hegemony, by 
overcoming his enemies through a policy of conquest in prosperity and 
to protect his potential claim ot overlordship, by preserving the 
balance of pox^ er during vicissitudes. The enemy cf the vijigigu and his 
allies could utilize the knowledge of this mapdala pattern of relation­
ship to maintain the status quo and undermine those aspects of -[he 
mapdala system which contributed to the vlj igigu *s strength. The 
implications of this pattern of political relations largely determined 
the pursuit of the sixfold policy and they were noticeable more in war 
than in peace. The restraints of the mapdala system influenced the nature 
of conquest by discouraging the annexation of the kingdom of a sub­
missive king and the persecution of a broken enemy, for fear of provoking 
other kings, thus providing political considerations for adhering to the
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heroic ideals of conquest. However, the inter-state complexities 
of an aggressive venture in a circle of kings, without the middle 
and neutral, were minimal and even territorial annexations were feasible. 
It must, however, be added that the role of the middle and neutral 
kings was relative to the circumstances of the belligerents: their
intervention ms conditional on their being approached by either of 
the belligerents facing destruction.
Many of the theoretical possibilities of inter-state politics raised 
by the ma&flala system did in fact occur in the struggle for empire? 
but it must be maintained that the system was no more than an excellent 
working hypothesis to discern a pattern of inter-state relations from 
the standpoint of an ambitious king, In order to provide a basis for 
the pursuit of the sixfold policy and the conduct of diplomacy. The 
concept of map.fl.ala did not embody any historical system of states, but 
its principles of geo-politics and power politics influenced the inter- 
dynastic relations of our period. While It envisaged a system of potential 
alliances and counter alliances as well as the possibility of the inter­
vention of another king indifferent tomr in order to preserve the 
political status quo, it failed to visualize any inter-state organization 
to preserve peace among states.
The concept of gatomva (sixfold policy) comprised measures of 
foreign policy which outlined the politico-military strategy of inter­
state conflicts in accordance with the relative factors of power, 
place and time. The objectives of the ^feu^ya were the promotion 
of internal economic and military undertakings and the acquisition of
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the wealth and territory belonging to enemies. Saflgu&ya confined itself 
to the politico-military aspects of inter-state relations and dealt 
with economic, religious, and cultural issues only by implication.
This indeed constitutes a very serious limitation of the concept of 
foreign policy.
The concept was, however, valuable, as it helped to develop certain 
norms of political behaviour in hostile relations. The policy of 
sandhi, while falling short of a policy of peace, was indeed an instru­
ment of peaceful relations. Its application to secure an alliance 
for war, as well as to terminate war was frequent. The rules of con­
cluding an agreement or treaty were laid down with care. The treaties 
depended for their binding character on oath and surety, but they really 
survived In the conditions of political necessity and weakness of 
power. The policy of vigraha (hostility a?war) was associated with the 
heroic and politic concept of war. It led to the formulation of prin­
ciples and rules relating to the outbreak of hostilities, declaration 
ofwar, ethics of war, devastation of the enemy country, occupation and 
settlement of the conquered kingdom. Because of the variety of views 
on many of these issues, it was possible to conform to one or the other 
In practice according to the exigencies of circumstances. However, 
rules relating to the conduct of hostilities tended to humanize war 
and to limit its agonies. Yana (marching or expedition) was the 
policy of agression. It was treated both as a military and as a 
political problem and was recommended in conditions of excessive 
superiority of power, particularly military, over the adversary for
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the sake of a further rise in prosperity. Asana was interpreted as 
a policy of watchful waiting, involving the cessation of hostilities, 
and it was viewed as a politico-military tactic against the enemy in 
many situations. It did not mean neutrality, although some kinds 
of asana denoted that it could he a policy of self-abiding towards 
and non-aggression against enemies. Dvaidhibhava was explained to 
denote the dual policy comprising measures of sandhi and vigraha 
pursued against two enemies; as bifurcation of troops on the eve 
of war, and, finally, as duplicity, which involved double dealing 
with two mutually hostile neighbours on the opposite sides of a king, 
by professing alliance for war with each against the other alternatively. 
It was the typical policy of a buffer king, and in the sense of the 
dual policy, it could help an aggrieved king to deal with two invaders 
on the opposite sides cf his kingdom by making peace with one and waging 
war with another. Sajgisraya was the policy of seeking shelter in 
the hour of destruction. However, a recourse to it in normal times, 
for fear of the harassment by the enemies, led to the formation of 
a protective alliance with another powerful ruler on the basis of 
accepting the status and obligations of a protectorate. Seeking poli­
tical refuge and forming protective alliances 011 the basis of willing 
subordination were admitted facts of Inter-state relations. Every 
ruler had the obligation of granting refuge to a suppliant in distress, 
although his obligations towards the refugee were determined by the 
political considerations.
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'dhile the possibilities of co-operation with enemies on the basis 
of common interest and fears were emphasized and tie need for a confederate 
course of action in certain situations, especially those created by a 
threat from outside, was acknowledged, the alliances and confederacies 
were always treated as a matter of politico-military expediency and 
none of the six policies were directed to create a concert of kings 
on a normal footing to review the political developments and preserve 
peace* The lasis of stable cooperation between enemies was the sub­
ordination of the weaker one to the stronger, which offended pride aid 
perpetuated political rivalry. The application cf the sixfold policy 
waslased on political expediency and none of the six policies were 
actuated by moral ideals, although moral scruples influenced the 
biding character of sandhi and the ethic of war.
The concept of upayas (means or political expedients) embodied 
means of diplomacy and war. In devising the means to overcome opposition 
in inter-state relations, our authors took into account the factors of 
human psychology and physical force. The recognition of maya (illusion), 
upekga (indifference), and indrajala (incantation or magic) was signifi­
cant. Upekga really completed the concept of upayas by being an ex­
pedient of calculated inaction, as opposed to the traditional means 
of action, viz. sama (conciliation), dana (gifts or bribery), bheda 
(sowing dissension) and da&da (force). Maya and indrajala, as means 
of inflicting secret punishment and of terrorizing the enemy, Indicated 
the exploitation of religious objects and superstitious beliefs, and 
signified the role of treachery and underhand types of warfare in inter-
state relations.
All the seven upayas were to he separately or collectively em­
ployed to attain success in foreign relations with the least effort 
and smallest risk. The scope of the upayas was wider than that of 
the sixfold policy as they were also the means to deal with allies 
and neutrals in the inter-state sphere. This demonstrated important 
aspects of foreign policy not covered by the sixfold policy and showed 
that in these spheres the upayas comprised means of fostering inter­
state understanding and co-operation in order to promote one!s own 
interests. Hoifever, the upayas were particularly associated with 
the execution of the sixfold policy. In tackling problems of peace 
and war, diplomacy consisting in the appropriate use of the upayas 
sought to achieve objectives of policy without engaging in battle, 
which, however, is not the same as avoiding war. For, upayas were the 
means to cause war, to prosecute war, and to consolidate the gains 
of victory, as well as the means to avoid war, to minimize the losses 
of defeat, and later to extricate oneself from the conditions of 
vassalage. The means and methods of avoiding war or precipitating it 
were the same, and in the application of upayas rivals, more often 
than not, combined the strategy of war with that of peace. However, 
while conducting hostilities by means other than open force, an attempt 
was made to bargain with the adversary and to give him sufficient warn­
ings about the ultimate consequences, thereby justifying a recourse to 
violence should he refuse to yield. So that, whenvar broke out, it 
appeared only as an extension of diplomacy through other means.
The merit of the concept of upayas consisted in Its recommendation 
of means other than force to achieve political objectives, and in its 
contribution towards the establishment cf a norm, of political behaviour 
between rivals. The Inherent prudence and effectiveness of these 
upayas recommended themselves to kings and statesmen, who dealt with 
the problems of statecraft by their application. It may be pointed 
out, that the application of upayas ‘was based on the principle of ex­
pediency, and the political morality, if any, emerged from the reluctance 
to go to war excej)t as a last resort.
Viewed as a whole the theory of inter-state relations was a signi­
ficant achievement of the ancient Indian thinkers. The pattern and 
problems of inter-state relations were approached from a purely secular 
standpoint. Political realism is evident in the principles of geo­
politics and power politics, in its delineation of the politico-military 
strategy of the situations in inter-state conflict, and the devising 
of means of diplomacy and war. However, the conflictlof interests, which 
is viewed, as conflict for power and political supremacy, is the dominant 
theme of the theory, as well as of the dynastic history of northern 
India during our period. This shows that the political education of the 
kings and their counsellors, based as it was 011 the traditional political 
ideas, must have influenced their activities.
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